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Volume XII Winter 1969 Number 4

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

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

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Reflections on the Quarter

The Nixon Administration and Foreign Policy

SINCE misgivings about the foreign policy of the Johnson Administration appear to have been the decisive factor in the election of the new administration, the Nixon approach to the conduct of foreign affairs is being observed with special interest. Whatever the desire among Americans for a measure of overseas disengagement, the United States remains committed to global policies and is likely to confront major challenges in its foreign relations in the years ahead. The Nixon Administration has taken office at a time when immediate decisions must be made regarding the Middle East and Viet Nam. Problems associated with both the short- and long-range future of U.S.-Soviet relations and the Atlantic Alliance are before it. There is urgent need to reassess the adequacy of defense policy, giving particular attention to the so-called security gap, strategic doctrine, the future of weapons development programs, arms control and disarmament, and the U.S. space effort beyond the Apollo project to land a man on the moon. Action to resolve at least some of these pressing problems must be taken lest the new administration be engulfed by the disaffection which contributed to the downfall of its predecessor.

It is difficult to foretell accurately the course any new administration will chart. Pre-election statements are no certain guide to post-election policies. Even personnel choices furnish only limited insights into likely courses of action. Although President Johnson had held office for almost a year before his election in 1964, few commentators were able to predict the policies which, in fact, he followed after the election, especially in Viet Nam. In the case of the Nixon Administration, the appointees to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet-level positions differ widely in both background and outlook. The administration took office without having greatly restricted its freedom of maneuver by campaign statements on foreign affairs. Nevertheless, it is possible from an examination of statements made both during and after the Presidential campaign to discern likely policy choices.

Dissatisfaction with the national security machinery of the Johnson Administration led Nixon to propose changes even before his inauguration. Presidential directives have enhanced the stature of the National Security Council for the conduct of long-range planning. Unlike Johnson, whose highly personalized style stamped the making of U.S. foreign policy, Nixon appears to favor a return to the more formalized staff procedures of the Eisenhower Administration. He

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delegated to Cabinet members the major voice in the selection of their immediate subordinates. Certainly the administration will strive to assure coordination among the various departments and agencies charged with national security and foreign policy. Yet the test of the adequacy of machinery, as well as Presidential appointees, will come not only in day-to-day operations but in those crisis situations from which no administration for the past thirty years has been exempt.

Scarcely any of the major issues to be resolved are separable from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Although Nixon's choice of William Rogers as Secretary of State and his inaugural address indicate that we can look forward to a period of negotiation with the Soviet Union, an effort will undoubtedly be made to narrow the "security gap" he discussed in the campaign. The appointment to the Defense helm of Congressman Melvin Laird, a long-time proponent of a strong U.S. military posture, suggests that the United States will attempt to strengthen its strategic position vis-à-vis the USSR. Instead of accepting parity in strategic weapons systems, Washington may be expected at least to seek an edge over the Soviets in overall military strength. Such a posture, it was pointed out during the campaign, would enable the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union from strength.

Although the future of the U.S. space program is uncertain, there are indications that greater emphasis will be placed upon advanced military R & D than was the case during the Johnson Administration. In fact, if the Nixon Administration opts for a strengthening of the U.S. strategic position for the early 1970's, it follows that more emphasis on research and development will be required. Given Republican criticism of the past administration, the allocation of larger resources to military R & D is not unlikely.

Republican statements have been critical of the doctrine of "flexible response." According to the Report of the Republican Coordinating Committee on national security: "Our policies must not publicly proclaim that America will withhold any element of her right to prevent or repel aggression; otherwise they strip this nation of those military and diplomatic options indispensable to the attainment of her national goals, the success of her foreign policies, and her influence for peace." If this report is indicative, the Nixon Administration may seek to elaborate a strategic doctrine which retains as many options as possible, while not foreclosing the prospect that nuclear weapons would be used at an early stage, if not initially, in a critical conflict. In all likelihood, the objective will be to deter war both by the quality of the U.S. strategic doctrine and the maintenance of a strategic posture based on "sufficiency."

Closely related is the question of U.S. policy toward disarmament and arms control. In a campaign speech, Nixon expressed hope that "through patient dialogue we and our opponents can one day arrive at meaningful and trustworthy

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ways to limit arms and other paraphernalia of war and ultimately dispose of them entirely." But he emphasized the feasibility of specific arms control measures rather than of sweeping disarmament efforts. Thus, the United States may be expected to favor certain unilateral arms control measures that are "in our own interest, even though they benefit our adversaries" as well as measures requiring reciprocal action, including the exchange of information to assure material compliance. Although Nixon did not emphasize the need for discussions leading to limitations on levels of strategic weaponry, the new administration, shortly after taking office, announced that such negotiations would be initiated. It also recommended ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Johnson Administration was the object of criticism for its excessive preoccupation with the problems of Asia, to the relative neglect of the Atlantic Alliance. The Report of the Republican Coordinating Committee called upon the next administration to "reassign a high priority to the Atlantic Alliance," stating that "We have lost many opportunities to take constructive actions in Europe —an area of vital importance to the U.S., politically and economically, as well as militarily." On several occasions Nixon himself spoke of NATO as crucial to U.S. security. In one speech he declared: "Our relations with Western Europe, so critical to our own progress and security, have been needlessly and dangerously impaired. They must be restored and NATO revitalized and strengthened."

The Nixon Administration may thus be expected to undertake a major study of U.S.-European relationships in order to present proposals for the revitalization of NATO. The flexible response strategy, as applied to NATO, is likely to be reviewed, and an effort made to provide more effective machinery for consultation and European participation within the alliance. Attention will be given to reducing frictions with France, and, conceivably, even to evolving an alliance framework within which French and other European interests may be more readily accommodated. The advent of the new administration, together with the galvanizing effect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, gives impetus to that constructive change for which the Troubled Alliance so plainly calls.

In general, Washington may now press for greater participation with like-minded nations in regional defense in order to reduce the burden on the United States. According to the 1968 Republican platform: "Our best hope for enduring peace lies in comprehensive cooperation. We will consult with nations that share our purposes. We will press for their greater participation in man's common concerns and encourage regional approaches to defense, economic development and peaceful adjustments of disputes." Statements such as this bespeak a U.S. concern about ways to lessen our unilateral assumption of the burdens

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of defense and aid around the world.

The Arab-Israeli confrontation perhaps presents the Nixon Administration with its most danger-laden problem. During the campaign, Nixon stressed the importance of the U.S. commitment to Israel as an ally against further Soviet penetration of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet the President-elect's special envoy, former Governor William Scranton, in a widely quoted statement, called for an "evenhanded policy" in the Middle East. Conceivably, an effort will now be made to restore relations with Arab states, broken during the June 1967 war, in order to diminish Soviet influence. The new administration has already taken a major diplomatic initiative to bring Israel and the Arab states together for negotiations.

There will undoubtedly be a period of protracted negotiation on Viet Nam. During the campaign, Nixon did not respond to challenges to present a detailed alternative to the Johnson policy, and thus preserved considerable freedom of action, but as President he faces great pressure to achieve a settlement that will extricate the United States from its present level of involvement without jeopardizing the noncommunist forces in South Viet Nam. Essentially, the new administration has three options: (1) to escalate the conflict or to threaten to do so in order to increase U.S. leverage upon Hanoi and the Viet Cong; (2) to make whatever concessions are needed to achieve a political settlement in the expectation that the Saigon government would be able to maintain a viable position when all or a major portion of the U.S. forces were removed; (3) to continue the conflict, as Henry Kissinger suggested in the January 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, while adopting a strategy which "reduces casualties and concentrates on protecting the population," strengthens the South Vietnamese Army and broadens the base of Saigon's political support, thus making possible the gradual withdrawal of American forces.

Conceivably, the administration, which reportedly is engaged in exploring the options available to the United States, will adopt a policy that combines elements of the major alternatives set forth above: for example, the threat of major escalation combined with the pursuit of a political settlement. But the urgency of achieving an end to the Viet Nam war or a scaled-down U.S. military effort will be apparent. Without such an action, the Nixon Administration will be hard-put to find the massive funds needed to support other areas of national security and to combat the deepening financial crisis facing American cities. Undoubtedly, a principal criterion of its success will be its ability to end the Viet Nam war. Given the expressed determination of the Viet Cong and Hanoi to achieve unification of Viet Nam under their exclusive control, its task is formidable.

Although there have been few indications of a shift in U.S. policy toward mainland China, Soviet leaders appear to have be-

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come wary of a possible rapprochement, or, at least, improvement in relations, between Washington and Peking. The triumph of technocratic, modernizing forces in the post-Mao period could lead to a Chinese effort to obtain access to the West's advanced technologies. A diminution in hostility between the United States and a modernizing China would pose security problems for the Soviet Union, and contribute to the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict. But changes from prevailing U.S. relations with Peking depend as much upon internal developments in China as they do upon policy shifts in the Nixon Administration.

Other major problems face the new administration: the restructuring of the international monetary system; Soviet policy in Eastern Europe; the relationship between the United States and its Western Hemisphere neighbors; the place of foreign aid in U.S. diplomacy; and, last but not least, the designing of a framework linking means and goals to achieve a global system compatible with U.S. and other Western values in the remaining years of this century.

NATO, European Aerospace Programs, and the Technological Gap

ON November 28, 1968 the West German Bundestag Finance Committee approved the purchase of eighty-eight Phantom jets from the United States at a cost of $513 million. In addition, orders were placed for fifty Lockheed F-104 Starfighters ($138 million) and a supply of Sikorsky medium transport helicopters ($380 million). The agreement provided that German firms would be given subcontracts covering about $125 million of the Phantom purchase and about half of the helicopter order.

The announcement of the contract met with less than unrestrained enthusiasm in Germany's aeronautics circles, where dissatisfaction with the technological dominance of the United States has been rising. Earlier in the 1960's, European concern about technological advance focused on atomic power, electronics, computers and aerospace developments. Although the United States dominated the European market for atomic weapons and U.S. corporations became preeminent in electronics and computers, a considerable aeronautics industry survived in Britain, France and the Federal Republic. The British, for instance, prided themselves on the most complete and competitive aeronautics industry outside the United States. The Rolls-Royce engine and the variable geometry division of the British Aircraft Corporation won awards for contributions to aeronautical advance. The French Dassault (Mirage) Company had both military and commercial triumphs to its credit. The German companies, rich in history, were merging into larger, more competitive units. In each country, the aeronautics industry comprised a major economic sector.

The problem for these industries lay mainly in the limited national markets of Western Europe. Be-

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cause of increasing air travel and technical advances, the national markets were simply too small to justify the enormous combinations of capital and skills required for them to remain competitive. They needed a European-wide market. The Anglo-French Concorde, the proposed supersonic passenger plane, represented one way to surmount this difficulty. But European collaboration, confined to the production of commercial aircraft, appears inadequate to solve the problem of economies of scale which handicap European aircraft industries. In the absence of joint production of military aircraft, they may not survive the competition with the United States.

By late 1967, the crisis facing the European aircraft industry had become acute. The British government, after abandoning the development of Britain's supersonic aircraft, the TSR-2, in favor of the American F-111A, canceled the U.S. order as well in the financial emergency which accompanied the devaluation of the pound in November 1967. As a result, when the Concorde and the Jaguar (a jet trainer to be built with France) are completed, the British will have no major aircraft contracts. Similarly, the German order books for aircraft stand empty after 1971. Thus, the coincidence of German military and industrial need, British military and industrial need, and the European mood for urgency of action to narrow the so-called technological gap have strengthened support for collaborative projects.

In December 1967, Belgium, Britain, Canada, the Federal Republic, Italy and the Netherlands signed a protocol for the development of a European fighter aircraft to be built for NATO. Ambitious plans called for the Advanced European Fighter Consortium to construct over 1,000 warplanes which could supply NATO with its basic conventional military aircraft during the next fifteen years. At the spring 1968 NATO meeting, the West German government was given a new reconnaissance mission over the North Sea. The United States, through Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry Kuss, offered to sell eighty-eight Phantom jets to the Germans for this mission. Because of European discussions on the consortium and objections of German aircraft firms, however, an agreement for the purchase of U.S. aircraft by the Bonn government was not concluded at that time.

In the summer of 1968 discussions among Europeans regarding the consortium reached an impasse. The Germans sought the principal role in aircraft design. This the British refused to concede, since they believed aircraft and engine design should be theirs on grounds of technical competence and economic efficiency. The disagreement appears to have reached its peak when German representatives at Britain's annual Farnborough National Air Show passed out literature explaining why Germany, rather than Britain, should design the aircraft. At this point, the French government entered the affair. In discussions with Bonn, President de Gaulle offered

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to provide the latest model Mirage for immediate reconnaissance purposes. Conceivably, the Mirage aircraft withheld by France from Israel would be made available for the German assignment. Thereafter, France would collaborate with other European countries to develop and produce an advanced version which would become the "warplane of the future" for Europe. The French did not insist upon design leadership.

In early October Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford arrived in Bonn for discussions with German officials about Bonn's contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in the Federal Republic. His visit coincided with the early stages of NATO's extensive investigation into the adequacy of its force levels in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Speaking for a government pressed financially by the Viet Nam war, Clifford requested that Germany increase to $600 million annually her payments under the Offset Agreement to reimburse the United States for troop costs in Germany. The German press hinted at the threat of a partial American withdrawal if the Germans should not agree to assume greater offset costs. Following up Clifford's visit, Kuss proposed that Germany double her purchase of Phantom jets in order to help offset U.S. costs in West Germany. The U.S. offer to permit German companies to bid on about $125 million of the contract did little to satisfy the German aeronautics industry. As one spokesman suggested, "it is hard to believe that we can bid competitively on Phantom components."

The proposed European consortium met with other problems. First, the Canadian government pulled out, pleading that Prime Minister Trudeau's policy review of NATO made long-range commitments of this type inopportune. The number of aircraft to be produced by the consortium was thus reduced by 250 planes. Second, a spy scandal in the Federal Republic, involving the theft of advanced missile and aeronautical equipment, cast a pall on the initial German insistence that Phantom subcontracts should include the production of advanced avionic components. Defecting Czechoslovakian agents were credited with having revealed information on this espionage operation to Western authorities.

As if to emphasize Western Europe's aerospace difficulties, an ELDO (European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization) meeting held during the week of November 14 ended with a call for a "single space agency in Europe," ELDO's previous record generally being regarded as unsatisfactory. The announcement of the German decision to purchase Starfighters and helicopters as well as Phantom jets was followed by ELDO's failure on November 30 to launch a satellite, an incident that symbolized the difficulties besetting collaborative European efforts. Composed of an Italian satellite, a British first stage, a French second stage and a German third stage, the ELDO missile failed when the German stage

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burned too briefly. As for the satellite, an ELDO representative commented: "We don't know where it is."

Events of recent months reveal that European collaboration in aerospace technology must fail if it is based more on an effort to exclude the United States from the European market than on a European willingness to subordinate considerations of national prestige in building a European technological community. Modern technology is so expensive and complicated that a satisfactory division of labor among European producers is a prerequisite for effective technological collaboration. Such a division of labor calls for difficult political decisions, for in Germany, Britain and France the fortunes of major industries and technologies are at stake. Historically, such industries have been related intimately to national economic and political independence. The Common Market resolution early in December to study the feasibility of a Technological Community is indicative of a growing European realization that the problems of technological collaboration cannot be resolved in the absence of a supranational political authority. Only such an authority can ensure that rational division of labor which, for political reasons, the individual national governments are unable to achieve.

Western Europe does not lack the skilled people or organizational genius needed to develop advanced technologies in sectors where it now lags behind the United States. So long as the so-called technological gap continues, European resentment of U.S. dominance in European arms markets will continue. Such resentment can be expected to fuel fears that Western Europe is bound by an alliance whose leading member, the United States, has monopolized advanced technology and—whatever the U.S. justification—contributed on occasion to the weakening of European efforts to collaborate in order to achieve a competitive position. Although Britain and Germany might not have been able to harmonize their differences in the consortium project (even in the absence of U.S. action undercutting the consortium), the recent frustration of the European aeronautics industry points up the potential for increased Atlantic friction arising from the technological gap.

The French Monetary Crisis

THREE times in little more than a year, financial crises have shaken the international monetary system to its foundations. In early November 1967, chronic balance of payments deficits, together with international dissatisfaction with the performance of the British economy, produced a rush to convert pound sterling to gold. In order to prevent the depletion of meager gold and foreign currency reserves, the British government devalued the pound from $2.80 to $2.40, a move which halted, at least temporarily, the speculative selling of sterling. At the same time, and again in March 1968, the U.S. dollar was sub-

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jected to intense pressure, as foreign holders of U.S. currency rushed to convert their dollars. The speculation against the dollar was the result of several factors: fear that the United States might abandon its pledge to maintain the price of gold at $35 per ounce, dissatisfaction with recurrent U.S. payments imbalances resulting from overseas investment by American corporations and expenditures abroad for the Viet Nam war, and inflationary trends within the United States itself.

The March 1968 crisis led to the formation of a two-tier system for gold trading in which the price for the settlement of official accounts remained unchanged, while unofficially the price of gold was permitted to fluctuate freely in private transactions. In addition, the United States took steps, including a temporary tax surcharge, increased interest rates, and cuts in spending, in an effort to stem inflation.

The third of the major crises threatened the French franc. Although the franc, unlike the dollar and pound sterling, is not widely held as an international reserve currency, its weakening and devaluation as a result of speculation against it would undoubtedly have led to further speculative action against the pound and the dollar.

The franc crisis of November 1968 was precipitated by the deterioration of the French economy in the months following the May-June riots. Although France in previous months had had trade deficits, the loss of production during the strikes, the large-scale usage and price increases which followed the strikes, and the consequent increase in the price of French exports and the flow of imports aggravated the financial malaise to the point of crisis. In the period from May to November, France reportedly lost about half of her gold reserves. On just two days, November 14 and 15, as the crisis neared its peak, she lost $400 million from her dwindling gold and foreign exchange reserves. Frenchmen themselves rushed to convert francs into gold or other currencies in the expectation that the franc would soon be devalued.

Essentially two courses of action were put forward in international discussions to resolve the crisis: French devaluation and German revaluation. Meetings of central bank authorities and finance ministers held in Bonn produced a coalition of the United States, Britain and France, whose representatives argued against devaluation of the franc and instead pressed for an upward revaluation of the West German mark. The old World War II coalition—all countries with payments deficits—sought to bring pressure upon the Federal Republic to increase the value of its currency, and thus to bear the principal burden for restoring equilibrium to the international monetary system. Reportedly, the British government hinted that failure of the Germans to revalue their currency might lead to the withdrawal of the British Army of the Rhine. Upward revaluation of the mark, it was anticipated, would have cut the huge export surplus which Germany has achieved in

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recent years, and would have increased imports into the Federal Republic. By reducing the competitive advantage of German exports and the incentive for foreigners to invest in the Federal Republic, the disparity between Germany's economic performance and that of other countries would have been narrowed.

The unwillingness of the Bonn government to yield to the wishes of its major allies on this issue, like the Federal Republic's reluctance to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, is indicative of growing German independence in international affairs. But the German decision stemmed as well from domestic considerations. Revaluation of the mark would have placed an undue economic burden on Germany's farming community since the prices of farm products, which are set by the European Economic Community, would have risen and thus become less competitive than those of her Common Market neighbors. In the short time that remains before the fall 1969 parliamentary elections to be held in the Federal Republic, the German government was not prepared to bear the burden of a currency revaluation.

At the time of the meeting of finance ministers and central bank heads in Bonn between November 20 and 22 there were widespread reports that France would receive a $2 billion central bank credit from the IMF and that the devaluation of the franc was imminent. In the hours before President de Gaulle's momentous speech of November 24, there was consensus in the press both in Western Europe and the United States that he would announce a devaluation, even though several days earlier the French President had rejected this solution. Instead, de Gaulle announced cuts in the French budget for defense and domestic public services, in order to reduce the anticipated 1969 budgetary deficit from $2.3 billion to $1.3 billion; the more rigorous administration of French tax legislation and foreign exchange controls, and action as might be needed to prevent a recurrence of the disorders of May-June 1968, to which he attributed France's present economic ills. In addition, the French government announced the imposition of tax adjustments that increase protection for French industry, and appealed for restraint on price and wage increases. Tests of a French hydrogen bomb, scheduled for 1969, were canceled, and funds for the Concorde, the Anglo-French supersonic airliner, were cut.

The immediate effect of de Gaulle's action was to stem the speculative tide against the franc and thus to avert for the time being a deepening of the international monetary crisis. On international markets, the rush to convert francs into West German marks was slowed, and the pound sterling advanced.

But the prospects for the French economy remain uncertain. Unless increases in productivity are registered, inflationary pressures can be expected to push export prices upward and to increase the demand for imports. Moreover, it

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is by no means certain that France will not be subjected to further pressure for large-scale wage increases similar to those which followed the unrest of May-June 1968. In December, student militancy, not unlike that of the spring, triggered revolts in several French universities. At the same time, France's most powerful union, the communist-led Confederation General de Travail (CGT) denounced the government's economic measures as a "heavy threat to the living conditions of wage earners." According to the union, the government's economic program would wipe out the gains registered by labor after the May-June strikes. Therefore, the CGT announced that it would press for new wage increases.

Given the persistent economic problems in leading Western countries, the international monetary system may face more challenges in the months ahead. In fact, so long as the system is so organized that its stability depends largely on the maintenance of payments equilibrium in leading Western countries, it may be subjected to periodic crises. The rules of the International Monetary Fund, which provide for fixed exchange rates, have imposed a considerable burden especially on the holders of reserve currencies, namely the United States and Britain, both of which have found it necessary to sell large amounts of gold and foreign exchange to preserve the value of their currencies in world money markets.

Although there is widespread opposition to a return to the floating exchange rates of the 1930's, there has been support for the following measures: retention of the system of fixed exchange rates with periodic realignment of currency parities, and establishment of limited ranges within which currencies could fluctuate.

Events of the past quarter have provided new evidence of the need for changes designed to reduce the direct "linkage" between the international monetary system and the payments position of leading countries. Proposals such as those outlined, as well as the creation of additional forms of international liquidity beyond national reserve currencies, would serve to reduce this "linkage" and thus to strengthen the international system.

Last but not least, events of the last quarter point up the growing economic and political strength of the German Federal Republic. Although the Germans were not prepared to revalue the mark, they agreed to place a 4 per cent tax on exports and to reduce taxes on imports by 4 per cent in an effort to trim the German trade surplus. Undoubtedly, Germany will play a major role in future discussions about the international monetary system. But her position as a potential West European leader, especially in the post-Gaullist period, will be enhanced as well.

Cuba: Consolidation of the Revolution

IN Cuba, on January 1, 1969, the Year of the Decisive Effort succeeded the Year of the Heroic Guerrilla. The change is indicative

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of the shifting focus of the Cuban Revolution as it celebrates its tenth anniversary. Survival of the Revolution against attack from abroad now seems assured, but thus far the attempt to spread violent revolution and crush counterrevolutionary forces through "many Viet Nams" in Latin America has failed. The immediate goal of the Revolution appears consequently to be turning from incitement of revolution to a new variant of "socialism in one country."

The death of Che Guevara in October 1967 in the Amazon highlands of Bolivia, like the Bolshevik failure in Poland in 1919-1920, may have marked the turning point after which domestic consolidation of the Revolution takes precedence over the drive to create a fraternity of revolutionary states. Cuban foreign ventures which followed upon the heady success of the April 1961 victory at the Bay of Pigs have steadily diminished Castro's stature in Latin America. The events of October 1962 showed him not to be master of his own house; those taking up arms against other governments throughout the continent have found their lives to be "nastie, brutish and short." In the Latin American political arena virulent denunciation of the moderates has cost the Left heavily, as indicated by the recent electoral victory of the relatively conservative Christian Democrats in Venezuela.

Guerrilla movements, where they still exist, are not flourishing. The Bolivian venture, which Guevara headed, is spent, if not ended. Venezuela has less than 400 insurgents in the field, utilizing the tactic of constant movement out of necessity as much as ideology. The Colombian army, wise in the ways of *la violencia,* is the most practiced in rural counterinsurgency operations in Latin America and appears able to keep present isolated pockets of discontent from spreading. In Guatemala, the guerrillas of the Armed Forces of the Revolution (FAR) are jointly supported by the Communist Party and extreme Castroite groups. They are still active, but a counterinsurgent campaign by the army has denied them the rural areas. Thus they are concentrating on urban terrorism while continuing the attempt to establish new rural fronts. A rightist wave of "personal justice" has swept the country, motivated in part by the view that the leftist terrorism of the early 1960's went unpunished by the lenient judicial system.

In order to gain power, rural guerrilla forces need leadership, discontented masses to appeal to, and, as their opponent, a weak but repressive government with a demoralized army. Since this set of requirements seems unlikely to be met in the Caribbean or Latin American states in the near future, Castro's policy of exporting revolution has little hope of success. Yet the promotion of stray heroics in his name, even though it may not lead to victory for the insurgents, serves to keep Castroism alive in Latin America, and as long as he can recruit suitable martyrs he will probably devote some resources to it.

Moscow's attitude may necessi-

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tate a lessening of emphasis on insurgency operations. Although the Soviet Union openly supports Castro with massive economic and military assistance, it has evinced little sympathy for his revolutionary objectives and appears to be interested in "normalizing" relations with Latin American governments. This will be difficult to do while Castro's forces are trying to overthrow them, and Moscow may demand a change of strategy. Finally, for Latin intellectuals, the romance of guerrilla life may be fading.

The armed struggle may continue, but on a reduced scale of violence. Urban agitation may continue to furnish university students and workers the opportunity to demonstrate their convictions. Because urban growth rates are twice the growth rates of national populations, the *ranchos* of Caracas or the slums of Santo Domingo are more fruitful ground for social disruption than the Colombian Andes. Those who have come to the city have taken the first step toward raising their aspirations, and the skillful manipulation of these desires may ensure that the next Latin American revolution emerges from the "ghetto of urban politics."

Latin American governments, learning from the Cuban example, have resolved not to repeat Batista's mistakes. By virtue of increased political and military sophistication, the central authorities have rendered the countryside an unattractive environment for large-scale anti-system political activity. Yet the technological means and politico-military undertakings, such as civic action, which have been successful in monitoring incipient insurgency and building support for the government in the countryside have little relevance to anti-system activity in the cities. In the interstices of urban life there are significant opportunities for disruption and paralysis of the great population centers. Provocations, if inappropriately met, could convert the urban masses' latent dissatisfaction into active hostility. The distance from present-day Caracas, where the majority of the working class vote anti-*Accion Democratica,* to another *Bogotazo* may have diminished because of the ineffectiveness of the rural guerrilla strategy and the consequent search for new societal vulnerabilities.

In addition to failures abroad, economic and morale problems have beset the Castro regime, for achievements have not kept pace with expectations. The 1968 sugar harvest was poor. Export earnings have fallen and domestic consumption has been depressed to increase resources for investment in the economy. Current investment is approximating 30 per cent of GNP. Castro has attempted to solve economic problems by increasing import controls, rationing gasoline and sugar, and expropriating all remaining private business enterprises except in agriculture. In addition, with the assistance of a team of British agricultural experts, Cuba has developed a process for the production of cattle feed derived from sugar cane. In anticipation of increased meat exports, the government is investing

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heavily in the agricultural sector in order to expand livestock production. The initial effect of this program will be to reduce drastically the consumption of meat in Cuba, but if it is successful in the long run it will not only lessen the country's export dependence on sugar, but also establish markets for Cuba in Western Europe.

The Cuban government has sought to counter the decrease of revolutionary *élan* resulting from foreign policy failures and economic deprivation by embarking on a new round of activism linked to domestic affairs. In his last 26th of July speech, Castro adopted Guevara's policy of replacing material incentives with moral incentives in order to provide an ideological justification for the economic demands. The suppression of diversions such as the state lottery, cock fighting and the state-owned bars was based as much upon social revolutionary motives as it was upon economic considerations. In an effort to restore ideological fervor to the Revolution, Castro purged from the party a "microfaction" of thirty-five old-line communists who allegedly had criticized Cuban policies and had become too close to other governments, including the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. His emphasis on uniquely Cuban policy interests in recent months is illustrated by Cuba's refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and by her absence from the Budapest Preparatory Conference of Communist Parties.

If such events are indicative, Cuba will be increasingly preoccupied with internal affairs and less likely to expend resources abroad in pursuit of revolutionary goals. An inward preoccupation might enable the Castro regime to effect a marked improvement in the quality of Cuban life and thus make Cuba the "showcase" for Latin American communism. Although, thus far, the Cuban leadership has explicitly rejected this course of action in favor of insurgency operations abroad, both the Soviet Union and Cuba might find their interests served by it.

In recent months, the Havana-based Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) has been politically dormant, and Castro's speeches have concentrated on internal affairs. If Cuba should adopt a more inward-looking policy, proposals for her re-integration into the Organization of American States, such as those recently propounded by the Archbishop of Recife, Dom Helder Camara, could mark the beginning of a widespread effort to reintroduce her into the hemispheric system. The costs and benefits accruing to the parties involved should be carefully weighed by American policymakers in any reassessment of U.S. policy in the Caribbean area.

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PREEMINENCE IN SPACE: STILL A CRITICAL NATIONAL ISSUE

by Mose L. Harvey

ONE of the first major decisions President Nixon will have to make is whether this country is to recommit itself to preeminence in space or is to accept for at least the 1970's, and perhaps for the indefinite future, a second-rate position in this new medium of man's activity. Nixon may take this decision by default. He may simply go along with the trend of the past three years, which looks toward success in the manned lunar landing and little beyond. But whether he seeks thus to bypass the issue or takes a positive position of his own, he cannot escape main responsibility for determining the relative role of the United States in space during the critical decades ahead, and this within the first several months of his administration.

The issue Nixon must decide is not the simple one of whether the United States is to press forward with a major space effort after completion of the Apollo moon landing project. Neither is it whether some dramatic postlunar goal is to be set, or new and imaginative missions undertaken to advance scientific knowledge or increase military capabilities, nor even whether we are to make an all-out effort to commit our space capabilities to the betterment of life on earth. These are matters of importance that the President must face up to. But the basic issue is whether the United States is to carry forward on a sustained basis the *balanced* program of space activities which alone can lead to preeminence.

True preeminence in space is a matter of achieving broadly based capabilities with regard to all aspects of the space environment and then constantly building upon and adding to those capabilities. Preeminence is not dependent on the attainment of specific goals, no matter how wondrous. It is dependent on the maintenance of a *process* which involves an interlocking cycle of research and applications—that is, a balance between projects that use technology, on the one hand, and research and development that constantly moves that technology forward, on the other. In this process, scientific knowledge and advanced technology must be purposefully and selectively used to perform missions that add

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to an understanding of the space environment and man's ability to work with that environment, and hence encourage the development of new knowledge and new technology for use in new missions. The new missions must be started in time to dovetail with completed missions, so there will be no interruption in the process.

Once the United States had set for itself the goal of a manned moon landing in this decade, some, including President Kennedy, tended to view successful completion of that enterprise as an achievement that would in itself gain for us leadership in space. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration disputed that point of view. James E. Webb, then administrator of the agency, spelled out for Kennedy in a letter dated November 30, 1962, the range of activities and competencies actually necessary for preeminence:

> The manned lunar landing program will not by itself create the pre-eminent position we seek. The present interest of the United States . . . demands that we pursue an adequate, well balanced space program in all areas. . . .
>
> To be pre-eminent in space, we must conduct scientific investigations on a broad front. We must concurrently investigate geophysical phenomena about the earth, analyze the sun's radiation and its effect on earth, explore the moon and planets, make measurements in interplanetary space, and conduct astronomical measurements.
>
> To be pre-eminent in space, we must also have an advancing technology that permits increasingly large payloads to orbit the earth and to travel to the moon and the planets. We must substantially improve our propulsion capabilities, must provide methods for delivering large amounts of internal power, must develop instruments and life support systems that operate for extended periods, and must learn to transmit large quantities of data over long distances.
>
> To be pre-eminent . . . we must . . . develop the capability to place payloads in exact orbits. We must maneuver in space and rendezvous with cooperative spacecraft and, for knowledge of the military potentials, with uncooperative spacecraft. We must develop techniques for landing on the moon and the planets, and for re-entry into the earth's atmosphere at increasingly high velocities. . . . we must learn the process of fabrication, inspection, assembly, and check-out that will provide vehicles with life expectancies in space measured in years rather than months. . . .
>
> . . . we must continually up-rate the competence of Government research and flight centers, industry, and universities, to implement their special assignments and to work together effectively toward common goals.

NASA succeeded in those early days in winning support for the type of broadly based developmental process it considered essential for preeminence. However, budgetary constraints have since increasingly jeopardized key elements in the plan, and if these

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constraints continue, the entire process will be disrupted. The nation is consequently at a crossroads with regard to its space future, and it is up to the Nixon Administration to choose anew its course.

II

It is one of the strangest paradoxes in history—and certainly a situation ill understood by the American people—that at the very moment the United States stands at the threshold of success in performance of the complex and difficult tasks it set for itself in space in the early 1960's, including the moon landing within a single decade, it is in danger of slipping into enduring inferiority as a space-faring nation. Preeminence in space is not yet foreclosed to us. But it will be for at least the next decade unless provision is made in short order for substantial new inputs into operational and developmental areas of key importance. Under the best of circumstances, there will be a period during which the United States will lag behind the USSR in an increasingly wide range of space activities and competencies. The hard reality is that budgetary constraints imposed since fiscal year 1964, and particularly for fiscal years 1967-1969, have forced a contraction of the U.S. program: it has had to mark time in the development of new capabilities and with respect to preparatory work for new missions.

Meanwhile, the USSR has been both accelerating and extending the scope of its efforts. Given the long lead times that govern in space, a certain number of Soviet advantages over the next two to four years cannot now be avoided, and this whether or not the United States is first to land a man on the moon. Among other things, the USSR will be unveiling its new super booster with a lift capacity perhaps one-half greater than Saturn V's. Soviet hardware in the form of orbiting laboratories and workshops and even an early version of a multimanned space station seems likely to give Moscow superiority in the near-earth environment, and may well result in its closing the gap in space applications. The USSR seems almost certain to come up with the first truly maneuverable spacecraft and with the first that can be reused for a succession of missions. And it will be the Soviets, not Americans, who will be capitalizing heavily on opportunities in the early 1970's for planetary and solar probes and explorations. (As a small measure of what they are engaged upon, note should

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be taken of the sudden lead they have attained in developing a supersonic transport aircraft.)

The die is cast for these and perhaps other advantages that the USSR will enjoy for the near term in space. They represent the price the United States must pay for the savings effected in its program over the past several years. It does not follow, however, that we must accept anything worse than passing inferiority. This country is in a position where it can still extend and broaden its thrust into space and once again move with assurance toward the goal of lasting preeminence. The capabilities it has built up, or can build up through the use of now proved methods and techniques, give it the option of doing almost anything in space if it has the will.

The Saturn V with its 7.5 million pounds of thrust is a general-purpose workhorse adequate for the requirements of most of the preeminence-related heavy payload missions that have been seriously suggested for the next fifteen years or so. These include extended manned explorations of the lunar surface; establishing a lunar astronomical observatory, a manned lunar station, and a multimanned earth orbiting station; fully developing the range of "space applications" that offer great promise of economic benefits, systematic explorations of the solar system, a succession of planetary probes and explorations with payloads up to 10,000 pounds, and on down a long list. Moreover, basic work has been done on a nuclear-fueled rocket engine (NERVA II) which, if added as an upper stage, could greatly extend the Saturn V's usefulness. It would, among other things, enable the United States to offset the renewed advantage the USSR is to enjoy when its new super booster comes on stream.

Aside from the Saturn V and assorted smaller boosters, an array of flight-proved payload hardware is available for use for a variety of missions and activities. Tools are also at hand with which to carry out the ground-based studies and other things necessary to create new and better hardware and develop even more ingenious tools. The launch, test, and other aeronautics and space facilities that have been built at a cost of more than $4 billion are adequate to meet the requirements of a vastly expanded program and one of far greater complexity than anything we have yet attempted. Even more valuable are the "space teams" that still remain largely intact. These teams—consisting of multidisciplinary elements from industry, universities and the government—constitute what former

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NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., calls "the most important base" of U.S. space capability: "It is these people—acquiring new scientific knowledge, trained in new techniques both technological and administrative, working on new problems with minds ever enlarged by the magnitude of the tasks before them—that form the living, growing capabilities of this nation for space exploration and utilization."

Most important of all, perhaps, is the organizational capability developed under the aegis of NASA. The basic problem to be overcome for success in the space endeavor has not been the discovery of new knowledge or the invention of new technology, but organizing the more effective use of knowledge and technology already at hand. *Forbes*, of July 1, 1968, pointed out that the space job has involved a "conscious, deliberate effort to compress time and technology" and likened the organizational-managerial accomplishment this represented to what would have been required if "pioneer auto builders had not only mass-produced a workable car, but had at the same time designed highway systems, an oil industry, suburbs and a whole new retailing system to cater to a newly mobile nation—instead of letting auto related changes simply happen." The space experience has required, as former Administrator Webb explained, learning and applying "new ways of organizing and administering human and material resources. Old ways were inadequate to meet the complicated problem of melding widely varying elements into a coherent, effectively functioning enterprise." In the organizational system developed by NASA the United States has an invaluable resource, demonstrably capable of initiating and exploiting the technological advances necessary for lasting U.S. preeminence in space.

NASA, according to a statement Webb issued on leaving the agency in October 1968, is now at the peak of its effectiveness. It currently has, in his words, "the strongest and most capable organization it has had in its ten year history." As an organization, however, NASA is highly perishable. It cannot be put on a "stand-by" basis and endure. It cannot be mothballed. Without adequate and challenging work it will disintegrate. The same holds for the space teams that have been so painstakingly built up in industry and in American universities. Space technology likewise cannot be put on a shelf. Technology, as one of NASA's leading innovators has pointed out, is basically motion. Technological capabilities

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cannot survive a loss of momentum. They either advance or they dry up. If production of Saturn V is stopped, it cannot be started up again two or three years hence. The whole Saturn V-Apollo system, which represents a technological accomplishment and a technological capability without parallel in this nation's history, will dissolve unless it is used. Even the magnificent facilities complex that the country now has will necessarily deteriorate if forced into near idleness.

Because of these circumstances the Nixon Administration will be in much the same situation with regard to the country's space future as was the Kennedy Administration in 1961. When Kennedy took office, U.S. commitments to space missions were rapidly running out. While NASA had prepared in 1959 a "long range plan" that looked toward the measured buildup of U.S. space capabilities during the 1960's, critical elements within the plan had been denied budgetary support. Of most importance, inadequate funds were provided for developing the large booster required if the United States was to become a truly space-faring nation, and especially if there was to be a manned flight program after Project Mercury. Within the Eisenhower Administration serious doubt existed as to whether the United States should continue manned activities. President Eisenhower was prepared to say flatly in his final budget message sent to the Congress in January 1961 that the manned program should stop with Project Mercury. The wording finally decided on was less categoric, but still ominous: "Further testing and experimentation will be necessary to determine whether there are any valid scientific reasons for extending manned space flight beyond the Mercury program." Thus, as the Kennedy Administration began, the country faced the prospect of a space program that would peak with a series of spectacular man-in-orbit shots and then rapidly taper off. Only if the new President took quick and far-reaching action could the United States undertake the development work so necessary to avoid prolonged, if not permanent, inferiority to the Soviet Union in space.

Contrary to the popular impression, when Kennedy took office he was by no means firm in his resolve about what we should do in space. As a candidate he had used space as a main exhibit in his proffered New Frontier, with its goal of getting the country "moving again." Thus he spoke of the Soviet "first" in outer space as "the most serious defeat the United States had suffered in many,

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many years." And he argued in a special statement: "We are in a strategic space race with the Russians, and we are losing. . . . Control of space will be decided in the next decade. If the Soviets control space they can control earth, as in past centuries the nation that controlled the seas has dominated the continents."

As President, however, Kennedy placed space and space-related decisions low on his agenda. Several reasons appear to have been responsible. Underlying all else, perhaps, was the narrow margin of his victory and his consequent reluctance to take chances or strike out on new paths. He had been led by his closest scientific adviser, Dr. Jerome Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to doubt the usefulness and even the feasibility of manned space flight, and had been especially urged to avoid a personal commitment before Project Mercury had proved itself. He repeatedly expressed alarm over the prospective costs of an ambitious effort and the resultant impact on "other programs." Meanwhile he had become uncertain about the importance of space to the security needs of the United States. For one thing, he had learned as President that there was no direct correlation between the positions of the United States and the USSR in space and their positions in rocket missilery. He found that there was no "missile gap." For another, the new Secretary of Defense and the group of young advisers surrounding him strongly discounted both the immediate and long-term military usefulness of space. Then there was the gnawing fear he exhibited on numerous occasions: the USSR's lead was so great that the United States could not hope to come up with something of its own which would be more than second rate, no matter how much money was spent, and he might be left with a politically costly can of worms.

It was only after the first manned orbital flight by the Soviets in April 1961, and the buildup of great pressure in the weeks following, that Kennedy was moved to make his call on May 25 for "a great new American enterprise" aimed at "a clearly leading role in space achievement." But by this time four critical and costly months of his administration had been lost; the momentum built up for the Mercury Project was running out, and NASA was marking time in forward developmental work for key areas because it had no assurance of the direction the space program was to take in the future. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA until his death in December 1965, was to tell the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1963 that the long U.S. lag in space

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flight was the "direct consequence of the delay in the decision to proceed with a manned program beyond Project Mercury."

Dryden added in his statement the hope that "this kind of history" would not repeat itself. Whether it will, and with even more serious consequences, is the issue President Nixon must decide.

III

What are the considerations Nixon will need to take into account as he weighs the question of U.S. commitments to preeminence in space? On the one side, he will be subject to strong negative views. Many will say—are already saying—that the quicker the country sheds the remnants of its "space madness" the better. There will be persistent remonstrances about pouring additional billions into space ventures, and parallel assertions that the billions are sorely needed to solve earthly problems. Influential scientists will repeat claims that man in space is a costly, if not ridiculous, anomaly—that instruments can do far more for far less. Some will see the time ripe for a shift to limited space activities having direct bearing on military needs and capabilities. Others will argue for the reservation of the capabilities already attained to "practical uses." Still others will see the whole space enterprise as an anachronous and even provocative manifestation of a Cold War mentality that should be thrown on the trash heap of history.

These negative views, as is now amply evident, can be compelling. Yet they are subject to a great weakness: they treat space issues as if they were for the United States alone to decide. Were the United States the only country with a capability to go into space, as we thought was the case in the early 1950's, decisions on whether we should go, and at what pace, and to what purposes, could be safely reached *in cathedra,* as it were. But with space open to another powerful nation, decisions on our side must be reached against the backdrop of what that other nation is doing and is likely to do, and what the consequences will be for the United States. The question whether we should seek leadership in space grows under this circumstance into the larger and more fateful question, whether we are willing or can afford to concede leadership to another great power.

As President, Nixon cannot fail to be impressed by the massiveness of the Soviet commitment to space; the degree to which Soviet leaders still view space as central to the total power

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position of the USSR; the acceleration of the Soviet effort; the expanding base of facilities for research and development, and the growing range of mission capabilities. It is not too much to say that Soviet supremacy in space has become an article of faith—a matter of doctrine—for the Soviet regime, and perhaps for the Soviet people. Space is the one arena, and an obviously impressive arena, in which the Soviets can credibly lay claim to having led the world. In virtually all others, they have had to talk of "overtaking the United States" or someone else. In space they succeeded in vaulting to the front, and from their standpoint it is up to others to catch up—if they can. Space has been earmarked by the Soviet leadership as the chosen ground for testing out the future, for proving its contentions that "socialism is a far better launch pad than capitalism" and that the ultimate triumph of the socialist system is certain.

In more tangible terms, the Soviet space program has become the key to the long-standing Soviet design to tilt the "technological balance of power" in the USSR's favor. Soviet leaders have always claimed that their system, with its total power to set priorities, allocate resources, and push forward in selected fields without regard to "profit considerations," gives them an immense advantage in the development and utilization of new technology, and makes certain their ultimate attainment of lasting technological preeminence. As the Party Program of 1961 put it, "the relations of production under capitalism are much too narrow for a scientific and technical revolution. Socialism alone is capable of effecting it and applying its fruits in the interest of society." Soviet leaders see the space program as a lever with which to effect a broad advance in science and technology, and as a great new resource for overcoming the relative backwardness of the USSR and building the productive capabilities basic to realization of the regime's goals at home and abroad.

Meanwhile Soviet leaders evidently view space as an immediate means of redressing the general imbalance of their power position relative to the United States. With the exploding of the "missile gap" myth, the Soviet backdown on Berlin demands, the Cuban missile fiasco, the steady buildup and diversification of U.S. missile capabilities, and the revival of U.S. mobile warfare capabilities, the strategic superiority of the United States over the USSR has been solidly reaffirmed. Because of this and other factors, Western Europe has escaped from its one-time hostage status

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and no longer evinces great concern over a Soviet military threat. At the same time, Moscow has had little recent success in its long-range design to extend its influence on a global scale. While the United States has found its own going in various parts of the world increasingly rough and troublesome, benefit has not redounded to the USSR. Instead, the summary dismissal of Khrushchev, followed by the failure of his successors to take initiatives or even to come up with effective operational plans to cope with pressing problems, suggests policy-bankruptcy in the Kremlin—the sort, it might be said, that was manifest in the brazen attempt to bring Czechoslovakia back into line through military occupation.

As a result, the regime has urgent need of a striking success. Like earlier successes, such as the rapid development of a nuclear capability, the breakthrough in missile rocketry, and Sputnik, a new "spectacular" would enable the Soviets to make, or to give the appearance of making, a quantum jump in a power-prestige sense. The way appears closed to such a success through territorial or political aggrandizement (at least without grave risks) or some form of foreign policy coup. And in view of the nuclear standoff, even major increments to Soviet military power will not appreciably affect the USSR's total power position. The only area that appears to lend itself to the badly needed forward surge is space. In space, the Soviets can still hope for the quick end-run, the quantum jump, that will bring a sudden shift in the political-strategic power balance.

Included in Soviet calculations of what can be gained strategically from a mastery of space is almost certainly direct military advantage. Here it must be emphasized that Moscow does not measure the importance of space by a strictly military yardstick. It sees space preeminence as itself constituting, even as a military establishment constitutes, an instrument of policy which can be used in combination with other instruments in pursuit of its objectives. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership is highly alert to the military possibilities of space. Like the United States, it has been quick to utilize space research and development to support the missions and improve the capabilities of its earth-based military establishment. Beyond this, the leadership will unquestionably try to derive military advantage *in* space, if and as this is feasible and promises to result in a net benefit to the USSR. As of now, the Soviets are probably as uncertain as we about whether space can be made to serve military ends in an important way. But it cannot be assumed that they have ruled out the

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possibility, or that they are not actively exploring what can in fact be done, or that they will not move quickly to capitalize on any opportunity that may open up.

The USSR also sees great possibilities in space applications. With its enormous land mass, and its relative backwardness in most of the fields to which space applications can make significant contributions (weather predictions, communications, agriculture, forestry, earth resources surveys, and so on), it stands to gain from a comprehensive application program earlier and more important economic-developmental spin-offs than the United States could expect. "Cooperative" space application programs would lend themselves admirably to Soviet plans and practices with regard to winning influence over the developing countries of the world. Moreover, Moscow must regard reattainment of unquestioned supremacy in space as a chief means of re-establishing Soviet supremacy in the communist world. The conflict with China is clearly one of the most difficult problems it faces. Moscow's need is to discredit the Chinese leadership, refute its charges that the USSR is no longer a dynamic force in the world revolutionary cause, and demonstrate that the hope of the cause lies in the power and accomplishments of the USSR.

One or more major space triumphs must also loom large in the calculations of Soviet leaders as a means of easing pressures and offsetting shortcomings and difficulties on the domestic front. Their basic problem is that the Soviet system as a whole has suffered a serious loss of momentum. There is at best sluggish movement toward established goals at home as well as abroad. The regime is not able to do what it wants to do and is committed to do. Such a loss of momentum for a dedicated communist regime is critical. At stake is the dynamics of the system, on which the regime's future hopes depend.

The great issue is how to get momentum under way again. This is what makes a striking success on one front or another so necessary. Where to seek a success sufficiently commanding to push into the background the gamut of failures and shortcomings and give new assurance that in spite of everything the Soviet way is the surest and best way? Space alone would seem to offer a realistic possibility. And what could be more convincing than to demonstrate that Sputnik was not a one-shot phenomenon but a true augury of lasting Soviet preeminence in the world of the future?

But space is a costly business. Does the USSR have the resources

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to sustain the activities necessary to again outdo the United States? Many insist that it does not. After all, even the United States is being strained by its effort to get to the moon and at the same time meet other pressing requirements. The USSR disposes a far smaller economic base: how can it possibly continue to carry on an ambitious space program indefinitely?

Logical as this point of view may seem, it does not take into account the Soviet system and Soviet practices with regard to the arbitrary setting of priorities. If the leadership wants a sustained space program at or even above the current U.S. level, there is nothing to stop it from mounting the effort. Such a program would amount to less than 2 per cent of the nation's gross national product, less than one-fourth the annual increment to total production, less than one-fifth of total annual investment. Moreover, the impact of the space effort is almost entirely on the heavy industry—or power base—sector of the economy, since the resources involved go as a matter of course overwhelmingly into these sectors. Any decision involving a space program, and almost regardless of its magnitude, represents a choice between one power element as against another. It does not represent a change in the pattern of economic activity, but merely a shifting of emphasis within an already well established pattern.

IV

To all of this some will say: So what? What does it mean for the United States if the Soviet Union continues a massive space effort and establishes its firm dominance of the space environment? Except for the pride and national prestige factor, would the United States be any worse off than before? Might it not, in fact, be better off if it uses its resources for "constructive" purposes at home and abroad? Even more important, might not the USSR find in its space preeminence satisfaction of its urge for a leading world role and become at long last content to live and let live in a peaceful international order?

This line of reasoning has great appeal. But what would our future as a nation be if our leaders accepted it?

There is first and foremost the basic question of whether any nation, even one as richly endowed as the United States, can long continue as a great power if it concedes to others control of a new sphere of human activity. The considerations involved have been well stated in these terms:

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Down through the course of history, the mastery of a new environment, or of a major new technology, or of the combination of the two as we now see in space, has had profound effects on the future of nations; on their relative strength and security; on their relations with one another; on their internal economic, social and political affairs; and on the concepts of reality held by their people.[1]

It is a hard fact of life that nations cannot stand still without losing ground. As C. Stark Draper of M.I.T. has put it:

Some countries have tried to hold a position of high influence on the basis of an existing but static superior level of ability. The failures of these attempts are recorded many times in the history of mankind. When, for any reason, a mighty nation has ceased to travel the path of progress, it has always been passed by rivals who continue to strive for advancement. . . .[2]

No one can now say with surety what benefits will flow from a mastery of space. But we can be reasonably certain that if the United States should now turn its back on the opportunities space offers as a new realm of human accomplishment, it will enter an era of decline.

A more immediate aspect of the matter is that the United States—however much wishful thinking would have it otherwise—continues to be engaged in a fateful struggle with the Soviet Union which will be strongly, perhaps decisively, influenced by what happens in space. The situation does not require a degree of preeminence that would give us a conclusive advantage. We can well afford to share space with the USSR. What we have to fear is that the USSR may secure a decisive advantage over us. The United States must maintain for as long as can be seen ahead a degree of leadership in space activities that will enable it to move successfully toward the goals it sets for itself and at the same time match quickly any advance of the Soviet Union toward its own goals.

Preeminence to this degree will guarantee that space cannot be turned against us either politically or militarily. It will guarantee the technological strength the United States must have to ensure its progress, safeguard its security, and protect its position of leadership in the noncommunist world. It could also importantly affect the long-term course of U.S.-USSR relations. If the United States demonstrates that the Soviets cannot hope to gain in space

[1]*Summary Report Future Programs Task Group: A Report by the NASA Administration to the President,* Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 88th Congress (Washington: GPO, 1965).

[2]The statement quoted is from an unpublished paper prepared in May 1965 by Dr. C. Stark Draper for internal NASA use.

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the type of major triumph they badly need and are not able to gain in other areas of competition, the possibility that Moscow will be willing to move from a policy of hostility and conflict to a policy of effective détente will be significantly increased. Preeminence to this degree is, then, an essential for effective cooperation in space itself.

Failure to maintain preeminence would give the Soviets strong, if not unmanageable, advantages. It would vitalize their hope of being able to press on toward world communist objectives and endow their struggle against the United States with sufficient chance of success to justify the costs and risks involved. If the United States were faced with a major Soviet breakthrough in space and were not in a position to counter it in relatively short order with a comparable capability and achievement, the results could range from the serious to the catastrophic, depending on the nature of the breakthrough and whether it represented a one-shot gain or could be used to generate further advances.

The lesson of Sputnik has continuing validity. Sputnik showered the United States with political and psychological debris that required years and great and costly efforts to dig out of. But even more important, it substantially increased Soviet confidence in, and the general credibility of, long-standing claims regarding the superiority of the "socialist system" for effecting human progress. A series of quick and bold Soviet moves, beginning with Berlin and ending only with the Cuban missile crisis, exploited the psychopolitical advantage gained, at grave risks to the peace of the world.

A second round of Soviet space triumphs could match if not surpass Sputnik in its devastating impact on the relative standing of the United States and the USSR, both as world powers and as exponents of competing social systems. At the lower end of the spectrum, a new Soviet demonstration of definite and substantial technological superiority—even if it did not offer much of a base for a further advance—would produce a profound psychological and political shock. The impact would probably not be as sudden and sharp as that of Sputnik. But it might well be more far-reaching, since a repeat performance under conditions of intense competition could not be attributed to a simple lapse in U.S. alertness or a lucky Soviet accident.

Should the second round entail a breakthrough that appeared to have immediate and direct bearing on Soviet strategic capabilities,

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it could herald a highly dangerous sequence of events in U.S.-Soviet relations. A Soviet reappraisal of the world power balance would almost certainly follow, and it would be completely out of character for Moscow not to try to exploit what it felt it had in hand. New confrontations would be in order, and the United States might once more be forced to choose between yielding important positions and risking nuclear war.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that a Soviet breakthrough in space would enable the USSR to score a significant breakthrough in weaponology. While there is apparently a high-level assumption in this country that military activities can be carried out better on the earth than in space, no one can be sure that this is in fact true. Only after man has firmly established himself in space and has fully explored the possibilities space offers can we know with certainty what can or cannot be done militarily or otherwise in that environment. Similarly, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets would be able to position themselves so as to deny to the United States any further use of space—specifically, that segment of space nearest earth. This could come from a long lead in establishing a major space station or launching a fully maneuverable space vehicle or developing a new and radically improved system of propulsion. To be sure, the consequences of such a denial can only be conjectured. But it is conceivable that, even if no weapon were fired, the United States could not long maintain its position as a first-class power, much less as leader of the world community of free nations, if it found itself forced to stand by while a confident adversary had the exclusive privilege of exploring and building upon the opportunities space offers.

The U.S. stake in space preeminence is as great as ever. Only if the USSR finally decides to relax its efforts can we afford to do likewise. From the standpoint of basic national security interests, the United States cannot chance a unilateral pause in the space drive. It must gear its purposes, activities and efforts to those of the Soviets.

V

How is it that almost eight years after we unequivocally committed ourselves to the objective of preeminence in space we again find ourselves threatened with a second-rate position? Certainly it is not because we lack the necessary technological competence or industrial and scientific resources: What this nation has done in

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space borders on the miraculous, and it has in hand the organizational and other means to perform further miracles. It is not because the effort would bankrupt us: The total cost of the civilian space program to date is less in absolute terms and far less as a percentage of GNP than the cost of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capability—and for the future the space program will increasingly pay its own way in yielding economic and other practical benefits. Thoughtful people throughout the country remain aware of the vital importance of space to the future, and the "man in the street" continues to support the U.S. space programs.

Yet the nation's resolve with respect to space has been weakened by the influence exercised by a relatively small group of highly articulate dissidents. From the inception of the expanded and accelerated space effort in mid-1961, there have been "economizing Congressmen and excessively zealous scientists who have been clamoring for an end to our country's program"[3] as well as "those who want the military to have a stronger role in space, mismanagement sleuths, and persons confused . . . by developments in the Soviet space program."[4] The main target of the space critics has been the moon goal, and because the true significance of that goal has generally been ill understood, it has proved vulnerable.

The most important feature of the expanded space program adopted in 1961, of which the moon goal was a part, was its balance, which space leaders considered essential to attain across-the-board leadership in space. The lunar landing was central to the effort, and would account for more than two-thirds of the funds allocated to NASA for the whole of the decade. But it was central not because it was of overriding importance in itself, but because it would, as Administrator Webb said, serve as a "focal point round which could be organized in a purposeful and coordinated way a range of activities that would collectively give us both the general and specific capabilities needed for the attainment of national preeminence."[5]

Despite such explanations, which have often been repeated, neither the balanced nature of the space program nor the subordinate role of the lunar goal within the program has been

[3] *Washington Sunday Star,* editorial, November 3, 1963, pp. 68-69.
[4] *Washington Post,* October 5, 1963, p. 4.
[5] Address by James E. Webb, "NASA as an Adaptive Organization," John Diebold Lecture on Technological Change and Management, Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, September 30, 1968.

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generally recognized. The prevailing tendency has been to equate the "moon program" with the space program itself. This was in part due to President Kennedy's early stance. As a political leader deeply concerned to improve the image of the United States abroad, and that of his administration at home, Kennedy naturally chose to focus on the most dramatic part of his space program, which could also be most easily visualized and understood by the average voter. But in doing this he tended to subsume the program as a whole to the moon goal. The effect was to give support to other forces and circumstances which were producing a distorted concept of the role of the lunar project. The sheer drama, complexity and costliness of the enterprise were of a magnitude to overshadow everything else related to space.

Beyond this, the news media latched onto the "moon race" with a singleness of purpose that excluded any real appreciation of other aspects of the program, much less of the broad needs and purposes the moon effort was to serve. We were in a race to beat the USSR by putting the first man on the moon; success would assure U.S. preeminence in space. Notwithstanding all efforts of NASA officials and others to put matters in better perspective, the view has persisted that the moon goal and the space program are virtually synonymous. Walter Cronkite, the CBS commentator who has adopted space as his special province, opened his reportage of the Apollo 8 circumlunar flight on December 21, 1968 with the statement that "This is what the space program is all about." The *Washington Post* of December 29, 1968 asserted that "The Apollo 8 flight clearly establishes American supremacy in space."

Initially, this oversimplified view of the relationship between the moon effort and the overall effort the United States was making in space was probably helpful in securing support for the national program. But over the long haul overdramatization of the moon goal has undermined support for the sort of effort needed to develop the broadly based capabilities essential to the attainment of preeminence. Viewed as an objective in itself, the moon goal could be plausibly questioned from the standpoint of whether it was worth the cost, or indeed made any sense at all.

Thus, not a few highly placed members of the scientific community who have favored a "science"-managed and science-serving "instrumented" program have been able to carry on a running campaign against the U.S. effort on grounds that it is a massive but

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fruitless, prestige-seeking "moon-race" which will leave the United States little better off than it was before. Similarly, many of those who have wanted a militarily-oriented effort have claimed that the country is putting all of its space eggs in the moon basket at serious risk to the national security. A third line of attack has been that the funds the United States is pouring into an "empty race to the moon" could be far better used for constructive purposes on earth. Sounding the keynote for this last point of view was the powerful voice of Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. At Tufts University on May 3, 1963, Fulbright said that the moon project should be abandoned and the money used to help with such earthly problems as the improvement of education. He added: "This allocation of priorities is a recipe for disaster, an unrecognized and powerful endorsement of the wrong side of the race between education and catastrophe." General Eisenhower recorded a still different reason for opposition: "Proud as we may be of our astronauts and our Venus probe and other accomplishments in space," he wrote in a *Saturday Evening Post* article on May 18, 1963, "this racing to the moon, unavoidably wasting vast sums and deepening our debt, is the wrong way to go about it, as I see it." Thus, in addition to a crossfire from would-be-purist scientists and the military-minded, the moon goal became subject to assault by what the *Washington Star* called "one of the strangest coalitions we have ever known in Congress, made up of conservatives who want to save money and liberals who want to spend money on welfare."[6]

A circumstance that added greatly to the vulnerability of the moon project, when taken out of context as a capability-building enterprise and viewed in terms of a race with the USSR, was that it depended for its rationale on the demonstrated will and ability of the USSR to compete in the race. This provided an opening the USSR was quick to use in attempts to influence U.S. space decisions. A first instance was at the Vienna meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev on June 1 and 2, 1961. Kennedy came to the meeting less than a week after his call for the expanded U.S. effort in space, including the moon goal. Khrushchev, however, made no direct reference to this in their talks, nor did he play up Soviet exploits. Instead he sought to give an impression of disillusionment with the whole space business and to put into

[6] *Washington Evening Star,* November 1, 1963, editorial section.

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doubt whether the USSR would even continue with a major effort. He told Kennedy in one conversation that he was "cautious" with regard to the possibility of launching a man to the moon because of the "military aspects" of such flights. In another he was more categoric: he said he was placing "certain restraints" on projects for a flight to the moon, for such an operation was very expensive and might weaken Soviet defenses. He went on to say that "of course" Soviet scientists wanted to go to the moon, but that the United States should go first because it was rich, and then the Soviet Union would be able to follow. He further observed that so far there had been few practical uses of outer space launchings, and that the race was costly and primarily for "prestige purposes."

Khrushchev's stance with Kennedy was in marked contrast to the exuberance he had shown over Soviet accomplishments and prospects in space at other meetings, including the "Camp David" meetings with President Eisenhower in 1959. If he expected by this switch to induce the new American President to reduce emphasis on space, he failed. Kennedy made no public reference to Khrushchev's remarks, and there is no evidence that he even discussed them with his space advisers. If anything, Kennedy left the Vienna meeting and its harsh experiences with increased conviction that the United States needed to outdo the USSR in space and strengthened resolve to push forward with the new program on which his administration had embarked.

However, some two years later, a public airing of views similar to those Khrushchev had expressed to Kennedy produced a quite different result. By mid-1963 domestic criticism of the U.S. space program had reached a high level, and this was strongly reflected in Congressional discussions on NASA's budget for fiscal 1964. Then on August 9 the U.S. and overseas press published a letter that Sir Bernard Lovell, Director of the Jodrell Bank Experimental Station in the United Kingdom, had written to Deputy NASA Administrator Dryden. Lovell reported that on a visit he had just completed to the Soviet Union, M. V. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, had told him that the USSR had rejected, for the time being at least, any plans for manned lunar landings because of "insurmountable problems of radiation in space."

Excitement over this letter was immediate and intense. While it was still mounting Khrushchev again entered the lists. In an

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"Interview with Newsmen" published in *Izvestia* on October 26, 1963, he was directly quoted as saying:

> At the present time we do not plan flights of cosmonauts to the moon. I have read reports that the Americans wish to land a man on the moon by 1970. Well, let's wish them success. And we will see how they will land there, or to be more correct "moon" there, and most important—how they will get up and come back. We will take their experience into account. We do not wish to compete in sending people to the moon without thorough preparation. It is obvious there will be no benefit from such competition. On the contrary it would do harm since it would lead to the destruction of people. It is a joke in our country to say "who is impatient on the earth, let him go to the moon." For us it is good enough on earth. But if we are to talk seriously we will have to work a lot and prepare well in order to complete a successful flight of man to the moon.

These "authoritative statements" from the Soviet side were avidly seized upon by opponents of the U.S. project: The USSR was being as sensible as the United States was foolish. What could it mean to win a race in which the other side was not competing? At the cost of tens of billions of dollars we might some day get a man on the moon, but what of it? The Soviets in the meanwhile would have grown much stronger in consequence of using their resources for more practical purposes. The effect was that many who had accepted the Kennedy program as the proper thing to do began to believe that the United States had already bested the Soviets and wondered whether it was necessary to continue a large-scale effort. It might be wise to slow the pace, and even put some of the things we had planned "on ice." In any event, a harder look should be taken at the scheduled rate of expenditures with the thought of effecting maximum savings for use in other urgent programs. Doubts such as these came to be reflected in editorials in many newspapers that had hitherto been staunch supporters of the space endeavor. Of more direct and immediate importance was a change of mood in the Congress: A *Washington Post* roundup of Congressional opinion on Khrushchev's statement indicated that most Congressmen felt the statement would result in at least some reduction in funds for the space program.

Predictably, the news from the Soviet Union soon took a reverse twist. On November 1, 1963, the Soviets launched their Polet I, a new spacecraft marking a substantial advance in the state of the art. On November 4, Khrushchev boasted, "Even our opponents realize that we have the leading role in space. They haven't overtaken us as yet and we are not going to let them. Our people are covering themselves with glory. We shall give the capitalist

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world no peace, since it has to go." Then on November 7 he told a group of American newsmen in Moscow: "We have never said we are giving up on our lunar projects. You are the ones who said that. . . . As for the economic difficulties, you keep on expecting us to give up our program. Well, gentlemen, I say give up such hopes once and for all and just throw them away. The economic situation within our country is excellent today. . . . In the future it will be still better."

This and a continuing stream of evidence thereafter that the Soviets were pushing their space program on the broadest possible front did not end speculation, or even outright assertions, that the USSR had in effect abandoned a space race with the United States. In following years, critics of the U.S. effort found such speculations to be the most telling weapon in their arsenal.

VI

Ironically, while criticism of the space program has centered almost exclusively on the moon project, its principal impact has been on other elements of the program, particularly those involving research and development and preparatory work needed for future missions—that is, on the elements required for rounding out the national effort so as to ensure preeminence.

NASA's plan for attaining preeminence called for an annual outlay of approximately $6 billion beginning in fiscal 1964 and continuing through fiscal 1969. At that level, as NASA saw it, the Apollo-lunar schedule could be met with adequate margins for unforeseeable contingencies and concurrent activities could be carried on that would enable the United States to advance smoothly and without costly losses of momentum. But NASA has never been able to secure support at the desired level; instead, it has had to operate 20 to 30 per cent below it.

NASA's problems began with the budget for fiscal 1964, which, as noted, was acted upon by Congress at the height of the Soviet disclaimer of a "moon race." It had submitted a request totaling $6.2 billion. Kennedy reduced this to $5.7 billion, an amount NASA considered minimal if established schedules were to be maintained and serious loss of momentum avoided. Administrator Webb testified that "even if the full amount requested by the President were authorized and appropriated," NASA would have to make "some difficult adjustments" and run some serious risks.

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The Congress nevertheless reduced the President's request by some $600 million, that is from $5.7 billion to $5.1 billion.

In fiscal 1965 the appropriation for NASA was again far below the $6 billion level. Although President Johnson in his first State of the Union message categorically asserted that "we must assure our preeminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space," he sensed that the Congress was in no mood to vote the necessary funds. He insisted that NASA cut its requirements to the minimum needed to maintain operations and continue with the approved missions already in the works. The request he finally transmitted to Congress totaled $5.44 billion (including a $141 million supplement for FY 1964). He was thus asking less than $200 million above the amount approved for the preceding year. NASA stressed in its defense of the budget before Congressional committees that it was as bare-boned as it could be. The Congress turned out to be less heavy-handed than it had been the year before, but it still reduced the requested figure by almost $200 million. Webb subsequently issued a statement in which he pointed out that although the cutback would adversely affect "launch schedules and program milestones," every effort would be made both to keep on schedule with the lunar landing project and to maintain the space science and applications programs and the advanced research and technology programs necessary to keep the overall national effort in balance. He added that "all programs would be kept under constant review to take advantage of every development and every means to maintain the momentum and progress toward preeminence in space."

This, as it happened, was the last time NASA officials were able to hold out hope that the level of support being given the space program offered any realistic prospect of U.S. preeminence. NASA continued to develop each year a budget plan in the $6 billion area covering the range of activities it considered necessary for preeminence. Each year, however, competing considerations caused President Johnson to insist that the request to Congress be substantially reduced. And each year Congress imposed further cuts, with special emphasis on activities not required for the lunar project. Thus, as against the roughly $6 billion needed for the NASA plan, for fiscal 1966 Johnson requested $5.26 billion and Congress appropriated $5.17; for fiscal 1967 the figures were $5.01 and $4.96; for fiscal 1968, $5.10 and $4.58; and for fiscal 1969, $4.37 and $3.99.

Unfortunately for NASA and its plans, the significance of these

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successive lacerations of its budget has not been grasped by the American public. The difference between $3.99 and $6 billion can be easily lost in the fact that the former adds up to a lot of money. NASA early became stamped with the image of a favored enterprise which had only to ask in order to receive from both a doting President and a doting Congress, and this image has persisted regardless of the discrepancy between appropriations and the agency's stated needs for funds.

Meanwhile, NASA was being forced not only to tighten its belt, but to give up activities that were essential if the United States was to have a reasonable chance of attaining preeminence. Of necessity, it formally downgraded the objective we were seeking in space: Whereas from fiscal 1962 through fiscal 1966 the space budget was presented to Congress in terms of securing U.S. preeminence, from fiscal 1967 onward the stated objective has been highly circumscribed. Thus for 1967: "Our task is to use the tools [that have been developed] wisely, carefully choosing our priorities in space in the context of overall national priorities." For 1968: "The primary objectives of the programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are to extend our ability to operate in space and to use that capability for the benefit of mankind." And for 1969: "The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will continue in 1969 with programs to improve our ability to operate in the space environment, advance man's knowledge of the universe and the experience gained for man's benefit."

The critical handicap, with respect to the goal of preeminence, was that the budgetary constraints were foreclosing the preparatory work for missions after Apollo. NASA had established in 1964 a Task Force on Future Missions to bring together in a single effort the results of studies that had been under way in various sections of the agency for some time. The immediate occasion was a letter dated January 30, 1964, from President Johnson to Administrator Webb, asking for a review of space objectives in relation both to what had been learned from past efforts and to the most important emerging concepts of missions needed for scientific purposes and advances in technology. A Summary Report on the work of this task force was submitted to the President and subsequently to the Congress in early 1965.

No attempt was made in the report to suggest "preferred missions for the future." Rather, the focus was on the feasibility and potential of various alternatives. The concept was that the

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further development of broadly based capabilities remained the basic national need in space, and that specific missions should be selected as required for this purpose. As a variety of activities were carried forward they would

> uncover new uses of space, force the solution of many emerging technical problems, and reveal others not now identified. This has been the way of all new areas of scientific and technical development, and it will certainly be true in space. It is, therefore, essential that in making plans for the future all elements required for a balanced program and the practice of maintaining maximum flexibility be preserved.

NASA expected to begin application of this sort of approach as the space program moved into the second half of the 1960's. Its budget request for fiscal 1966 included funds for preliminary work in two new program areas. One, called the Apollo Extensions System and later renamed Apollo Applications, would encompass "studies and selected technological developments which will prepare the way for a future decision on possible uses of the Apollo spacecraft and Saturn launch vehicles other than those specifically required for the manned lunar landing." The second would initiate "development of the Voyager, a major new unmanned spacecraft designed to explore the planet Mars." President Johnson, however, proved unwilling to go forward with NASA's projected program. He limited the NASA budget request for fiscal 1967 to a level below that appropriated for 1966, a step that reflected, as Webb reported to Congress, "the President's determination to hold open for another year the major decisions on future programs—decisions on whether to make use of the space operational systems, space know-how, and facilities we have worked so hard to build up, or to begin their liquidation."

Johnson yielded somewhat the next year and allowed inclusion in the NASA budget of almost $600 million of new funds for Apollo Applications, the Voyager-Mars program, and initial work on the development of a nuclear-fueled engine (NERVA II). But this time Congress proved to be the stumbling block. The President's request was cut by some $500 million, eliminating the possibility of anything more than a holding operation in the three new program areas. Johnson concurred in this action and the strong turn toward conservatism implicit in it: On signing the NASA authorization bill for 1968, he stated that conditions had greatly changed since he had submitted his budget in January and that it had become necessary to make "harsh choices" and "distinguish between the necessary and the desirable."

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In the budget exercise for fiscal 1969—only recently completed—the President's request for NASA was at the lowest level since fiscal 1963. While it provided for a substantial amount to fund Apollo Applications, it envisaged only minimal work on the Mars program (now greatly reduced in scope) and the development of the NERVA II nuclear engine. Congress in its turn imposed further cuts: it left largely intact funds needed for the Apollo-lunar project but severely reduced the allotments for everything else.

On September 29, 1968, a few days before he retired as NASA administrator after almost eight years of service, Webb soberly appraised the meaning of this final decision and previous ones that had cut so deeply into the plans for space preeminence enthusiastically adopted in May 1961:

> These reductions in the level of research and development work in the fields of aeronautics and space will have many serious effects on the U.S. position in space and technology, and in time on our status and prospects as a great power. But the ones to which we are adapting this year are only the most recent in a series of cutbacks that constitute in total what may be called a national decision. This decision has been in the making since 1964. It is that the United States will not at this time take the steps necessary to use the trained manpower and capital plant which we have built up to continue the advances of recent years in the scientific and engineering fields essential for success in space and aeronautics. Looked at in another way, the decision means that the United States is not pursuing, for the time being at least, its goal of preeminence in space.

Yet, while he thus warned of the dark prospects that loom ahead for the United States unless a radical change takes place in its space policies, Webb emphasized that, given the proper support, the bright hopes of the early 1960's may still be realized. NASA, he said, was adjusting to its budgetary difficulties and still "continuing a hard-hitting, technically sound program aimed at keeping open a wide range of options for use when the nation decides to resume its advances as a space-faring nation."

That Webb spoke accurately when he cited "a wide range of options" was dramatically demonstrated by the moon-orbiting flight of Apollo 8. But as things now stand they are only options. Whether they are to be taken up and made to serve the future of this nation—and of all mankind—is the matter that our new President must decide. The judgment of history may well be that "nothing could be more important."

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STATE-BUILDING IN TROPICAL AFRICA

by Ernest W. Lefever

DURING the 1968 presidential campaign in the United States one of the world's largest land masses, embracing no fewer than forty sovereign states, went virtually unnoticed and unmentioned. Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon, like the Democratic and Republican platforms, spoke of U.S. policy toward Latin America, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Communist China, and, of course, Viet Nam. But the candidates rarely spoke of Africa or any African country. Neither produced a task force report on Africa. Africa did not even rate a footnote in the campaign.

This uncalculated nonchalance toward the ancestral home of one American out of every ten stands in sharp contrast to the expectant mood of Americans just a short decade ago when two dozen African colonies were on the brink of independence. The end of European control, an objective devoutly sought by the United States and the Soviet Union, each in its own way and for its own reasons, appeared to be in sight. In 1960 Washington and Moscow exaggerated the political significance of tropical Africa and entertained extravagant expectations in behalf of the newly emerging states, expectations not shared by the experienced African hands in Europe.

As the drama unfolded, the highest hopes and worst fears of 1960 were confounded. The new states did not "go back to the bush," as the cynics predicted. Nor did they become peaceful democracies, as the romantics hoped. The record is mixed and the future uncertain. Independent black Africa has been torn and bloodied by tribal conflict and civil war in Nigeria, the Congo and the Sudan. There have been a score of coups, countercoups and abortive coups. Economic growth has been slow, and in some countries the economy has stagnated. On the positive side there have been no interstate wars, no tribal or regional group has succeeded in permanently fragmenting the territory of any state, and there has been slow, peaceful political development in a handful of countries, notably Kenya and the Ivory Coast.

Looking back, Robert A. K. Gardiner of Ghana, one of Africa's most respected statesmen, referred to the African drama as "a

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decade of discouragement." How could it have been otherwise? To an uncomfortable extent all peoples are prisoners of the past. The political resources essential to state-building in Africa are severely limited by the tribal culture of the precolonial era, the brevity and superficiality of Western influence, and the abrupt but peaceful transfer of authority from Europe to inexperienced political leaders.

In the past few years both Washington and Moscow have taken a sober second look at the realities in this vast underdeveloped region three times the size of the United States. They have revised their expectations downward and adjusted their policies accordingly. But U.S. objectives have remained constant: the achievement of stability within and between states as the basic prerequisite for constructive economic and political development, and the encouragement of moderate regimes capable of sustaining mutually beneficial relations with industrial countries that respect the integrity of the new African states. A recognition of the limits of politics is the beginning of wisdom for the architects of new states as well as for their outside friends.

"A Female Continent"

The hundred million indigenous people living between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn belong to more than two thousand tribes and speak twice that many languages and dialects. The great majority of these people are illiterate and live in small villages. Their primary identity is the traditional tribe which circumscribes their social loyalties and their view of the larger world.

In a massive and precipitous shift of sovereignty, the political responsibility for these traditional tribesmen and their kinfolk who live in or near the European-built cities was transferred from mature governments in London, Paris and Brussels to fledgling African leaders. Partially Westernized and varying widely in education, political sophistication and patriotism, these politicians are determined to maintain and develop the thirty states bequeathed them by the European colonial powers.

The leaders of each new regime, large and small, have repeatedly declared their intention to develop a modern welfare state along broad Western lines, supported by an expanding economy based on foreign trade and investment, and secured by statewide military and police services. The fundamental political prob-

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lem—the task of achieving a new order as secure as the colonial order and able to protect basic human rights and provide for a fuller life by means of increased productivity—will be grappled with for the foreseeable future within the framework of the existing territorial states. Though new legal entities—larger by reason of merging present states or smaller by reason of successful secessions—are possible, they are not likely in view of the tenacious opposition of the great majority of African leaders to any changes in the state boundaries drawn by the metropolitan powers.

To maintain and develop any new state is a formidable task. In black Africa this task has been exacerbated by the character of the precolonial culture, the ambiguous colonial heritage and the premature transfer of sovereignty.

Precolonial Africa south of the Sahara was largely an iron-age culture fragmented into a multiplicity of tribes and language groups. Unlike the Mediterranean world, black Africa developed no literature, no science, and only the most primitive forms of architecture and artifacts. The wheel and mathematical calculation were unknown. Animism was the dominant "religion." The primary social unit was the extended family, and the primary source of identity was the tribe which bound the imagination and historical memory of its members.

The tribe was also the primary political unit. The tribal chief wielded final political authority, though there were larger kingdoms established by the conquest of the stronger warrior tribes. Tribal wars were frequent and savage by modern Western standards. Ritual cannibalism and indigenous slavery were widespread. As Russell Warren Howe points out, Africa "created the Atlantic trade in slaves by stimulating a formerly disinterested market," and the "African leadership of the day fought fiercely against" the abolition of the slave traffic.[1]

In terms of its physical and political environment, tropical Africa was passive. Howe describes it as a "female continent":

> Black Africa . . . possessed no maps. With eighteen thousand miles of coast, it produced no oceangoing ships, no navies or navigators. It sent no trade missions or emissaries around the world, of which it knew—and contrived to know—nearly nothing. Indeed, before the pan-Africanizing experience of colonialism, each tribe was ignorant of almost all African lands except its own, and those of its neighbors and present or past enemies. A female continent, Black Africa was to be "discovered,"

[1]Russell Warren Howe, "Man and Myth in Political Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1968, p. 585.

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penetrated and dominated by others. There were few exceptions to this image of passivity.[2]

This "secular inertia," says Howe, "helped make colonial domination inevitable."

The conquest of Africa by the European powers in the nineteenth century had a unifying, not Balkanizing, effect upon the continent. It imposed upon over two thousand tribes a political system of some fifty administrative territories and six European language zones. The colonial administrators, along with Christian missionaries, brought education, medical care and better living standards. Law and order were imposed. Tribal fighting was greatly reduced, and the cruel excesses of the witch doctors and cannibalism were curbed. Slavery was virtually abolished. The rudiments of Western justice were made available to a large portion of the indigenous population.

Most consequential of all, the imperial presence in Africa created in the partially Westernized elite a sense of supra-tribal identity and a desire for political authority and autonomy coextensive with the territorial boundaries drawn by the Europeans, even though some of them cut across traditional tribal lines. But the colonial powers failed to prepare adequately either the elite or the larger population for wider political responsibility. Developing the desire for self-determination without creating the capacity for self-government was the ambiguous legacy of the colonial period.

Given these conditions, independence came too abruptly and too soon. The new states were established by fiat. Statehood was essentially a gift of the metropolitan power, based largely on an elite "demand" generated in part by the Western conscience and the desire of an increasing number of Africans to enjoy the material fruits of industrial society. The Africans did not win their independence by fighting for it. The fact that authority was handed over with little or no struggle and with almost no violence doubtless increased the severity of and delayed the reaction to the trauma of independence.[3] It is axiomatic that men who gain political control over a territory by fighting for it against a determined foe learn more about the exacting requirements of ex-

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] The concept of trauma drawn from psychology is applied to the African scene by Victor T. Le Vine, "The Trauma of Independence in French-Speaking Africa," *The Journal of Developing Areas,* January 1968, pp. 211-224. See also Rupert Emerson, "African States and the Burdens They Bear," *African Studies Bulletin,* April 1967, pp. 1-13.

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ercising political power than men whose knowledge of politics is drawn largely from observing a colonial administration or participating in the civil service of an alien authority. The element of struggle may be one reason for President Jomo Kenyatta's strength in Kenya. The delayed shock of the birth trauma can also be attributed to what appeared to be a smooth and successful transition of authority in the first years of independence in Ghana and the Sudan. Subsequent events led to a more sober recognition of the shock and burdens of independence.

From Colony to State—Tribe to Nation

When the political cohesion and coherence imposed upon Africa by European conquest was suddenly withdrawn without adequate provisions for maintaining order and security, the endemic centrifugal forces of tribe, language and region reasserted themselves. Where these atavistic forces prevailed over the improvised and fragile authority of the new state, chaos and violence were the inevitable result. The disintegration of the old order and the partial breakdown of the new point to two fundamental requirements for the development of effective nation-states. One has to do with the political-legal transition from colony to state, and the other with the psychological-ethnic-cultural transition from tribe to nation. Under optimal conditions the transition from colony to state can be effected quickly and smoothly, but even under the best of circumstances the transition from traditional tribal identity to a larger national identity is likely to be long and tortuous.

Decolonization in Africa can be described as the fragmentation of sovereignty at the periphery of empire. Under political pressures, large pieces of territory were cut loose, not to fend for themselves, but to become independent and self-determined states that would be sustained in large measure by continuing cultural, economic and security ties with the former colonial power. Seriously deficient in the disciplines, habits and institutions essential to modern economic and political development, these new states have been correctly described as weak, fledgling, embryonic, makeshift and soft.[4]

A major reason for this weakness is that the transfer of legal authority is not matched by a transfer of power. The shift of sovereignty from London or Paris to a former colony, ap-

[4]Gunnar Myrdal in *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968) uses the word "soft" to describe the countries of South Asia which can legislate but not govern.

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propriately symbolized by a ceremony lowering an old flag and raising a new one, is a relatively simple transaction involving a commitment by the colonial power to cease exercising authority in the new state and a commitment by the new political leaders to accept the responsibilities of government. Political power and capacity, in contrast, cannot be transferred from one capital to another by a certificate of independence or by any other means. The capacity to govern must be drawn from the human and material resources of the new state. On independence day it is impossible to predict whether the newly installed government will develop that capacity, even though it has the assurance of help from the former metropolitan power or other friendly states.

It has been argued that most of the new African states are not economically and politically viable and that therefore their boundaries should be redrawn to create larger or smaller units corresponding to tribal or economic realities. This abstract argument flies in the face of the determination of the great majority of Africa's present leaders (with the notable exception of the Somalis) to maintain present state frontiers. On no other problem have they reached greater agreement than in their resistance to territorial changes by force or subversion. They show no disposition to merge their recently attained autonomy into more inclusive sovereign entities, or to create smaller units by secession. Even when it appeared that Biafra had a chance, only four of the forty members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the secessionist state. As President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania said of the founding OAU conference in 1963, everyone present could agree that "our boundaries are so absurd that they must be regarded as sacrosanct."[5]

A small state may be in a perpetually precarious position, but it is not an anachronism. As David Vital argues, a weak state is not without resources in its effort to maintain its security and independence.[6] A small, poor and tribally diverse state with an overwhelmingly illiterate population can survive indefinitely if it is surrounded by benign neighbors and sustained by a propitious balance among the great powers. Under these conditions, plus trade, investment and other forms of support from industrial states, even a pocket-sized African state can survive and gain strength. Ultimately all weak states continue to exist with the sufferance of the more powerful states, whose interest in maintaining

[5]Quoted by Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[6]David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

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them may in some measure be induced by fear of hostile behavior on the part of other powerful states. The independence of the Congo in the 1960's, for example, was insured in part by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each sought to prevent the other from exercising control over this important country.

The persistence of tribal identity, thought, habits and social structures, in the great mass of tropical Africans, is the most serious barrier to national identity and the most serious internal obstacle to effective statewide government.[7] K. A. Busia, a professor of African sociology and former leader of the parliamentary opposition in Ghana, says: "One of Africa's most intractable problems is how to integrate different tribes into a modern state," noting that "all African States have this problem."[8] Aristide R. Zolberg points out that "African countries are distinguished from other Third World clusters by extremely weak national centers" and "a periphery which consists of societies until recently self-contained," adding that "original African . . . values, norms, and structures" have "survived to a significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was not legally recognized" by the colonial power.[9] In a 1947-1948 survey in Ghana, Busia noted the tenacity of "intense tribal loyalties" even among "those who had been town-dwellers for many years"; he cites with approval a 1965 study of Ghana that concludes:

> a considerable body of evidence points to the persistence of elements of traditional social structure even within the most "modern" sectors of Ghanaian society. Ethnic background, kinship affiliation, and traditional residence patterns still play a role even within the urban context and indeed may provide the basis for organizations which appear at first sight to be essentially Western.[10]

There is a growing recognition of the yawning gulf between the intimate tribe and the remote nation in traditional societies, and increased attention to the problem of how to bridge the gulf.[11]

[7]See Robert A. Lystad, "The Tribe in Modernizing Africa," *SAIS Review,* Winter 1964, pp. 27-33.

[8]K. A. Busia, *Africa in Search of Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 111.

[9]Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review,* March 1968, pp. 70-71. This excellent essay is documented from political, psychological and anthropological sources.

[10]Busia, *op. cit.,* pp. 117-118. The citation from the study is found in Philip J. Foster, *Education and Social Change in Ghana* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 301.

[11]For a summary of the problem, see Douglas E. Ashford, "How Non-Western are the New Nations?," *World Politics,* January 1962, pp. 364-374.

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In regard to the goals of encouraging national identity and building a modern state, colonial rule can be criticized for showing too much respect for indigenous institutions. Albert Meister, a sociologist, said the

> colonial adventure was incomplete in effecting social change, and African societies might now be in a better position for "take-off" if colonial exploitation had been harder on them—if the colonial powers had done the nasty work of destroying traditional structures and had engendered men socially and psychologically prepared to build a new society.[12]

Since the colonial authorities were not "nasty" enough, the new African leaders find themselves in the awkward position of being "nationalists without nations,"[13] presiding over tribally fractured states.

A cohesive national identity is an asset in building an effective African state, but its absence is not an insurmountable obstacle. Almond and Coleman note that while the multiplicity of tribes tends to "retard the process of national unification," this is not necessarily a barrier to the state's survival or "the creation of a broader political nationality. Indeed, the larger their number and the smaller their size, the better are the chances of effective amalgamation. Moreover, it could be argued that such a rich pluralism makes dictatorship less likely by providing countervailing power centers."[14] In Nigeria, large tribal communities which saw one another as rivals were the primary cause of the challenge to the central government that erupted into bloody civil war.

Though the tribal situation differs from country to country, every African state including Ethiopia, but excepting Somalia, must confront the stark reality of ethnic fragmentation. In terms of state survival the immediate answer is a central government strong enough to impose its will on all groups within its territory. In terms of developing a cohesive state, the long-range answer lies in detribalization, the slow painful process of replacing primordial loyalties and habits with increasing participation in a new, larger, pluralistic social-political community.

Contemporary African leaders, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it, operate from the "premise that the various ethnic groups

[12]Quoted in Helen Kitchen, editor, *Footnotes to the Congo Story* (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), p. 161.

[13]The term was suggested by the title of Victor Alba's book on Latin America, *Nationalists Without Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1968).

[14]Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 301.

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. . . can and should reconcile their differences within present national boundaries and in the process build national identities reflecting African values and African necessities."[15] But there is no assurance that a larger identity will be realized in all areas of tropical Africa. Crawford Young speaks of the "myth" of detribalization and warns that urbanization is not synonymous with Europeanization.[16] Emerson notes that the transition from tribe to modern nation in Africa "is very much more difficult now than it was for the Western peoples and states" which moved "by gradual stages under far easier conditions."[17] In view of the burdens of instant independence and other difficulties, it would be foolhardy to assume that the statehood experiment will produce no failures. If any African state, large or small, fails to meet the minimum requirements of the modern world, it may well retrogress into a cultural-political situation approximating the tribal fragmentation and conflict of the precolonial era.

The Relevance and Limits of Western Norms

The supra-tribal territorial state in tropical Africa is a pure European import, a bequest of Western political experience accepted without question by the indigenous politicians. The state is an alien institution in black Africa, alien in concept, function and external manifestation. Yet in spite of their ambiguity toward the West—a product of the colonial period and the trauma of independence—the great majority of African leaders are attempting to develop modern states.

A distinction should be made between maintaining a *minimum state* and moving toward a *mature state*. A minimum state, by definition, may be poor, weak and economically stagnant, but it manages to survive because its central government is not seriously challenged from within and it is sustained from without by nonhostile neighbors, foreign assistance, and a balance of power in the area. The foreign policy of a minimum state is inward oriented, largely confined to rhetoric, vote trading in the UN General Assembly, and efforts to get as much external material assistance as possible.

Movement toward a mature state is characterized by economic

[15] *Department of State Bulletin*, October 7, 1968, p. 353.
[16] Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); see especially "The Challenge of Cultural Pluralism," pp. 232-240.
[17] Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

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growth and political development in the direction of stronger and more representative government. Many Third World countries are minimum states and are probably destined to remain so for the foreseeable future. Most new states in Africa aspire to become active mature states, though none has yet achieved this objective. The problem is one of movement and resources, not the ideal goal.

The most immediate and urgent political task is that of "state-preserving"[18] as distinct from the longer-range task of state-building. State-building implies movement from a minimum state to a mature state. Any state, minimum or mature, must have a system of political authority and sanctions capable of protecting its people from internal and external dangers, though in the latter task the assistance of other friendly states may be required.

Political development may be defined broadly to include the disciplines of state-preserving and state-building, involving efforts to strengthen the government's capacity to maintain security and the movement toward a more just, responsible and democratic exercise of power. The first task of government is to govern. From the standpoint of Western values, the second task of government is to govern justly, and its third task is to govern democratically. However, since Western values and political institutions are recent and alien influences in tropical Africa, we must guard against imposing Western norms upon the new states or using Western categories in analyzing them. Zolberg warns that external political forms in Africa are often deceptive:

> . . . although we can refer to the existence of "states" and "regimes" in Africa, we must be careful not to infer from these labels that their governments necessarily have authority over the entire country, any more than we can safely infer from the persistence of these countries as sovereign entities . . . a sense of community and the ability of authorities to enforce cohesion against a people's will.[19]

Indigenous and Imported Elements

All cultures and political systems develop from indigenous and borrowed roots and resources. In tropical Africa, where the state itself is an imported institution, there is great dependence on the outside for its survival and development. The extent of this dependence on "imported" resources and borrowed disciplines

[18]Harold K. Jacobson suggested this useful term in "ONUC's Civilian Operations: State-Preserving and State-Building," *World Politics,* October 1964, pp. 75-107.

[19]Zolberg, *op. cit.,* p. 72.

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becomes even more evident against the background of indigenous barriers to effective state-building, most of which are related directly or indirectly to the persistence of tribal identity, thought-forms and habits in the overwhelming mass of the people.

Tribal identity, expressed in the form of special preferences for tribal brothers, often subverts loyal service to the state by partially Westernized African politicians who constitute the majority of the ruling elite. This leads to widespread nepotism in government and, along with a kind of avarice that crops up among leaders during periods of great political change, contributes to a high level of corruption.[20] Superstition and magic have also played a significant political role in Africa, particularly in the Congo during the 1964 rebellion.[21]

In sharp contrast to Western culture, traditional African society tends to be static, with a strong resistance to change, innovation and adaptation. This passivity has been celebrated in three lines of the well-known poem by Aimée Césaire in praise of Negritude:

> Hurrah for those who never invented anything;
> Hurrah for those who never explored anything;
> Hurrah for those who never conquered anything; . . .[22]

This massive inertia, only superficially eroded by the colonial period and the first years of independence, will have a profound effect on political and economic development for a long time to come. Rudyard Kipling's epitaph: "A Fool lies here who tried to hustle the East," in *The Naulahka,* is even more appropriate to Africa than to Asia.

On the positive side is the tiny but slowly growing indigenous elite, varying in size and competence from country to country, which includes many top politicians, military officers, civil servants, professional people and businessmen. This largely Westernized elite is more dynamic than the mass and more

[20]J. S. Nye maintains that certain types of corruption under certain circumstances can contribute to constructive political achievement. See his "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review,* June 1967, pp. 417-427. Albert O. Hirschman also takes a relaxed attitude toward certain kinds of corruption in societies where "corruption is rampant," in his *Development Projects Observed* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967); see especially "Latitude for Corruption," pp. 107-112.

[21]See *Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic, and Other Psychological Phenomena and their Implications on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo,* a twelve-page memorandum prepared by James R. Price and Paul Jureidini, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, August 8, 1964, at the request of the U.S. Department of the Army.

[22]Quoted by Guy Hunter, *The New Societies of Tropical Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 324. See also his concluding chapter, "The Quality of African Societies," pp. 316-347.

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detribalized than the urban dweller or educated villager. It is the chief generator of rising expectations.

Most of the modernized leaders recognize the need for continuing external resources, are eager to use these resources, and believe they can do so without compromising their political integrity. A notable example is Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, President of Malawi.[23] It must also be said that many African leaders suffer from an ambivalence toward the West, in some respects like that of an adolescent attempting to establish a separate identity from his parents. Most African leaders both recognize and resent their continued dependence on Europe and the United States. Many of them have a profound inferiority feeling which is sometimes expressed in public criticism of Western practices they associate, justifiably or unjustifiably, with racial discrimination or "colonialism." The strident outcry against the humanitarian Belgian-American mission to rescue some 2,000 foreigners held hostage by communist-supported rebels in the Congo in November 1964 was a dramatic manifestation of this inferiority complex along with certain political factors.[24]

A minority of the elite is fully or partially alienated from the values and institutions of the democratic West, but committed to the goals of economic development. A few have turned to communist states for economic advice and assistance. For historical and pragmatic reasons even these leaders find it difficult to avoid substantial reliance on Western aid, talent, and ways of doing things.

Africa holds vast untapped human and natural resources. Only further education or economic opportunity will release the latent productivity of the millions of village tribesmen. The semi-detribalized African—the product of European industry or Christian missions—represents an asset and a liability. Standing bewildered between two vastly different worlds, he is a marginal man, semi-literate, confused, and often restless. His precarious identity between the static mass and the more dynamic elite can be exploited by rabble-rousing politicians or be eased by gainful employment or fuller participation in the nascent political community.

Tropical African economies are very poor and growing very

[23]See his interview, "A Black Ruler Tells Why Africa Needs the Whites," in *U.S. News and World Report*, May 13, 1968, pp. 64-68.

[24]Washington and Brussels were accused of "wanton aggression," "deliberate genocide" and "massive cannibalism" by African spokesmen at the United Nations.

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slowly. The per capita GNP grew at a rate of about 1.4 per cent a year in constant prices between 1957 and 1966, from approximately $112 to $129.[25] The mass of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the potential for commercial farming, mining and light industry is great, given the necessary external assistance. Medical and health standards are rising slowly. Africa does not yet suffer from serious overpopulation. Though various manifestations of tribalism, including communal land tenure, traditional authority and the economic obligations of the extended family, are continuing obstacles to economic development, Africa is fortunately not saddled by a widespread caste system such as that in India or with an imported feudal structure as in some Latin American countries, both of which have frustrated productivity.

Political stability, so essential to constructive development, is the product of internal and external factors, the latter including appropriate forms of economic, military and police assistance. All these new states, as well as Liberia and Ethiopia, must import a wide range of human and material resources—capital goods, consumer goods, arms, and technical and managerial skills—through a variety of channels, e.g., grant aid, loans, trade, private investment, and technical advice from visiting experts or resident expatriates. The 200,000 or more Europeans who decided to stay on after independence day have performed an invaluable service. This heavy degree of dependence of nominally independent states is probably without parallel in history. The education of Africans will slowly change the picture. Of the approximately 7,000 African students in the United States in 1968, more than half are expected to return to serve their countries. Some 600 military personnel a year return after receiving U.S. training in specialized skills.

External material assistance can help to maintain a minimum state indefinitely, but it cannot provide those essential internal requisites of character, skill and dedication which alone can produce a strong and viable state. Underlining this fact, Busia has called attention to a passage from Plato's *Protagoras* in which Prometheus gave the "mechanical arts" and fire to men, but failed to provide "political wisdom"; with food to nourish their bodies but without

[25]U.S. Congress, Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1968*, Part 2, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968. Testimony of Joseph Palmer, II, March 13, 1968, p. 344.

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the "art of government," men proceeded to destroy themselves.[26]

The Army—Neglected Factor

Among the increasing number of theories that attempt to explain the complex process of political development, scholars have identified stages, priority elements or key factors, and some have even attempted quantification and prediction. The great bulk of research has focused on economic factors, often under the false assumption that economic development automatically leads to desirable political development. In 1961 Chief H. O. Davies of Nigeria expressed a view commonly held at that time: "Economic development is the natural way of adjusting a traditional society to the exacting demands of a modern democratic way of life."[27] But there are too many intangible and unpredictable variables in the formula for desirable political change to establish reliable correlations between measurable economic factors (such as GNP, per capita income, annual growth rate, or the percentage of the population in industry) and political behavior. Politics is more an art than a science.

Recently more attention has been given to noneconomic elements in the politics (and even the economics) of developing states—tribal, kinship and identity questions; literacy and education; elite-mass analyses; and the persistence of tradition. Some studies have examined the impact of religion, superstition, magic, nepotism and corruption. Political parties, political elites, political communication and the formal instruments of government inherited from the colonial power have also been studied.

In this burgeoning literature almost no attention has been given to what is perhaps the most consequential factor: the army. The rash of coups, conflict and chaos in tropical Africa has belatedly focused attention on the political role of the military. The neglect of the army as an actor in the political drama must be attributed to a strong academic prejudice against the military as an institution and a preoccupation with economic and other familiar noncoercive factors. Lucian Pye notes that until recently scholars assumed

> the future of newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing

[26]Quoted in Busia, *op. cit.*, p. ix.
[27]Quoted with apparent approval by Arnold Rivkin, *The African Presence in World Affairs* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. xvii.

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Communist parties. It occurred to few students . . . that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation-building.[28]

In tropical Africa, where many of the nonmilitary institutions such as political parties or labor unions are either weak or nonexistent, the military assumes an even more important political role than in Asia and Latin America. As Crawford Young observes: "In any political community lacking in consensus, a sense of its identity, and adequate legitimation for its political structures, the role of force must necessarily be large."[29]

There are important differences among the present African armies, but they tend to be the most detribalized, Westernized, modernized, integrated and cohesive institutions in their states, chiefly because they were created by the European powers to maintain security in the former colonies. As a community of command and obedience, the army is usually the most disciplined agency in the country. It often enjoys a greater sense of national identity than other institutions which are more tribally, regionally or economically based. In terms of technical skills, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, it is the most modernized agency. It is the "best organized trade union,"[30] a potent pressure group competing for its slice of the meager state budget.

A more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the constitution or the parliament, the army often evokes more "popular" sentiment than a bland or incompetent political leader. The officer corps is an important and conspicuous component of the tiny ruling elite. In trim and colorful uniforms the army marches on independence day and its top brass stand with the head of state and prime minister on the reviewing platform. The political leaders understand only too well their dependence on the loyalty and effectiveness of the army in upholding their authority and putting down any major challenge to the regime.

On independence day the African armies were essentially nonpolitical and nonconspiratorial. They had not been identified with individuals or groups calling for independence, nor had they taken part in events preceding the transfer of authority, except in a few cases to restore order during small disturbances. Their European and African officers fully expected to continue serving the new regime as they had the old. The African officers accepted the

[28]Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, editor, *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 69.
[29]Young, *op. cit.*, p. 438.
[30]Zolberg, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

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Western doctrines of civilian supremacy and a nonpolitical army. They learned by example of the colonial powers and by precept at Sandhurst and St. Cyr, where many of them were trained.

Virtually all African armies have continued to rely heavily on European officers and advisers and on material support from the former metropolitan power. Even in those countries where the Africanization of the officer ranks was most advanced, such as Ghana and Nigeria, European officers continued to predominate in top command and training positions during the first several years of independence. All officers and most NCO's in the Congo were Belgian on independence day. As late as the end of 1968 all the top command positions in Zambia's army were held by British officers. The highest Zambian officer was a major. Though the top positions in the armies of Kenya and Tanzania had been Africanized by 1968, both governments employed high-level British officers as military advisers.

During and following the traumatic transition from colony to state in most African countries the army was the strongest symbol of continuity between the old and the new orders. When the frail and inexperienced regimes could not withstand the centrifugal forces unleashed by the withdrawal of externally imposed restraints, the military in a dozen states moved in to fill the vacuum. The circumstances varied widely, but in those where military initiative appeared justified to save the state from disintegration, as in the Congo, or from dictatorship, as in Ghana, the officers were obviously uncomfortable in their unexpected role. Even in the islands of relative stability such as Kenya and the Ivory Coast, the army came to realize that simply by performing its classic function it was in fact acting politically by "siding" with the regime against its active or latent opponents.

While playing its traditional role, the army is involved in a range of activities which have political consequences. Its behavior has an impact for good or ill on maintaining the state, building national cohesiveness, upholding the regime, and on the direction and effectiveness of major domestic and foreign policies. This is not the place to evaluate the contribution of tropical Africa's armies to state-building, but in anticipation of findings emerging from my current study on the role of the army in Ghana, the Congo and Ethiopia, I am prepared to say that the net impact of the military establishment in these three countries has been constructive.

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The United States Interest

Formally nonaligned, the states of tropical Africa tend to lean one way or the other in the East-West struggle and shift direction from time to time. During the past decade a majority of them were moderate and inclined toward the West. A minority were militant, i.e., they welcomed a significant degree of political and economic influence from communist states (usually without precluding Western diplomatic recognition or material assistance) and occasionally indulged in strident anti-Western rhetoric. Mali, Guinea and Ghana have been militant in the past, and more recently Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania assumed that posture. Conversely, a moderate government is willing to accept substantial Western advice and assistance, though it may receive some communist aid. Liberia, Ethiopia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Congo (Kinshasa) have been fairly steady moderates.

African neutralism, like Asian neutralism, is not based on a political or moral principle, but is a pragmatic response to the realities of world politics.[31] A neutralist leader seeks to remain aloof from external struggles that do not bear upon his immediate interests; he does not want his country to become a political battleground for two alien adversaries. President Kenyatta once said: "When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers; and when East and West are struggling in Africa, it is Africa that suffers."[32] Kenyatta's observation is selectively valid. Peaceful competition between Washington and Moscow, for example, has doubtless increased economic aid to Africa.

With respect to American political, strategic and economic interests, Africa ranks below Europe, Asia and Latin America, and tropical Africa ranks below the African states bordering on the Mediterranean and the Republic of South Africa.[33] U.S. policy toward Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, seeks to augment the forces of stability and peaceful change. The absence of armed

[31]The political and psychological bases of Afro-Asian neutralism are elaborated in Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Laurence W. Martin, editor, *Neutralism and Non-Alignment* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 115-120.

[32]*New York Times,* April 12, 1961.

[33]See Noel Mostert, "High Stakes Southeast of Suez," *The Reporter,* March 7, 1968, pp. 17-20, and E. S. Virpsha, "Strategic Importance of South Africa," *NATO's Fifteen Nations,* February-March 1967, pp. 37-43. Economically South Africa is more important than tropical Africa. U.S. private investment in the Republic of South Africa in 1966 was $601 million, compared with $1.5 billion for the rest of the continent, including North Africa. South Africa produces 95 per cent of all gold mined in Africa and approximately 75 per cent of the known world production.

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conflict is regarded as a contribution to the balance of power in the larger world and a prerequisite to constructive economic and political development. To discourage secession, civil war and fragmentation, Washington opposes military intervention by African and non-African governments in African affairs. Opposed to secessionist Katanga and Biafra, the United States did not become directly involved in either conflict, but did provide military equipment and logistical support for the UN force which ended Katanga's secession in January 1963.

American policy is designed to encourage the development of moderate governments that respond to the needs of their people and maintain normal relations with the industrial states of the East and West. To this end Washington has provided a modest amount of economic, technical and military assistance. The major complaint of the great majority of African leaders is that Washington has given only a small portion of the material aid they want.

The U.S. posture and commitment in tropical Africa is in part a response to the behavior of the communist states and their allies. Active Soviet intervention in the Congo in 1960, for example, virtually assured U.S. involvement which, as it turned out, succeeded in frustrating Soviet and Chinese designs there. Russell Warren Howe has observed: "The cold war has been the sinews of African diplomacy: if the U.S. and Russia were 'on the same side,' Africa's leverage on them would sink toward the pathetic level of its economic and military power."[34] Because of its internal weakness tropical Africa is still a "female" region, often the residual legatee of larger decisions.

In this arena of competition, new to both superpowers, Moscow has had a more turbulent experience than Washington. Viewing rapid decolonization as a historic opportunity to assist key new states on the road to revolutionary socialism, the Soviet Union invested substantial resources and prestige in the first years of independence. Communist propaganda exploited the African ambivalence toward the West, accusing the United States and the former metropolitan powers of "racism" and "neo-colonialism." In Ghana and the Congo, where Moscow made its greatest efforts, it attempted to "radicalize" the political situation by the classic communist tactics of subversion, including trade, loans, military

[34]Russell Warren Howe, "China as the Trump in the African Pack," *New Republic,* September 5, 1964, p. 16.

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aid and bribery.[35] William Atwood, former U.S. ambassador to Guinea and Kenya, says the activities of the "Soviet KGB and other Communist intelligence services . . . are both far-flung and intensive. Between 60 and 70 per cent of all Soviet-bloc diplomatic personnel in Asia and Africa are intelligence agents in disguise. And among Communist newsmen, the proportion is even higher."[36]

Heavy-handed Soviet penetration resulted in the expulsion of the Soviet diplomatic mission from the Congo in 1960 and again in 1963, and was a key factor in prompting the military and the police to overthrow Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966. These severe political setbacks, together with the widening Sino-Soviet rift, forced the Kremlin to reappraise its policy and tactics in tropical Africa.[37] Consequently, Moscow has revised its expectations sharply downward, has not overtly supported direct subversive activity against tropical African regimes since 1965, and has channeled its weapons and training assistance to guerrilla groups, primarily those seeking to overthrow "white regimes." Moscow prefers to use client states for subversive activities rather than to operate directly as it did earlier in the Congo.[38] Though they are more pragmatic and less doctrinaire than they were in 1960, the Soviets still supplement their diplomatic and trade relations with quiet, long-range infiltration efforts. Large-scale investments of rubles and prestige have been replaced by behavior approximating traditional diplomacy.

In sharp contrast, Peking has taken up the revolutionary cause in Africa where Moscow left off. China (sometimes with the help of Cuba, Algeria or the UAR) supported the 1963-1965 rebel movement in the Congo. It has been active, sometimes with the support of the regime, in Nkrumah's Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. Red China provides material support and some political direction to the more

[35]For a systematic account of Soviet and Communist Chinese goals and policies in tropical Africa, see Fritz Schatten, *Communism in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

[36]William Atwood, "A Few Kind Words for the CIA," *Look*, April 18, 1967, pp. 70-71. See also Atwood's *The Reds and the Blacks* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 17-19 and 296-297.

[37]See Zbigniew Brzezinski, editor, *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1964, pp. 640-654; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Soviet Strategy in Africa," *Africa Report,* November 1960, p. 5 ff.; and Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 168-184.

[38]See Colonel Donald H. Humphries, *The East African Liberation Movement* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1965).

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militant guerrilla groups. In Africa, Peking regards the Soviet Union and the United States as its two principal adversaries and as the two chief obstacles to its version of "national liberation" north and south of the Zambezi.[39] It has encountered serious difficulties with the governments of post-Nkrumah Ghana, Burundi and Kenya.

Though basic U.S. goals in Africa remain unchanged, the volume of economic and security assistance has leveled off since the mid-1960's. This reduced effort, like that of the Soviet Union, is a reflection of realities in Africa and the larger world. The earlier expectations of both Moscow and Washington have been chastened by the intractability of the African political problem and the severe limits of the political and economic absorptive capacity of its new states. Both powers now operate under a more sober assessment of tropical Africa's strategic value. The reduced interest and commitment of each induces the other to move in the same direction. On the U.S. side the changing mood of the Cold War, including the Viet Nam problem, has forced a reappraisal and cutback of U.S. foreign aid across the board. In 1966 President Johnson requested Edward M. Korry, then ambassador to Ethiopia, to spell out the implications of these factors for the African scene. The resulting "Korry Report," whose findings have been largely adopted, recommended the establishment of priority states to receive U.S. bilateral aid, emphasized regional economic cooperation in the area, and encouraged the transfer of resources to Africa through multilateral organizations.[40] Washington continues to urge the former metropolitan powers and other industrial states to continue or increase their assistance.

The new and more realistic approach toward Africa developed during the last two Johnson years will doubtless be pursued by the incoming Nixon Administration. This new look can be construed as a "triumph of the realists over the romantics," to use the words of one high U.S. official. In any event, policies rooted in a sober assessment of African realities will better serve American interests and the interests of the fledgling states than policies flowing from extravagant expectations.

[39]For brief accounts of Chinese policy and tactics in Africa, see Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategy Priorities," *Africa Report,* January 1965, pp. 19-21; "China: A Revolution for Export," *Mizan* (London), March-April 1967, pp. 80-86; George T. Yu, "China's Failure in Africa," *Asian Survey,* August 1966, pp. 461-468. See also John K. Cooley, *East Wind Over Africa: Red China's Offensive* (New York: Walker and Company, 1965).

[40]*New York Times,* September 4, 1966. See also Anthony Astrachan, "AID Reslices the Pie," *Africa Report,* June 1967, pp. 8-15.

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THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: A STEP TOWARD PEACE*

by Curtin Winsor, Jr.

THE Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) represents man's latest effort to achieve political control on a global scale over the destructive potential of his science and technology. It is also a step toward the stabilization of the international political environment, increasingly affected by modern technology with its swift communications and increased dangers from weapons of mass destruction.

In recent years we have witnessed the success of international efforts to achieve political consensus on security matters of marginal importance to most nations, for example, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. In addition, the three principal possessors of nuclear weapons (the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR) have been willing to accept restrictions on their nuclear testing programs in the interests of arms control and as concessions to the health of the planet's population. In the instance of the NPT, certain nonnuclear-weapon nations will be required to abstain from developing or purchasing nuclear arms at great monetary savings to themselves, while averting the risks to themselves implicit in the unrestricted spread of nuclear weapons. This article is founded on the assumption that the NPT is a reasonable and timely proposition, within a realistic framework of political consensus at home and abroad, for the establishment of international control over nuclear technology and weapons.

PERSPECTIVES

The basic issues which might be expected to determine a nation's attitude toward the NPT are (1) whether it is consistent with national security interests; (2) whether it will effectively carry out its own objective of halting the spread of nuclear weapons; and (3) whether technical objections to the NPT, primarily concerning safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear en-

*The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the U.S. government.

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ergy, are valid and thus seriously vitiate the main purpose of the treaty.

The objective of halting the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nations which currently possess them has been affirmed repeatedly in the United Nations by both nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states. On behalf of the United States, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon[1] have all sought agreements to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. That highest priority in the past several years has been given to conclusion of an NPT is illustrated by the unanimous support given to Senate Resolution 179 of 1966 (the Pastore Resolution), which commended the President for his efforts to negotiate an international agreement limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The question of proliferation of nuclear weapons by the United States to nonnuclear-weapon allies is virtually academic. U.S. atomic energy legislation prohibits transfer of control over nuclear weapons to foreign governments and requires guarantees on transfers of nuclear materials and equipment to nonnuclear-weapon states to ensure that they will not be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In view of this legislation and the commitment to nonproliferation reiterated by successive U.S. administrations, it is highly unrealistic to consider as valid an option under which Washington would assist nonnuclear-weapon countries to obtain nuclear weapons.

The U.S. policy favoring nonproliferation is based on the premise that the spread of nuclear weapons to friendly as well as hostile countries would be detrimental to the fundamental security interests of this country. Even though an "nth" country might not have sufficient capability to launch a major strike against the United States, it might be able to engage in nuclear blackmail against other nations. One could never wholly dismiss the possibility that such a nation might—however irrationally—decide to stage a nuclear attack on U.S. armed forces overseas or even against the United States itself, at a not inconsequential cost to this country. While such a possibility is highly unlikely, there is a far more realistic danger that smaller powers could become in-

[1]President Nixon's recommendation to the U.S. Senate, on February 5, 1969, read: "After receiving the advice of the National Security Council, I have decided that it will serve the national interest to proceed with the ratification of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accordingly, I request that the Senate act promptly to consider the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification."

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volved in a conflict with each other which could threaten to draw their Great Power protectors into a general nuclear holocaust.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons to our allies would not enhance U.S. security. While some of NATO's European members have sought greater influence over matters of nuclear strategy, there has been no demand for nuclear weapons by the nonnuclear-weapon members of the alliance. Even under the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposals, there was no intention to permit control over use of nuclear weapons to pass from the NATO nuclear-weapon states, for it is a basic tenet of U.S. foreign policy that any advantage gained by transferring nuclear weapons to nonnuclear-weapon allies would be far outweighed by the leverage thereby granted to these allies for involving the United States in a nuclear conflict.

The Nonproliferation Treaty should be at least as important to the nonnuclear-weapon states as it is to the United States and the USSR. The successful implementation of the NPT would substantially reduce the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons among rival nations in the less stable regions of the globe, for in the event of a nuclear conflict at the regional level these powers would be the net losers. This aspect of the problem has been frequently overlooked by those nonnuclear-weapon states which have been inclined to view the treaty as requiring a sacrifice or deprivation on their part.

With few exceptions, it is highly improbable that any nonnuclear-weapon state could, in the foreseeable future, mount a sufficient nuclear capability to challenge or offset a threat from the United States or the USSR. While the desire of certain states (e.g., India) to counter the Chinese communist nuclear threat is understandable, it is pertinent to ask whether these countries could ever achieve the capability to offset this threat. The guarantees provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella to its allies and the commitment of the United States and the USSR under the UN Charter, buttressed by Security Council Resolution 255,[2] to nonnuclear-weapon countries, affords a greater assurance of security than any attempt to develop an offsetting nuclear capability.

The development of a nuclear capability by an nth country would almost certainly increase the likelihood of a decision by a regional rival also to go nuclear, thereby increasing the possibility

[2]This resolution is a pledge by the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to nonnuclear-weapon parties that are victims of nuclear aggression or blackmail.

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of nuclear conflict—especially in those areas where vital national interests are directly engaged and where national leaders have not had the long-standing, sobering responsibility of control over nuclear weapons which the United States and the Soviet Union have had. Moreover, in several regions actual or suspected development of a nuclear-weapon capability could be considered sufficiently provocative to invite a preemptive attack by rival nations.

In addition to the NPT's security benefits, it provides a basis for détente and a framework within which the nuclear-weapon states can take substantial strides toward damping the nuclear arms race without the complications of proliferation. The failure to implement the NPT would materially weaken the incentive to reduce arms and vastly complicate future U.S.-USSR negotiations for strategic missile limitations. The recent agreement in principle for discussions on this subject between Washington and Moscow probably would not have materialized had the NPT not been successfully negotiated and signed.

Issues

The questions some critics have raised concerning the NPT have been technical in nature and have served to mask national political interests. They fall under five categories: (1) safeguards and verification, including the question of industrial espionage; (2) the professed need of some countries for unrestricted supplies of enriched nuclear fuels for peaceful purposes; (3) the conditions pertaining to the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in nonnuclear-weapon states; (4) security assurances and the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (5) matters of national interest, such as whether nuclear weapons, in addition to possessing strategic utility, are necessary attributes of national sovereignty, and whether nuclear weapons have such value that their denial constitutes a meaningful sacrifice for a modern state.

Safeguards

The most frequently raised issue with regard to the NPT is the politically sensitive matter of safeguards, of verifying that nuclear reactor facilities for electric power production and for research and development are not applied to the fabrication of nuclear weapons. Safeguards must provide for international accountability of the nuclear materials used, produced and processed by a state's peaceful nuclear activities.

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The United States has followed a policy of encouraging the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom) to administer safeguards through agreements with their respective member countries. This policy parallels efforts by Britain, Canada and others and has been largely responsible for the general acceptability of both inspection systems.

The safeguards provision of the NPT, contained in Article III, provides the means whereby nonnuclear-weapon states, party to the treaty, may work out agreements with the IAEA to ensure that source or special fissionable material is not diverted to the production of weapons. The IAEA has already demonstrated competence in administering safeguards on nuclear activities in over thirty countries and, with increased financial and manpower resources, should have no difficulty in implementing Article III of the treaty.

It has been argued that the IAEA cannot prevent a determined effort by a party to undertake clandestine weapons development, nor would it have any competence to prevent transfer of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear-weapon parties. These objections miss the point of the safeguards issue, since the latter were designed to detect, not to prevent, the diversion of nuclear materials. Since the widespread application of safeguards will certainly assist in the detection of treaty violations, they will act as deterrents to such violations, and thereby advance the objective of nonproliferation.

Some nonnuclear-weapon states criticize the treaty's safeguards not so much because they might be ineffective, but rather because they might be too intrusive and pose an impediment to peaceful development in the nuclear energy field. Obligations undertaken by these states under the NPT would not in fact be substantially more extensive than those already accepted by most countries receiving nuclear material and equipment. The United States has already transferred safeguards responsibility to the IAEA for eighteen of its peaceful-uses agreements with those countries to which it supplies nuclear material and equipment. The IAEA safeguards system can be expected to take into account future technical developments by keeping its agreements as simple as possible while remaining effective and aiding the development of peaceful-uses technology.

Some have alleged that Article III is discriminatory since it ap-

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plies only to the nonnuclear-weapon parties. The treaty does not call for safeguards to be applied in the territory of the nuclear powers since it does not limit the production of nuclear weapons by these parties. Despite the absence of treaty obligations, however, the United States and Great Britain have voluntarily agreed to place a broad range of peaceful nuclear activities under the safeguards called for by Article III, as soon as the NPT safeguards are applied. This offer should overcome many of the objections that the safeguards are discriminatory.

Nations also question whether the safeguards and verification can be easily circumvented. This problem arises from the "undeveloped" IAEA mandate to implement the safeguards under Article III. Such questions and reservations are premature, and will continue to be so until the IAEA provisions have been developed. It is inaccurate and misleading to claim arbitrarily that the IAEA is inadequate to handle the safeguards and verification tasks specified by the NPT. Voluntary inspection provisions sponsored by the United States and Great Britain have considerably augmented the agency's capabilities and led to the development of a workable safeguards and verification system now being used in over thirty countries. The IAEA system can be improved, but today it is clearly the best we have; the IAEA stands as the only international organization able to begin the task of supervising NPT safeguards.

The important problems of industrial espionage, the adequacy of IAEA procedures, and discrimination in favor of nuclear-weapon states reflect the political anxieties of several nonnuclear-weapon states which are bargaining for a weak treaty that can be more easily reconciled to their respective national interests. Representatives of these states fear that the application of safeguards as stipulated by the treaty could permit possible espionage by IAEA inspectors. The result would be commercial discrimination against the nonnuclear-weapon states.

This is not a convincing objection to the treaty. To begin with, the information needed by the IAEA's inspectors would be similar to that which these countries would make public as a consequence of engaging in an export market. Moreover, the IAEA system contains protective provisions to assure that participating nations do not have to admit a given inspector if for some reason he is considered unacceptable, and that the information revealed to the inspectors would be closely guarded within the IAEA Secretariat. In

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addition, there is an explicit IAEA prohibition against any kind of interference by its inspectors with regard to the construction or operation of any inspected facility.

The Common Market states of Western Europe have had reservations about the NPT transcending national interests. The European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom) has been coordinating nuclear activities for its members since 1958, has developed safeguards capabilities and techniques, and represents European regional interests in the nuclear field. Euratom countries have expressed concern that the application of IAEA safeguards might lead to the erosion of Euratom's functions. The NPT negotiations were delayed for several months in an effort to reach agreement on an Article III which would be satisfactory to Euratom members as well as other nonnuclear-weapon states. According to the interpretive statements made by the U.S. representative to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) on January 18, 1968, the IAEA safeguards will be administered in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary duplication of Euratom's present arrangements by making appropriate use of its safeguards and existing records—provided that, under mutually agreed arrangements, the IAEA is satisfied that nuclear material is not being diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Euratom countries are thereby assured that NPT safeguards will not duplicate or replace their own. As this matter now stands, member nations will probably use Euratom as their vehicle for joint negotiations with the IAEA.

The treaty provides for safeguards, including arrangements between IAEA and Euratom, and thus will expedite the movement of nuclear materials for peaceful uses between the signatory states to the treaty. Up to now the introduction of IAEA safeguarded materials into the Euratom Community has been a problem, due to the exclusive operation of the two control systems. The treaty would resolve it by providing for an exchange of nuclear materials between non-Euratom countries subject to IAEA controls and those countries operating within the Euratom framework.

Access to Fuel

Some nonnuclear-weapon states have argued that the treaty will hinder their peaceful nuclear programs because the nuclear-weapon powers presently are the principal suppliers of nuclear fuel and consequently control its distribution. The treaty calls for

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the parties in a position to do so to cooperate in providing information, fuel and assistance to nonnuclear-weapon states. However, critics profess concern that the continued dominance of the nuclear-weapon states as the principal producers of peaceful-use fuels could retard the competitive position of nonweapon states in the field of peaceful nuclear research and development. They suggest that nuclear-weapon states should guarantee the nondiscriminatory availability of enriched fuel,[3] and demand that this fuel be provided cheaply and in unrestricted amounts to the developing nations which have ratified the treaty. Their demand is politically unrealistic on its face. The matter will perhaps be less important if and when the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and/or Japan successfully develop a centrifuge process for enriched uranium production. At the present time, however, it is clear that the NPT does not prevent nonweapon parties from developing their own facilities for the production of enriched uranium, so long as the treaty's safeguards are applied.

Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Explosive Devices

The NPT gives considerable attention to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosive devices (PNED's). It makes no distinction between a nuclear weapon and a PNED, since it is obvious that an explosive nuclear device intended for peaceful purposes can be used, or easily adapted to be used, as a weapon. Moreover, the technology required in manufacturing PNED's is indistinguishable from that required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. A treaty permitting the widespread and unrestricted acquisition of PNED's would have a loophole so large as to render it worthless. On the other hand, it is probable that PNED's will have economic utility in the future, and many nonnuclear-weapon states will feel that provision should be made for the application of such devices if and when they become commercially feasible.

The Foreign Minister of Brazil, who has treated peaceful uses as a major issue, cited it as one reason why his country did not sign the NPT last July. However, Article V is designed to offset the prohibition against manufacture of PNED's by nonnuclear-weapon states. It calls on the nuclear-weapon states adhering to the treaty to make explosives available at low cost, and stipulates

[3]Achille Albonetti, "Access for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States . . . to Technology for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" (A/Conf. 35/Document 2, July 3, 1968, a paper prepared for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States by the UN Secretary General).

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that explosions are to be conducted by the nuclear-weapon state that has produced the device.[4] Although the technical details for PNED arrangements remain to be worked out, it can be anticipated that provision of these explosives would constitute a substantial saving for the nonnuclear-weapon beneficiary state, for the estimated cost of developing a PNED capability would be similar to that of developing a nuclear weapons capability.

In any event, commercial use of nuclear explosives is not yet feasible for underground applications, and the application of the technology for large earth-moving purposes is rendered exceedingly difficult by the terms of the limited Test Ban Treaty. Considerable research on problems related to contamination of water tables and similar matters must still be conducted for the development of safe and useful underground applications of PNED's. Hence, for the present consideration of the NPT, the issue of the PNED as a possible "tool for national development" is still hypothetical; its invocation by certain nations suggests their emphasis on political motivations rather than technical problems.

Western Europe and NATO

There are few areas in the world which have more to gain from the realization of the NPT than Western Europe. The region is not characterized by expanding international interests and territorial objectives; local conflicts within its confines seem unlikely; and the United States and Great Britain continue to support strong security arrangements.

Critics who have recently been concerned about the survival of NATO today may be witnessing its rebirth. France, beset with economic difficulties, may become a more tractable partner and rediscover that its vital security interests are best served within the NATO community. The threatening posture of the USSR before, during and after the Czech invasion has reawakened members to their responsibilities, and President Nixon has made it clear that one of the primary foreign policy tenets of his administration will be to encourage the European members of NATO to play a greater role in the alliance.

The U.S. policy of arming NATO troops in Europe with

[4]Article V reads, in part, ". . . in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and . . . the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. . . ."

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nuclear weapons led the Soviet Union to charge that this was not compatible with the NPT. Washington replied that no inconsistency exists between the NPT and U.S. nuclear weapons arrangements with the NATO states. In addition, the United States has explicitly stated that the Soviet Union will not be permitted to use the NPT as a lever against NATO. The United States has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe, but they are under exclusive American control. The position of the United States, which has been made clear to the USSR, is that the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of allies does not constitute nuclear proliferation so long as custody over the weapons does not pass from the United States.

U.S. nuclear policy toward NATO has been successful in developing a framework for consultation and planning on nuclear force posture, deployment, strategy and tactics—in particular, the establishment of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. The Committee is open to any NATO member wishing to participate. Washington has made clear its position that the NPT would not in any way detract from or alter its existing consultative and planning arrangements with its NATO allies.

Security Assurances

The United States could not possibly have security alliances with all of the nonnuclear-weapon countries of the world, and many states do not wish to lose their nonaligned status by entering into a NATO-type arrangement with the United States. However, many of these states believe that if they give up the option to manufacture nuclear weapons, they might be defenseless in the face of nuclear aggression or blackmail. To meet this issue, the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution No. 255 of June 19, 1968 and issued accompanying declarations which announced their intention "to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance" to victims of nuclear aggression or the threat of such aggression that are nonnuclear-weapon parties to the treaty.

Some states have argued that the declaration is inadequate. However, most states, in reflecting on the basic question of whether the Nonproliferation Treaty enhances their security, seem to agree that the UN Security Council is the body with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council Resolution and declarations—supported by the three major nuclear-weapon states—are of consider-

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able political importance and contribute to an effective deterrent against the misuse of nuclear weapons.

National Interests

Some critics and opponents of the treaty contend that it places a burden of compliance upon the nonnuclear-weapon states while providing protection for the "monopoly of power" of the present nuclear-weapon states. Their argument usually cites the importance of nuclear weapons to national prestige or status in the high councils of international diplomacy, in alliance structures, and within geographic regions. They claim that the "sacrifice" demanded by the NPT of the nonnuclear-weapon states is not matched by their nuclear-weapon state counterparts: the result is discrimination directed against their national sovereignty by the denial of nuclear weapons, which they choose to construe as an attribute of sovereignty.

This position is founded upon a dubious premise, namely, that nuclear weapons capability, no matter how small, creates power and political, if not military, advantage. In rebuttal one can cite a lesson of modern history: the demonstrable strategic disutility of nuclear weapons as tools of limited warfare or effective foreign policy. In fact, the two powers which have had them in quantity have usually gone to extremes to avoid confrontations in which nuclear weapons might be used.

The position is even less defensible from a military or economic point of view. The cost of a program for fabricating five bombs a year, plus a nuclear weapons testing program that would *not* include a sophisticated delivery system (missile or high performance aircraft) would exceed $450 million, spread unevenly over a ten-year period.[5] For defensive or deterrent purposes against an attack by a more advanced nuclear power, such a minimal nuclear force supported by conventional military jet aircraft would probably not survive. Even if it did, it would represent a suicidal response, given lack of a credible escalatory capacity against an aggressor nation with greater nuclear-weapon capability and sophisticated delivery systems.

Most national interest arguments favoring the "right" of a nation to nuclear weapons seem to be related to international status. However, it also seems clear that the price of such status may be too high—in diverted resources and the heightened risk of war—for either the nations themselves or the international community to

[5]James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., editors, *Arms Control for the Late Sixties* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), p. xxxv.

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bear. Placed in a political balance of values, the questionable issue of status seems slight in contrast to the manifest advantages offered by nonproliferation.

Détente and the NPT

A highly debatable issue surrounding the NPT is whether it is a manifestation of growing détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. The détente-NPT link is disputed by those who acknowledge the validity of the détente as well as by those who deny that détente as such exists or is possible at the present time. Those who acknowledge that ratification and implementation of the NPT would represent another step in the U.S.-USSR détente can be divided into two categories.

The first group attributes détente to a natural congruence of interests between the two countries. The NPT is seen by them to be an exercise in national interest: "Collaboration between adversary states . . . in those areas of military policy that are thought to be of common or coincident interest to the parties concerned."[6] Behind this coincidence of interests lurks the fact that the two powers are each heavily involved with client states, whose regional disputes may directly implicate the superpowers themselves. Neither superpower relishes being caught as guarantor to a contentious or irrational state in an emotionally charged, and potentially nuclear, local conflict situation. According to this line of reasoning, détente is limited to risk reduction in the interests of regional stability—in the regions "guaranteed" by one or the other superpower.

The second group of détentists proclaims the NPT as the harbinger of a more general stabilization of the interests of the United States and the USSR. The proponents of this belief view the NPT as an emanation from broader underlying processes, a precursor to major arms control agreements, and possibly the development of a concert of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Opposition to the theory of détente and to the validity of the NPT as an arms control measure comes from those who view the treaty as a Trojan horse, designed by the Soviets for the purpose of weakening U.S. alliances and deluding U.S. policymakers into dropping their guard against the Soviet Union's goal of world dominance.

This writer does not view the NPT as a conscious step by either Washington or Moscow toward political rapprochement or

[6] *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

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harmony. Nor can he construe the NPT as an instrument guilefully designed to disrupt the alliances and political balances of the Western powers. Rather, the treaty seems to be a product of a realistic, but limited, international political consensus seeking to achieve greater stability and more far-reaching arms control arrangements for the development of international controls over weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusions

It can be said with some justification that the NPT is an acknowledgment of the inequality existing between sovereign states—an inequality that becomes more obvious when a few states possess nuclear weapons and the others are asked to forgo the opportunity to acquire them. However, it also seems obvious that the existing power structure will not be altered should the NPT come into force. The present major nuclear powers will continue to be preeminent, whether or not the treaty enters into force.

It has been axiomatic to the thesis of this article that nuclear weapons do not and will not advance the security interests of a state which does not currently possess a considerable number of these weapons together with credible and sophisticated systems for delivering them to their targets. Furthermore, nuclear weapons have not been used in combat since 1945, and the history of the recent decades demonstrates their disutility as tools for limited warfare and effective diplomacy. Without the NPT, the futile U.S.-USSR standoff at the nuclear level may be repeated in several regions and at untold cost, wastefully diverting the precious resources of the developing nations. It is this element of waste, compounded by the specter of international insecurity inherent in nuclear weapons proliferation, that makes the NPT essential to all nations.

That sovereign nations are basically not equal in military capabilities is hardly a new or startling idea. Yet, the existence of national pride and ambition has raised the political question of whether sovereign states must have nuclear weapons as token manifestations of their sovereignty. These political arguments are often masked by the economic issues related to the possession of nuclear explosives for peaceful developmental purposes. However, this issue is confronted by the fact that preponderant national security interests, especially those of the dominant nations in the present international system, need the NPT. Most nations are concerned with the security of the international system as a whole and have found the NPT to be a per-

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suasive and effective alternative to parochial and destabilizing forces.

The argument in favor of nuclear weapons as necessary attributes of national sovereignty does not make a persuasive case against the NPT. The economic benefits to be reaped by the nonnuclear-weapon states ratifying the treaty create a far more attractive alternative than the exercise of the sovereign right to acquire a nuclear arsenal.

These arguments in favor of the NPT also apply to the powerful nonnuclear-weapon states—the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan—which have considerable economic and military potential. They would find that involvement in the nuclear weapons race would create more problems than advantages for them even given their desire for national security and credible deterrence. It should not be forgotten that the miraculous development of these states has been at least partly due to the existence of a U.S. nuclear umbrella which made it unnecessary for them to divert valuable resources for costly weapons development.

By mid-February 1969, eighty-four nations had signed the NPT and nine (Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway and the United Kingdom) had deposited their instruments of ratification. If it is to come into force, the NPT must have the deposited ratifications of forty nations in addition to those of the nuclear-weapon signatories, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Political complications due to the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia and its threats against West Germany have been cited as the cause for delays in ratifying the treaty in the United States and in Europe. Ratification by the United States is considered to be the crucial move that would break the logjam of hesitant nations which would otherwise have signed and ratified the treaty. The NPT represents absolutely no liability to the United States, and it will not measurably affect its foreign policy flexibility. The benefits to be derived from the NPT by the United States are immense, especially as it will contribute to future international stability.

Aristotle once wrote that "In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish but should avoid impossibilities." The Nonproliferation Treaty is a step toward the ideal of control over nuclear weapons and eventually over all weapons of mass destruction. It is also a realistic step toward world peace and the security of nations.

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PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION THROUGH THE LEGAL CONTROL OF CHINA'S BOMB

by S. C. Yuter

THE spread of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to the survival of mankind. If proliferation is not halted, the probability of their eventual use will increase through a variety of incalculable contingencies: mistakes in predicting the response of an enemy to a limited war or blackmail; failure to exercise effective control over nuclear arsenals and their operators, increasing the chance that these weapons will fall into unauthorized and irresponsible hands; errors in tracing the source of a nuclear attack, leading to an inappropriate response; an attack launched by a country whose leaders are ignorant of, or unconcerned with, the consequences of their action. One can imagine other equally tragic scenarios.

Fortunately, the two nuclear-armed superpowers seem to be convinced that further proliferation would work against their best interests. They must now demonstrate that their concern is matched by the will to cooperate in establishing and enforcing meaningful arms control measures. This raises the possibility of a Washington-Moscow global condominium, a prospect that does not upset historian Arnold Toynbee:

> . . . I believe that peace and affluence are what most people desire, and we cannot have these without order in the age of mechanization. I therefore believe that the human race would submit to a Russo-American . . . dictatorship if it believed that, at this price, it could have affluence and peace. . . . Of course, if nuclear weapons were limited to Russia and America, there wouldn't be democratic government of the world. A Russo-American world government would probably be very authoritarian, but it would at least ensure the survival of the human race—and that is the first consideration, to my mind.[1]

Raymond Aron agrees that the two nuclear giants must collaborate for their own safety, but dismisses the possibility of joint authoritarian rule:

[1]Interview with Arnold Toynbee, *Playboy,* April 1967, pp. 68, 70; confirmed in a private memorandum received by the author on August 16, 1967. Also see Arnold Toynbee, *Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 157.

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The governing idea by which I interpreted the diplomatic situation was that of the solidarity of the two great powers—the warring brothers—against a total war of which they would be the first victims. Inevitably enemies by position and by the incompatibility of their ideologies, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest not in ruling together over the world (of which they would be quite incapable), but in not destroying each other.[2]

Even if the United States and the Soviet Union agree to arms control and nonproliferation measures, they cannot damp the arms race unless these measures can be made universally binding. Above all else, the superpowers must support arms control arrangements that can effectively freeze Communist China's nuclear development program; otherwise, Chinese progress will probably drive India, Japan and eventually West Germany into the nuclear club. While it is unlikely that West Germany would be the sixth nuclear power, she might well follow India and Japan in "going nuclear."

China's nuclear capability could be stunted by a universally-binding test ban which is either observed voluntarily by China or forced on her by both superpowers or by one superpower with at least the tacit support of the other. However, in the absence of a traumatic event, such as an accidental nuclear exchange, universal arms control measures do not appear to be feasible. In this case, the nuclear club will be expanded to admit, among others, West Germany, a development foreseen by Professor Morton A. Kaplan:

> Although the United States and the Soviet Union do have a common interest in not destroying each other, the Soviet Union has not learned to be satisfied with its present resources and influences. A nuclear-armed Federal Republic is in the best interests of the United States as a buffer against the Soviet Union; in any event nuclear proliferation to West Germany and other states is most likely regardless of U.S. policies. When the U.S.S.R. first learns that West Germany is acquiring nuclear weapons, the U.S. will deter the Soviet Union from forcibly disarming the West Germans. After West Germany has an operational nuclear arsenal which poses at least a minimal threat to the major Soviet cities, reunification with East Germany will not improbably follow. A reunited nuclear-armed Germany would in that case play a leading role in Europe and would provide an effective buffer to Soviet expansion and influence. The Soviet Union would then be sandwiched between a reunited nuclear-armed Germany and a nuclear-armed mainland China. Even if nuclear proliferation to West Germany and other states leads to small nuclear

[2]Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. xi.

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wars, the world will survive. The remaining practicable alternatives to this world are worse.[3]

II

The perils of proliferation which we will examine in this article lead me to conclude that the United States is currently faced with three difficult alternatives: (1) accepting a nuclear-proliferating world, in which a confrontation with the Soviet Union over a nuclear-arming West Germany could easily lead to general nuclear war; (2) attempting, with at least the tacit support of the Soviet Union, to prevent further nuclear proliferation by freezing or destroying the Chinese nuclear program, which might lead to a nuclear exchange in the Far East; or (3) withdrawing in isolation behind a heavy anti-ballistic missile system, leaving the rest of the world to be dominated by the Soviet Union and China—a policy that could lead to U.S. surrender or a nuclear war if and when the noose got too tight.

My analysis also leads to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is faced with three similar and difficult choices: (1) accepting a nuclear-proliferating world in which a confrontation with the United States over a nuclear-arming West Germany could easily lead to nuclear war; (2) attempting, with at least the tacit support of the United States, to prevent further nuclear proliferation (particularly to West Germany) by freezing or destroying the Chinese nuclear program; or (3) withdrawing in isolation behind a heavy anti-ballistic missile system, leaving the rest of the world to be dominated by the United States, China and Western Europe (probably led by a nuclear-armed and unified Germany), with the likelihood of having to relinquish former German territory to the Germans and former Chinese territory to the Chinese.

If Professor Kaplan is correct, the Soviets will back down in the confrontation with the United States over the nuclear arming of West Germany; and later, in a second crisis with the United States over the attempts of a nuclear-armed West Germany to force reunification, the USSR will back down again. The ultimate result will be a truncated "fortress Russia." But if Kaplan is wrong and the Soviets resist, the danger of an escalating crisis leading to general nuclear war is real. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, partly to counter a perceived military threat from West Germany, evidences strong Soviet resolve to prevent a nuclear-armed West

[3]Morton A. Kaplan, private memorandum, received by the author June 15, 1967.

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Germany; and U.S. policy in Viet Nam (at least prior to President Nixon's inauguration) seems to indicate that the United States would not risk nuclear war over the right of West Germany to go nuclear.

The least undesirable of the alternatives listed above is a joint attempt by the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent further nuclear proliferation by attempting to freeze or destroy the Chinese nuclear program. Such a plan is worth exploring if one agrees with Toynbee that the human race would submit to a "Russo-American dictatorship" in order to have affluence and peace. Nor is a Russo-American condominium, designed to minimize the threat of nuclear war, inconsistent with Aron's view. Such a condominium might take the form of an international organization to administer a universally-binding nuclear test ban law, i.e., an international nuclear peacekeeping law recognized by a large majority of states, including the United States and the USSR, and expressing an intent to bind nonassenting states.

India advocated a universal test ban during the UN disarmament debate in November 1965,[4] presumably to control the Chinese nuclear threat. The Nonproliferation Treaty not only fails to deal with the Chinese nuclear threat, but probably encourages the Chinese to consider giving nuclear weapons to "socialist" countries, which could include Syria and the UAR. On the other hand, a universal test ban could result in the removal *under law* of the Chinese nuclear threat and thus prevent further nuclear proliferation.

III

Kaplan's prognosis that in all likelihood West Germany will go nuclear and then reunite with East Germany, notwithstanding the resistance of the Soviet Union, might produce one, or perhaps two, dangerous crises: the first, when the Soviet Union learns about the Federal Republic's plans to go nuclear (the transition crisis), and a second, if and when a nuclear-armed West Germany attempts to force reunification from a position of nuclear strength (the reunification crisis). In the transition crisis, the Soviets will have an option to conduct a preemptive or disarming strike against the embryonic nuclear-weapon manufacturing capability of the West Germans, whether located in West Germany or elsewhere. Less dangerous Soviet responses would include blocking Western access

[4]General Assembly, Official Records, Twentieth Session, First Committee, pp. 169-170 (November 24, 1965).

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to West Berlin, seizing West Berlin, or giving nuclear weapons to the East European allies, perhaps Poland and East Germany.

Washington could react to such Soviet moves by temporizing and taking no substantive action, meeting the escalating crisis by effectively countering each Soviet move, or leaving West Germany and therefore Europe to their fate and withdrawing behind an anti-ballistic missile system. Kaplan believes the United States could not afford to adopt an isolationist posture and permit the Soviets to dominate Europe; therefore, Washington will counter each Soviet move, preventing the Soviets from disarming the West Germans—i.e., Moscow will back down. The U.S. government would have little choice but to oppose Soviet moves, since the alternatives would lead to a substantial change in the world balance of power against the United States, with a consequent threat of nuclear conflict when Soviet pressure became intolerable.

Under almost any conceivable circumstance the transition crisis presents a serious threat of a nuclear holocaust, since a confrontation between the United States and the USSR is likely to occur. In light of the strong Soviet resolve shown in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the lack of comparable U.S. resolve in Viet Nam, the United States might not succeed in forcing the Soviets to back down over the German problem, and instead might leave Europe to Soviet domination rather than risk nuclear war over the right of the West Germans to go nuclear. Therefore, Washington might well prefer to take action to avoid a transition crisis that could lead to nuclear war or an adverse change in the world balance of power.

A reunification crisis could also lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, since a move by a nuclear-armed West Germany to force reunification against the will of the USSR is likely to be countered by the Soviets and any threat by the Soviets against the West Germans will probably be countered by the United States. This pessimistic prediction is based on the reasonable assumption that the Soviets oppose a reunited Germany as inimicable to their interests; therefore, reunification will not be achieved by peaceful means in the foreseeable future. A forced reunification could result from an uprising in East Germany against the Soviet overlords, whether or not sponsored by the West Germans, or even by a national liberation war, directly or indirectly supported by the Federal Republic, to free the "Soviet-occupied zone of Germany" (the jungles and moun-

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tains of the communist-style liberation war being replaced by nighttime sabotage and terrorism against Soviet installations, personnel and sympathizers).

The people of a nuclear-armed West Germany, after many years of unsuccessful attempts to reunify peacefully, and in a state of increasing frustration, might elect a neo-Nazi or other radical nationalist government dedicated to reunification by force if necessary. These radical leaders might engage in an escalating crisis with the Soviets in the belief that a smaller West German nuclear capability could neutralize Soviet nuclear strength and force the Soviets ultimately to back down. While the outcome of such a crisis is difficult to foresee, it seems likely that if the United States remained a power in Europe, it would have to back the West Germans, thus setting up a second U.S.-USSR confrontation and threat of nuclear war.

There appears also to be a direct connection between a nuclear-arming mainland China and a U.S.-USSR confrontation leading to nuclear war. A plausible scenario can be constructed along the following lines:

(1) India continues to refuse to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty because of the Chinese nuclear threat and the failure of the superpowers to give credible guarantees to defend her against that threat. At an opportune moment, India goes nuclear,[5] on the pretext of developing an anti-ballistic missile system for protection against mainland China. However, such a defensive nuclear program would probably initially pass through a stage where the Indians would mount offensive missiles as a deterrent against Chinese nuclear blackmail. A nuclear missile program would probably have to be pursued in a joint venture with either West Germany or Japan.

(2) Japan, also because of the Chinese nuclear threat, either reserves the option to go nuclear by refusing to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, or signs and later opts out for substantially the same reasons as the Indians. Japan could join with India to develop a ballistic missile defense system, the Indians providing the nuclear warheads and the Japanese the missile vehicles.[6] The Japanese have a sophisticated electronics capability and have had valuable experience in designing and manufacturing high-altitude rockets. Their rocket technology could probably be supplemented with the electronic guidance system necessary to develop a ballistic missile with sufficient range to threaten most of the major Chinese cities from

[5]In the UN debate in May 1968 concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty, India explicitly stated that it could not subscribe to it. (UN Document A/C.1/PV. 1567 [May 14, 1968], p. 82.) By 1966 India was in a position to produce about two atomic bombs a year; additional facilities were being constructed to provide an increased atomic bomb capability.

[6]As of February 1969, Japan, India and West Germany had not yet signed the Nonproliferation Treaty.

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either Japan or India, and ultimately to develop an ABM system. The Indian civilian nuclear capability could easily be converted to military purposes to produce the nuclear warheads.

(3) When India and Japan acquire nuclear weapons for defense, it will be difficult to deter such countries as Israel and Sweden from going nuclear, again nominally in order to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system against potential nuclear threats. Pakistan and the UAR are quite likely to go nuclear shopping in Peking in order to counter threats from India and Israel, respectively.

(4) Increasing nuclear proliferation and the threat from Soviet missiles targeted on West Germany will certainly force the Bonn government to acquire nuclear weapons, previous commitments notwithstanding. After all, why should the Federal Republic be discriminated against when Great Britain, France, India and Japan have found it necessary to defend themselves against nuclear threats and blackmail?

Paradoxically, the USSR is making it easier for the West Germans to go nuclear because of its deployment of an ABM system. This action offers India and Japan a good excuse to acquire ABM systems and will most probably encourage the West Germans to do the same. After all, would the Soviets deploy a system which was not effective against a Chinese nuclear attack? While the answer to this question might well be yes (since an ABM cannot be fully tested today, its effectiveness even under light nuclear attacks cannot be proved), how could the Indians and Japanese be persuaded, in light of the Soviet deployment, that ABM systems are not worthwhile? Ironically, then, the Soviets may be deploying an *ineffective* ABM system, yet indirectly encouraging the West Germans to go nuclear, and thus defeating one of the most important goals of Soviet foreign policy.

The failure of the two superpowers to deal effectively with the developing Chinese nuclear threat, coupled with the Soviet deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system probably chiefly deployed against the threat from the East, seems likely to result in the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, eventually to West Germany. Kaplan believes the resulting containment of the Soviet Union between a nuclear-armed West Germany and a nuclear-armed mainland China is in the best interests of the United States—even though small nuclear wars may occur. He sees no better practicable alternatives. However, for those of us who hope that he is wrong about practicable alternatives, a *limited* U.S.-USSR condominium aimed at containing the Chinese nuclear threat and preventing further nuclear proliferation (particularly to West Germany) must be explored as a feasible alternative to a nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers.

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Such a condominium is unlikely to be abused to the detriment of the nonnuclear-weapon states, given the fundamental ideological and power dispute between the superpowers. It would work only when vital selfish interests coincide, as is the case with the superpowers' common desire to prevent further nuclear proliferation. Understandably, some have asked what gives the United States and the USSR the right to set up a condominium, no matter how limited. The clearest answer is that the American and Soviet peoples have the most to lose in a nuclear war stemming from nuclear proliferation.

IV

Aron's view of the two superpowers' mutuality of interests in preventing a total war in which they would be the major victims was supported by the circumstances surrounding the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Notwithstanding what appeared to be its firm support of Israel's right of passage through the Straits of Tiran and of Israel's claim that the Aqaba Gulf was an international waterway which could not legally be blockaded by the United Arab Republic, the United States temporized in fear of a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. On the other side, the Arabs thought they had a firm promise on the part of the Soviets to provide effective support for them against "Israeli aggression." Yet, in the face of an overwhelming Israeli military victory, Moscow joined with Washington in calling for a cease-fire which effectively confirmed the new territorial status quo, with Israel occupying vast sections and strategic areas of former Arab territory. As soon as it appeared to Soviet leaders that they might be heading for a possible confrontation with the United States, they got on the hot line to Washington to assure President Johnson that they had no intention of meddling in the Middle East war if he would give similar assurances, which he quickly did. Thus, the United States and the USSR appeared ready to sacrifice what most observers thought were firm guarantees to their "client" states in order to avoid a possible confrontation with each other.

The Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that both superpowers would go to great lengths to avoid a face-to-face encounter, providing vital interests were not involved. On the other hand, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 proved that dangerous confrontations are possible when vital interests *are* involved—in that case the vital interests of the United States. Similarly, it is surely against the

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essential interests of the Soviet Union to have a nuclear-armed "revanchist" West Germany on its western flank or to have a strong reunified Germany in Europe. If there is a potential crisis which could produce a U.S.-USSR confrontation and lead to nuclear war, it would be a West German decision to go nuclear or a West German decision to force reunification against the will of the Soviet Union. It was not surprising then that, despite continued U.S. bombing of the socialist state of North Viet Nam, the Soviets continued to negotiate with the U.S. government in an attempt to obtain a nonproliferation treaty that would hinder what the Soviets perceive to be West German nuclear ambitions. The Soviets fear that some West German leaders want to acquire nuclear arms one way or another, and there is fairly persuasive support for their fears:

> Former Chancellor Adenauer expressed dissatisfaction late in 1965 with the prospect that Germany's NATO allies, Great Britain and the United States, as part of a "select club" of nuclear powers, might negotiate at Geneva an agreement deleterious to German interests. This prospect led Adenauer to announce he could not commit himself "forever" to German nonacquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, Franz-Josef Strauss has warned that "a new Fuhrer-type" who "would promise and probably also acquire nuclear weapons" might emerge if Germany were subjected to continued nuclear discrimination within the Atlantic Alliance.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The renunciation by the Federal Republic of the production of atomic weapons on its territory would not necessarily preclude German participation in an Atlantic or European nuclear force.[7]

A foreign policy adviser to Franz-Josef Strauss, one of the most influential members of the current West German coalition government, made the following statement:

> The Federal Republic will only gain its national independence and full political sovereignty if it abandons the demand for the creation of a larger national . . . entity in favor of promoting the reunification of the German people *within the process of European integration.* . . . A West European confederation would have every right in law and ethics to state and to pursue its purpose, namely, to end the division of Europe and to create a European community extending from the Atlantic to the present borders of the Soviet Union.[8]

Some influential German politicians appear to believe that German reunification should be pursued from a position of

[7]Diane A. Kressler, "Germany, NATO and Europe," ORBIS, Spring 1966, p. 234.

[8]Klaus Bloemer, "Germany and a 'European Europe'," ORBIS, Spring 1966, pp. 245-246.

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strength provided by a European nuclear force. Despite the evidence that the vast majority of the West German people and their political leaders have no present desire to acquire a national nuclear force,[9] a future West German government, whether or not led by a "Fuhrer-type," may decide to go nuclear in the face of fading hopes for a European nuclear force and continued frustration caused by the division of the German people. Nuclear proliferation to states such as India and Japan could readily provide the excuse for Bonn officials to take this step.

V

What is the likelihood that India would change its policy and sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and forgo nuclear arms? Mason Willrich has summarized India's conditions:

> Would a guarantee against nuclear blackmail help India decide to forgo the chance of developing a nuclear capability? Since Communist China began setting off nuclear blasts, India has raised its price for making an unequivocal renunciation; it indicates that it wants considerably more than a simple guarantee. An undertaking "through the United Nations" to safeguard the security of nonnuclear nations is only part of its demand. Also included are an agreement by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to other powers, a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a freeze on further production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, coupled with substantial reductions in existing inventories. Moreover, India has not excluded Communist China from the list of required subscribers to a nonproliferation agreement. It seems clear that a "paper" guarantee other than one by the United Nations, or conceivably one given jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union, would be unacceptable as contrary to India's commitment to nonalignment.[10]

Any guarantee to defend India against Chinese nuclear blackmail and attack would probably be unsatisfactory to India since it would have to depend on joint U.S.-USSR action, which could be undermined by a credible Chinese nuclear threat to the superpowers or their allies, or even by a Moscow-Peking realignment after the passing of Mao from the Chinese scene. In any case, India was not satisfied by the Security Council Resolution of June 17, 1968, jointly sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, which recognized "that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a nonnuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which the Security Coun-

[9]Karl Deutsch, *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 52.

[10]Mason Willrich, "Guarantees to Non-Nuclear Nations," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1966, pp. 689-690.

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cil, and above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter."

Therefore, if India is to remain nonaligned, New Delhi must deal sooner or later with the Chinese nuclear threat, unless it is removed by one or both of the superpowers or by some unforeseen upheaval in China itself. The Chinese nuclear threat could be minimized by an effective anti-ballistic missile system supplied to India by either or both of the superpowers, or independently developed in cooperation with Japan or perhaps West Germany. However, since an ABM system, to be effective, most likely requires nuclear warheads, and since these and the system as a whole have not been proven and probably cannot be proven under the restrictions of the Test Ban Treaty, a more likely option is an independent Indian nuclear deterrent. Either option is incompatible with an Indian signature on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Unless the Chinese nuclear threat is removed by a disarming strike, or is otherwise dealt with to the satisfaction of India, a voluntary Indian signature seems unlikely. Of course, India may bow to joint pressure by the superpowers, particularly from a U.S. threat to terminate grain shipments. But such an involuntary signature is unlikely to be meaningful after the first good Indian harvest, and the consequent long-term damage to U.S.-Indian relations should hopefully deter the U.S. government from using such tactics to obtain an Indian signature.

There is the slight possibility that a Chinese misstep in connection with the Vietnamese conflict may provide the Pentagon with sufficient reason to preempt the Chinese nuclear capability, but the Chinese are no doubt aware of this possibility and have been careful not to give the United States such an excuse. The past policy of both superpowers has obviously been not to launch a preemptive strike even under severe provocation, and it seems unlikely that this policy will change. Further, Soviet deployment of an ABM system, probably aimed chiefly at China, supports the belief that Moscow has decided to live with the Chinese nuclear threat.

Unless the Chinese threat can otherwise be dealt with to the satisfaction of India, or India gives up its nonaligned status and moves under the American nuclear umbrella (a very remote possibility), it is likely that New Delhi will not sign the Non-

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proliferation Treaty and will eventually go nuclear.[11] If West Germany follows the Indian example, as it well might, a U.S.-Soviet confrontation is almost inevitable and a nuclear exchange cannot be ruled out. The prospect of continuing enmity in the Middle East coupled with nuclear proliferation to Israel and the United Arab Republic (not to mention India and Pakistan), could set off small and disastrous nuclear wars. While all evidence seems to indicate that the superpowers will not become involved in minor nuclear wars, every effort should be made to avoid them, notwithstanding Professor Kaplan's suggestion that there are no better practicable world alternatives.

Even if India and other nonnuclear-weapon states do not sign the treaty, this does not mean that it would not be beneficial—at least to the Soviet Union. From the Soviet view, a treaty bearing American and West German signatures is desirable, since such a commitment might hinder the United States in coming to the aid of the West Germans if they decide to abrogate the treaty and acquire nuclear weapons, and are then confronted by determined Soviet opposition, including the possibility of a disarming strike. A U.S. decision to counter Soviet threats might not be popular with the American people, who believe treaties should be observed and who still have residual fears of German militarism. But if the alternative is to allow Europe to be dominated by the Soviet Union, as it probably would be, then a dangerous superpower confrontation would be likely. In this light, it is not surprising that many West German leaders resisted signing the treaty, while the Soviets promoted the treaty—despite Peking's accusations of U.S.-Soviet collaboration, the irritations caused by the war in Viet Nam, and the expressed opposition of India and other nuclear club candidates.

Several other complications connected with the treaty should be noted briefly. It has been stated on high authority that the treaty will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons because mainland China, although denouncing the treaty, is not able to offer its weapons for export.[12] China's position, in reality, is that the more

[11]A 1968 report by India's government-sponsored Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses made the case for India's ability to afford the bomb by noting that she has the tenth largest gross national product in the world, and argued that India should "develop its nuclear option." *New York Times*, September 8, 1968, p. 34. An Indian ambassador put it to the author more simply, saying: "If China can afford the bomb, so can India."

[12]Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Arthur J. Goldberg, *New York Times*, October 5, 1968, p. 34.

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socialist countries with nuclear weapons the better,[13] and Syria or the UAR might meet the ideological qualifications. A Chinese transfer of even a few nuclear weapons to Syria or the UAR could instantly and radically change the balance of power in the Middle East, and a U.S. treaty obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons to Israel to redress the balance actually encourages such Chinese action. Further, should Washington attempt to pressure Bonn to sign the treaty, many top West German political leaders will be alienated, and the same is probably true with respect to the Japanese. Also, some U.S. allies, not likely to go nuclear in any case, will want additional guarantees of nuclear security, thus increasing U.S. obligations.

Thus, the treaty hardly seems worth ratifying if it does not deal effectively with the principal cause of proliferation, namely, mainland China. And the treaty may not survive its first five years if the superpowers continue to escalate the nuclear arms race. Atmospheric or space testing of anti-ballistic missiles by the superpowers would kill the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty.

VI

Is there an international arms control alternative which might deal with the Chinese nuclear threat to the satisfaction of India and thus lead to a voluntary Indian signature on the Nonproliferation Treaty? In September 1965, I proposed that the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, agreed to by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in Moscow in 1963 and later signed or acceded to by the vast majority of states (with the notable exceptions of mainland China and France), be made universally binding. This proposal was set forth in a privately circulated memorandum to U.S. and foreign arms control specialists, including Ambassador V. C. Trivedi, the Indian delegate to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. I later discussed it in detail with Ambassador Trivedi, and on November 24, 1965, during the disarmament debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Ambassador, referring to Chinese atmospheric tests, stated that:

> The first priority is the task of making the Moscow Test Ban Treaty universally binding. We have requested and we have urged, we have deplored and we have condemned; but neither our displeasure nor our appeals have borne any fruit. The international community cannot, I sub-

[13]Morton Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 47.

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mit, continue to remain helpless and impotent in the teeth of such defiance and will be obliged to examine what it can do to ensure that the health of humanity is not periodically attacked by the death-dealing debris of radio-active fallout.[14]

On February 15, 1966, Ambassador Trivedi told the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:

As the Indian delegation said in New York during the last session of the General Assembly, the first priority in this field is thus to be accorded to the task of making the Moscow Test Ban Treaty universally binding. This is not a treaty which is subscribed to by a few powers with vested interests and their allies; it is a treaty which the non-aligned and non-nuclear nations have urged from the beginning and have signed in overwhelming number.[15]

Again, on June 30, 1966, he said:

When we talk of nuclear weapons tests, therefore, it is essential that we talk comprehensively of all nuclear weapon tests, that we talk of tests in all environments and that we remember the terms of United Nations resolution 2032 (XX) of the last session, namely, "arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments". . . .

In working out those arrangements, the first priority should logically and coherently be given to the task of making the Moscow Test Ban Treaty universally applicable.[16]

However, in October 1966 China exploded on target a nuclear weapon carried by a guided missile; on December 28 China conducted another explosion; and on June 17, 1967 she successfully detonated her first hydrogen bomb. Apparently the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution had not slowed the Chinese nuclear weapon development program.

After the Chinese guided-missile test of October 1966, some observers thought India had lost interest in a universally-binding test ban and had turned her attention to acquiring an ABM system, presumably from one or both of the superpowers—an action that would have been incompatible with an Indian signature on the nonproliferation treaty. If this was New Delhi's intention, it may have been based on a belief that it was too late to freeze Chinese nuclear development, or on the U.S. failure to respond to India's suggestions for a universally-binding test ban. The United States presumably believed that it was not politically feasible to force compliance with arms control agreements, particularly on

[14]General Assembly, Official Records, Twentieth Session, First Committee (November 24, 1965), pp. 169-170.

[15]Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Document ENDC/PV.240 (February 15, 1966), pp. 9-10.

[16]*Ibid.*, Document ENDC/PV.269 (June 30, 1966), p. 12.

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mainland China and possibly on France, the only states that have not signed or acceded to the 1963 Test Ban Treaty and continue to conduct atmospheric tests.

It is highly unlikely that France would risk a confrontation with the superpowers if they decided to support and enforce a universal test ban, but it must be assumed that China would challenge the ban. If that conclusion is correct, then we are face-to-face with a tragic dilemma: If the Chinese nuclear threat is not checked or removed, the likely result is a dangerous superpower confrontation over a West German decision to go nuclear, which could lead to general nuclear war. On the other hand, if an attempt is made by one or both of the superpowers to check or remove the Chinese nuclear threat, then a dangerous confrontation with China is likely—one that could lead to Chinese nuclear threats, and possibly nuclear and conventional attacks on neighboring areas, such as Japan, India, South Viet Nam, South Korea, Taiwan and Siberia. The danger of such attacks depends on whether the Chinese have an operational nuclear capability at the time of the confrontation; in view of Chinese nuclear progress, such a capability might be achieved in a few years. While China may even now have a small number of atomic bombs, she does not have long-range bombers. Chinese leaders seem to be counting on mating a hydrogen warhead to an intercontinental missile delivery system. But there is some danger that in a confrontation in the near future, China might be able to deliver atomic bombs by aircraft, triggering a nuclear response by one or both of the superpowers or even by a missile-supplied Taiwan.

Because of China's nuclear progress, Washington decided to deploy a "thin" anti-ballistic missile system originally estimated to cost about four to five billion dollars. A similar system will probably have to be supplied to Japan, Taiwan and other U.S. allies at comparable costs. It would be difficult to turn down an Indian request for a similar system. Thus, the initial cost of deploying extensive "thin" ABM systems would be in the order of tens of billions of dollars, and such "thin" systems would have to be periodically "thickened" to keep up with increasing Chinese nuclear capabilities. Eventually, "heavy" ABM systems would exist in many areas of the world at a cost reaching into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Under such circumstances we would have little money left for the global war on poverty.

But even a worldwide ABM deployment would not prevent the

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foreseeable superpower confrontation over West Germany. Indeed, it may even increase the chances for a confrontation since the United States and the Soviet Union may believe the danger of mass destruction has been lessened by their ABM systems. The resulting arms race would be catastrophic in cost and potential danger, for advances in ABM systems would force the superpowers simultaneously to deploy more advanced offensive missile systems. The effect would be to render arms control measures completely meaningless.

It is the author's view that—to paraphrase Gresham's Law that bad money drives out good money—arms race measures drive out arms control measures. In their syndicated column ("Inside Washington") of December 9, 1966, Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott reported:

> U.S. authorities are gravely concerned by an authoritative warning that Russia may use Red China's next atomic test as the pretext to withdraw from the [nuclear test ban] treaty. The State Department has been informed that this alarming possibility was clearly intimated by Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov during a long talk with UN Secretary-General U Thant last week.
>
> Kuznetsov, the highest ranking Soviet official to visit the UN in two years, observed that abrogation of the 1963 test ban pact may become necessary because of the growing threat to Russia's security from Peking's unrestricted development of nuclear weapons.
>
> If a way isn't found soon to curb China's atomic activity, Kuznetsov maintained, the Soviet would have no other recourse but to resume atmospheric testing.
>
> Significantly, Goldberg was directed by President Johnson to find out whether the Russians or U Thant have recommendations on how the Chinese nuclear program could be curbed without triggering a war.

This report may still have validity for today. The probable reason for a Soviet abrogation of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty would be to test the ABM system it is deploying. This would require atmospheric nuclear explosions. It is unlikely that the Soviets would spend tens of billions of rubles on an untested ABM system. Thus, the 1963 treaty is likely to become a casualty of Chinese nuclear developments, in much the same way as the Nonproliferation Treaty will become a casualty if some of the leading candidates for the nuclear club go nuclear in response to the Chinese threat.

Given these dismal prospects, the political feasibility of a universally-binding test ban, designed to freeze or permit the destruction of the Chinese nuclear capability, seems worth serious

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consideration. Such a universal test ban should be comprehensive, that is, include all types of nuclear tests, especially underground tests. Otherwise, the Chinese could continue their development program by testing underground. But nuclear weapons specialists in both the United States and the USSR may be counting on underground shots to perfect and test warheads for anti-ballistic missiles, even though extensive underground tests already conducted by both superpowers may have solved most of the foreseeable problems. In any case, determined and probably successful opposition from the military and their supporters in both countries against a universal comprehensive test ban is reasonably predictable.

It should be remembered, however, that the primary reason for deploying a "thin" ABM system is to defend against a Chinese attack. If a universal comprehensive test ban is successful in halting or eliminating the Chinese nuclear development program, a "thin" ABM system would not be required, and the Soviets might readily agree to remove their probably unproven ABM system in order to avoid an expensive arms race escalation with the United States—particularly if there was little likelihood that the West Germans would go nuclear. One would certainly hope that underground testing could be safely suspended until the effectiveness of a universal ban was determined; this would not require a long period of time, because as the Chinese nuclear arsenal becomes more and more advanced, the likelihood that an attempt would be made to enforce a universal test ban decreases.

VII

The following feasibility analysis assumes that a universal test ban rider has been attached to the Nonproliferation Treaty with U.S. and Soviet approval to induce India and possibly other nuclear club candidates to sign. The rider would prohibit all nuclear tests by a party or a nonparty, and would obligate all parties, particularly the nuclear states that signed the treaty, to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the UN Charter, to prevent any banned activities by a nonparty.[17]

[17]Such a rider would be similar to Article X of the Antarctic Treaty which provides that "Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity contrary to the principles or purposes of the Present Treaty." Paragraph 1 of Article V specifically prohibits any nuclear explosions in Antarctica. December 1, 1959 [1961], 12 U.S.T. 794; T.I.A.S., No. 4780; 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961).

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(1) *France would probably not challenge the rider.* A major obstacle to U.S. acceptance of a universal test ban rider is the possibility that it could further strain U.S.-French relations. However, France would probably avoid a confrontation with the United States and would either await challenge of the rider by mainland China or would accept the Nonproliferation Treaty with the rider, for the following reasons: (a) France continues to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which could be removed as a consequence of a U.S.-French confrontation over effective arms control measures. (b) The French *force de frappe* is so far only a political device to help France achieve world power status; it could be politically neutralized by a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system deployed primarily against a Chinese nuclear threat. (c) Continued testing would probably not significantly improve the sophistication of the French nuclear arsenal or enhance French prestige and status as a world power. Thus, France does not really need to conduct a lengthy series of tests and may be ready to sign the treaty with a rider. (d) French tests could be prevented by blockading their Pacific test islands or by surrounding the islands with ships of many states. (e) The treaty and rider would require the establishment of an organization to administer and enforce the test ban, and France could be given equal world status with the United States and the USSR in the organization's peacekeeping activities.[18] (f) Washington could offer other concessions to France to induce her to sign a treaty with a rider.

(2) *Mainland China would probably challenge the rider.* A universal test ban rider would probably be challenged by mainland China for the following reasons: (a) Continued testing is essential if China is to develop a credible nuclear weapons arsenal. (b) Testing produces important political gains, both domestically and abroad. (c) The rider would be a precedent for other universal arms control measures likely to be opposed by mainland China, such as a universal nonproliferation treaty. Therefore, a Chinese challenge of the rider and a confrontation with the international community is probable, although a prudent government in Peking could postpone such a confrontation for a long time and might even terminate its expensive nuclear weapons development program.

(3) *Probable U.S. position.* If the U.S. government believes that the rider is acceptable to the USSR and that France is willing to cooperate by signing or at least by postponing additional tests until the Chinese have challenged the rider, then it could be acceptable to Washington. If France postponed testing to await the Chinese challenge, and the international community then failed to compel Peking to abide by the rider, France could safely resume her testing program. In any case, French cooperation is probably attainable, particularly if the French are led to believe that the United States will accept the rider and attempt to enforce it against the French if challenged. In view of the long series of

[18]According to a leading French nuclear strategist, "It is a pretty safe bet that at the latest when ['democratization' of the nuclear weapon] happens, the nuclear powers will close their ranks in face of this common danger and will be forced *to* conclude between themselves a control agreement which they will not hesitate to enforce, more or less politely, on the rest of the world." André Beaufre, *Deterrence and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 99.

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anti-American actions taken by France, particularly with respect to NATO, Viet Nam and the Middle East, it should not be difficult to convince her leaders that the United States would actively help to enforce such a test ban against her. If mainland China postponed testing or terminated its nuclear weapons development program, France would almost certainly follow suit.

(4) *Probable USSR position.* The Soviet Union would sign the Nonproliferation Treaty with a universal test ban rider for the following reasons: (a) An overriding Soviet goal is to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons, and this goal would be closer if the United States and West Germany signed the Nonproliferation Treaty. (b) If India and Japan refused to sign the treaty without a universal test ban rider, then the Federal Republic might not sign; even if Bonn did sign, it is likely that it would eventually opt out rather than suffer discrimination. (c) There is reason to believe that India would sign the Nonproliferation Treaty with a rider, and would opt out only if the rider were not successfully enforced against the Chinese. (d) Another Soviet goal is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons generally; if India refused to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, or signs and then opts out at a convenient time, that goal would be unattained. (e) The Soviets would like to diminish the severe worldwide criticism of their invasion of Czechoslovakia. (f) The Soviet Union seems to have many reasons to freeze or reduce the Chinese nuclear weapon capability. Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a fellow socialist state, was probably motivated by a strong Soviet resolve to prevent a West German military threat, the Kremlin in all likelihood is prepared to take even more direct action, if necessary, against the more immediate and more dangerous threat from a nuclear-armed China. Maoist China will probably soon be formally ejected from the socialist camp, thus reducing the political cost of Soviet action against China.

(5) *Both the United States and the USSR might accept the rider.* In the face of New Delhi's insistence on the rider, the USSR might accept it in order to obtain India's signature and to freeze or reverse the Chinese nuclear development program. Washington might accept the rider for substantially the same reasons. Certainly, neither superpower would agree to the rider without acceptance by the other, but the possibility of mutual agreement could be secretly explored prior to their taking public positions on it.[19]

(6) *Probable consequences of a rider.* If the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and a large number of other states agreed to adding the universal test ban rider to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the

[19]Paradoxically, the chances for meaningful arms control agreements have probably increased as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the election of Richard Nixon. The invasion symbolized Soviet interest in maintaining the global status quo and generated a Soviet need to lessen the adverse reaction by agreeing to further arms control agreements. President Nixon probably has a freer hand to negotiate than Johnson had because he need not fear attack from the right; and "hard-liners" in Washington and Moscow will probably be able to do business together on the basis of coinciding selfish interests (with respect to mainland China, for example), since to some extent they think alike.

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burden would fall on the United States (with the help of the Taiwan Chinese) and the USSR to enforce it against any mainland Chinese challenge, preferably before an international enforcement organization was established in order to avoid unnecessary delay and additional political obstacles. It seems unlikely that the superpowers would accept the rider unless both were prepared at least tacitly to support its enforcement. Each superpower would probably maneuver to place the enforcement burden on the other. However, it is likely that both superpowers would at least tacitly support Taiwan in enforcing the test ban against the mainland Chinese (for example, by enabling Taiwan to destroy Chinese nuclear facilities), or both would accept substantially equal responsibility for enforcing the test ban *in the name of the law* with the help of other volunteers, such as the Taiwan government.[20] While Peking's short-term reaction would obviously be one of great anger and bitterness, the Chinese are unlikely to respond with offensive thrusts and risk nuclear attack on their major cities. The long-term Chinese reaction might also be one of revanchism; yet it should be kept in mind that, although the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japanese cities and fire-bombed German cities, within a few years the Japanese and Germans were among America's best allies.

(7) *Universal observance or enforcement of the rider could lead to world peace through law.* If the rider were universally observed or successfully enforced, *nuclear* peace could probably be maintained through law as long as the superpowers cooperated; in view of the alternatives, this might be for a long time. In any event, the danger of a nuclear war would be minimized and a giant step taken toward the goal of attaining peace through law.

Whether or not there is any logic in this feasibility analysis, the ineluctable fact remains that neither superpower is likely to support arms control measures that might require enforcement against noncomplying states—even though the long-term alternative may be a nuclear war over West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. Only an extremely dangerous crisis which thoroughly alarms the world, such as an accidental nuclear missile exchange, might alter the nuclear powers' outlook. Therefore, the Chinese quite likely will be able to create an operational nuclear missile arsenal which will eventually pose a credible threat to the United States, the USSR and other countries resisting Chinese political objectives. A Chinese announcement of June 1967 looked forward to the day when the superpowers' nuclear blackmail tactics would no longer be effective:

[20]Such an enforcement action might be carried out successfully through conventional bombing, but some ground action, similar to the British commando action against the Nazi heavy water plant in Norway during World War II, might also be required. If the mainland Chinese were to rebuild their nuclear weapon facilities, enforcement action would have to be repeated if they resumed nuclear tests.

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The success of China's hydrogen bomb test has further broken the nuclear monopoly of United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism and dealt a telling blow at their policy of nuclear blackmail.

It is a very great encouragement and support to the Vietnamese people in their heroic war against United States aggression and for national salvation, to the Arab people in their resistance to aggression by the United States and British imperialists and their tool, Israel, and to the revolutionary people of the whole world.[21]

A major purpose of China's nuclear arsenal is to neutralize the nuclear advantage of the superpowers, leaving her mass army free to accomplish its goals. These goals are, at the very least, the ejection of U.S. influence from the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia and Japan, the acquisition of Taiwan, and the recovery of former Chinese territory in Siberia. Additionally, China wants to dictate formation of pro-Peking governments in New Delhi and the capitals of Southeast Asia, and to gain recognition as a superpower, with the expectation that her views would have to be taken into account in connection with the settlement of all international disputes and the allocation of resources. Last, but not least, Peking wants to be free to lend active support to revolutionary peoples throughout the world so they may be liberated from "Western imperialism" and "Soviet revisionism."

The envisioned failure to deal with the Chinese nuclear threat is likely to produce a threat of nuclear conflict over a nuclear-arming West Germany, small nuclear wars between countries such as India and Pakistan and Israel and the UAR, and the expenditure of many tens, even hundreds, of billions of dollars in ABM systems at the expense of the world war against poverty. Additionally, both the United States and the USSR can expect to be involved in escalating crises caused by what China believes to be legitimate complaints—Taiwan, U.S. military bases, and former Chinese territories in Siberia. Considering the commitment of present Chinese rulers to violence, revolution and turmoil, Peking's acquisition of a sizeable nuclear arsenal before the end of the 1970's threatens to create instability over large portions of the globe—and possibly nuclear conflict. It is not hard to envision the Chinese winning "nuclear chicken" games and thus acquiring Taiwan and bordering Soviet territories; they may also influence establishment of pro-Peking governments in New Delhi and Tokyo, Seoul and Saigon. The Chinese would probably be emboldened to support "wars of national liberation" in Venezuela and even Mexico, and

[21] *New York Times,* June 18, 1967, p. 3.

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the developing countries of Africa and Asia. It is not comforting to envision Vietnamese-type "liberation wars" in our own backyard. Many undeveloped countries have masses of discontents, potential "revolutionary patriots" whom the Chinese might actively support by supplying arms and by neutralizing "imperialist nuclear blackmail." Also, China, mischievously or in an effort to replace Soviet influence, might give nuclear weapons to countries such as the UAR, thus instantly creating a dangerous situation likely to involve the two superpowers. China could no doubt find many ways to trigger a nuclear war between the superpowers.

It has been argued that her increasing affluence might diminish China's present revolutionary fervor—along the lines of the Soviet experience—so that these dismal predictions might not come true. But there is a fundamental difference between China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is reasonably satisfied with the territorial status quo, at least to the extent that her leaders are unwilling to take grave risks. China is not willing to settle for the status quo.[22]

The prospects for the Soviet Union are not much better. If, as predicted by Kaplan, the Soviets cannot prevent China and West Germany from gaining access to nuclear arms, they may not be able to stop these two states from reacquiring their former territories in Siberia and Central Europe. A somewhat truncated Russia surrounded by unfriendly nuclear-armed powers might be forced into isolationism and a "fortress" mentality.

VIII

Arms control measures cannot be effective if they are binding only on those states which assent to be bound. This is particularly true with respect to nuclear arms. Chinese nuclear arms progress apparently has forced the Soviet Union to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, and it is unlikely that the Soviets will expend the vast sums needed to complete the system until they are sure of its effectiveness. Since an anti-ballistic missile will almost certainly use a nuclear warhead, the testing of the system will require atmospheric and space test explosions which will force the Soviet Union to withdraw from the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

[22]The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which upset nearly all communist parties in the West and many nonaligned states, is evidence of the Soviet desire to maintain the status quo of the "Socialist Commonwealth" at the expense of extending its control to other states. It will be more difficult now, for example, to persuade the people of France and Italy to elect a communist party to power and thus put their country into the communist bloc.

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Further, Chinese nuclear arms progress is likely to prevent the attainment of an *effective* nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Arms control measures can prevent arms race measures only when they are universally binding, i.e., by virtue of being accepted by assenting states and imposed on nonassenting states. A universally-binding nuclear test ban in all environments which had enforcement credibility could be effective in preventing further Chinese work on nuclear weapons if Peking observed the ban or if it were forced on the Chinese by a threat to destroy, or the actual destruction of, their capability.[23] The failure to freeze or terminate the Chinese nuclear program is likely to lead to a superpower confrontation with its danger of a general nuclear war, to small nuclear wars, and to the expenditure of vast sums of money on ABM systems of questionable effectiveness.

But is there a legal basis for binding nonassenting states against their will? In my view, *generally-recognized* international peacekeeping laws can be relied on to bind nonassenting states because they are recognized by a large majority of the states. These laws are limited to international peacekeeping purposes, express an intent to bind nonassenting states, and are adhered to by a large majority of the states, specifically including the United States and the Soviet Union. They can be relied on to bind nonassenting states because the international community says they are universally binding.

The UN Charter is the principal example of a generally-recognized international peacekeeping law. Article 2 (6) of the Charter makes its peacekeeping provisions applicable to nonparties against their will. The UN action in repelling the North Korean invasion of South Korea is just one example of UN actions against nonparties deemed to have violated the Charter.[24]

[23]A universally-binding *partial* nuclear test ban (forbidding tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, as the present ban does) might be a more feasible first step. It would also be a precedent for a universally-binding test ban in all environments, as well as other universal arms control measures such as a universal nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and could bring a halt to the Chinese nuclear arms development program.

[24]For an excellent survey of the precedents for binding nonassenting states, see Louis B. Sohn, "Enforcement of Disarmament Controls with Respect to States which have not Ratified a Disarmament or Arms Control Treaty," in Donald G. Brennan and Robert Maxwell, editors, *Arms Control and Disarmament* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), p. 99. It should be noted that most states, including the United States and the USSR, also agree that both customary law and peace treaties settling wars can bind states against their will. Based on my discussions with some Soviet international law experts in August 1968, a universal test ban, if politically acceptable, would present no legal problems to the Soviets with respect to binding nonassenting states. The U.S. position on this legal issue is not publicly known.

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If enforcement measures are to be carried out by volunteering states, then generally-recognized international peacekeeping laws will have enforcement credibility to the extent that a nonassenting state, desiring to conduct the activity banned by the law, believes that at least one volunteering state with adequate capability would punish it. For example, if the Nationalist Chinese had an enforcement capability, such as a fleet of long-range bombers, the mainland Chinese might believe that Taiwan would volunteer to punish them for conducting the banned activity.

An organization established to administer these peacekeeping laws could be controlled by a small number of responsible powers and develop into an "upper house" to the United Nations, particularly if the government of mainland China is admitted to the world body and takes the Chinese seat in the Security Council.

It is the task of the political leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and other states to determine whether, as a practical matter, universal nuclear arms control laws can be enforced against nonassenting states. If they conclude that it is feasible to enforce compliance of these laws, a significant step toward the goal of maintaining nuclear peace through law may be taken. If enforced compliance is not feasible, arms control agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban and the Nonproliferation Treaty will inevitably be "driven out" by arms race measures such as a Chinese missile deployment, ABM defenses and ABM-penetrating offensive missile systems.[25] To put it plainly, if the Chinese are able to deploy an effective nuclear missile system, there will be no effective nuclear arms control measures.

[25]This view is supported by the result of the London Naval Agreement, signed on March 25, 1936 by Great Britain, France and the United States, which provided for restrictions on the size of certain types of naval vessels and the caliber of guns of the signatories. The treaty also had an "escalator clause" allowing signatories to exceed the restrictions in the event of competitive building by another state. Within two years, the United States and Great Britain announced that they were resuming competitive building due to the accelerated naval construction of Japan, a nonsignatory. Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, *Responses to Violations of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements* (Washington: HERO, April 1964), p. 152, and in the Annex, Volume II, p. A-161. This report was prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under ACDA Contract GC-17, March 29, 1963, and is on file in the ACDA library in Washington.

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WEAKNESSES OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

by Morton A. Kaplan

IT is politically difficult to take a stand against the treaty on nuclear nonproliferation (NPT), for it is one of the few areas in which there is apparent political consensus in the United States, a consensus that has run from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Johnson through Senators Fulbright and McCarthy to such organizations as SANE and the Communist Party of the United States. To argue against the treaty appears equivalent to arguing against motherhood, beauty, justice and peace. Even those nations that apparently are opposed to the NPT, with the exception of Communist China, hide their objections behind a smoke screen of verbal support either for the treaty or for the ideas lying behind it. No doubt a poll taken among the Mafia, the peddlers of dope and the organizers of white slavery would show support for the treaty so that those who oppose it must appear truly depraved by comparison. I, therefore, can provide moral support for my position only by taking refuge behind the aphorism of the venerated W. C. Fields to the effect that anyone who dislikes small children and dogs cannot be entirely bad.

I am grateful to Dr. Yuter (see his article in this issue of ORBIS) for making intellectually clear one of the most significant conditions necessary for success of a nuclear nondiffusion treaty: a universal nuclear test ban. Politicians and/or statesmen obfuscate the conditions requisite for a successful treaty in an effort to secure support for the NPT by hiding its weaknesses; they dissemble its blemishes, its dangers and its immoralities. Three major conditions requisite for the treaty's success are a universal test ban, as Yuter notes; a condominium between the United States and the Soviet Union; and a guarantee by the nuclear powers to nonnuclear powers against aggression by countries possessing nuclear weapons.

It is important not to ignore one of the purposes of the universal test ban that Yuter advocates. Although a universally binding test ban would operate to prevent any nation from testing nuclear weapons, one of the main purposes of such a ban is to

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legitimate an attack on China's nuclear facilities if China continues to develop her nuclear arsenal. Peking is well aware that the Geneva negotiations on nuclear diffusion, although addressed to the general problem of the spread of nuclear weapons, were also directed against China and West Germany. The failure to include an explicit universal test ban in the treaty—largely the result of a failure of nerve on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union—or alternatively to provide India with ironclad guarantees against aggression, accounts for stubborn Indian resistance to the NPT. Unless the Indians can be induced to sign, the prospect that the treaty will hold for the twenty-five years of its life is slight.

Of course, unexpected changes in world politics leading to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the reduction of issues among nations, and enormous increases in international cooperation and international governance might confound this prediction. Yet, it is doubtful whether even supporters of the treaty, at least those in official positions, would expect such developments.

I

Consider the enormity of a decision to destroy China's nuclear facilities. The United States refrained from carrying out a similar attack on the Soviet Union at a time when to do so would have maintained the American nuclear monopoly. That monopoly cannot be restored by destroying the fledgling Chinese arsenal. If many regard the war in Viet Nam as a racist war, a conclusion from which this writer vigorously dissents, an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities would seem to most of the world to be unmistakably of that character. Such an attack, even if it succeeded, and this cannot be assumed, would not end China's nuclear ambitions. The resentment accumulated within that sleeping giant would likely produce both political and military disturbances and eventually a resumption of nuclear production. The shock generated by the initial attack would more likely deter those who undertook it than those who suffered from it. Moreover, the message conveyed to other nations in Asia, regardless of whether they thought they wished to see the Chinese facilities destroyed, would be that the United States or the Soviet Union can intervene in Asian affairs without provocation—hardly a reassuring message or one the United States should desire to convey. Even those who believe, mistakenly in my opinion,

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that we are morally capable of carrying out such an attack on China would not be able easily to contemplate a similar attack on a nuclear-armed India or a nuclear-armed Japan—an outcome an attack on China would do more to promote than forestall.

Furthermore, unless the attack were carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union in concert, which would not be easy to manage considering how difficult it is to secure cooperation on much less momentous issues, the single nation mounting it might drive China into the arms of the other. Only the most reckless of American administrations would entertain the prospect of thus reunifying the communist world, for, even though the Soviet Union might wish and might secretly encourage a U.S. attack on Chinese facilities, Moscow would denounce us for it with the utmost vehemence. We would be foolish to do otherwise were circumstances reversed.

One can discount the possibility that such an attack could be carried out by an international administration. The attempt to bring an international body to such a decision, by means of sophisticated arguments concerning the binding quality of a treaty on a nonsignator nation, would stir up so much horror in contemplating the act that the consensus necessary for carrying it out could not be achieved. A decision to attack China's nuclear facilities requires secrecy, stealth and guile. The nature of this decision-making process leading to an attack would help to discredit it. In any event, such secrecy is not genuinely possible for an international administration under contemporary circumstances.

Since it is most improbable at this late stage of China's program that purely conventional military operations would suffice, the attack on the Chinese facilities would have to be nuclear. It would thus constitute the first use of nuclear weapons since the Second World War. The resort to nuclear weapons toward the end of that war did not sociologically or psychologically set a precedent for the post-World War II period. To employ them now in the absence of a cause for war, other than nuclear testing by China, would demonstrate the shocking uses to which nuclear weapons could be put in the world; it would instruct nations in their utility in a way not favored by the present leaders of the United States or by any intelligent leaders who might later take office. It would at the same time legitimize the use of nuclear

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weapons. The impact on the structure of world politics would be one I would contemplate with the greatest concern.

II

That an effective nuclear nonproliferation treaty would require a Soviet-American condominium appears beyond question. The process of securing passage of the treaty in the General Assembly of the United Nations demonstrated the power of such a condominium, as threats, promises and pressures were employed against reluctant nations in a way not seen since Stalin's ham-handed rule of the Soviet satellites—except for Moscow's attempt to halt the liberalization process in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although U.S. pressures and threats were less harsh and more veiled behind superficial politeness than those used by the Soviet Union, the episode is a shameful chapter in recent history, falling far short of the quality of behavior we have a right to expect between supposedly friendly and nearly equal nations.

But whence comes the warrant for such a condominium? Where is the moral authority for it? What right does either the United States or the Soviet Union have to such a role, apart from the present possession of massive nuclear systems, that would not pertain equally to Great Britain, France, West Germany, India, Japan or Communist China? At the very time when the Soviet and American blocs are breaking up and when the superiority of these two nations over the other nations of the world is diminishing, what reason is there to believe that their military ascendancy will be accepted for the next twenty-five years? What warrant is there for believing that this condominium will not be resisted, revolted against, subverted and challenged in ways that might prove even more destabilizing than the diffusion of nuclear weapons? Are we prepared to maintain this condominium by such brutalities that we would interfere with the independent political life going on in the various nations of the world? Are we ready and willing to take on the enormous responsibilities entailed? And are such responsibilities really in our own interest?

What is there in the nature of Soviet-American relations in the past twenty-five years, in the social and political systems of the two nations, in their goals in the world, in the means they use to achieve these goals, that leads us to believe they could maintain this harmony of interest in face of the unexpected problems virtually sure to arise in the near and intermediate future?

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Upon what basis can we believe that the national regimes in the two countries will find such harmony consistent not merely with external interests but with their interests in winning elections or maintaining regime continuity? What reason is there to believe that maintenance of such a condominium will so overshadow all other values, beliefs and commitments that the governments of both nations will maintain it with single-minded purpose? And, even were all these other doubts to be overcome, what reason is there to believe that the two regimes could overcome problems of bargaining among themselves in such a way that agreement upon spoils and responsibilities would continue to be reached over so long a time?

The condominium, in effect, did not even survive the process of negotiating the treaty, for the terms of the treaty failed to meet the minimum requirements for effective implementation over the intermediate period. Thus, faith that such a condominium could be established and maintained for a quarter-century constitutes a touching reaffirmation of the simplistic nature of politics, to wit, that the most complicated events can be manipulated from the right vantage points. This is a charming notion, but it gives more credit to social engineering than is warranted and ignores the complexities, ambiguities, absurdities and novelties that help to make up the historical process. The treaty represents a flight from reality.

III

The third item required for the success of a nonproliferation treaty is a guarantee by the United States and/or the Soviet Union to defend the victims of aggression. This guarantee must be not merely against nuclear attack but also against conventional attack, for one virtue of a nuclear arsenal is its deterrent effect against attack by a conventionally superior foe. The United States and the Soviet Union have restricted their guarantees to other nations to cases of nuclear attack, but even these guarantees are less than automatic. India asks for a guarantee going far beyond anything we have extended to our NATO allies. And our NATO allies interpret the American "pause" strategy as a retreat from the restricted nuclear guarantee we have offered them.

The guarantee issue has been buried beneath a web of deceptive verbiage. At this point in time nuclear attacks are unlikely and, with few exceptions, wars designed to exterminate another nation are almost equally unlikely. For most situations

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that could arise either the U.S. or Soviet nuclear force would constitute a sufficient deterrent, apart from any question of guarantee. As long as our image of the threat is one of criminals huddling behind closed doors, plotting conquest, and preparing their massive attack in secrecy and without provocation, we will misunderstand the nature of the problem. If such a threat ever existed, and it is doubtful whether this image correctly describes even the Nazi aggressions or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, then the guarantees being offered by the Soviet Union and the United States should suffice; for, although it is not clear that the guarantees would be honored in all cases, the risk that they would be honored would seem to outrun any conceivable gain "criminal" aggressors might achieve in their strikes out of the blue.

It is the unanticipated crisis, in which the equities are mixed or unclear and in which regimes or international interests arise in a not entirely controllable manner, that lies at the root of the concern of other nations. Such crises develop slowly, although they may accelerate rapidly toward the end, and provide opportunity for the guaranteeing powers to conclude that their guarantees were not meant to be extended under the prevailing conditions. This would place the guaranteed power under enormous pressure to make concessions to which it might object for legitimate national reasons, as in the case of Czechoslovakia during the Munich crisis. Otherwise the guaranteeing power would in all likelihood attempt to withdraw from its commitment in consideration of the damage that might occur to its major cities as a result of action in support of a state not vital to its interests, a regime of which it might not entirely approve, or a bargaining sequence it had come to believe, under pressure of events, was stubborn, unintelligent or unrealistic.

Surely the United States does not desire to give a blank check to other states for nuclear wars. Blank checks almost invariably work out poorly, as the Kaiser learned during the First World War and as Britain learned after its blank check to Poland in 1939. They may increase rather than decrease the prospect of war, improper political demands, and risks that no reasonable U.S. government would desire to subject the American population to. Yet, in the absence of a blank check, a conditional and vague guarantee of the sort being offered to other states by the United States and the Soviet Union may only constitute a source of pressure against the victimized or weaker state, as at Munich.

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Torn by our ambivalence over the concept of the guarantee, we make a weak guarantee that entails the worst of the possible political prospects. We are led into deceit, as we were when we proposed the MLF. Such deceit is not often a sound basis for policy.

It is ironic that this particular form of guarantee, deceitful though it may be, is being offered at a time when the American public is threatening to return to a new version of its prewar isolationism. The 1967 Middle East war demonstrated the extent to which the events in Viet Nam have produced a cautious response in our highest official circles with respect to crises elsewhere. The slogan of reducing U.S. commitments has gained great popularity, and most of our leading political figures vie in proclaiming their adherence to that slogan. Yet we ask the rest of the world to believe that we are making the most momentous, and grave, and risk-bearing, form of commitment, that will cover circumstances we cannot begin to visualize. We fool only ourselves, for our self-deception is transparent to most other nations of the world; the latter temporarily cooperate with our policy and with that of the Soviet Union only because of the enormous pressures we have brought to bear against them.

Worst of all, we are attempting to force vigorous countries, with proud histories and dignified cultures, to accept the position of international wards. Were they to accept such an ignoble role, there would doubtless be unfortunate domestic political repercussions. Were they to resist the role, international problems might be worsened by the very existence of the treaty we are forcing upon them. At a time when important political pressure is being applied to lower the voting age to eighteen in the United States, and when university students are demonstrating in favor of increasing autonomy in control of their institutions, we are trying to force proud nations led by civilized and intelligent adults into the role of international juveniles. Does anyone really believe that such a solution could be maintained for long?

IV

The treaty involves the additional danger that it will not halt the spread of nuclear weapons but will only force the spread to occur under the worst possible auspices. The Germans endorsed the MLF not because they thought it a viable military force but because they thought agreement to the plan was the most prac-

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ticable method for maintaining U.S. support and because they hoped it would evolve so as to give them a potential finger on the American nuclear trigger. They have since come to fear that German interests are being sacrificed by the United States to the concept of American-Soviet détente. This may (or may not) be a reasonable policy for the United States to follow but at least the decision concerning it should be made with a view to the potential consequences. Eventually it will become clear to the Germans that the French as well as the Americans have been playing games with German interests, and that the French are also opposed to German reunification.

It is now twenty-four years since the end of the Second World War. Germans who were fifteen years old at the conclusion of the war in 1945 are now thirty-nine. In five years all Germans under age forty-four will have been fifteen years old or less when the war ended. These Germans rightly feel no guilt for the crimes of the Nazis, and, to the extent that they may recognize the complicity of older German citizens, a complicity that is somewhat less than crystal clear, they do not recognize that any of this bears upon themselves. Although the NPT superficially applies to all nonnuclear states, Germans as well as Chinese are aware that it is particularly directed against them. They are sure to resent this unequal treatment of their great nations.

Granted that such speculations are hazardous, I would not expect the pressure for German nuclearization to become severe before 1975. The change of generations both in Germany and in her neighbors, as well as the changes in international circumstances, will by then allow what is now only latent to become manifest. In this respect it is interesting to note that resistance to Germany's signature on the NPT includes such distinguished crusaders for peace as Nobel prize-winner Carl von Weizsacker, ostensibly because the treaty would interfere with Germany's peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Yet this reason, cited by many Germans, seems so weak intellectually that we must suspect latent motivations perhaps not understood by those who advance it.

If the present generation of responsible and democratic German leaders is forced to accept the onus for Germany's signature on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, as now appears likely, the nationalistic reaction of betrayed German youths toward the nations that have treated Germany as an inferior and toward the democratic politicians who have accepted such a role could in-

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spire a movement leading to the development of a German nuclear force under the direction of a radical regime. Acquisition of the force would not be difficult, for Germany will in the near future have the capability of producing several hundred nuclear weapons a year. Were it to be acquired during a period that is fairly quiet on the international scene, I do not believe Moscow would do more than bluster. Moreover, were the Soviets to attack in an effort to destroy Germany's nuclear force, the impact upon world politics would be shattering and the prognosis for the future less than sanguine. Neither of these projected outcomes would be consonant with American national interests, and a Soviet attack would be particularly threatening.

Although it is difficult to think how a central war could originate in Europe, the least implausible scenarios for such a war begin with a crisis on the frontier between the two Germanys. The present unnatural division of Germany remains the greatest danger for Europe's future. The dream of some to evade this danger by integrating West Germany within a united Western Europe allied with the United States through an effective NATO seems almost beyond resurrection. To the extent that a united Western Europe is possible, we should continue to support it, even outside an American alliance, although in the latter case a joint European nuclear force would be required. Under these circumstances, unification would probably not become a pressing political goal in Germany. The impact of de Gaulle, however, will continue to erode the enthusiasm of German youth for supranational goals and feed the flames of nationalism.

If nationalist sentiment continues to increase over a period of time, it will create an additional incentive for an independent German nuclear force. We would do well to support such a force while it can still be developed by German democrats. Otherwise, it is likely to be controlled by radical nationalists who come to office on the basis of the mistakes of present U.S. and German leaders. Conceivably, the newcomers might deal with the Soviets at the expense of the East Germans and the Poles, who are pursuing a particularly senseless and self-defeating policy. No matter how much the Soviets may now denounce such an entente, they have displayed a realism in the past that gives us cause to assume they would see its advantages when confronted with the dangers of a nuclear-armed Germany and the prospect of forcing the United States out of Central Europe. Further erosion

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of the unity of the communist bloc would increase Moscow's receptiveness to such a deal. Although the probability of a holocaust is fortunately small, this set of developments would maximize it as well as produce political consequences and alignments least favorable to a humanistic and democratic world.

One can only hope that the issue of German unification becomes muted over time, either because West Germans lose interest or because, as the blocs disappear, the East German regime is liberalized and confederal relations between the two Germanys develop peacefully. It seems reasonable that a democratically-led West Germany would be more inclined to support a gradual liberalization process in East Germany and to refrain from precipitous interventions than would a West Germany led by radical nationalists. And it seems probable that a combination of the unification and nuclear issues would buttress the development of radical nationalist forces. Moreover, a dangerous interim period will likely occur if the Soviet Union proves unwilling to intervene in East European affairs and the consensus underlying the East German regime crumbles. The East Germans might then be strongly tempted to develop their own nuclear forces and make demands on Poland in order to capture nationalist sentiment and re-establish domestic support. Possession by a democratically-led West German government of nuclear forces—or even better, the Federal Republic's integration within a European nuclear force—would help to deter or mitigate such a crisis. If Soviet troops had already been withdrawn from East Germany, the ability of a democratically-led West Germany to dampen the crisis would do much to remove the incentives for Moscow's intervention. If Soviet legions remained in East Germany, then a West German nuclear force under democratic control would have a deterrent effect upon both East German and Soviet activities. Such a force under radical nationalist control would precipitate the worst possibilities for crisis, including a deal between West Germany and the USSR at the expense of world order and American interests.

There are advantages to the United States in contemplating a Soviet Union bordered on the east by a nuclear-armed China and on the west by a nuclear-armed Germany led by determined democrats. Under such circumstances, the likelihood of Soviet adventures would be greatly diminished, the pressures on the Soviet Union to reach détente with the United States enormously

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increased, and the need for the United States to involve itself directly in the affairs of Europe, with the attendant nuclear risks, reassuringly lessened.

V

Although a nuclear incident might occur in the world described above, it would probably not set off a nuclear holocaust. In any event, I do not believe that the nuclear nondiffusion treaty will appreciably diminish or slow the spread of nuclear weapons; for this reason I do not believe that the risk of a nuclear incident can be reduced by the implementation of the treaty. Conceivably, this risk could be heightened by the nature of the circumstances under which proliferation of nuclear weapons might occur should the treaty come into force.

I am concerned about the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons even to responsible governments in Europe, but I do not consider this a major danger to world security. Clearly it would be desirable to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the unstable small states. Yet it may turn out that the most counterproductive way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to these states was to enter into a nuclear nondiffusion treaty that will almost surely prove ineffective.

The negotiations over the NPT have informed many of the participants about the nature of nuclear systems and whetted their interest in them. The capability of smaller nations for achieving nuclear status has been enormously increased by the Atoms for Peace program. The failure of the present treaty will undoubtedly inhibit the search for other alternatives to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. In short, the present treaty may have been the least efficacious route the United States could have chosen to achieve the aim of nuclear nondiffusion.

Still, the treaty will not necessarily fail. Universal détente may blossom, the nations of the world may cooperate in a wide variety of measures, and international techniques for the control of nuclear weapons may be developed, in which case the stigma of national inferiority may be removed. We may some day be glad that the treaty was entered into, and we may view the present negotiations as acts of farsighted statesmanship. This may be the retrospective view of history. From the vantage point of the present, however, and weighing the subjective probabilities concerning the outcomes with as little sentimentality as possible, I can only conclude that the negotiations for the conclusion of a

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nuclear nondiffusion treaty constitute one of the great disasters of contemporary statesmanship.

VI

The preceding sections of this article were written just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. It would have been possible to revise the entire article to remove inconsistencies between the statements made here and those made in the body of the article, but this would indicate a degree of prescience that is not warranted. I had stated several times during the crisis that, were I a dedicated communist and a member of the Soviet Politburo, I would vote for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but that I thought the Soviet leadership was sufficiently conservative to make that course of action less than a 50/50 contingency. The events of August 1968 showed that the Kremlin leaders were able to mobilize their courage for a vicious assault upon the freedom of the Czechoslovakian people.

This latest tragedy of our age, a tragedy that has engulfed the Czech population for the third time in the last thirty years, demonstrates anew the emptiness of the projections offered by the premier mythmaker of Washington, Senator J. William Fulbright. Senator Fulbright, who during the height of the Cold War was one of the chief architects of the myth of a monolithic communist bloc, has been for the past several years the chief architect of the myth of the liberalization and democratization of the Soviet Union. He began by contrasting Stalin and the present Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership. Yet when Yugoslavia broke with the bloc in 1948, Stalin did not invade Yugoslavia with the armed legions of the Soviet Union, although he had more than six million men under arms while the United States had less than a million and would have been unable to hold against attack even in Western Europe. In 1956, Khrushchev crushed the freedom of the Hungarian people with Soviet armed force after Hungary opted for political neutralization. Czechoslovakia in 1968 agreed to support the foreign policy of the Soviet bloc; thus the present Soviet leadership, in assaulting the freedom of Czechoslovakia, has done so under even less provocative circumstances than in 1956.

Although the bloc is far from monolithic and was less than monolithic even under Stalin, the unity of the five invading

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powers has been forged anew. Rumania remains defiant and recalcitrant, but shows no signs of defecting. China pursues its lonely path, but, when Mao dies, it is not inconceivable that Chinese military leaders may turn to the USSR as the only power capable of supplying them with modern arms, and attempt to repair the rupture between the two countries and diminish the distance between their policies. If the Soviet Union can hold to this new tough course, it is possible that even Rumania and Yugoslavia may be brought into line. This is speculative, however, and much depends upon the events of the near future.

The situation in Czechoslovakia remains uncertain. The Soviet Union has been unable to find the kind of "stooge" government it was able to set up in Hungary under Janos Kadar. It cannot administer and run Czechoslovakia without aid from at least some remnants of the Communist Party. The truce between the Dubcek Government and Moscow is uneasy, but the prospects for Czechoslovak freedom and independence are dim. As to the reaction of the United States to the Soviet intervention, the story dispatched from Warsaw by Jonathan Randal to the *New York Times* on August 21 remains pertinent.

> Eastern Europeans find it difficult to understand why the Johnson administration chose to negotiate a number of important deals with the Soviet Union during the height of the Czechoslovak crisis. Many Eastern Europeans feel that the United States is more interested in fostering its relations with the Soviet Union than in exerting influence in the area of Europe that since 1956 the United States has accepted as a Soviet sphere of influence. "The inaugural flights between New York and Moscow, the signing of the treaty to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the bilateral cultural exchanges may have led the Soviet Union to intervene militarily," an Eastern European diplomat said recently, "because the Kremlin calculated that the United States was not even morally concerned with Czechoslovakia."

Comments of this kind manifest how some East Europeans engaged in the art of international politics interpret the significance of American behavior. The Soviets by analogy may reason in the same way. Moreover, since these diplomats have many contacts with their Soviet colleagues, their observations may possibly represent some of the expressed opinions of highly placed Soviet personnel. It is not inconceivable that their advice on how to bargain with the Soviets is preferable to the generalizations about projection and the theories about mirror images that Senator Fulbright obtains from his consulting psychiatrists.

The quotation from the Randal news story confirms what

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intelligent observers already knew: that it was not the example of the Viet Nam conflict that led to Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, but rather the combination of the danger of internal liberalization in the Soviet Union and the threat to the bloc, particularly to East Germany. These serious problems motivated the Soviet Union to act at a time when the United States was showing an indecent desire for détente with the USSR. For the past several years, and particularly during the crisis, Washington has displayed enthusiasm for measures that are of more importance to the Soviet Union than to the United States. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty is a prime example. After having made the mistake of agreeing to the NPT, the United States might have deterred the invasion of Czechoslovakia by informing the Soviet Union privately that such an invasion would lead to the immediate cancellation of the pact and the possible nuclear armament of West Germany. That intelligent and sensible step was not taken because the Johnson Administration was in fact, despite the attacks upon it by the doves, inclined to the same sort of flabby sentimental enthusiasm for détente that motivates such people as Senators Fulbright and McCarthy.

The opportunity to deter the invasion of Czechoslovakia is past. But Washington still has an opportunity to aid the Czechoslovak people in bargaining with their Soviet captors. The inability of the Soviet Union so far to form a "responsible" government in Czechoslovakia makes Moscow's position a difficult one. Instead of assuring the Soviets that it will do nothing more than denounce the intervention and that it intends firmly to pursue arms control measures, Washington should inform them that a number of measures, including the cancellation of the nuclear diffusion treaty, will be undertaken unless the Soviet Union compromises its objectives in Czechoslovakia, frees the seized leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and withdraws its troops. There is reason to believe that this action would cause severe debate within the Soviet Politburo, with some chance that the Soviets would relax their grip on Czechoslovakia.

Although the warning to the Soviet Union would have to be private, there are ways in which it could be made known to the members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The fact that the United States was bringing this kind of pressure to bear in support of the Czech position would probably encourage them to maintain their resistance to Soviet aggression.

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The present sequence of events dims the prospects for the continued gradual dissolution of the Soviet bloc, although this possibility still cannot be ruled out despite the vigorous action taken against Czechoslovakia. We cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union might some day attack West Germany. Although this probability is not very great, no doubt many Germans today feel less secure, as indeed they should, than they did before the Czech crisis. The fact that West Germany is a member of NATO and Czechoslovakia is a member of the Warsaw Pact does not entirely invalidate the conclusion some Germans might draw that the U.S. guarantee, either under NATO or under the nuclear nondiffusion pact, is somewhat less than certain. The innocent expressions in Washington that there is, after all, nothing we can do but accept a *fait accompli,* undercut seriously the value of both guarantees. Few Germans will miss this point, and those Germans who have been particularly associated with the concept of détente and with acceptance of the nuclear nondiffusion treaty, such as Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party, will be seriously injured in their political prospects because of it. The changing German viewpoint increases greatly the likelihood that Germany will some day seek nuclear weapons and that if the democratic politicians do not lead this move, radical nationalists will. Let us hope that Washington will understand this message.

One cannot draw the conclusion that the Germans will be deterred from acquiring nuclear weapons by fear that the United States will desert them during an acquisition crisis. If assurance concerning the U.S. guarantee in a political crisis is not strong enough for Germans to rely on it firmly, still their acquisition of nuclear weapons in time of tranquillity, particularly if Japan or India has already taken similar action, would hardly justify a resort to force by the USSR—except in a way threatening to the United States and world stability and therefore invoking the possibility of an American nuclear response. This probability need not be high to deter the Soviets. Their hesitancy about Czechoslovakia before the decision to invade was obvious enough that they might have been deterred by expressions of American opposition or even by indications of a Czechoslovak willingness to fight.

Thus we are confronted by the apparent (but not genuine) paradox that a U.S. guarantee which is not fully credible for a political crisis might nonetheless be sufficient to dissuade the

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Soviets from creating a crisis over the German acquisition of nuclear weapons. This need not be the case and much will depend upon circumstances. Included in such circumstances will be the speed with which Germany acquires at least some nuclear weapons, either through clandestine production—she will have the fissionable materials required to produce several hundred bombs a year in the 1970's—or through collusion with another nation. German possession of only a few bombs, even if they do not constitute an otherwise viable nuclear force, would probably be adequate to deter the Soviets, apart from the American deterrent. Would the Soviets have invaded Czechoslovakia if that nation had possessed a few bombs and even the most primitive kind of delivery capability? Germans are likely at some time in the future to ask themselves this question.

Perhaps the United States should consider the possibility of creating a quick-transfer capacity to avoid worse alternatives should a German-Soviet crisis arise in the future, whether that crisis be over German acquisition of nuclear weapons or over some other issue. A quick-transfer capacity might be a deterrent to the kind of action the USSR took against Czechoslovakia—and it *might* make German acquisition of nuclear weapons unnecessary. Although the latter consideration would not be the major reason for creating it, such a capacity might nonetheless provide more of a barrier to proliferation than the treaty, which, by attempting to draw the line at the wrong place, will most likely be counterproductive.

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SOVIET POLICY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 1966-1968

by Gerhard Wettig

THE debate on the merits of a nonproliferation treaty, both in political and academic circles, has treated various aspects of the problem, but the question of Soviet motives and objectives has rarely been raised.[1] This gap may be due largely to the difficulties facing the analyst of Soviet foreign policy intentions. Direct information on the process of policymaking is virtually nonexistent. Soviet communications via diplomatic channels, poor sources of information anyway, are shielded from the public by classification procedures.

The only sources usually available are public statements issued by the Soviet regime. Western observers are inclined to treat these as "mere propaganda"; indeed, these statements are designed, not to reveal underlying Soviet motives, but to serve as instruments to manipulate audiences. This does not mean that Soviet public statements are worthless as tools for assessing Soviet intentions. As purposive communications, they are guided by the purpose behind them. If compared with related and verifiable data and put into the environmental context, purposive communication, by its very deviations from what one should have "normally" expected in the situation, yields its underlying purposes. Thus, Soviet public statements can serve as a basis for understanding Soviet foreign policy—not directly by taking them at face value, but indirectly by using them to make inferences.

The following analysis rests on the assumption that the nonfrequency type of content indicators is best suited to examining Soviet statements.[2] Excellent clues to underlying purposes are provided by differing accounts on the same subjects appearing in various Soviet statements—differences of time (allowing cor-

[1]The only attempt at a comprehensive assessment seems to be the author's earlier article, written in June 1967, "Funktionen eines Sperrvertrages in der sowjetischen Politik," *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 19 (1968), No. 1, pp. 9-23.

[2]For further methodological discussion see Alexander L. George, *Propaganda Analysis* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1959) and "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, editor, *Trends in Content Analysis* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 7-32.

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relations with changes of events, situations and overall policies) or of place (allowing correlations with varying audience dispositions).

Time differences can be broken down into a first main period, during which the Soviet Union tried to get the type of nonproliferation agreement she wanted from the Anglo-Saxon countries; and a second main period, during which worldwide approval had to be secured for the agreement reached by the three powers. Subdivisions of considerable relevance are provided by two changes of the Soviet line toward the Federal Republic of Germany in December 1966 and by the severe setback dealt the Nonproliferation Treaty by Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Audience differences are related to the peculiarities of the various Soviet communication organs surveyed. *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* provide the political guidelines for domestic consumption. At the same time, however, Soviet leaders are aware that these papers are carefully read by Western observers. In addition, *Pravda* has the function of guiding the behavior of Moscow-oriented communists all over the world.[3] *Krasnaya zvezda, Komsomolskaya pravda* and *Trud* are designed to manipulate domestic audiences. We can learn what Soviet leaders want their citizens to believe by reading the statements issued by the Russian services of TASS and Radio Moscow. International audiences are addressed by the weekly *Novoye vremya,* published also in English (*New Times*), French, German, Spanish, Polish and Czech, and, on a more sophisticated level, by the foreign policy journal *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn',* published—occasionally with inaccurate translations—in English (*International Affairs*) and French language editions. All official Soviet statements and unclassified diplomatic documents are released for international consumption; sometimes these are not transmitted to the Soviet public. TASS, Radio Moscow, and Radio Peace and Progress have news services in many foreign languages, and these often differ widely from one another. A communication organ directed specifically at Anglo-Saxon audiences is the Press Agency Novosti (APN). Interesting insights are provided by conferences of Soviet or communist academic specialists in the foreign policy field.

[3]Cf. Donald S. Zagoria. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 28-29, and John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), pp. 200-202.

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These conferences have an important policy-checking and policy-formulating function. Their proceedings are often published after a certain time lag; while the contributions may not be given in full, they can be regarded as essentially unaltered, thus allowing a glimpse into internal debate.

Basic Soviet Perceptions of the Nonproliferation Issue

Present Soviet policy toward the West operates on two distinct levels: the European level and the U.S.-USSR level. In the first case, the central concept is "European security"; in the second case, nonproliferation plays the decisive role. It is striking that the Soviet communicators hail "European security" as an application of the ideological doctrine of "peaceful coexistence between states of different social orders," but they do not associate nonproliferation with that doctrine. Another conspicuous fact is Soviet reluctance to voice the only argument that can provide moral justification for a nonproliferation treaty, namely, that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens the world with the prospect of uncontrollable nuclear conflict.

Until April 1968, only slightly more than one per cent of all Soviet statements had mentioned the nonproliferation argument. In these cases, either the international public or, more often, an exclusively Anglo-Saxon audience was addressed. This argument clearly was the one the Soviets felt would appeal most to foreign, especially Anglo-Saxon, audiences. It is surprising that Soviet communicators did not exploit the popularity of nonproliferation with foreign audiences more often than they did. They would use the topic sporadically for a time, and then it would disappear from the communications media altogether, to reappear later. The nonproliferation argument seemed to be alien to the thinking habits of the Soviet elite. Moreover, the top leaders carefully avoided giving publicity to the subject at home and in the communist world: no message directed to a domestic or communist audience alluded to it. One concludes that Soviet leaders did not want their followers to regard nonproliferation as an important objective—an inference confirmed by Soviet unwillingness to link nonproliferation to peaceful coexistence. Communists are to view nonproliferation as a matter of temporal expediency, not as a matter of high principle as they would were an ideological concept associated with it.

Since May 1968 the Soviet propaganda line has undergone some

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changes. Especially between May and July, the arguments in favor of nonproliferation were repeatedly publicized in statements not only for foreign, but also for domestic, consumption. This seems to contradict the conclusion of the previous paragraph. However, a closer scrutiny of the statements for the domestic public reveals that the nonproliferation argument is never employed in general terms, only as a specific foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union. A nonproliferation agreement is usually deemed necessary in order to neutralize the dangers emanating from the "most aggressive" members of the "imperialistic camp," i.e., mainly West Germany. Thus, nonproliferation is regarded not as a universal principle, but as a political weapon which serves in the struggle against specific opponents. Soviet citizens were warned to regard the Nonproliferation Treaty not as an "end in itself," but as a means which will improve the conditions of the struggle against the imperialists and, "consequently, also the perspectives of a success in this struggle."[4] Soviet communicators made clear that nonproliferation was of "special importance, as it helped the cause of social progress" by "taming the forces of war" through means such as foreign control imposed on various countries, especially on the Federal Republic. Not to conclude the proposed treaty would benefit only "the 'madmen' in the camp of imperialism," i.e., the West Germans.[5] *Pravda* stressed that nonproliferation was "an important requirement of our time,"[6] thus indicating that it must not be regarded as a lasting principle.

Soviet interest in a nonproliferation agreement is obviously dependent on whether Soviet leaders see their general foreign policy objectives advanced or hampered by it. They usually applaud the policies of Gaullist France because of their anti-American and anti-Atlantic implications, yet Paris is resolutely opposed to any nonproliferation treaty. Soviet communicators try to create the impression that USSR and French attitudes toward nonproliferation are practically identical. This line is fed not only to the French (who are to regard the Soviet Union as their natural ally against the Americans and the West Germans) and to the West Germans (who are to be frightened into despair regarding Western support), but also to the Russian people (who are to be

[4]Commentary of Boris Pavlov, Radio Moscow (Russian), June 10, 1968.
[5]"Na blago vsekh narodov," *Izvestiya*, June 21, 1968.
[6]G. Vasil'ev and N. Kudryumov, "ONN: Na zasedaniyakh i v kuluarakh," *Pravda*, May 6, 1968. Similar remarks have never been made with regard to strategic concepts such as "peaceful coexistence."

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given a proper international orientation). One must deduce that the Soviet leadership perceives a community of interest on the nonproliferation issue between Moscow and Paris. Since it cannot be based on a common nonproliferation stand, the only conceivable common denominator is the interest of the two powers in preventing the West Germans from acquiring a nuclear arsenal. On the nonproliferation issue, the West German factor is much more important to Soviet leaders than any other aspect.

This is confirmed by Soviet propaganda behavior in December 1966. For some weeks Soviet leaders cherished the hope that the new coalition government in Bonn might gradually turn away from NATO and steer a Gaullist course. As long as this hope prevailed, Moscow ceased its violent anti-West German propaganda. When Soviet leaders realized that Bonn would not alter its policy, the campaign against the Federal Republic was renewed with increased hostility.[7] Characteristically, the pause in the political attacks against Bonn coincided precisely with Soviet silence on the nonproliferation issue. Soviet fervor on the nonproliferation issue depended on the zigzags in Moscow's policy toward Bonn. This fits in with the remark of a prominent Kremlin foreign policy expert that the negative Soviet attitude concerning West German nuclear development must be continued only "as long as German militarism exists."[8] "German militarism" is, by definition, a political and social order which does not have Soviet approval and, therefore, is associated with the "capitalistic class enemy."

The notion of nonproliferation as a political *means* instead of a political *objective*, surprising as it may seem to the Western mind, is a logical outcome of Soviet doctrine. Since the days of Lenin and Stalin, peace has been accorded no moral and political preference in comparison to war. Peace and war are good and just in quite the same manner, provided they promote "social progress" and "liberation of mankind." That Soviet leaders actually have preferred peace to war in most cases (though not always) is due to their perception that war involves serious risks. It is in this context that the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," proclaimed in 1956, can best be understood: The risks of modern warfare have become so

[7]Cf. Gerhard Wettig, "Moskau und die Grosse Koalition in Bonn," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament'*, B 10/68 (March 6, 1968), pp. 3-22.

[8]Address of V. V. Razmerov to the Conference of Communist Foreign Policy Experts in Moscow (April 23-25, 1968), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow), 1968, No. 7, p. 119.

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great that an interstate war, possibly involving the nuclear-weapon powers, must be avoided in principle. Other forms of warfare, such as "liberation wars" outside the zones of nuclear armament or civil wars with no possible interstate confrontation, may still be supported as "progressive."[9] A similar pattern of reasoning applies to the choice between nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation: it is good if it promises to serve Soviet interests; it is bad if it is likely to impair Soviet interests. It is not by chance that Soviet statements never indicate any interest in universal nonproliferation, i.e., in a nuclear armament ban to those countries which are not viewed as actual or potential opponents. The function of the treaty is to "bind the hands" of specific enemies; it "has a clearly anti-imperialistic and anti-colonialistic character." In this sense, the treaty is called "one of the programmatic points of the communist and workers' movement in the world."[10]

Though the Nonproliferation Treaty is actually a policy device for the Soviets, their communicators depict nonproliferation as a moral issue, not as a matter of diverging political interests or expediency. Everyone who is a man of peace and good will, they say, must subscribe unconditionally to the treaty as it stands. If he is not willing to do so, this is taken as convincing proof of his aggressive and warmongering designs. Furthermore, the treaty is open to any interpretation the Soviet Union chooses to give it. Any protest against Soviet aspirations in connection with the treaty is frequently denounced as an attack against an absolute moral principle. Such a stand serves to emphasize two notions: (1) All audiences shall internalize the belief that Soviet demands will never be abandoned but must be fought through at all costs, because they are moral imperatives. (2) Proposals or objections from other states must be measured by Soviet standards and no other criteria, so that the states which stand behind them can be "unmasked" as the sinister enemies of all mankind. Wherever Soviet propaganda succeeds in creating the desired attitudes,

[9]For the traditional Soviet doctrine on war and peace (still valid, but not stressed), see F. D. Khrustov, "Voyna," in B. A. Vvedenskiy, editor, *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya,* Vol. 8 (2nd edition; Moscow, 1951), pp. 570-589; "Voyna," in M. Rozental' and P. Yudin, editors, *Kratkiy filosofskiy slovar'* (Moscow, 1955), pp. 68-69. A collection of remarks on peaceful coexistence made during the Khrushchev era is contained in *Peaceful Coexistence—A Communist Blueprint for Victory* (Chicago: The American Bar Association, 1964). The post-Khrushchev concept has been elaborated in some articles, most notably that of D. Tomashevkiy, *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn',* 1966, No. 3. It is significant that these articles have not been included in the English-language edition, *International Affairs.*

[10]A. Krivopalov and O. Grinev, "Bar'er," *Komsomolskaya pravda,* June 6, 1968.

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whether in the communist camp or in rival countries, Soviet leaders can expect that their uncompromising insistence on their demands will be approved or at least regarded as natural. Moscow wants its demands to be viewed as the standards by which morality is measured. If the attempt is successful, Soviet leaders will have a freedom of action unencumbered by any kind of moral considerations.

The Nonproliferation Treaty: Issues and Ambiguities

The objectives the Soviet leaders seek to attain by means of the Nonproliferation Treaty can be discerned from their interpretations of it and demands regarding its provisions. Until 1967, U.S.-Soviet negotiations were largely focused on the issue of whether nuclear-weapon powers had the right to transfer nuclear weapons or know-how to alliance organizations. U.S. authorities held the view that this did not amount to proliferation, because substituting a "nuclear alliance" for a nuclear power did not enlarge the number of entities controlling nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union maintained, in diplomatic notes and public statements, that the American standpoint would open loopholes to proliferation by indirect means. The option of creating a nuclear defense organization, such as MLF, ANF or an integrated West European nuclear force, seemed vital to NATO and to the West Europeans. An Atlantic Alliance restricted to conventional defense, which was becoming less and less relevant to modern military strategy, might gradually lose its military and political significance to its European member states. Many observers felt that its cohesion could be secured only by some kind of nuclear partnership.

The Soviet Union did not face a similar problem in the Warsaw Pact, for Soviet hegemony remained strong enough to discourage East European aspirations for nuclear partnership and the Soviet allies were not exposed to a nuclear threat similar to that of the Soviet MRBM's targeted against Western Europe. Contrary to the United States, the USSR has been completely unwilling to share its nuclear capabilities with its allies. Moscow does not even allow them to develop major civilian nuclear facilities.

In 1967, Washington bowed to Soviet objections and eliminated the alliance option from its draft. In subsequent Soviet public statements, this U.S. backdown was depicted as a great triumph. The "American imperialists" had been forced to comply with the

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principle of nonproliferation due to the unflinching efforts of the Soviet "defenders of peace." Indeed, it *was* a great victory for Moscow: the Kremlin acquired a voice in determining how NATO can be armed, and it received an assurance against the possibility that a West European nuclear defense community might be created as an intermediate step toward an evolving United Western Europe.[11]

On a number of other issues, the wording of the Nonproliferation Treaty, in its final form, contains basic ambiguities. The Soviet Union uses these ambiguities to back up its demands which have not yet been accepted by Washington and London and which are directed against them in most cases. The Kremlin's aim is to convince people within and outside the communist orbit that Soviet demands are in reality Soviet-Western agreements which the Western powers are breaking arbitrarily.[12] Controlling nearly all communications media in its own country, the Soviet regime can effectively keep out all undesirable information and prevent internal criticism. Because Moscow can maneuver freely in its foreign policy communications, the ambiguities in the NPT tend to be of much greater advantage to Soviet leaders than to their Western counterparts, who have to reckon with the criticism of an independent press and an informed public.

NATO Nuclear Planning

Several ambiguities inherent in the Nonproliferation Treaty affect political and military problems of the Western alliance. The treaty is not clear regarding the meaning of indirect control over nuclear weapons which a nonnuclear-weapon state may not exercise. On this basis, Soviet commentators frequently denounce even the limited consultation in matters of nuclear strategy realized through the two planning bodies of NATO, calling it a wicked device designed to circumvent the treaty and proliferate nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic. This assertion is a purposive allegation which the Soviet foreign policy experts do not believe.

[11]Soviet commentaries after the U.S. concession was made show that Moscow is well aware of the interventionist possibilities opened with regard to NATO. For Soviet concern over the eventuality of post-Gaullist West European unification, see the addresses of A. M. Rumyantsev and D. Ye. Mel'nikov to the Conference of Communist Foreign Policy Experts, in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*, 1968, No. 7, pp. 105-106, 116-117.

[12]This kind of propaganda technique has been employed by Moscow almost without interruption regarding the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, despite the fact that Moscow itself began to break the agreement at the very moment of its conclusion by clandestine unilateral creation of Central Administrations for Germany.

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They are well aware of the fact that the creation of the nuclear committees in NATO "has not brought it [the Federal Republic] nearer to the satisfaction of its atomic ambitions."[13] The allegation serves to depict NATO as an aggressive bloc and a dangerous conspiracy against peace, and to attack the United States for not living up to the principles of nonproliferation. Sessions held by the planning bodies of NATO are called "impudent provocations" destined to inflame the aggressiveness of the "West German revanchists." The notion of Bonn's revanchism is also built up for propaganda purposes only: in internal discussions, Soviet foreign policy specialists declare that no one believes "that those in the FRG, after an acquisition of nuclear weapons, have the intention to unleash an atomic war, in order to burn in its fire."[14]

Contrary to accounts in Soviet press commentaries and radio broadcasts, the official representative of the Soviet foreign ministry has given a negative answer to a journalist's question asking whether the NATO planning bodies constituted a violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty.[15] Presumably, Moscow did not wish to declare officially that it intended to employ the treaty as a weapon against existing NATO institutions, for this might have given U.S. leaders second thoughts about supporting the treaty. Probably for the same reason, Moscow has refrained from making diplomatic protests against NATO planning bodies until now. But the fact that Soviet public communication frequently depicts these bodies as contrary to the rules of nonproliferation makes it clear that Soviet leaders want their audiences to regard the NATO planning bodies as illegitimate. This may point to future Soviet moves against NATO, once the treaty is in force.

Another target of Soviet propagandists is the presence of nuclear-warhead stockpiles in West Germany. They stress that nonproliferation does not permit storage of nuclear weapons on the territories of nonnuclear-weapon states. That the West Germans fulfill their alliance obligations by allowing Western, especially

[13]Address of V. V. Razmerov to the Conference of Communist Foreign Policy Experts, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[14]*Ibid.* This is wholly consistent with constant appeals to the West Germans (through Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress in German) to discontinue the "suicidal" NATO course which allegedly threatens the Federal Republic with nuclear war and immediate extinction. During the last four years, all appeals to the West Germans to come to terms with the USSR have been based on the assumption that it is the Federal Republic—not the Soviet Union—which has reason to seek safeguards for its military security.

[15]Report on Leonid Zamyatin's press conference by Josef Riedmiller, "Moskau preist den Sperrvertrag," in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (München), April 23, 1968.

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American, nuclear-armed troops to be stationed on their soil, is interpreted as a violation of nonproliferation policy. The imputed motive for West German behavior is that the "Rhenish revanchists" count on gaining access to nuclear weapons, an ambition said to be highly favored by leading political forces in the United States. Western assurances that the nuclear arsenals are under strict U.S. control are dismissed as insincere or as unrealistic. Anglo-Saxon audiences are advised that their safeguards against West German misuse are utterly unreliable. The Soviets ask rhetorically whether there could be any protection against the contingency of a "madman in the uniform of the Bundeswehr" invading a nuclear depot, breaking the engagement code, and unleashing war, in order to involve the Western powers in a West German war of revenge.

It is obvious that the Soviet aim is to induce the West Germans to oppose the Western military presence on their soil and to create as much trouble as possible for the stationing of American troops in Central Europe—which, after all, is still the hard core of U.S. security guarantees to the European members of NATO. A denuclearized NATO defense posture in Western Europe would have no chance of success in case of a military conflict, for the Soviet armies in East Germany, Poland and the USSR would be qualitatively superior by virtue of their nuclear armament.

Civil Nuclear Technology

One of the principal deficiencies of the Nonproliferation Treaty is that it does not distinguish between military nuclear technology (which shall not be allowed to the nonnuclear-weapon states) and civil nuclear technology (which must not be hampered in any way). Soviet representatives give assurances that no one, including the West Germans, shall "suffer under the pretendedly different interpretations of the wordings" of the treaty, provided, however, that the West Germans do not attempt "to seek loopholes in the interpretation of the articles of the treaty which would allow them to acquire nuclear weapons in one way or another."[16] This sounds fine, but it leaves open the crucial question as to which kinds of nuclear activity should be regarded as opening loopholes for nuclear armament.

The record of Soviet public statements makes it abundantly clear that Soviet leaders are willing to denounce a wide variety of

[16]Interview given by Leonid Zamyatin to Mr. Shragin, broadcast by Radio Moscow (Russian) on April 24, 1968.

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West German nuclear activities as steps toward nuclear weaponry. In communications addressed to non-German audiences, the Federal Republic is regularly accused of preparing or even initiating production of nuclear weapons inside and outside its borders. All kinds of national or international civil nuclear programs are quoted as evidence for this. West German missile development, space exploration, possession of plutonium, and plasmatic or ionic research are denounced as signs that Bonn is planning to produce nuclear armaments.[17] Of course these technological achievements can be converted to military purposes, shortening the time span needed to create nuclear weapon systems, but arguing in this vein would mean that any nuclear activity, even the most peaceful one, would have to be prohibited as having a potential military value. Judging from Soviet press and radio statements, this seems to be the Soviet desideratum regarding West Germany. Soviet commentators take the view that anything in the fields of nuclear energy and electronics, whether technical installations or know-how, can and will be put to military use.[18] Alleged nuclear cooperation between the Federal Republic and other countries, notably South Africa, Israel and Communist China, is condemned as especially dangerous.

A more moderate view of what can be judged as nuclear activity of a military nature, e.g., the view that military applications of nuclear technology must already have taken place or at least seem imminent (the risk involved is not so great, for a modern nuclear weapon system comprises a great many components which cannot be created at once), is rejected by the Soviets as a criterion for West Germany. It seems probable that Moscow might take a more lenient stand with regard to other states as long as they do not stand in the way of Soviet policy. The uncertainty inherent in the distinction between military and nonmilitary activity is apt to provide the Soviet government with a means of bringing pressure to bear against all nonnuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. Moscow will define civil nuclear activity in broad or strict terms depending on whether the respective states comply with Soviet policies.

[17]For example, the Euratom projects of ELDO, ESRO, and SETS are listed as military nuclear activities of West Germany. For a statement of that kind see D. Nikolayev, "Chto ishchet Bonn v kosmose?," in *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 2, 1968.

[18]Specific attention is paid to West German development of the "fast breeding" technology. An indication of Soviet intentions to label "fast breeding" a military activity might be seen in the argument of V. Yemelyanov, "The Atom of War and the Atom of Peace," *New Times*, 1967, No. 15, p. 4. Cf. Wettig, "Funktionen eines Sperrvertrages," *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

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In their messages to foreign audiences, Soviet communicators have to reckon with their audiences' fears that the application of NPT provisions might impose restrictions on the civil nuclear activities of nonnuclear-weapon states. They deny that such limitations will exist and depict all apprehensions as the invention of West German politicians who are said to create artificial pretexts in order to defeat the treaty and acquire nuclear weapons. This line of reasoning was dominant until mid-1967, but it became unconvincing when more and more politicians in all parts of the world began to voice their concern over the future of civil nuclear development. So the Soviets began to replace the old argument with the assertion that the treaty was not to hamper, but to promote, the civil nuclear activities of all states. A declaratory promise to that end, inserted into the treaty in January 1968, strengthened the new Soviet line. They now argue that the treaty will open the way to greater assistance by the nuclear powers to the less developed countries, thus starting a new era in the peaceful use of the atom. Moscow's strategy is to appeal to the states of the Third World to support the treaty and in this way to pressure reluctant Western nations into signing it. In practice, however, the Soviet record of peaceful nuclear assistance to other nations, even to the East European allies, has been poor, especially compared with the efforts of the United States and Canada.

Another Soviet argument used since 1967 is that the treaty will allow the nonnuclear-weapon countries to concentrate their resources on civil nuclear technology by freeing them from wasteful military programs. These states are advised that it is a privilege to be free of nuclear armaments, a burden the nuclear-weapon powers will carry for mankind. Concern as to whether the unclear dividing line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear technology might not be drawn eventually in a way harmful to the interests of the nonnuclear-weapon states is labeled as an intolerable and provocative defamation of the nuclear-weapon powers. In sum, the Soviets have carefully avoided making any firm commitments with respect to hampering or assisting other nations in their civil nuclear development.

Compliance and Safeguards

Another issue raised by the Nonproliferation Treaty has to do with the controls to ensure treaty compliance. In accordance "with the long-standing Soviet policy of favoring public declaratory agreements without effective controls" for the sole purpose of

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restraining public-controlled Western decision-makers,[19] Soviet leaders originally rejected nonproliferation safeguards. In order to overcome Soviet opposition, Britain and the United States then conceded that controls should be applied only to the nonnuclear-weapon states, as these were the parties which were to assume the real obligations under the treaty. The idea of controls only for other nations was acceptable to Moscow. Controls applied to other countries seemed to be a real bargain, since they might open doors to Soviet inspection and influence abroad without requiring any Soviet compromise in return.

Soviet leaders had to consent to controls in the communist East European countries, it is true, but whether this amounted to a concession is doubtful. The civil nuclear equipment of the area is rather scarce, as the Soviet Union has reserved full-scale development for itself. Moreover, the Kremlin is apprehensive of emancipatory tendencies in the people's democracies: international checking procedures, carried out with Soviet participation, may well become a means of strengthening Soviet supervision over the whole area.[20]

The controls envisaged by the treaty are viewed by Soviet leaders as highly favorable to their interests. Soviet communicators support them fervently, emphasizing that controls are absolutely necessary and constitute an indispensable precondition of any nonproliferation arrangement. No treaty, they reason, is conceivable without verification of treaty compliance through stringent controls. The contention that the nuclear-weapon powers occupy a privileged position by virtue of their not being subject to controls is strongly denied.

Soviet public statements clearly identify the main targets of the future controls. West Germany, the nonnuclear-weapon members of Euratom, and other advanced industrial countries, such as Japan, are the states that could build nuclear-weapon systems. Only the Federal Republic, however, has been the object of slander from the beginning, especially in communications aimed at non-German audiences. The Soviets demand that those states harboring excessive nuclear ambitions, most notably West Germany, submit to the most rigorous of controls.

After the Americans conceded to the Soviet demand that

[19]Reflections on the Quarter, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," ORBIS, Winter 1968, p. 966.

[20]It is not by coincidence that the Rumanians, so deeply committed to independence from Moscow, have vigorously opposed the Nonproliferation Treaty.

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nuclear powers be exempted from the inspection safeguards, Moscow raised a new issue, namely, the control procedure to be applied to the nonnuclear-weapon states.[21] There are three generally recognized models. (1) The controls administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna include checking all relevant documents and blueprints, site inspections, and approval of installations and technical processes. (2) The safeguards practiced by Euratom do not require nations to divulge technological secrets, but are based largely on input-output checks of fissionable material.[22] Such controls are much less prone to industrial espionage and to foreign interference with a nation's decisions in civil nuclear technology. (3) A still less interventionist form of control is advocated by some scientists who believe that there is hardly any need for specific control devices, since a modern and effective nuclear weapons system must consist of so many components that their existence would be detected early.[23]

The IAEA controls in their present form are highly unpopular with the industrially advanced nations, especially the members of Euratom, due to the opportunities for espionage and intervention they open to the controllers and their increasing costs which, according to some experts, may amount to 10 per cent of the civil nuclear product. The Soviet position is quite clear: the present IAEA controls are to provide the standard. They are the only ones stringent enough to bar the West Germans and others from access to nuclear armaments. Soviet commentators demand that the "system of efficient guarantees" against military employment of nuclear materials, as devised by the IAEA, must be accepted by the nonnuclear-weapon states.[24] In their opinion, one of the crucial features of the IAEA safeguard system is the inspectors' "right not only to examine all documentation relating to controlled nuclear installations and materials, but also to carry out on-the-spot inspections."[25] Western, especially West German, advocacy of input-

[21]For the technological aspect of the control problem see D. Gupta and W. Häfele, "Das Prinzip eines instrumentierten System zur Überwachung des Spaltstoffflusses auf dem friedlichen Sektor der Kernenergie" (with an abstract in English), *Atomkernenergie* (München), July-August 1968, pp. 229-236.

[22]Cf. Felix Oboussier, "Euratom und der Kernwaffen-Sperrvertrag," in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn), August 25, 1968, pp. 574-576.

[23]Cf. the contributions of J. R. Schlesinger and Arnold Kramisch, *Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen: Ein Problem der Friedenssicherung* (Witten/Ruhr: Luther Verlag, 1967).

[24]V. Matveyev, "Krupnaya pobeda dela mira," *Izvestiya,* June 15, 1968.

[25]V. Korablyov, "Nonproliferation and IAEA," *New Times,* 1968, No. 14, p. 7.

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output checks as a reliable control procedure that would not be prone to misuse provoked a sharp retort from Moscow. Bonn was accused of wanting to keep open loopholes "for the uncontrolled accumulation of nuclear explosives" and to protect its "nuclear centers from the eyes of all those not taken into confidence."[26] The West Germans were only looking for "new pretexts which are to prevent an efficient control of treaty compliance."[27] The possibility of misuse under the IAEA-type of control, according to Moscow, was nonexistent.

The question of the control procedure is connected with the problem of whether the IAEA is to be the sole and direct agent enforcing nonproliferation safeguards. If all authority is given to the IAEA, Euratom might be put out of business. The Euratom safeguard system would become redundant, equality between the Euratom members would be destroyed through discrimination in applying IAEA controls (France being exempted from them in any case), and differences of policy among the five nonnuclear-weapon members regarding treaty accession would be likely to break up the common nuclear market of Euratom.[28] In view of these dangers, the five states have made their accession dependent on a verification agreement between Euratom and the IAEA which would leave the controls to Euratom and entrust only subsequent verification to the IAEA.

This has provoked great hostility in Moscow. The Euratom controls are denounced as a worthless "self-control" arrangement designed to prevent detection of military nuclear preparations by the West Germans, who are alleged to be in full command of Euratom. Above all, Soviet propagandists try to persuade Anglo-Saxon audiences that Euratom cannot possibly be entrusted with control functions as this "would mean that, in the place of an objective and impartial control, there would be carried out a kind of self-control or that, to put it more accurately, any kind of control would be excluded."[29] Moscow asserts that, whether the Euratom states choose to negotiate the agreement with the IAEA individually or collectively, the resulting control procedure has to correspond precisely to IAEA standards and take the same shape as

[26]N. Polyanov, "Sled ot torpedy," *Izvestiya,* May 28, 1967.
[27]Radio Peace and Progress (German), January 23, 1968.
[28]Cf. Oboussier, *op. cit.,* pp. 571-580; Robert Margulies, "Atomsperrvertrag und Euratom unvereinbar," *Wirtschaftsdienst* (Hamburg), Summer 1967, pp. 361-370.
[29]Commentary of A. Pogodin through APN, January 26, 1968.

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the IAEA agreements entered into by all other nonnuclear-weapon states.[30]

The Soviet line of argument is that there must be one and the same control arrangement for all nations concerned. Moscow warns the other nonnuclear-weapon states that the Euratom countries are trying to secure special privileges for themselves. The IAEA is presented as the only body which can enforce the safeguard system envisaged in the Nonproliferation Treaty and be responsible for checking treaty compliance. Thus, U.S. hopes that Moscow will acquiesce in a verification agreement between Euratom and the IAEA seem to be very dim.[31] Soviet public statements give the impression that the only satisfactory safeguards agreement is one based on acceptance of the present IAEA conditions by all nonnuclear-weapon states. In the event that agreement is not reached within the 180 days fixed by the Nonproliferation Treaty, one must expect Moscow to argue that treaty compliance is lacking and must be enforced by the sanctions envisaged, i.e., by a U.S. decision to withhold supplies of nuclear fuel to Euratom.

Security and Nuclear Blackmail

In addition to the problems created by the ambiguities of the treaty, there are some issues related to nonproliferation that are largely ignored by the treaty. The nuclear-weapon powers claim for themselves a permanent monopoly of the crucial means of destruction, putting all other states into a position of lasting relative weakness. They do so in the name of international security, i.e., reducing the chances of a world war between nuclear-armed powers.

The nonnuclear-weapon states have a more comprehensive notion of their security: they do not want to be exposed to nuclear threat and blackmail any more than to nuclear warfare. Fears of being blackmailed into dependency or surrender have been the principal incentives for "going nuclear." Some of the present nonnuclear-weapon states view their nuclear option as an *ultima ratio* in case of changes in the international environment which would

[30]Cf., e.g., A. Alekseyev, "Non-Proliferation Talks," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1968, No. 5, p. 20; V. Shestov, "Major Success for the Cause of Peace," *ibid.*, 1968, No. 8, p. 6.

[31]When, on January 18, 1968, after the full draft had been tabled, American delegate Adrian Fisher asserted Soviet acquiescence, *Pravda, Izvestiya,* and Soviet delegate Aleksey Roshchin in an interview in *Neues Deutschland,* January 23, 1968, cautiously stated the contrary.

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leave them no choice except to defend their autonomy.[32] Some nuclear "have nots," especially several of the more advanced countries in the nonaligned world, regard both the good will and the deterrence assurances of the nuclear-weapon powers as utterly unreliable sources of security. American-Soviet mutual deterrence was of no use to Czechoslovakia in 1968. Various states, currently under an effective nuclear-weapon power guarantee, are concerned that changing superpower interests and commitments or changing nuclear power ratios in the future might undermine their security. Thus, they are reluctant to forgo their nuclear-weapon option as long as they are not given firm security guarantees. Seeking to avoid overcommitments and to maintain maximum freedom of action, the nuclear-weapon powers have refused to furnish the assurances wanted—the declaratory resolution of the Security Council being an inadequate substitute.[33] The incentives to retain a "go nuclear" option remain strong, even for unwilling states.

In the early phases of negotiation on a nonproliferation treaty, Soviet communicators were reluctant to mention the security issue at all. When it became impossible to ignore the matter, they began conceding its "great importance" in order to create the semblance of a positive response. At the same time, they made various attempts to redefine the problem to meet Soviet needs. The West Germans were told that the decreased danger of nuclear war to be achieved by a nonproliferation treaty was in itself a sufficient security guarantee. Other statements to West German audiences emphasized that they did not need protection against Soviet hostility but rather an "anti-imperialistic" struggle directed against the "plottings of the Strauss Party and the Bundeswehr generals," which the NPT was apt to eliminate and thus strengthen West German security.[34]

Public communications to Western and nonaligned countries, and also to domestic audiences, claim that the safety of nonnuclear-weapon states no longer depends on armaments, the NPT provides a defense guarantee adequate to the requirements of the nuclear age,[35] and the special Security Council resolution

[32]Cf. David Vital, "Double-Talk or Double-Think? A Comment on the Draft Nonproliferation Treaty," *International Affairs* (London), July 1968, pp. 419-433.

[33]Each of the nuclear-weapon powers, except Communist China, can cast a veto against actions and resolutions under consideration by the UN Security Council.

[34]Broadcast by Sakharov on Radio Moscow (German), January 20, 1968.

[35]For an elaborate statement, see I. Vanin, "O garantiyakh bezopasnosti neyadernym stranam," in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 1968, No. 10, pp. 47-48.

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enhances the security of all countries. Doubts as to the effectiveness of assurances under the NPT and UN resolution are denounced as insulting and provocative. Notions of insecurity are dismissed as absurd allegations fabricated by the West Germans.

Meanwhile, Moscow is careful to avoid any commitment. When a West German memorandum called for an unequivocal assurance from the nuclear-weapon states never to resort to nuclear blackmail,[36] Moscow replied that this was but an "attempt to spread distrust to the objectives and intentions of those signatory powers which possess nuclear weapons." What the Bonn demand had to do with the Nonproliferation Treaty was "known to God alone."[37]

A serious deficiency of the Nonproliferation Treaty is the lack of clear criteria for treaty compliance. Nowhere does it specifically state that a nation's acceptance of the treaty and subjection to its control procedures will be held as compliance—until violations have been positively established. Mainly, but not exclusively, with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, Soviet spokesmen have advanced criteria which allow almost anything pertaining to nuclear matters to be declared military in nature and, as such, contrary to the treaty. One can foresee that, if the treaty enters into force, Moscow will raise charges of military nuclear activity against certain countries and demand that the supply of fissionable materials to those countries be halted at once. Such demands with regard to American uranium supplies for Euratom would give Soviet leaders another opportunity to intervene in U.S.-West European relations. That this is their intention can be safely concluded from recent communications to domestic audiences warning that West German industry must be cut off from supplies of uranium ore, as these supplies necessarily serve military purposes.[38]

A survey of Soviet comments on the various aspects of the Nonproliferation Treaty reveal that the Kremlin's attacks are directed against a distinct order of targets. The principal target is the Federal Republic of Germany. A high percentage of the charges

[36]"Denkschrift der Deutschen Bundesregierung vom 7. April 1967 [published on May 17, 1967] zu den gegenwärtigen Abrüstungsverhandlungen," *Europa-Archiv,* July 25, 1967, pp. D 332-335. Cf. Willy Brandt, "Deutschland und der Atomsperrvertrag," *Aussenpolitik,* May 1967, pp. 257-267. The issue still is vital to Bonn also because, on the basis of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, Moscow formally claims the right of interference in the internal matters of the Federal Republic.

[37]Broadcast of Radio Moscow (German), May 18, 1967.

[38]Cf. "Dlya chego uran Bonnu?," *Komsomolskaya pravda,* January 14, 1968.

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and denunciations are aimed expressly at it, and in the attacks against such groups of nations as NATO, Euratom, or the advanced civil nuclear countries, West Germany is always included. Moreover, Soviet treaty application strongly discriminates against the Federal Republic. The criteria employed with regard to it are different from those applied to other states. The hesitation and objections of countries such as Italy or India regarding the Nonproliferation Treaty are interpreted in Moscow as tantamount to approval in principle; yet the same views expressed in Bonn are cited as proof of West Germany's unlimited nuclear-weapon ambitions. For the Soviets, the principal concern of a nonproliferation agreement must be "to eliminate the possibility that those circles will dispose of nuclear armament who proclaim the expansionist and revanchist aims of changing the existing state frontiers."[39]

As their secondary target, Soviet leaders have zeroed in on the various forms of U.S.-West European cohesion: NATO, U.S. supplies of nuclear fuel to Euratom, and the role of the United States as protector of West Germany. Finally, the Soviets are trying to splinter the delicate unity of Western Europe by making it impossible to organize a West European nuclear defense arrangement or a post-Gaullist federation[40] and by using the IAEA to destroy the effectiveness of Euratom.

Zigzags in Soviet Nonproliferation Strategy

The Soviet communication strategy prior to final agreement on the Nonproliferation Treaty consisted of playing down the merits of nonproliferation, while holding out for the provisions it deemed essential. To the various audiences, especially those in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Soviet Union conveyed the impression that it was willing to champion nonproliferation as a matter of détente and peace but had not the slightest self-interest at stake in it. Accordingly, Moscow assumed the role of an impartial arbiter in deciding what would advance the principle of nonproliferation and what would not. The Kremlin's underlying assumption was that the Anglo-Saxons had to pay the price for an accord on

[39]V. Matveyev, "Dvigat'sya dal'she," *Izvestiya*, July 3, 1968.

[40]One must conclude that Moscow will object to the creation of a united West European state on the ground that its nuclear armament in 1968 was not its own, but France's and/or Britain's. At the same time, weakening of West Germany's preponderant economic position is deemed desirable in view of her possible future role in West European unification. For Soviet attention paid to the "European" contingency, see the addresses of A. M. Rumyantsev and D. Ye. Mel'nikov to the Conference of Communist Foreign Policy Experts, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106, 117.

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nonproliferation, both for moral reasons (nonproliferation was inherently good) and political considerations (the Americans and the British were the ones who greatly desired to reach agreement). It was wholly consistent with this strategy for Moscow frequently to raise doubts as to Anglo-Saxon sincerity and to attack alleged Anglo-Saxon efforts to sabotage nonproliferation negotiations. American and British impatience to come to terms with the Soviet Union on nonproliferation placed their negotiators in the role of petitioners, while Moscow could take advantage of its position as the party which might, or might not, grant agreement. Because the Anglo-Saxons were courting them, Soviet leaders could in large measure fix the conditions.

During this period, Soviet appeals to American and British audiences usually stressed that Washington must accord priority to the cause of peace and détente, inherent in nonproliferation, and dissociate itself from NATO which had aggression, tension and war as its purposes. Those appeals were frequently accompanied by stiff polemics against the U.S. government. Whenever Washington seemed inclined to give its attention to NATO policy and the objections of its Atlantic allies, Soviet communicators warned that American leaders were supporting the warmongering course of NATO and the dangerous revanchist designs of Bonn, including West German frenzy for nuclear armament. This line of argument was designed to justify the Soviet conditions for agreement and to implant the notion into the Anglo-Saxon mind that the desired collusion with Moscow was incompatible with continuing emphasis on NATO.

As long as the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the nonproliferation agreement were under way, Moscow sought to exploit all kinds of Western differences which arose over the issue. Anglo-Saxon audiences were warned of alleged aggressive intentions on the part of the West Germans—intentions partly deduced from the fact that Bonn was understandably reluctant to support nonproliferation in some of the forms under consideration. The issue of nonproliferation as well as other problems, such as differences over the formula for sharing the burden of military costs, were used to accuse Bonn of employing brutal blackmail against Washington. Americans were advised to ignore European criticism of U.S. policies, and to prove their good will by disregarding West European interests, putting an end to the machinations of false West German friends, and attaching absolute priority to a non-

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proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union. The degree of resoluteness in snubbing NATO allies was made the criterion of American sincerity in the nonproliferation talks. The general formula for all non-German audiences was clear: the fortunes of nonproliferation depended above all "on how resolutely the U.S.A. and other Western powers turn against the attempts of their NATO ally [the Federal Republic] to block the road to agreement."[41]

The West Germans received another version of the Soviet line. The United States, according to Moscow, dictated her will to her European allies and did not heed her allies' interests. The Americans were depicted as indifferent to the issue of reunification, reluctant to support West German policies in general, tired of their NATO commitment, and already embarked on an anti-Bonn, nonproliferation course. Since Bonn's foreign policy is immoral and dangerous, all German patriots must struggle against it. The blame was put on the West German leaders, who were still trying "to bring the corpse of Adenauer's policy back to life." Such a policy "turns not only the European partners of the F.R.G., but even the Americans, against West Germany," a fact which accounts for U.S. indifference toward the Federal Republic and the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty.[42] This kind of argument was meant to convince the West Germans that they were losing their crucial backing in Washington and, therefore, would be well-advised to initiate a new policy outside NATO, especially one that was more friendly toward the USSR. As of the end of 1968, the anti-Bonn line is still being pursued, but since the treaty has been signed and needs West German approval (and the Soviets' earlier hopes that Washington would pressure Bonn to sign have dimmed), Moscow shows greater interest in making the NPT look attractive to the Federal Republic.

When agreement on the Nonproliferation Treaty was in sight, Soviet communication strategy gradually changed. Moscow had secured what it wanted. Therefore, principal Soviet concern had to be directed toward making sure that the promise contained in the agreement would be fulfilled through treaty implementation. The first indication of the shift in Soviet policy was the stress

[41]O. Grinev, "Sdvigi v Zheneve," *Pravda*, August 27, 1967. An anti-West German attitude alone, however, did not suffice to credit the Americans with good will: "If the ruling circles of the U.S.A. really bothered to ease international tension," they would "in the first place cease aggression against the people of Viet Nam." B. Dubrovin, "Pered otvetstvennym etapom," *Pravda*, August 28, 1967.

[42]Broadcast of Radio Peace and Progress (German), January 1, 1968.

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placed in late 1967 on the absolutely binding character of the treaty. Any provisions which might give the nonnuclear-weapon states a chance to withdraw in case of national emergency were attacked as "evasion clauses" that would nullify the entire treaty.

Early in 1968, Soviet commentators began to press for formal conclusion of the treaty as early as possible. Any delay was called dangerous, as it might kill the treaty. Occasionally, they explained that delays would serve only West German strategy which aimed at putting off the treaty as long as possible, in the hope that it might be eliminated altogether. The West Germans were told that they had no choice but to accept the treaty unconditionally; it was the only way they could acquire "merit."[43] This twofold line has been pressed up to the present (the end of 1968), with a period of interruption in August and September.

Soviet public statements sported another feature when they began to point up the merits of the future treaty. The Soviet press gave an unprecedented amount of attention to news about, and favorable comments on, the treaty. Moscow could now afford to give up the role of a participant devoid of any self-interest: the Americans had already made the necessary concessions. The new Soviet purpose was to achieve worldwide acceptance of the treaty, no longer to extract concessions from the United States. Thus, the appeals, demands and charges communicated to the American and British people were discontinued.

Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia had a great impact on communication strategy. Western reactions to the military intervention convinced Soviet leaders that their action had seriously dimmed the prospects for treaty adoption. There must have been considerable embarrassment over this fact in Moscow. Until mid-September, Soviet communicators, obviously lacking instructions on how to deal with the new situation, remained silent on the nonproliferation issue. When the topic was finally taken up again, their serious concern over the influence of the opponents of the Nonproliferation Treaty in the United States and over the increasingly negative attitude of the West German leaders was clearly discernible.

The Soviets tried in various ways to counteract the trend. They warned Americans that a change of attitude might render "the relations between the greatest world powers as bad as they were during the first days of the cold war." For the first time, the

[43] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1968.

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mutuality of interest in U.S.-Soviet cooperation (the existence of which had been previously denied) was stressed. They appealed to U.S. self-interest, warning that the "refusal to sign the nonproliferation treaty will only do harm to those who refuse." In no aspect of superpower cooperation did the Soviet Union have a greater interest at stake than the United States had.[44] "The American reactionaries and the Bonn revanchists" were accused of sparing no effort "to prevent a détente in Western Europe and to push the world back into the worst days of the cold war."[45] Western apprehensions aroused by Soviet action against Czechoslovakia were denounced as mere pretexts for scuttling the treaty. The United States was informed that Bonn was exploiting the Czechoslovakian events "in order to justify its unwillingness to sign the nonproliferation treaty," and that Bonn no longer considered itself "a vassal of Washington." Discontented with the "European course of the American reactionaries," West German leaders allegedly desired to forge their "own political and military hegemony in Western Europe," a course that required possession of "atomic and hydrogen bombs." The implication was that if the Americans dropped the Nonproliferation Treaty, they would be playing into the hands of their West German opponents.[46]

West German audiences learned that if Bonn rejects the treaty, it will have chosen "a dangerous way" leading to nuclear armament.[47] In all these communications the previous anti-NATO emphasis was eliminated, obviously for the reason that it might raise the very apprehensions the Soviets are now trying to assuage. Moscow now wants to avoid the impression of exerting pressure on the Federal Republic.[48]

West Germany, the Primary Target

From the very beginning, with the exception only of December 1966, West Germany has been depicted as the chief obstacle to

[44]Broadcast by Druzhinin, Radio Moscow (for North America), September 19, 1968.

[45]Commentary by L. Kolesov, APN, October 10, 1968.

[46]Broadcast by Belobrov, Radio Moscow (English), October 10, 1968.

[47]Broadcast of Radio Peace and Progress (German), October 13, 1968.

[48]Such pressure was applied quite openly until August 1968. As a clue to present Soviet behavior, it is characteristic that in Foreign Minister Gromyko's New York speech of October 3, 1968 there was no hint of the need for West Germany's ratification of the treaty. In his subsequent private conversation with the West German Foreign Minister, however, Gromyko made it quite plain that Moscow demanded Bonn's accession to the treaty. Cf. "Bonn/Ostpolitik: Something cooking?," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), October 14, 1968, p. 26.

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nonproliferation. According to Soviet allegations, the Federal Republic is determined at all costs to acquire nuclear weapons so that it has the capabilities necessary for the instigation of a general nuclear war. Western countries are fed the version that Bonn wants to drag them into a nuclear holocaust in order to carry out its expansionist designs against Eastern Europe. Later, it is alleged, West German nuclear power will be turned against Western Europe.

Meanwhile the West Germans are told that their "reactionary" and "revanchist" ruling circles steer a suicidal course by adhering to NATO and adopting an anti-communist stance. The Federal Republic is compared to Carthage which, after going down to defeat in two wars, risked a third one and was destroyed. It is highly significant that Moscow claims all influential West Germans, without exception, are violently opposed to nonproliferation and eager to secure nuclear weapons. All data likely to invalidate that assertion are ignored or reinterpreted to fit the Soviet line. Any hesitation or objection regarding the actual form of the Nonproliferation Treaty is depicted as a veiled tactical maneuver designed to kill the treaty or make it worthless.

In the international context, Soviet communicators report that all mankind hails the NPT as a principal work of peace and progress, except the West Germans who are the only, or at least the principal, opponents of the treaty. Until early 1967, the Federal Republic was depicted as the sole state resisting nonproliferation. When this version was no longer plausible, the Soviets either minimized the objections of other states or ascribed them to instigation by the West Germans who were said to employ such means as subversion and bribery. Since the fall of 1967 Soviet commentators have tried to discredit the notion that there might be a community of interest between the Federal Republic and other states, especially nonaligned ones, on the nonproliferation issue. They maintain that a "good" country, for example, India, cannot possibly have common interests with "bad" West Germany. Another means of discrediting the West German position is associating Bonn policies with the alleged or real nuclear-weapon ambitions of other states treated as international outcasts by Soviet propaganda, such as Communist China, South Africa and Israel. In these cases, "common ideological bonds"—expansionism, adventurism, racism and fascism—are invented.

West Germany is the focus of Soviet nonproliferation polemics,

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as it is for many other issues. Denunciation of, not appeal to, the Federal Republic is the gist of Soviet messages—or was, prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In addresses to non-German, especially American and British, audiences, Moscow has repeatedly stated in unambiguous terms that the principal importance of the NPT lies in the "situation of Central Europe where the nuclear ambitions of the West German military gang dictate most vigorously measures which are apt to prevent equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons in any form, directly or indirectly."[49] The veto of any West German "access to nuclear weapons" is the very essence of nonproliferation;[50] the anti-West German implications of the treaty are the reason for the satisfaction shown by the "peace-loving forces of all countries."[51] Moscow has stated also through diplomatic channels that its interest in the Nonproliferation Treaty is motivated primarily by considerations concerning the Federal Republic.[52]

What are the reasons for Soviet preoccupation with West Germany? The Soviet leaders must be fully aware of the fact that Bonn has no chance in the foreseeable future to acquire nuclear weapons, for the United States, France and Britain are opposed to the Federal Republic's acquisition of them. Under these circumstances, Bonn cannot aspire to nuclear club membership, even if it wanted to, since West Germany is vulnerable to Soviet attack and wholly dependent on Western protection.

Indeed, analysis of Soviet public statements yields other motives for selecting the Federal Republic as the main target of attack. Alleged West German opposition to a nonproliferation treaty is frequently linked to Bonn's NATO orientation. For example, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party who, prior to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, seemed inclined to accept the Nonproliferation Treaty even with its serious shortcomings, were ac-

[49]V. Matveyev, "Shag vpered," *Izvestiya*, August 27, 1967.

[50]Commentary by Spartak Beglov, APN, August 28, 1967.

[51]Commentary by A. Grigoryants, APN, January 22, 1968.

[52]One such diplomatic communication that has become public knowledge is Kosygin's remark to Otto Krag, then Prime Minister of Denmark, that the nonproliferation treaty was of interest to the Soviet Union only if Bonn's signature could be secured. Cf. Franz Horner, "Der Atomsperrvertrag—politischer Idealismus oder Realismus?," *Politische Studien* (München), Vol. 18 (1967), p. 695; Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, "Deutschland-Politik—warum nicht mit de Gaulle?," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), October 7, 1966; Fred Luchsinger, "Monopol der Nuklearmachte?," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zürich), February 5, 1967.

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cused of favoring nuclear armament of the *Bundeswehr* solely because they support fulfillment of "West Germany's obligations toward the Atlantic Union" and approve the "strategy of the so-called staged deterrence."[53] The fact that Soviet polemics against Bonn on the nonproliferation issue ceased when Moscow hoped for West German withdrawal from NATO in December 1966 helps to confirm this interpretation of Soviet motives. Further proof is provided by the fact that, prior to American-Soviet agreement on the NPT, the image drawn of the United States was more positive or more negative depending on whether the respective U.S. policies were regarded as harmful or beneficial to NATO. The West Germans have been told repeatedly that their compliance with the treaty can be accepted as a sincere contribution to peace only if their ties to NATO are severed and Atlantic nuclear strategy rejected. Occasionally, Moscow has communicated the anti-NATO bias in its nonproliferation policy to an international audience. In November 1966, before the MLF option was a dead issue, Moscow defined the purpose of nonproliferation as thwarting U.S. attempts to prevent "the collapse of the military blocs it [Washington] has whipped together, in the first place . . . NATO, by giving their members access to nuclear weapons," i.e., by creating a nuclear partnership.[54]

The focusing of Soviet anti-NATO attacks on the Federal Republic is based on the estimate that, after the withdrawal of Gaullist France, the health of the alliance depends on the willingness of Bonn to remain loyal to the alliance with the United States. Moscow regards West Germany as the backbone of NATO and of the American presence on the European continent. Deprived of West Germany, NATO would be "reduced to an empty notion."[55] Thus, the Soviet Union is trying to loosen the Federal Republic's NATO ties, in the expectation that, if West Germany proves to be a vulnerable target, the Atlantic Alliance and the European position of the United States can be mortally wounded.

Soviet nonproliferation policy is paralleled by Soviet "European

[53]Commentary of Serov, TASS (German/English), January 9, 1968.

[54]A. Aleksandrov, "End Nuclear Threat Now!," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1966, No. 11, p. 17.

[55]Spartak Beglov, "What is Behind the 'Special Relationship'," *ibid.*, 1968, No. 3, p. 39. Due to the bad quality of the English version, I have translated the passage directly from the original text in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 1968, No. 3, p. 55.

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security" policy.[56] They fulfill different functions: the actions under the heading of European security are geared to mobilize West Europeans against the United States and the Federal Republic (depicted as an anti-European American instrument). Such a course, however, increases the danger that the dreaded "Washington-Bonn axis" will grow firmer. To prevent this, by separating the Americans from the West Germans, is the function of Soviet nonproliferation policy. Lesser Soviet objectives are to undermine the Federal Republic's position as an integral part of Western Europe and as an indispensable component of any future West European integration, to disrupt the West European communities by weakening Euratom, and to thwart West Germany's new East European policy of conciliation and bridge-building[57] which may affect the obedience and militancy of Moscow's allies.[58]

In sum, Soviet nonproliferation policy does not aim at international détente but at generating tensions that will help the Soviets in their struggle to remove American power from Europe, to spread Soviet influence over a disunited Western Europe, and to restore Soviet rule over Eastern Europe.

[56]Cf. Wolfgang Berner, "Das Karlsbader Aktionsprogramm," *Europa-Archiv*, June 10, 1967, pp. 393-400; Richard Löwenthal, "Der Einfluss Chinas auf den Ost-West-Konflikt," *ibid.*, May 25, 1967, p. 347; Gerhard Wettig, "Die europäische Sicherheit in der Politik des Ostblocks 1966," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), February/March 1967, pp. 94-113 [an updated English extract appeared in *Modern World* (Düsseldorf), Vol. V (1967), pp. 134-138]; Gerhard Wettig, "Haupttendenzen der gegenwärtigen sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament'*, B 42/67 (October 18, 1967), pp. 3-6, 15-16.

[57]Especially since May 1968, the American and West German policies of "bridge-building" have been depicted as attempts to split and penetrate the "Socialist Community." In this context, the Federal Republic is viewed as the dangerous spearhead of U.S. subversive activities. Characteristic of the Soviet view of U.S.-West German bridge-building, with the polemics at low volume, is the article by Ye. Novosel'tsev on Bonn's eastern policies, *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1968, No. 7. The topic also had the attention of communist foreign policy experts convened in Moscow on April 23-25, 1968. Cf. *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*, 1968, No. 7, pp. 102-121, and 1968, No. 8, pp. 72-81. Another assessment of the political situation is contained in V. Gantman, "Tekushchyye problemy mirovoy politiki," *ibid.*, 1968, No. 7, pp. 82-84, 94-101.

[58]For a short analysis of Soviet intrabloc policies based on a broad spectrum of Soviet statements, see Gerhard Wettig, "Freiheit im Sozialismus ist Häresie," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), September 7, 1968.

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LIMITED PEACE*

by Hans Speier

THE fact that two states live in peace does not permit specific inferences regarding the nature of the political relationship existing between them. There is peace between Austria and Tanzania, but this means above all that these countries have very little contact. The United States and Canada share a long frontier; this border is open, and the two states will probably never wage war one against the other. West Germany and East Germany, however, live in peace and enmity; at their common border, which is open for commercial traffic, shooting occurs. The Soviet Union and little Czechoslovakia are allied, but peace and the sovereignty of the Dubcek Government were victimized in the alliance. The United States and the Soviet Union, the only big powers technically capable of breaking the peace on any continent and embroiling the whole world in war, have preserved peace despite seemingly irreconcilable clashes of interest, primarily ideological and political. They have reached certain agreements. Some of these, such as the consular agreement, merely regulate bilateral relations in a restricted area. Other agreements, for example, on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, were concluded in order to assert common interests of the two antagonists vis-à-vis other states. With some exaggeration Dean Rusk once spoke of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union had lived in a state of peaceful coexistence since the October Revolution.

Although all the relationships mentioned are peaceful ones, the nations concerned are by no means content with existing conditions. They demand that certain territorial borders be recognized or changed, and they believe in the value of certain economic and social systems as in a doctrine of salvation. Old and powerful states, concerned about their power, try to extend their influence, and protect their security through armaments and alliances. New and poor states envy the rich ones, curse them for a system of rule that belongs to the past and insist that the cursed ones are morally

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obligated to render selfless help. One can only conclude that the world is in a permanent state of injustice and of antagonistic, unfulfilled demands for justice. Even in cases in which peace between two states is based on a protectorate of one power over the other vis-à-vis third powers, the protected will sooner or later, secretly or openly, deny that the peace is just.

When wishing that peace be preserved, we do not necessarily consider the existing borders, systems of government or political aims of the states that live in peace to be good and right. In international affairs, peace means an international order in which strife is settled without violence. Correspondingly, war is a state of disorder in which a new peaceful order—again without full realization of justice—is to be established by violent means. A similar observation can be made in respect to peacefulness in domestic affairs: absence of revolt and civil war does not necessarily mean that the existing social conditions are just. Social peace and social order frequently rest only upon the acceptance of rule by those who are ruled and upon the nonviolent settlement of political discord.

War and peace are forms of international relations between states. Some observers are inclined to regard peace as the normal condition and war as an abnormal relationship. But this is a question of how normality is defined. In any event, propositions about the abnormality of war are more or less true depending on historical chance and geographical circumstance. It is a matter of the time in which one lives and the community to which one belongs. I have spent only about fourteen years of my life in countries whose soldiers were involved in war. Not counting the span of the so-called Cold War, only five or six additional years were times of acute crisis, when some statesmen said that world peace was imperiled by other statesmen. This makes nineteen or twenty years altogether, so that in my lifetime and given my changing geographic location, peace—statistically speaking—has been normal and war abnormal. Nevertheless, I have lived through two world wars. The Second World War has not yet led everywhere to a final peace settlement, and today nobody can conclusively prove that a third world war will not break out in my lifetime.

From 1918 to 1939, Europe lived in mortal fear of aerial attacks on cities and the use of poison gas in the next big war. In the twenty-four years that have passed since the end of the Second World War, civilized mankind has dreaded the catastrophe of a

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war waged with nuclear weapons. Besides dreading such a war, we live in fear of political opponents, in particular communists or imperialists. It is true, the possession of nuclear weapons, which increases the anticipated horror of war, reduces the expectation of it, but it does not restrict distrust, nor is it a sufficient safeguard of peace.

If one disregards Greece from 1946 to 1949, Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Cyprus, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the long years since the end of the Second World War have passed more peacefully for Europe than for other continents. The so-called hereditary enmity between France and Germany in Western Europe has disappeared for the short or medium run, in part perhaps because Germany is divided, West Germany has been put under military supervision, and France, but not the Federal Republic, has nuclear weapons of her own. In East and Southeast Europe there is the semblance of peace, purchased for freedom, and punctuated by foreign intervention. This part of Europe is not yet so menaced by new nationalisms that it could draw the remainder of that continent or the whole world into a new war. The European colonial powers have almost completely withdrawn from their former possessions overseas, and in the process only France has suffered relatively high losses of life.

By contrast, the many new states of Africa and Asia have gained independence but not peace. The number of wars, secessions and mutinies in the underdeveloped countries is mounting.[1] Some observers, among them Robert S. McNamara, attribute this increase in violence to poverty. But these countries were formerly not more prosperous. The bloody strife, which has led to the uprooting of millions of refugees and to terrible famine, is in part a consequence of decolonization and the lack of tradition in the exercise of national political power. Within a few years more than a hundred new states have emerged with a total population of more than a billion people. Many of the new entities are struggling for political survival, have no natural frontiers, and are economically not viable.

[1]According to a study by David Wood (*Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, Adelphi Papers No. 48, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, June 1968), there have been 40 violent conflicts in Asia in the 70 years from 1898 to 1967. Twenty-two of these 40 conflicts occurred in the last 20 years. For Africa, the corresponding figures are 23 out of 33; for the Middle East, 15 out of 22. Counting by type of conflict regardless of locale, there have been 50 insurgency-type conflicts in the 70-year period, 33 of which occurred in the last 20 years. In "civil wars," the corresponding figures are 9 out of 17; and all 9 coups d'état in Wood's statistic occurred in the last 20 years.

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The old democracies, in particular the oldest one—the United States—are able to absorb a large measure of internal violence, including assassinations and disorders, without a collapse of the political system. The same holds true for totalitarian governments, although they derive political stability in part from terror. In the case of the Soviet Union, according to the figures Andrei D. Sakharov recently made public, 1.2 million people were arrested in the limited period 1936-1939. Only 50,000 regained their freedom; "the others were tortured during interrogations or shot." The number of those executed amounted to 600,000.[2] The Nazi Reich was also politically stable. A world war was necessary to destroy it. These orders were more stable than the new states of Africa and Asia and the older states of South America. With the exception of Mexico, illegal and irregular change of the head of state is a frequent occurrence in Latin America. From 1930 to 1965 such a change occurred in nineteen states 106 times.

II

Unlimited, eternal peace is an old dream of mankind. But we live in a world in which peace is limited by wars, revolts and injustice. It should be the aim of policy to extend the limits of peace instead of chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of eternal peace. For otherwise men drift all too easily into waging a last war against war, or a holy war, or a just war with the aim to exterminate those who break the peace. "Last" wars, holy wars, crusades for a religious or political belief, are usually total wars or easily degenerate into them. The extension of the limits of peace consists in alleviating injustice without violence and in regulating war. A British scholar has expressed this view somewhat unpopularly, but quite correctly, as follows: ". . . so long as an international order exists—or so long as we might desire one to exist—wars must come short of the last degree of irreconcilability and retain some of the characteristics of a conflict between potential allies, some trace of the fact that they are quarrels between friends."[3]

In a limited war, the technically available means of violence are

[2]Andrei D. Sakharov, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Co-existence and Intellectual Freedom," *New York Times,* July 22, 1968. Robert Conquest in *The Great Terror* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), estimates that in the period 1930-1952, 20 to 30 million people died in the Soviet Union as a consequence of communist purges and the officially induced famine during the rural collectivization campaign of 1932-1933.

[3]Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy, and War* (London: Epworth Press, 1953), p. 97.

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not fully exploited. They are used inefficiently. In total war not only the annihilation of life and the destruction and devastation of land and property are unrestricted, but also cruelty is boundless.

War may be restricted in place and time so that even in a local war certain regions under enemy control may be spared, and no blood may be shed during the war in certain seasons, on certain days of the week, on holidays, or during certain hours of the day. Also the technically available means of war may be used with self-restraint. Not in all wars are the wells to be filled with sand, as was recommended in the Prussian patriotic literature for the War of Liberation from Napoleon. Not in all wars will poison gas be used, as by the Italians in fighting the Abyssinians or by the Egyptians in Yemen. In regulated, limited war, certain places, goods and persons are exempt from violence: sanctuaries or whole cities may remain intact; the earth need not be burned either by victor or vanquished; heralds, prisoners, the wounded will not be murdered; women not be raped, the defeated government not be overturned, the surviving civil population not be slain, driven out or enslaved. In limited war the aims of war are not limitless, and when peace is concluded the victor refrains from humiliating the vanquished.

Limited wars contain, so to speak, an admixture of peaceful order. They are civilized wars. True, for the survivors in a limited war it is no consolation that their dead did not fall in a total war. But limited war as a whole causes less suffering than a war in which violence and cruelty rage without restraint.

The preservation of some traces of peace in limited war is the result of human decisions to restrict the war geographically, to wage it without employing the full range of awesome weapons technology has provided, and to put one's own soldiers under a law that declares certain actions to be punishable crimes: unauthorized violence, the wreaking of revenge, cruelty, the rage of destruction, sexual exploitation, personal enrichment at the expense of the enemy.

Such decisions are made and observed more easily when war is not waged for sacred or semi-sacred, ideological aims; when the government personnel of different states is related by blood or belief, and when the governed people do not participate much in the war. Mass armies and civilian enthusiasm for war have uninhibiting effects on warfare. The enemy is satanized or

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monsterized in religious wars, colonial wars, guerrilla fights, wars of liberation, and in class or race wars. Often the enemy is equated with wild beasts. Fighting to the last becomes a self-righteous mission to exterminate evildoers, strangers, barbarians, beasts; it may become at the same time a rage out of panicky fear.

The weapons used in limited or unlimited wars reflect the level of technological development which state and society have reached in peacetime. Underdeveloped countries can wage only technically underdeveloped wars. The industrial revolution of the last centuries has transformed European society in times of peace and has industrialized wars as well. We no longer hunt with bow and arrow, and we no longer use them in battle. Our industry builds dreadnaughts, guns, tanks and airplanes for fighting wars; it also builds cars and airplanes for civilian transportation.

The terrible boundlessness of violence in total war is not only a result of technological progress. That unlimited war is possible on any technological level was as true of the time of Ghengis Khan as it is of the atomic age. The loss of life in the Thirty Years War in Germany was relatively more severe than that suffered in the Second World War, and the restoration of the destroyed buildings and the devastated countryside proceeded much more slowly after the total war of the seventeenth century than after 1945. From 1864 to 1870 Paraguay waged war against Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. All male inhabitants in Paraguay, including children at the age of twelve and grandfathers, had to fight. Resistance against the draft resulted in imprisonment, torture and slow death. According to cautious estimates, the population of Paraguay was reduced by the war from 525,000 to 221,000. About nine-tenths of the survivors were women. Although this war was waged with weapons which according to the European standards of the time were backward, the relative loss of the population of Paraguay—more than 50 per cent—corresponded approximately to the loss the Pentagon predicts today for the United States in certain kinds of nuclear war with the Soviet Union—about 120,000,000.

Technical progress, of course, has made possible the expansion of war. The scientific and technological improvement of weaponry has drawn ever larger groups of the population into the region of violent death: soldiers at the front and in the rear; combatants and noncombatants; workers and nonworking civilians—the aged, women, children; not only people in factories, but also in their homes, in churches and hospitals. Now there are not only point-

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targets, but carpets of destruction can be laid over cities. In the nuclear age, a whole region can be devastated and contaminated. A few bombs would suffice to turn West Germany into a graveyard, as Khrushchev once warned. Neutral and even allied countries can be drawn into the turmoil of war, as though they were enemy territory, and finally, not only the living can be killed or maimed, but also unborn children can be genetically damaged. Thus, technological progress has almost completely removed the limits of war—geographically, socially and biologically. This progress has made possible cruelty from a distance, which is distinguished from the cruelty of the secret policeman or the criminal in that the perpetrator does not look his victim in the eye. Adam Smith, two centuries ago, spoke of "invisible death" in war as a consequence of technical progress.

Horrified as we are by this development, we must not overlook that the nuclear age has other than martial aspects. The efficiency of weapons has not grown more astonishingly than have the possibilities of making life in peacetime more comfortable and of fighting disease, death and hunger. All nuclear physicists agree in this regard, whether you read Glenn T. Seaborg, Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker or Andrei D. Sakharov.

The efficiency of nuclear weapons has deepened the fear of war, although this is true mainly of nuclear war and in some parts of the world more than others. Since antiquity, many political philosophers have held the view that the worst of all wars is civil war, because it opens the door to savagery and leads to the decay of political order. This evaluation of civil war has changed as nuclear weapons have been invented and improved and their production costs have decreased. Today, no civil war, no matter how fiercely waged, appears so terrible and so dangerous as nuclear war. Civil wars are at least localized. The same holds true for colonial wars and wars of liberation, that is, for wars which in turn favor resort to boundless violence, because racial hatred and fear and self-righteousness seem to justify all means.

Thus we live at a time in which a nuclear catastrophe is possible but has hitherto been avoided. We enjoy a controlled nuclear peace. But this peace rests to a large extent on fear and deterrents, not on a common belief in that which makes life worth living, nor on undivided power, as in the short period of the American atomic monopoly. Limited nuclear peace is erected on the precarious balance of the big nuclear powers and on allegedly

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complementary interests that these powers share in preventing other states from getting possession of nuclear arms. Within this order of limited peace, conventional wars continue to be a "normal" occurrence. Some observers entertain the view that the small and medium powers have gained freedom of maneuver for their own power politics and for local wars because the atomic powers are preoccupied with mutual deterrence. Some exception must be taken to such opinions, bearing in mind the quick termination of the war against Nasser in 1956 or the joint Soviet-American support of India against China. Localized conflicts in which the big powers are involved with part of their military capability—Korea, Hungary, Viet Nam, Czechoslovakia—deepen the fear of nuclear war, and the number of conventional wars has *increased rather than decreased in the nuclear age.*

III

The modern age has given us not only scientifically improved weapons but also utopias of peace that are based on both science and pseudo-science. These utopias differ from mythical beliefs in a distant peaceful life and from the classical utopias by the assumption that the utopian state of affairs will eventually be realized on this earth.

According to the theories of progress, the midwives of modern sociology, war is, briefly speaking, simply barbaric and a consequence of the irresponsible use of power. Allegedly, the progress of mankind from a state of ignorance, superstition and error to the enlightened age goes hand in hand with progress from conditions of compulsion and subordination to forms of free, intelligent socialization. In the course of this progress the false martial virtues and the arbitrariness of rulers are replaced by education so that people will behave reasonably, by free economic activity, and by parliamentarism.

The utopia of a classless, peaceful society was originally a pedagogical notion, until Marx put it on an economic base. The Marxian classless realm of freedom is an unpolitical society, without state and without war, although according to communist doctrine this state of affairs can be attained only with the help of force.

In this connection it is important to recall that Marx and Engels applauded not only unlimited popular war and guerrilla struggles, but also the crushing of popular resistance through ruthless coun-

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termeasures taken by professional soldiers against people's armies and guerrillas. Marx had a weakness for Gneisenau, who in his recommendations for the establishment of the *Landsturm* drew certain lessons from the methods of fighting adopted by the Spanish guerrillas; to the distress of his king, Gneisenau ruined the old Prussian ethos of war. After the defeat of the French at Sedan in 1870 Engels and Marx (in his letters to Kugelmann) derided the British, because the latter were indignant at the way the Prussians fought the French *franc-tireurs*: requisitions were made, hostages taken, *franc-tireurs* executed, villages burned down. Engels considered it a typical prejudice of the Hohenzollern to believe that a nation was committing a crime if it continued to resist after the destruction of its standing army.

Marx and Engels were right in regarding limited war as a form of war in which the ruling classes observed certain social conventions even in enmity and struggle. The fathers of communism welcomed the barbarization of war, because it meant to them a recoil from upper-class ethics. They were adherents of total war, even when it was waged for an *unjust* cause, and from their point of view the Prussian war aims in fighting the French after Sedan were, of course, not just.

It was not Marx, however, but Stalinists, who held the view that after a worldwide victory of socialism the socialists would continue to wage war against one another.[4] Marx and Engels, "the general" of the communists, and Lenin, believed in the "just" war and did not discuss future wars of the just against the just. It is still communist doctrine that insurrection in underdeveloped countries is just, and the support of such insurrection by foreign communist states legitimate and moral, whereas the support of political order by other states is illegitimate and immoral. To this day, the pseudo-scientific utopia of a just order of peace contributes its share to contracting rather than widening the boundaries of peace.

In addition to the theories of progress there are other, pseudo-scientific notions of utopian peace. In the eighteenth century, before the democratic participation of large masses in politics led to a form of total war, which Clausewitz designated as "bürgerlicher Krieg" and de Jomini as "ideological war," quite a few observers believed that the outcome of war could be

[4]Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 50.

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calculated scientifically. With topography and geometry as bases of their analyses, serious people considered it possible to abolish war by studying and teaching the principles of military science, preferably at an international war academy. In 1780, the Prince of Ligne proposed the opening of such an academy. He believed that, given equal knowledge and equally good training and exercise of command on both sides, neither side could gain an advantage in war, so that war would become useless.[5]

This notion of the calculability of war has survived. In fact, it has gained prominence only in our age. It is an implication of today's war games, in which civilians study the results of nuclear wars. In these games the fictitious enemy is compelled, as it were, to take part in the game and observe the rules of economic rationality. The intellectual disposition reflected in such games recurs in the supposition that the nuclear powers can reach silent agreement on cooperative strategies so as to wage nuclear war in a reasonable fashion; such silent agreement appears possible because it is assumed that each side is capable of exact calculations of gain and loss in various forms of nuclear war. Fortuna, the goddess of chance, appears in such games only when the computers break down—a malfunctioning of technology which technicians can easily overcome. Robert McNamara has illuminated the role assigned to reason in such considerations. He said,

> Mutual [sic] interest—mutual trust—mutual [sic] effort: these are the goals. Can we achieve these goals with the Soviet Union, and with Communist China? . . . The answer to these questions lies in the answer to an even more fundamental question.
>
> Who is man?
>
> Is he a rational animal?
>
> If he is, then the goals can ultimately be achieved.
>
> If he is not, then there is little point in making the effort.
>
> All the evidence of history suggests that man is indeed a rational animal —but with a near infinite capacity for folly.[6]

McNamara should really have concluded from this remarkable observation that the unlimited power of folly and its roots should be investigated scientifically, but it is unlikely that the modern sciences are equal to this task, for as producers of utopias they are themselves children of folly.

A policy of limited peace must not be oriented on eschatological

[5]Hans Speier, *Social Order and the Risks of War* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, paperback edition, 1969), p. 240.

[6]Robert S. McNamara's address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in Montreal, May 18, 1966; text in *New York Times*, May 19, 1966.

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notions of an eternal peace. It must also guard against the pseudo-scientific illusion that it is possible to solve foreign policy problems like mathematical problems, that is, more or less elegantly but in any case once and for all. Neither the abolition of war nor the establishment of a world government is humanly possible if sovereign states refuse to give up their sovereignty. As long as there are states, there will be conflicts of interest, which may lead to war. But it would be an immense gain for the cause of peace if men succeeded in avoiding wars of political faith and race wars, in which the will to destroy is unbridled.

Today it is the most important task of a policy of limited peace to prevent nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The nuclear war would be a catastrophe of such dimensions that it must be avoided even if this is possible only by sacrificing important interests. Yet sovereign states demand such sacrifices of other, third, states, more readily than of themselves or of one another. Nor is it possible to establish with scientific exactness the circumstances in which such a sacrifice must be made. For example, one can hold very different views on how to counter the Soviet advances in the Mediterranean. Should certain interests of Western Europe, Israel or the United States be given up for the sake of peace so that the USSR may have more freedom of political expansion? As soon as any specific conflict in international relations is described precisely, the difficulties of a concrete policy toward peace become as evident as does the political weakness of general desires for peace and disarmament.

As I have pointed out, the communist doctrine of the just war obstructs reconciliation which could contribute to an extension of the area of peace. It is therefore desirable that the communist leaders of the USSR revise this doctrine, as they gave up, a few years ago, the doctrine of the inevitability of war between communist and capitalist states. At the present time, foreign policy is being passionately debated in the United States. This debate is a consequence of the limited war in Viet Nam. The outcome of this public discussion could be influenced by the Soviet government in favor of peace if it abandoned its doctrine that wars of national liberation are just wars. But to date there are no signs pointing to such a change in communist official doctrine.

War is just only if waged in self-defense against foreign aggression. Today this principle is defied not only by Soviet advocacy and justification of wars of national liberation, but also by

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the Soviet justification of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. According to this thesis, Soviet forces have a right to invade other socialist countries when their domestic or foreign policies are disapproved in Moscow. This "right" to violate the sovereignty of any government in the socialist "commonwealth" is derived from the principle that international law is "subordinated to the laws of the class struggle."[7] Any socialist government pursuing domestic or foreign policies that are disapproved in Moscow has to reckon with the possibility of Soviet military aggression. The Yugoslav paper *Borba* commented that the occupation of Czechoslovakia and its justification introduced a qualitatively new dimension into international life, namely, "the dimension of war between socialist countries."[8] Indeed, sometime in the future, attempts to justify Soviet aggression on these grounds could conceivably be made if Moscow should decide to use force against Rumania or Yugoslavia—or if it were to embark upon war against China—or if it found it necessary to let its tanks roll in order to punish an East German regime pursuing a German policy undesired in the Kremlin.

In addition, the Soviet government has repeatedly claimed to have the right to attack West Germany. This alleged right to unilateral military intervention in the Federal Republic has been based on a biased reading of Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet claim has, of course, been rejected by the Federal government[9] and by West Germany's allies. No matter whether the claim is merely an attempt to enfeeble the Western alliance by isolating the Federal Republic or a propagandistic threat of aggression, it constitutes a punitive extension of World War II against vanquished Germany.

Many observers of world politics foresee peace being threatened by the so-called North-South conflict, i.e., by the contrast between the rich, industrialized states of Europe and America, the Soviet Union, Japan and Australia on the one side, and the underdeveloped countries on the other. For the time being, there is no reason to fear the outbreak of such a racial war. It is more probable that the new states will wage further wars against one another and will continue to be beset by domestic revolts. By and

[7]Sergey Kovalev in *Pravda*, September 26, 1968.

[8]As quoted by Herbert Wehner in his important speech in the Bundestag on October 18, 1968; cf. *Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, October 22, 1968, No. 134, p. 1171.

[9]For example, as early as June 24, 1964, in the Bundestag, by Karl Carstens, then Deputy Secretary of the Foreign Office.

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large, these battles will be fought with primitive weapons or with the obsolete weapons of the technologically dominant powers. The advanced states could extend the area of peace by trying to settle such violent conflicts or reduce their number instead of instigating them or attempting to derive benefits from them. In the long run, only nuclear China could provide a reason or pretext to the white nuclear powers to use nuclear weapons in a racial war. The combination of the unleashed atom with the consequences of decolonization, racial hatred and eschatological notions of justice would produce a catastrophe whose horror could be exceeded only by a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

IV

Modern science and technology have immeasurably increased the efficacy of the means of production and destruction, but this has happened only in a limited part of the earth. Modern science is of little help to justice and peace. It can alleviate misery and poverty in peacetime; desalt the water of the oceans; serve medical and industrial progress; produce new raw materials and new foodstuffs; make contributions to birth control and to arms control. It can accelerate the communication between governments so that it becomes possible for facts and intentions to be divulged or distorted over a "hot wire." But science and technology have no power over human strife and the settlement of conflict between states, ideologies, races and classes. Since science aspires to power over nature, it lacks moral standards. Only man, as a political being, can wage war and limit war. Only as a political being can he become fully aware of the limits of peace and the consequences of war. Only as a political being can he constrain himself and serve peace.

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WEST GERMAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

by Elmer Plischke

THE Federal Republic of Germany made a remarkable transition, in less than a decade, from war, defeat and occupation to the establishment and stabilization of a reliable political system and acceptance as an equal partner in NATO. During this period, West Germany surmounted a series of critical problems: rebuilding a destroyed country, reconstructing a shattered economy and founding a sound financial system; integrating the federal structure and its territorial composition; creating and maintaining a workable governmental system which met the needs of the German people and, for a time at least, the requirements of foreign occupying powers; terminating a foreign occupation; regaining a place in the society of nations and establishing widespread diplomatic and treaty relations; and joining a host of international organizations, including NATO. The Federal Republic also produced comprehensive public policies, both internal and international.

However, significant issues flowing from World War II and its immediate aftermath have remained: the German question, the Berlin problem, European division and security, and the Cold War. The keystone to their resolution is Germany. In view of Germany's location, previous geopolitical role, and traditional *Weltanschauung,* her defense policy and power posture constitute critical factors in the international politics of Europe. With the impending end of the 1960's—a decade that witnessed retrogression in the spirit of European integration, the revival of nationalism, and the twilight of charismatic leadership in the principal European countries—the Federal Republic appears to be approaching the threshold of a new era in international affairs. The year 1969 marks the point at which any member "may cease to be a party" to the North Atlantic Alliance, subject to a year's notice of withdrawal, and the status of the Western coalition is vital to the foreign and defense policy of West Germany.

The starting point for an analysis of contemporary West Ger-

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man foreign and defense policy is 1945. For Germany, World War II ended in defeat, surrender, demilitarization, disarmament and occupation. So far as its economy was concerned, allied policy sought, maximally, to reduce the country to a pastoral state under the Morgenthau Plan, or, minimally, to institute programs of dismantlement of the industrial warmaking potential, decartelization, and deconcentration of economic power. Although the occupying powers failed to agree in advance to a new European power balance to stabilize Continental relations, they were unanimous in their decision to deny Germany the opportunity of challenging the peace and threatening the security of her neighbors. Among other things, this required keeping Germany militarily impotent. A policy to this end was instituted early in the occupation program, and the wartime allies might have been able to enforce it had they been able to agree on other important policy matters and had they not succumbed to the Cold War.

Development of Postwar West German Defense Posture

The progression of postwar West German foreign policy and defense posture may be divided into three principal phases. The first began with the Nazi surrender, and is characterized primarily by the destruction of Germany's military might, the marshaling of a concerted program to keep her demilitarized, and the freezing of the power balance against her. It was during this period that the wartime allies assumed supreme authority over the country, divided it into four zones of occupation, established allied control machinery, restricted the initial level of industrial production to approximately half of that existing during the prewar years, and revived German governmental machinery on a gradual basis, first at the local, then at the bizonal, and eventually at the "national" level.

The details of this development are well known; yet it is sometimes forgotten that, even though the split between East and West began to emerge during this phase, the Western allies were still determined to prevent the Germans from re-establishing their military arm. For example, the three Western occupying powers created the International Authority for the Ruhr to control German steel production, and the Allied Military Security Board to supervise demilitarization in West Germany. In addition, the Brussels Pact, signed on March 17, 1948, united its five members in commitments to aid one another against armed at-

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tack. This first postwar European alliance, according to the preamble of the pact, was aimed specifically at Germany. Moreover, the constitution or *Grundgesetz* of the Federal Republic, drafted in 1949, denied a defense function to the new Federal government.

In short, German security was of little concern to the powers during these immediate post-surrender years. However, with the split between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the commencement of the Cold War, and the birth of the Federal Republic, the Western allies assumed responsibility for West German security.

The second phase, in which a major policy shift occurred, was epitomized by the negotiation of a controlled West German military contribution to Western defense and the first steps toward integrating the Federal Republic into an emerging European community. The main changes experienced during this period were impelled by the Cold War, specifically by communist aggression in Korea in 1950. This phase consisted of four major interrelated developments.

The first concerned control over the West German steel industry. In 1949 the Federal Republic was admitted as a partner in the International Authority for the Ruhr, thereby continuing allied management of the industry while giving West Germany a voice in stimulating steel production. Two years later this arrangement was superseded by the European Coal and Steel Community—a customs union of equal partners with a supranational control system—which marked the first major step in the six-nation drive for European integration. In 1957, treaties were signed at Rome to create the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community, climaxing the movement toward integration in the economic field.

The keystone of this second phase, however, was the negotiation of the European Defense Community (EDC) and European Political Community treaties, signed in 1952 and 1953, respectively. The Defense Community Treaty envisaged a fully integrated European military establishment, functioning as a supranational force under a unified command, to which the Federal Republic would consign manpower and resources. Bonn would refrain from creating a national German military force. This would have linked the security of the participants and enabled West Germany to play a partnership role in strengthening

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West European security and in contributing to, but not managing, her own defense. The Political Community Treaty would have established a West European federation with limited, though genuine, authority of governance. The political community, together with integration in the defense and economic sectors, could have changed the geopolitics not only of Germany but also of Europe.

While the parliaments of five of its signatories, including the Federal Republic, approved the Defense Community Treaty, the French Chamber of Deputies tabled it in 1954. The Political Community Treaty went to governments for consideration and approval, but never re-emerged. The rejection of these treaties reflected a leveling off and decline of European supranational integration in the political and military spheres and a revival of nationalism in West-Central Europe. It facilitated the creation of a national German military establishment.

Related to the plan to incorporate West German forces into a European defense arrangement was the matter of affiliating the Federal Republic with NATO. Simultaneous with the negotiation of the Defense Community Treaty, the powers agreed in 1952 to invite West Germany to become an associate member under the North Atlantic Treaty and signed a protocol to this effect at Paris. However, when the French government defaulted on the EDC treaty, the question of West German affiliation with the North Atlantic Alliance was deferred.

The final aspect of this second phase concerns a little known but very important internal German constitutional maneuver. One of the imaginative features of the Pleven Plan, on which the defense community was based, was that West Germany would have been able to circumvent her constitutional restriction regarding military forces by creating a West German defense obligation through the treaty process. Under the *Grundgesetz,* treaties are the law of the land. The West German parliament debated the EDC treaty at length and approved it for ratification, but the legality of the action was challenged in the Constitutional Court. In the meantime, as a result of the election of 1953, the political composition of the West German parliament changed and the *Grundgesetz* was amended the following year, granting the Federal government exclusive authority over the national defense of West Germany. Thus, this troublesome constitutional difficulty was removed.

When the EDC plan failed, a new solution had to be found

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for strengthening Western security and dealing with the Federal Republic's defense problem. The crux of the issue was to devise a way to create a West German military contribution without establishing an independent German military force. French rejection of the EDC obliged the powers to give up the effort to integrate German troops into an amalgamated European force and to devise a plan for controlling a separate national German military establishment.

The solution to the dilemma was negotiated at London and Paris in 1954, and introduced the third phase of West German security development. The plan had three principal components: the creation of the *Bundeswehr* (West German military force); a formula for its international control, accomplished by incorporating it within the combined NATO forces; and the fabrication of a European political institution, the Western European Union, for regulating certain West German military functions. WEU was produced by amending the Brussels Pact in 1954 to admit the Federal Republic and Italy into membership. The new arrangement, directed at the Soviet bloc, established commitments respecting the military forces of the Federal Republic and the other signatories, and prescribed controls on German arms manufacture. Among other things, the WEU serves as a vital residual mechanism for harnessing West German military forces in the event the North Atlantic Treaty should become defunct.

In the third phase, the Atlantic allies agreed to empower West Germany to create her own national, but not independent, military establishment and to accept her as full partner in the alliance. Within the limits fixed by her relations with the former wartime allies and the power structure of Europe, the West Germans began to construct a defense policy. Her geopolitical position was uncertain and her options were somewhat restricted; her policy turned out to be both pluralistic and complex.

The West German Policy System

In its essentials, the West German "national purpose, basic objectives, foreign policy system" is similar to that of other countries. At its apex stands national purpose—the basic, all-pervading, motivating drive of a people, which is identifiable to and identified by the body politic and imbues the government and people with a willingness to sacrifice much for its achieve-

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ment. The national purposes of countries vary, and they may change for a given country from time to time. That of the Federal Republic may be stated as the restoration of German unity in freedom and peace—or, more fully, as the revival by peaceful procedures of a reunified, respected and respectable Germany in control of her internal affairs and fulfilling her proper role in international relations.

The second layer in this structuring comprises the country's fundamental goals. These are fourfold: achieving and sustaining national identity, preserving national security, maintaining the peace, and enhancing the general welfare. These are common to all peoples, but interpretations, priorities and courses of action differ from country to country. Moreover, their impact upon one another in the international environment, in which states vie for patrimony, power and prestige, renders them intrinsically competitive though not necessarily mutually incompatible. Competition occurs most often in the case of national security, especially if it is founded on a quest for military paramountcy.

The third layer encompasses the gamut of public policies designed to achieve these fundamental goals. They fall into three categories: (1) basic, long-range, or strategic foreign policies, which are relatively constant and long-lived; (2) intermediate policies, which are distinct and important, but have not acquired the stature of the strategic policies; and (3) short-range or tactical policies, which change from time to time and place to place and are intended to implement the more important policies. Each of these categories, in turn, may consist of policies of a primary, secondary or sustaining, or even tertiary, nature.

In keeping with this skeletal patterning, the post-World War II foreign and defense policy system of the Federal Republic may be defined in various ways. It is composed of ten basic or strategic policies of a primary nature, each of which is supported by a series of subpolicies, as depicted in Table I. The fundamental policies are arranged in a generally logical pattern of priorities, based on imperatives deductively determined: those that West Germany seems to regard as possessing least negotiability and which most closely approximate her vital interests appear at the head of the list, while those on which she is more likely to be flexible with respect to negotiations or which may be deferrable are in the lower portion of the list. Naturally, sequence among primary and particularly among secondary elements will shift over the course of time.

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TABLE I

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES

A National identity and international status

- Achieve acknowledgment as honorable member of family of nations*
- Acquire sovereign status and acceptance as equal*
- Obtain diplomatic recognition by, and establish diplomatic relations with, as many foreign governments as possible (with reservation concerning governments recognizing East Germany)*
- Reactivate prewar German treaties (as successor state)*
- Consummate new treaties
- Gain membership in international organizations

B National security

- Forestall aggression against integrity of Federal Republic (and West Berlin)
- Provide for own security to extent feasible
- Affiliate with other countries to establish guarantees of collective security
- Create West German military establishment—though not necessarily an independent military force*
- Avoid development of such powerful, independent military force as to produce forceful counteraction
- Support mutual disarmament, but not neutralization of West Germany

C Alliances and alignments

- Buttress national security by affiliating with defensive alliances (i.e., NATO, WEU)
- Convince other powers that West Germany is not revanchist
  - Western powers: by direct relations (i.e., Franco-German Treaty)
  - Eastern powers: by reviving direct relations on gradual, selective basis

D Berlin (pending reunification)

- Maintain freedom from communist aggression, control or incorporation of West Berlin into East Germany
- Integrate West Berlin into Federal Republic as constituent *Land* (state)—full integration, or as complete as possible while preserving four-power commitments regarding all of Berlin
- Prevent establishment of "free city" in West Berlin, or even for all Berlin; reject "third Germany" concept

E Reunification

- Achieve by self-determination of entire German people
- Negotiate by peaceful means
- Acquire by democratic process: popular elections, constitutional assembly, ratification referendum, and then establishment of government of unified state and election of officials; reject communist obverse order
- Hold division of Germany to be unnatural and intolerable

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Oppose "two Germanys" policy and development

Regard reunification as internal, not international, matter so far as German policy and action are concerned

F European integration and stabilization[1]

Integrate the European Communities—by supranational "federalism"

Unite West-Central Europe—by limited confederation

End division of Europe into two opposing, uncooperating parts—by loose association and traditional diplomacy

Achieve and maintain European political and power stabilization

G Peace treaty

Terminate remaining vestiges of World War II

Strive for a peace treaty for all Germany, but only after Germany is reunified

Oppose separate peace treaty between Soviet Union and East Germany as representing all Germany (but if this occurs, policy may be to support peace treaty between Western powers and Federal Republic as representing all of Germany)

H Territorial settlement

West—resolve issues, including Saar*

East—reject juridical validity of action of East Germany, Poland, and Soviet Union respecting Eastern territories, reserving legal determination to peace settlement

I Power and prestige

Develop influence in international affairs commensurate with realities of West German power status

Gain prestige as a major power

Play significant, recognized and respected role in international political affairs

Establish international political leadership role

J International cooperation

Develop and expand direct trade relations

Join multipartite arrangements for trade promotion and flow, balance of payments, tariff control and adjustment, and the like (e.g., European Communities, OECD, GATT, IMF)

Contribute foreign aid and assistance—both national and multipartite programs

Join international organizations for collective purposes (e.g., Council of Europe and other European organizations, specialized agencies of United Nations, IAEA)

*Asterisk indicates those policies which have achieved, or largely achieved, their goals, as compared with those whose goals have not been achieved or are not fully achievable because the policies are of a continuing nature.

[1]The West German *Grundgesetz* contains the unique stipulation that "The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions." (Article 24)

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Even a cursory review of the accompanying policy pattern reveals a number of basic facts. Certain policies and subpolicies are fulfillable in the sense that their objectives are achievable by some precise action, whereupon they no longer constitute compelling needs or desires. Examples include the attainment of diplomatic recognition, the reactivation of prewar German treaties, settlement of particular territorial issues, reunification, and the signing of a peace treaty. Many, on the other hand, are of a continuing nature and are rarely completely achievable, such as preserving security, stabilizing European geopolitical affairs, maintaining national power and prestige, and engaging in international cooperation. A related fact is that the various elements of this policy system are not mutually exclusive. There is some overlapping and a good deal of interacting. Moreover, some elements are spatially oriented, such as European integration, while most have functional rather than areal pertinence.

One obvious difficulty with this West German policy complex is that its principal elements are so inextricably intertwined that attempts to achieve one cannot be made without affecting the achievability of others. As a matter of fact, some are really "bijunctural." For example, as illustrated by Diagram I, items B and C in the accompanying table (national security and alliances), items D and E (Berlin and German reunification), items G and H (peace treaty and territorial settlement), and items F and J (European integration and international cooperation) are, in each case, mutually contributory or otherwise directly interacting.

Multiple interrelationships also exist, as represented in the lower portion of Diagram I. Thus, it may be said that membership in NATO and WEU relate fairly directly to seven of West Germany's basic policies, including items A (international status), B (national security), C (alliances and alignments), D (Berlin), F (European integration), I (power and prestige), and J (international cooperation), while the remaining three are indirectly involved. In addition, an analysis of West German security policy and defense posture involves all of the primary strategic policy elements except, perhaps, certain elements of item A (national identity and international status). While defense policy is not as directly related to item E (reunification) as it is to other elements, it is impossible to consider either the security policy of

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DIAGRAM I

WEST GERMAN POLICY INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Individual Interrelationships



Multiple Interrelationships

Alliance Perspective



Security Perspective



X = North Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union

Key to Foreign Policies

A	National identity and international status	F	European integration and stabilization
B	National security	G	Peace treaty
C	Alliances and alignments	H	Territorial settlement
D	Berlin	I	Power and prestige
E	Reunification	J	International cooperation

the Federal Republic or its reunification policy without involving the other.

One conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis, therefore, is that where such interrelationships exist, the policy system may be viewed from a particular, predetermined perspective—i.e., from the point of view of power and prestige, or of national defense, European integration, or reunification—which the policy planner often needs to do in dealing with the issues of the mo-

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ment. Relevancy, significance and priorities vary with the particular perspective design.

Another point to be noted is that in some cases a secondary or subpolicy under one primary, long-range policy may be virtually identical with another subpolicy supporting another primary policy. Thus, subpolicies promoting affiliation with international organizations appear under items A, B, C, F and J.

A second major difficulty with policy interrelationships is that some elements are accorded a particular sequential relevance by the Federal Republic, while other powers prefer a different ordering of priorities. Thus, an East-West "contra-sequence" exists respecting the resolution of the European question. While the Soviet government has demanded that in order to achieve a relaxation of East-West tensions it is essential first to settle the German question and then to negotiate a disarmament settlement, the Federal government insists on the opposite sequence of these three factors. It stipulates that a relaxation of tension by virtue of a change of Soviet attitude must come first, followed by a reduction of the Soviet military posture in Central Europe; then the negotiation of reunification will follow easily. These appositional sequences are based, in part, on differing views respecting the relation of political prerequisites to negotiability.

Another "contra-sequence" emerges from the juxtapositioning of three of the principal elements—D, E and G—involved in resolving the "German question." Bonn proposes that reunification be negotiated first, followed by the signing of a peace treaty with the newly integrated Germany; when this is achieved the Berlin question will be automatically resolved because, presumably, the metropolis also will be reamalgamated and designated the capital of the new Germany. On the other hand, Moscow argues that World War II should be brought to an end as the first step; for it, the initial priority is a peace treaty with the two Germanys, followed by reunification, whereupon the Berlin problem will be resolved. Alternatively, if the Western powers reject this sequence, the Kremlin contends that reunification may then be bypassed and a separate peace treaty signed with East Germany. In this case the Berlin problem would not be settled automatically, but would have to be dealt with independently, and Moscow would be satisfied only by Berlin's conversion into a neutralized "free city," or a "third Germany," unless it were fully incorporated into East Germany. These "contra-relationships" are depicted in Diagram II.

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DIAGRAM II

"CONTRA-SEQUENCES" OF
WEST GERMAN POLICY PROBLEMS



Internal Dimensions of West German Defense Policy

When the Federal Republic was admitted to NATO and was empowered to create a military force, the Bonn government turned to establishing a West German defense policy. This entailed, on the one hand, devising an *internal* program of planning, activating, organizing and controlling manpower resources, equipping military forces with arms, providing effective logistical support facilities, arranging for essential budget resources, and, because of Germany's recent past, conditioning the public to accept such a rearmament program. On the other hand, the decision to build a national military force necessitated a reconsideration of overall West German foreign policy and objectives, and a redefinition of the interrelationships of its components, which concerned the *external* aspects of defense policy.

In 1955 the parliament enacted the initial military legislation and the Defense Ministry was created; the first 1,500 volunteers were recruited early the following year, a planned program was announced some months later, the first draftees were called up in April 1957, and by July the *Bundeswehr* numbered some 100,000

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men. The second, more intensive phase of remilitarization started at the beginning of 1959, and four years later the military numbered 430,000 men, including 33,000 in the Territorial Defense Service, plus over half a million reserves. On April 10, 1965, ten years after the defense program was launched, the *Bundeswehr* reached the target of twelve divisions fixed as West Germany's contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. Annual defense expenditures approximated 6 to 8 billion DM ($1.5 to 2 billion) between 1953 and 1957, much of which was for occupation costs and defense support of certain NATO countries. In the 1960's the annual expenditures have risen to between 12 and 21 billion DM ($3 to 5.50 billion)—for the *Bundeswehr,* support-related costs, and civil defense—representing some 28 to 36 per cent of the total federal budget.

TABLE II

INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF WEST GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY*

1. Regard the military force a creature of the government, based on law, without the right of self-existence.
2. Maintain civilian control, i.e., under parliamentary supervision and civilian political leadership.
3. Identify the military mission as the defense of the West German domain—including Berlin—against aggression, and cooperate with allied forces in preserving German territorial integrity and political independence.
4. Recognize the political mission of the military force as serving the democratic and constitutional order, securing peace and defending freedom and justice, and protecting the welfare of the democratic political society.
5. Keep the military force, as well as its individual members, apolitical, and not allow the military to become a government within a government.
6. Deem members of the military service to be "citizens in uniform," not comprising an elite class enjoying a special position in the political community, but nevertheless constituting an integral and respected element of the social order.
7. Base participation on the principle of universal military service—in order to satisfy a commitment to the allies and to afford adequate protection to the Federal Republic.
8. Create a new "inner structure," i.e., a reformed relationship between officers and men, founded on inherent principles of a democratic society.
9. Maintain viability and effectiveness of the military force, i.e., review and improve force levels, organization, mobility, weaponry, logistical support, and the like.
10. Avoid the spirit of militarism.

*Because this analysis is limited to West German defense as it pertains to relations with other countries, matters of purely internal security, such as civil disturbance, counter-espionage and civil defense are not included.

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The main policies developed by the Federal Republic to govern this new military establishment are listed in Table II. From the outset, those leaders concerned with planning rearmament were determined to modify certain fundamental German military concepts. Unlike the situation at the time of the birth of the Weimar Republic, the Federal government had been functioning for several years before the *Bundeswehr* was established, so that basic policy planning was in the hands of a pre-existing political authority which had had an opportunity to consider and institute major policy reforms. The Federal Chancellery, working closely with a parliamentary committee, was able to fabricate the basis of a military organization which conformed to the requirements of a constitutional, democratic state, and placed control over it in the hands of nonmilitary agencies of the government. The *Bundeswehr* was created, empowered and controlled by laws enacted by the parliament and implemented, at the top, by civilian executive officers.

As noted earlier, before the Federal Republic could raise military forces, it was necessary to acquire proper constitutional authority. This was made possible by a series of amendments to the *Grundgesetz* in 1954 and 1956, ascribing the defense responsibility solely to the Federal government and defining certain agencies and functions of the parliament and executive, such as making a legislative Defense Committee responsible for exercising parliamentary control over defense, stipulating that the size and organization of the armed forces be contained in the national budget, and authorizing the establishment of military criminal courts with appeals ultimately to the Federal Supreme Court.

Details concerning defense matters and the *Bundeswehr* have been defined by statutory law. Enactments prescribe the rights and duties of members of the armed forces (Soldiers' Act), military discipline (Military Act), and the procedure for prosecuting serious violations of duty, such as desertion or mutiny (Military Penal Code), as well as providing for recruiting volunteers, compulsory service, military pay, subsistence, and procedure for the investigation of grievances. In short, the result is a package of legislative authorizations and controls laying the foundation of, and codifying a new basic concept for, the West German armed forces.

As evidence of the changed approach to military affairs, certain formal restrictions have been built into the contemporary West

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German political system. Some are institutional (discussed later), while others are of a legal nature. For example, the constitution specifies that the general rules of public international law form part of the federal law and take precedence over the statutory enactments of the government; that activities undertaken with the intent to disturb peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional and subject to punishment; and that weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported and marketed within the Federal Republic only with the permission of the Federal government.

Political management of the military is a policy concept so different from previous practice that many Germans have had difficulty understanding and accepting it. Nevertheless, the defense policy framers determined that the highest military command authority must be kept firmly under civilian control. The *Grundgesetz* specifies that the Minister of Defense serves as commander-in-chief. (For some years, federal statute required that the Chancellor become commander-in-chief in time of war, the transfer being made by a declaration of a state of emergency, determined by the *Bundestag* and promulgated by the Federal President. However, this arrangement was rescinded in 1968.) In addition, by constitutional amendment in 1956, a *Bundestag* Defense Committee was empowered to function between sessions of parliament and serve as an investigatory committee with the right to interrogate witnesses under oath. Simultaneously, the office of Military Commissioner of the *Bundestag* was created in accordance with the constitution to safeguard, on behalf of parliament, the basic rights of troops. Thus, in establishing the legal foundation of the defense function, the Federal Republic was careful to lay down the principles and establish the institutions needed to guarantee parliamentary and civilian control of the military and to integrate it into a constitutional, democratic system.

A third policy aspect of significance concerns the changed attitude toward "inner control" of the *Bundeswehr,* i.e., the effort to assure a new and more satisfactory soldier-superior relationship. This reform, intended to reflect the democratic quality of the West German social order, involved changes in the way in which officers address troops, in the nature of performance motivation so that a spirit of cooperation would prevail over coercion, and in the degree of respect enjoyed by the soldier as an individual possessing innate fundamental rights as well as obligations. One

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of the initial difficulties encountered in carrying out these changes was to find officers who, though trained under the old system, were dedicated to introducing the new one and making it work.

Related to this reform was the policy of regarding members of the military force as "citizens in uniform." Instead of constituting a special element of West German society, they are looked upon as ordinary citizens, performing one of the important types of public service. Members of the military are neither supermen, nor fraternal members of a sacrosanct elite, nor mercenaries and criminals. They are regular members of the nation's social order, many of whom, after a short period of military duty, return to their normal places in the community. This change is reflected in the new military oath: whereas under Hitler military personnel vowed their allegiance to the person of the *Führer,* the new oath is not a pledge to a person, or a military service, or even the *Bundeswehr,* but rather to the "Federal Republic of Germany." The oath is required of all officers and volunteers, while draftees, at their option, may replace it with a "solemn promise."

"Nonmilitarism" is one of the most important internal defense policies. That military force planners consciously sought to avoid revival of former German militarism is reflected in a number of the practices already described, such as guaranteeing parliamentary control, placing civilians in charge of military affairs, and developing an apolitical citizens' military establishment. This spirit of nonmilitarism also includes the deliberate refusal to revive a German General Staff—which would become an essential ingredient of the military establishment were the Federal Republic not under the command responsibility of NATO—and the disinclination, thus far, to create a national armaments industry, thereby rendering it impossible for a combined military-industrial complex to gain control of public policy.

External Dimensions of West German Defense Policy

The above-mentioned internal aspects of West Germany's defense policy are not unrelated to interstate politics, nor would it be valid to presume that the internal and external elements of her public policy are clearly disparate and distinguishable. The political processes of international affairs have changed so markedly in recent decades that the domestic and foreign relations of a country, as well as the national and international dimensions of its foreign policy, are no longer fully differentiable. Because

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of the conditions under which the Federal Republic came into being and was required to forge public policy—allied occupation, divided nation, transformed European power balance, and the Cold War—the problem of distinguishability and the fact of policy interrelationships are particularly pertinent to the Bonn government.

On the basis of the policy pronouncements and actions of the Federal Republic, the principal external relations aspects of its defense policy may be summarized as given in Table III. These policies, supplemented by supporting subpolicies, relate to seven of the ten fundamental West German foreign policies listed in Table I. The exceptions are reunification (E), a peace treaty (G),

TABLE III

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF WEST GERMAN DEFENSE POLICY

1. Preserve territorial integrity and independence against external aggression.
2. Avert outbreak of war in Europe and support peace and amicable processes.
3. Participate in collective security based on the Atlantic Alliance.
4. Acquire and contribute to a credible and effective deterrence.
5. Achieve reliable nuclear protection without becoming an independent nuclear (military) power.
6. Maintain defensive character of the military establishment.
7. Strengthen politico-military ties to allies; isolation and neutralism not viable options.
8. Reject enforced neutralization.
9. Support balanced and controlled arms limitation.
10. Promote East-West politico-military détente in Europe, especially in German territory.

and territorial settlement (H). Even these three are tangentially concerned with national defense because, on the one hand, if the East European countries cannot be persuaded that the Federal Republic is sincere in its desire to pursue these policies by amicable means, the continued suspicious and aggressive politico-military posture of the communist countries could not help but influence the security attitude of West Germany; hypothetically at least, the Federal Republic might eventually modify its reliance on peaceful processes. On the other hand, if substantial détente with the East and a reasonable degree of European security and

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stabilization were reached, reunification and the peace treaty would seem to be more negotiable. Stressing the interrelationship of reunification and West German security, although oversimplifying it, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard said, in a policy statement to the *Bundestag* in 1965: "I believe it is agreed that reunification policy, security policy, and foreign policy are one."

Another point of interest concerning Table III is that it contains little that is really surprising. In view of post-World War II developments in Europe and the nature of the power balance, each major policy item is not only rational but also realistic. Moreover, in its essentials, this policy complex has been relatively constant: its basic elements, and often the subpolicies under them as well, have been pursued by the Federal Republic since defense policy was initiated during the administration of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. As might be expected, the principal differences among succeeding administrations have concerned specific interpretations, nuances, emphases, priorities and timing. Variations have occurred primarily in the area of implementing or tactical policy, illustrated by such concepts as massive retaliation, flexible response, forward defense, graduated deterrence, a multilateral nuclear force, and joint nuclear strategic planning responsibility.

Structure of West German Foreign and Defense Policy System

Analysis of the substance of the external side of West German defense policy, like that of other countries, begins with the avowed goal of maintaining the peace. This pervasive objective, frequently espoused in official and unofficial statements, has three facets: the fundamental and declared desire to have peace and friendliness permeate the international environment; the expressed intention to deal with other governments amicably and disavowal of the use of force in pursuing foreign policy goals; and an acknowledgment of the imperative need to avoid the outbreak of warfare in Europe. In a major policy statement to the *Bundestag*, Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger declared: "That peace may be preserved is the hope of all nations, and the German nation desires this no less than others. The will to preserve peace and to promote international understanding is, therefore, the first and the primary concern of this Government's foreign policy."

Moreover, the Federal government has repeatedly stated that "it has for all time renounced the use or threat of force for the

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attainment of its political aims"—even with respect to East Germany and reunification—and has invited other governments to negotiate similar commitments; that its policies and objectives are not intended, and should not be regarded, as a threat to any country; and that it seeks change only by peaceful negotiation. Respecting the third facet, averting hostilities, the Federal Republic acknowledges that, in view of the realities of technological and geopolitical developments, its survival is impossible unless "war is eliminated from the political association" of nations.

In the 1950's Chancellor Adenauer enunciated West Germany's well-known triumvirate of vital interests: the security of the Federal Republic; the maintenance of the existing political, legal and economic ties between Berlin and West Germany; and the achievement of reunification, the nonrecognition of the East German regime, and settlement of frontier questions in a peace treaty with an all-German government. The Adenauer Government also laid down most of the basic defense policy of the Federal Republic, and much of its foreign policy, such as principles of national identity and respectability, European integration, international cooperation, trade development, Franco-German rapprochement and self-determination.

While Chancellor Adenauer, it appears, tended to conceive of West German policy from the viewpoint of a "national security—reunification—Berlin" relationship, by the mid-1960's the focus had shifted to what might more accurately be described as a "national security—German reunification—European unity—power/prestige—détente" policy configuration. That is to say, the defense policies and defense-related basic foreign policies tended to gravitate into four interrelated clusters joined together by the fifth element—détente—as illustrated in Diagram III.

Détente, aside from having the character of a goal that is desirable in itself, is also a means to an end. In fact, it has become the cement in the West German policy complex and, in many respects, is regarded as a prerequisite to the achievement of cooperation between West Germany and the East European countries, the enhancement of West German security, and, eventually, German reunification and a peace treaty. Addressing the *Bundestag* in December 1967, Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder proclaimed: "The aim of German foreign policy is to establish a peace system in Europe that ensures a sufficient degree of stability for all European nations" and "the German Government

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DIAGRAM III

WEST GERMAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY CLUSTERS



is fully aware that the road to such a European peace system can only be opened during a period of détente." To attain such a "common-sense peace arrangement," Foreign Minister Willy Brandt told the *Bundestag* members, "we should dismantle political tensions, accommodate ourselves to one another's interests, foster people-to-people understanding, and promote cooperation among states." Two years earlier, Chancellor Erhard, in one of his major foreign policy statements to the parliament, epitomized the matter when he said: "We do not want LESS but MORE détente." Despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact powers and the proclamation of the "Moscow Doctrine" by the Kremlin in 1968, West German leaders reiter-

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ated their determination to continue pursuing détente as the prerequisite for German reunification and European unity and stability.

The general principles of the West German security policy cluster have often been defined by the Chancellor, the Foreign and Defense Ministers, and political party and parliamentary leaders. They look upon West German and West Berlin independence and territorial integrity as absolute imperatives and insist that they must be inviolable. They have stressed the Federal Republic's peaceful intent by not insisting on having an independent military force; proclaimed the purposes of this force to be entirely defensive; espoused a conscious spirit of nonmilitarism; assumed a commitment not to produce atomic, biological and chemical weapons on German territory; disavowed the desire to acquire a national nuclear force; and renounced resort to force. Aside from these and similar policies, the Federal Republic bases its security largely on two principles: alliance with the North Atlantic powers and balanced East-West arms limitation.

Fundamentally, West German alliance policy consists of contributing to a credible and guaranteed collective deterrent vis-à-vis potential aggressors and securing reliable nuclear protection, without becoming a nuclear (military) power, by participating in joint strategic nuclear planning and responsibility in order to increase the dependability of such protection. Admitting that national effort alone—by the Federal Republic or any other West European power—is insufficient to assure national security, and that a West European guarantee based purely on Europe's own resources is equally unreliable for such assurance, the Federal Republic has frequently asserted that it relies for its security on NATO, so long as the United States remains an integral partner. Furthermore, West Germany has assigned all of the combat elements of her military force to the alliance. As a matter of policy, Bonn insists that it must be a full and equal partner in NATO and that all members must faithfully contribute to it in accordance with negotiated commitments and their respective capabilities.

Emphasizing West German reliance on the alliance, Chancellor Adenauer declared in 1962: "The importance of NATO for the preservation of peace and freedom in the world cannot be overestimated." Two years later the Foreign Minister summarized the Federal Republic's position, when he said: "Our security con-

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tinues to be guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance and the nuclear power of the United States. It is therefore only logical and vital that we do everything we can to fortify the defensive strength of NATO and to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance." In short, it is West German policy to continue the alliance as a politically "consolidated and militarily effective" institution.

Not unlike other countries, West Germany links her alliance policy to her desire for arms limitation. In a major foreign policy statement to the *Bundestag* in 1962, the Chancellor said: "We share the wish of the majority of nations to call a halt to this arms race and to avert the danger of war by means of a general and controlled disarmament." More recently the Defense Minister added that West German arms limitation policy is "to undertake steps and to support proposals that may lead to a militarily balanced reduction in arms in both the nuclear and the conventional fields." These two statements embody several fundamental elements of German arms control policy.

Except in the minds of dreamers, disarmament policy can only be an extension of national security policy, and West Germany's precarious geopolitical position compels the Federal government to prescribe with care the conditions it considers essential for an acceptable arms control arrangement. Thus, the Bonn government contends that, in general, arms reduction must be balanced, mutual, controlled and negotiated; unilateral disarmament of West Germany, or of all of Germany, is out of the question; prior unilateral concessions by West Germany as a precondition to broader East-West arms negotiations will not be granted; disarmament commitments must not seriously upset the existing power balance in Europe; steps taken to delimit armaments must be linked with negotiations to solve existing political problems; and, while West Germany's long-range goal is general disarmament, partial arms limitation must be sought pending the conclusion of more wholesale agreements. In any case, the immediate goal of the Federal Republic is an agreed and balanced reduction of forces in Western and Eastern Europe, in order to lessen the dangers of confrontation through the central part of the continent, especially along the line which Foreign Minister Willy Brandt called the " 'death strip' that slices Germany in two."

In the nuclear area, aside from the voluntary abnegations already noted, West Germany signed the Test Ban Treaty and

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favors agreement on a nonproliferation treaty, provided her interests are adequately preserved respecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the inspection system, the security of the nonnuclear nations, and her power and prestige. In essence, the West German arms limitation policy is designed to lessen the terror of nuclear war, halt the arms race, and maintain a balanced but reduced arms level in order to preserve peace and security.

The European-unity foreign policy cluster of the Federal Republic is composed of four interrelated elements. The first of these is bilateral rapprochement, illustrated by the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 and by an expressed willingness to broaden diplomatic relations and negotiate with the East European countries, thereby ending what the Foreign Minister has called the "defensive phase of our policy towards the East."

The second, often regarded as the crux of European unification, is the development of the European Community system—fusing the existing Economic, Coal and Steel, and Atomic Energy communities; expanding participation through the admission of additional countries; striving for genuine political unity; and perhaps incorporating within such a united European Community an integrated defense function and responsibility. This policy supports a return to the federative or supranational process derailed by the French government in the 1950's. Admittedly, such a united European Community can be accomplished only gradually, but German policy statements suggest that it might eventually become a viable Third Force in world affairs. For example, in his annual statement of government policy to the *Bundestag* late in 1965, Chancellor Erhard implied this when he said:

> The old traditional European order does no longer stand up to the spirit and the demands of our present century. Alliances, treaties and individual arrangements in the old style will no longer do. A new, a united and great Europe must, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, acquire the standing that is in keeping with the historic, intellectual and cultural achievements of its peoples. Europe must take shape, politically, economically and militarily.

The Bonn government looks beyond the European Community system to support broader and more general European cooperation. It participates in the activities of the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Cooperation and Development, the Western European Union, and other European international agencies. It has also launched a serious attempt to "normalize" and augment bilateral contacts with the communist countries of

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Eastern Europe through agreements on economic, technical, scientific and cultural affairs, the exchange of trade missions, and the formal establishment of diplomatic relations.

The fourth element, closely related to the third, is the policy of bringing the West and East European blocs into closer cooperation, an endeavor still in its formative stage. Aside from somewhat nebulous statements proposing new and constructive agreements between the two blocs, general intimations have been made respecting links between informal cultural, social and technical agencies; between the economic groupings, including the Common Market, the European Free Trade Association and COMECON; and eventually between the NATO and Warsaw security blocs. Regarding North Atlantic-communist bloc relations, the West German government may have nonaggression, renunciation of force, military de-escalation and denuclearization arrangements in mind.

In 1961 Chancellor Adenauer summarized Bonn's German reunification policy in these words: "The restoration of German unity in peace and freedom continues to be the invariable aim of German policy. The Federal Government demands the restoration of German unity on the basis of the right of self-determination." The reunification policy cluster consists of the following three primary elements: rejoining West and East Germany, which presumably would automatically provide a resolution of the Berlin problem; negotiating a peace treaty, which would terminate World War II and the residual rights of the wartime victors in German territory; and resolving the Eastern Territories question. In this policy field, shifts have been made respecting the immediacy of, and the procedure for, attaining a reunited country and ameliorating relations between West and East Germany, particularly in the economic, financial, trade, cultural, communications, transportation and population areas. Whereas the Adenauer Administration tended to stress legal rights and political propriety, more recently Bonn's approach has been characterized by a firm stand on such rights while emphasizing improvement in relations with the communist countries of Europe in order to render these objectives more negotiable. Clearly this is less a change in substance than in method, but it is expected to make the goal of reunification less visionary.

Within this context, the Federal Republic remains dedicated to such policy precepts as considering East-West German relations

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to be purely an "inner German problem," not an issue of "foreign relations" between West and East Germany; regarding the Federal government as the only German government to have been freely, lawfully and democratically elected and, therefore, entitled to speak for all Germany; rejecting the communist "two Germanys" theory, and the "three Germanys" notion under which Berlin becomes an internationalized, distinct legal entity; insisting that Germany be reunited and establish a national government democratically before a peace treaty is negotiated; regarding the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany as an unfriendly act against the German people and a demonstration against reunification; and repudiating the legality of the disposition of the Eastern Territories until the peace treaty is signed.

The Federal Republic bases its reunification policy on the political right of self-determination. While on a trip to Asia in 1967, Chancellor Kiesinger proclaimed: "Germany acknowledges the autonomy of any state founded on self-determination of its people. We claim this right for our own people in a divided country." Some months earlier, in a letter to Minister President Willi Stoph of East Germany, the Chancellor said: "The right of self-determination is undisputed among the peoples of the world. The day will come when this right can no longer be denied the German people. . . ." Thus, the Federal Republic supports this principle for other peoples and actively solicits firm reassurances from the Western allies and worldwide moral approval for the right of the German people to self-determination.

Policy modifications are discernible in two aspects of the reunification cluster. Under the Hallstein Doctrine, propounded and undeviatingly adhered to during the Adenauer Administration, the Federal Republic pursued the practice of breaking off diplomatic and economic relations with nations that, not having done so previously, granted recognition to the East German regime. More recently, however, the Federal government has intimated a moderation of its stand and, should the issue become something more than hypothetical, it is probable that the West German government will decide the matter on the immediate merits of the particular case rather than on the inflexible basis of principle. Apparently Bonn recognized the inconsistency of establishing diplomatic relations with an East European communist country that maintains diplomatic relations with East Germany,

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while breaking off diplomatic relations with another country that establishes diplomatic ties with the Pankow regime.

Similarly, Bonn has eased its stand on the Eastern Territories question. While the Federal Republic continues to support the legal judgment that this matter can be settled only in a peace treaty with an all-German government, Chancellor Kiesinger, in speaking at a press conference on relations with Poland, conceded that "this does not exclude joint considerations being made before such a peace treaty about an acceptable solution." Presumably, the Federal government recognizes that the territory is irremediably lost and acknowledges that there is no question of resort to force to retrieve it, but, nevertheless, the matter is being reserved as a bargaining factor in the peace treaty negotiations.

Turning to the fourth policy cluster, West German leaders have said little publicly about enhancing the power and prestige of the Federal Republic. Late in 1967 Kiesinger told an Asian audience: "Germany has no ambitions of political and military power in any part of the world." In view of the infamy of Nazism, it is not surprising that current German leaders regularly disavow expansionist, revanchist and aggressive inclinations.

Power—the ability to influence—is a normal attribute of a normal state in a normally competitive international environment. In this sense, it is not unnatural for West Germany to strive for a voice in foreign relations commensurate with her real capabilities and resources and to seek to influence the policies and views of others. In a major address in 1964, Foreign Minister Schröder declared:

> A reasonable discussion of our foreign policy must be based on the position, the power, and the possibilities of our State in the existing world situation. History teaches us that foreign policy can fail if it does not perceive or does not wish to perceive the incompatibility of aim and possibilities.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Our role in the world today, in which we are sought as partners and allies, is based less on the military strength of Germany and the number of its divisions than on our internal stability, on our responsible foreign policy, and not least on our increasing economic power.

Without making overt references to national power, the Federal government pursues policies and actions that are clearly related to it: for example, its rejection of neutralization; insistence on having a national military establishment and the protection of a reliable nuclear deterrent; effort to maintain a constant and

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dependable European power balance; assumption of a leading role in the integration of the European Community and of greater diplomatic initiative toward the East; and interest in the possibility of creating a Third Force.

These developments are not surprising, nor are they inconsistent with customary international behavior. As the Federal Republic gains greater acceptance from other countries and more confidence in itself, accompanied by growing international prestige —and these are not unlikely in the years ahead—its power will increase. However, Bonn needs to exercise caution; in view of past German history, too energetic a role in power enhancement and manipulation is apt to engender adverse reactions from other countries. In summary, while the West German power-prestige policy undoubtedly exists, it is more subtle, less widely heralded, and less immediate and overt than the other major policy clusters.

Foreign and Defense Policy Options

Practitioners of statecraft who function within a competitive environment find merit in keeping their options reasonably flexible. Because history is astatic and no state controls its relations with other countries absolutely, policy positions, except on fundamentally vital interests, need to be viable. In the relations of governments, nonnegotiability of issues generally arises only when the realm of choice ceases to exist and the parties become frozen in disagreement.

The Federal Republic, emerging from occupation in 1949, had more restrictions on its course of foreign and defense policy development than the normal sovereign state. Bonn's formulation of policy has been not only a problem of deciding on appropriate substantive principles, but also a process of forging options, whether actual or potential. This process of widening alternatives is likely to continue, and in some cases will be consciously pursued.

It is possible to consider policy options from various perspectives of the foreign policy complex, each of which may be justifiable and useful. As with policy analysis in general, the particular perspective may be any of the policy clusters, any major foreign or defense policy, or even certain of the important subpolicies. Moreover, options analysis may be applied both to substantive policy and to procedure or method.

The validity of such analysis is related to the assumptions on which it is based. In this case, these relate to both internal and

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external factors, and, in essence, they presume that the existing socio-economic and geopolitical situation remains relatively unchanged. The main assumptions pertaining to internal matters are that the political system of the Federal Republic remains intact and stable; there are no drastic shifts to the extreme Left or Right by the principal political parties and no extremist minor party gains control of the government; no major depression or prolonged economic crisis upsets the economy; and no serious revolution occurs in the social system of the country.

The fundamental assumptions relating to the international situation are that no significant change in the European balance of power occurs and neither the Soviet Union nor the United States achieves a military preponderance in European affairs; no serious revolts erupt in neighboring East European countries which, if successful, would alter the political and military equilibrium or, if unsuccessful, would produce forceful retributive reaction; and there is no outbreak of war in Central Europe and no resort to nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

There are four principal general options respecting West German national security:

(1) *Neutralization and disarmament.* This option is opposed by both West Germany and her allies and, therefore, could be established only by outside force (and even this would require the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States) or, possibly, as an agreed segment of a negotiated overall European package settlement. A strong, industrialized country like West Germany is bound to view acquiescence to a neutralized and disarmed position as too demeaning to its international political power and prestige—except, perhaps, in the context of a totally disarmed Europe, which, under existing circumstances, is most improbable. While the alternative of neutralization might have been negotiable among the allies who occupied disarmed Germany at the end of World War II, conditions have so changed that this option seems to have become largely hypothetical.

(2) *Unilateral (unaligned) defense posture.* This alternative would necessitate massive—and in a financial and industrial sense, perhaps an impossible—arms development program to produce a credible military deterrent. In the foreseeable future, even such a gigantic undertaking might not be able to produce a really effective protection or a reasonably acceptable psychological sense of security. In all probability, if a dependable military deterrence

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were created, it would frighten West Germany's neighbors into such forceful reaction as to be counterproductive and, therefore, lessen her security. Bonn has frequently rejected this alternative, both overtly and by implication. Nevertheless, while it may not be a preferred option at this time, there are contingencies under which it could become more credible, and West German policy planning must regard it as a potential course of action. Yet, the more attention Bonn pays to it, the more anxious Germany's neighbors will become.

(3) *West European coalition, without the United States.* This option has consistently been rejected on the grounds that the Federal Republic requires a reliable security guarantee against an aggressive communist Eastern Europe and that such assurance could not be provided by a West European coalition bereft of U.S. support. However, the West Germans cannot fully ignore it as a possible option under two contingencies: if the United States withdrew voluntarily from the Atlantic Alliance, which the Federal government obviously would strive to avert; or if the challenge from the East were sufficiently moderated and the West European coalition boasted enough military power to provide an effective countervailing force. These developments are unlikely, but not inconceivable, and, therefore, must be included in long-range West German policy planning. Options need to be refined and kept open by the policymaker even in the case of such seeming improbabilities. Circumstances may be altered by so many unanticipated contingencies that the well-advised policy planner must try to foresee them, identify his choices, and prepare his alternative strategies.

(4) *Western coalition, with the participation of the United States.* This is the preferred option of the Federal Republic because, at present, it appears to be the only, and certainly the least expensive, trustworthy arrangement for effective security assurance and military deterrence. From the West German point of view, frequently and openly reiterated, the keystone of NATO is active U.S. military cooperation and commitment of the U.S. nuclear capability. To be reliable, according to West German policy statements, the alliance must remain intact and the United States must continue her enthusiastic participation.

These four primary options encompass various sets of sub-options and sub-suboptions which warrant the serious consideration of West German policy planners. Some of the more obvious

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are suggested in Table IV, which indicates in an elementary way the complexity of the policymaking task. To illustrate, under the fourth general option, a choice may be made between an alliance system possessing a permanent decision-making or negotiating mechanism with a joint military force in operational readiness, as in NATO; an arrangement involving combined West European military forces in combat readiness, supported by U.S. nuclear power but without U.S. conventional forces deployed on a continuing basis in Europe; or simply an agreement among coalition members to consult and cooperate under specific conditions, with an overlying promise of U.S. nuclear deterrence. A set of suboptions also exists respecting the nuclear deterrence function, including West Germany's reliance on U.S. power, on the more limited French and British capabilities, or on developing her own nuclear force to be employed unilaterally or in coalition with that of the Atlantic powers as a group or that of France or Britain.

While adhering to the primary option of reliance on U.S. nuclear strength, the Bonn government must choose among suboptions pertaining to the role the Federal Republic should play in assuring itself an adequate defense guarantee. These include simply leaving the matter entirely up to the United States; creating a joint overall control arrangement among equal partners (with the unilateral veto, or with some method of weighted voting); establishing a joint but limited nuclear facility, such as a multilateral nuclear force; or participating as a partner in a joint strategic planning body, on which West Germany can rely for deterrence, but which leaves the actual control of nuclear weapons to the United States.

This discussion of selected sets of security policy options implies the existing division of Germany. However, the defense question would change materially if the country were reunited. Because reunification has been established as one of the Federal government's vital interests and most important policy goals, let us briefly examine some of the options related to this matter. From the perspective of the prime interested parties, reunification might occur in several possible ways:

(1) By agreement among the four wartime allies without the participation of the present regimes of West and East Germany —which is quite improbable.

(2) By agreement between the Federal Republic and East

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TABLE IV

WEST GERMAN SECURITY:
SELECTED POLICY OPTIONS PROJECTIONS


Primary Options
Suboptions
Sub-Suboptions
I Neutralization and Disarmament
A By outside force
1 Joint Soviet-U.S.
2 Joint East-West coalitions
3 Other arrangement
B By voluntary acquiescence
1 Unilateral abnegation
2 Joint or complementary abnegation
C By agreement
1 East and West Germany
2 East and West coalitions
3 All Europe (excluding U.S.)
4 All Europe (including U.S.)
II Unilateral Defense (unaligned)
A Diplomatically isolated
1 By preference
2 By imposition
B Not diplomatically isolated
1 Accept security status
2 Seek to change security status
A Conventional forces
1 Without nuclear power
2 With outside nuclear deterrent
B Nuclear power
3 With national nuclear deterrent
III West European Coalition (without U.S.)
A Military nature of alliance
1 "United" combat ready forces
2 "Joint" combat ready forces
3 National combat ready forces
B Alliance mechanism
1 Permanent mechanism for decisions and planning
2 Ad hoc mechanism for decisions and planning
3 Without mechanisms and only commitment to consult
C Role of France (Same for Britain)
1 Fully integrated
2 Closely affiliated
3 Loosely associated
4 Unaffiliated

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TABLE IV (continued)



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Germany without involving the World War II allies. This is even less probable than (1), although the way toward eventual reunification might be paved by establishing closer relations between the two German governments.

(3) By agreement between the four wartime allies and the communist regime in East Germany, which is virtually inconceivable.

(4) By agreement of the four wartime allies and the Federal Republic. Since this would be possible only if the Soviet government were prepared to sacrifice East Germany, it is an unlikely option.

(5) By agreement between the Soviet Union and the West and East German governments, which also is unlikely, although not inconceivable in the long run.

(6) By agreement between the three Western allies and the two German governments, which is unlikely but not inconceivable.

(7) By agreement among all six powers, which is feasible if an acceptable formula can be produced.

The Federal Republic has pursued a policy based on the last of these seven options. In all likelihood, Bonn could accept the fourth; or the sixth, if the Soviet Union could be eliminated from consideration; or the second, if the World War II allies agreed to accept the consequences of the reunification settlement and terminate their residual rights; or even the first, if genuine reunification resulted and the new internal political system were free, democratic and subject to approval by the German authorities and ratification by the German people. The West German government could not accept the third option, and the conditions under which the fifth would be acceptable are not apt to arise.

Additional sets of options apply to the method by which, as an internal German problem, West and East Germany may be rejoined. One of these focuses on the nature of the fundamental agents that might play a primary role. The most obvious alternative is "the German people" who would elect an all-German agency to consummate the action. This option, if based on proportional representation, would give West Germany better than a three-to-one determination ratio. Another alternative is the *Länder* (states), which would give West Germany a two-to-one ratio, but would require the reconstitution of the East German *Länder* that were disestablished by the communist regime in 1952.

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A third would be the four original occupation zones, which would give West Germany a three-to-one ratio. The fourth would involve the West and East German governments, on an equal one-to-one ratio.

The time for the zonal approach seems long past, and it would be difficult to induce East Germany and the Soviet Union to accept the formula based on the *Länder,* although the supporters of a federal governmental system might regard this alternative as being to their advantage. West Germany has opposed the fourth option, which is preferred by East Germany, not only because it would give the communist regime negotiating parity, but also because this procedure would lend itself most readily to the creation of a loose confederation of equals in which East Germany might retain a high degree of separate identity and control. The Federal Republic prefers the alternative of self-determination of the entire German people, with the electorate selecting representatives to design a new system of governance which would be acted upon by popular referendum. Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future the only negotiable way to reunification may be to begin with a loose confederation of West and East Germany; such a confederated government would exercise only limited functions and authority, but might set in motion a "federative continuum" leading, step by step, to greater national integration.

Another basic set of suboptions pertains to the method of amalgamation. Thus, reunification can be accomplished by joining East Germany to West Germany, by joining West Germany to East Germany, or by fusing the two Germanys. West Germany is a federal union with an established admission to statehood process, constitutionally prescribed and actually employed for the incorporation of the Saarland in 1956. If the East German *Länder* were reconstituted, theoretically they could simply be absorbed into the Federal Republic by this procedure, as would Berlin (which is already designated a constituent *Land* under the *Grundgesetz,* although this stipulation has been rendered inapplicable by the Western allies). The necessity of creating a new system of governance could be obviated by this process. This option, naturally, is unacceptable to the East German and Soviet governments, but might be agreeable to both West Germany and the people of East Germany.

On the other hand, up to 1968 West Germany similarly could have been absorbed into East Germany, whose constitution of

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1949 presumed to apply to all of Germany; a decision to utilize this procedure would have made it unnecessary to set up a new governmental system. This option would have been patently unacceptable to both West Germany and her allies. The East German Constitution of 1968 does not claim universal German applicability and thus removes even this theoretical alternative.

Because the simple incorporation of one Germany into the other is an unlikely option, an entirely new, united German government will have to be designed. This seems to be the only negotiable alternative acceptable to all principal parties, provided the powers are able to agree to the principle of reunification and willing to accept the many important consequences that would ensue.

Policy options also exist concerning the nature of the amalgam to be created. Two basic institutional choices have already been alluded to, namely, a federation of the *Länder* and a confederation of West and East Germany. The third possibility—a unitary state—represents the most common political system in the world, is often preferred by communist countries, has previously existed in Germany, and might be the choice of the German people. The three Western allies and the Soviet Union could determine this matter as a precondition to their agreement to reunification. Decision on this matter would influence the resultant nature and location of political power within the German socio-political system and, therefore, would engender a proliferating series of sets of internal institutional suboptions and sub-suboptions. Moreover, preference on certain of these choices is integrally related to the alternative methods of amalgamation discussed above.

Still another series of options, also touched on earlier, relates to the problem of sequence, involving such elements as the process used to select the agents to form a governmental system, the procedure for devising the new government, the formal reunification action, and the conclusion of a peace treaty and disposition of the Eastern Territories. As previously noted, the views of the West and East concerning sequences differ markedly.

A final set of primary choices bears upon the alliance relations of a reunified Germany—which brings one full circle to the question of security policy. All governments intimately associated with the reunification question are bound to consider the alternatives —under each of the principal and secondary sets of options—in the light of the anticipated impact on each nation's security, as

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well as on the European power balance and political equilibrium. Consequently, an obvious and direct relationship exists between security and reunification policy.

The basic alliance alternatives are for the reunified Germany to become a partner in a Western alliance or in a communist pact, to seek to realign the power relations of Europe, or to remain unaligned. Neither the Federal Republic nor the Western allies would accept a reunification arrangement that portended Germany's affiliation with the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the Federal government has indicated that a unified Germany must be free to determine her own alliance and security policy. Since Germany, were she really free, might opt to affiliate with the Atlantic Alliance, it is inconceivable that the Soviet and East German regimes would willingly accept a reunification formula permitting this contingency.

Soviet consent to reunification, therefore, hinges materially on the defense policy of a reunited Germany. With this in mind, West Germany needs to contemplate the following fundamental choice: Is reunification worth nonalignment, which would leave Germany weak, or neutralization, which could leave her weaker still? Or is greater strength and sense of security through alignment with the Atlantic powers worth enduring the continued division of the country? Or is reunification achievable through European integration—and, if so, what kind of integration, at what cost?

This last point on reunification and security indicates the element of schizophrenia permeating much of West German defense and foreign policy. It is mentioned here less as a criticism of the policymaker than as a factor of analysis which, hopefully, will contribute to a better understanding of West Germany's painful policymaking problem. While this characteristic is by no means unique to the Federal Republic, and sometimes is more apparent than real, nevertheless it is sufficiently widespread to warrant a degree of skepticism respecting the viability of certain aspects of the West German policy options system. The following merely suggest some of the more serious juxtapositions:

(1) Desire peace and the averting of war in Europe in order to survive—while the unresolved German question, together with the Berlin problem, constitutes one of the most disquieting elements in European politics and most disturbing challenges to the maintenance of that peace and, therefore, demands early resolution.

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(2) Seek an acceptable security posture vis-à-vis the aggressive challenge of communist Eastern Europe—while keeping the West German security posture so controlled as to avert overreaction by Eastern Europe, which, in turn, diminishes the degree of security otherwise achievable by the Federal Republic.

(3) Acquire security assurance through partnership in NATO with U.S. participation and buttressed by American nuclear deterrence—while building closer relations with France, which seeks to eject the United States from Europe and attain an independent nuclear capability, and while seeking détente with the Soviet Union, which strives to undermine the Western coalition.

(4) Obtain nuclear protection, participate in a joint arrangement to secure such protection, and play an increasing nuclear role—while realizing that the more reliable the assurance becomes and the more actively the Federal Republic participates, the greater becomes the anxiety of the Soviet Union and East Germany, and, perhaps, of some of the Federal Republic's Western allies.

(5) Require a reunified Germany to be free to join the Western coalition—while soliciting East German and Soviet acquiescence to that reunification, a development which, under such conditions, would clearly contravene the latter's interests as they conceive them, and, therefore, would be unacceptable to them.

(6) Strive for the reunification of Germany as a stated primary goal—while pursuing certain other courses of action which have proven to be more readily attainable (for example, partnership in the Atlantic Alliance, nuclear protection and perhaps a voice in its management, a national military force, and integration with the West European powers) and which, in turn, render agreement to reunification less acceptable to the Soviet Union and East Germany.

(7) Continue to insist upon reunification as a pressing need and seek to prevent the West and the East from acquiescing in the status quo—while failing to propose a reunification formula that is agreeable to the Federal Republic and, at the same time, acceptable to the other principal parties as a basis for negotiations.

(8) Improve bilateral relations with East Germany by means of direct negotiations, pending reunification—while denying a separate legal status to the communist state, refusing to accord it diplomatic recognition, and contesting its acquisition of international status, which East Germany insists must be the basis for

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negotiating a reunification arrangement with the Federal Republic.

(9) Achieve complete integration of West Berlin into the Federal Republic as an integral and constituent *Land*—while retaining the advantages of the commitments by the four wartime powers respecting all Berlin which would terminate on full integration.

(10) Overcome the fears of Germany held by various European neighbors by promoting rapprochement and détente—while pursuing other policies that tend to enhance such anxieties.

(11) Exercise West German policy and diplomatic initiatives —while such action, entirely aside from the substance of the initiatives, tends to alienate both friends and opponents.

(12) Gain power and prestige commensurate with existing realities, in order to play an increasingly important international role—while trying to allay the fears of other powers concerning German political and military resurgence.

Conclusion

The foreign and defense policy system of the Federal Republic of Germany, like that of other countries, is composed of a network of goals and objectives, basic and subsidiary principles, national and vital interests, and major and minor options, paralleled by factual contingencies. Policy option selection obviously is not carried on in a vacuum, but relates to existing conditions and is determined in the context of the policies, actions and possible reactions of other powers. Governments are not really free and unlimited in their policymaking function. Instead, they "peel off" those elements for which solutions are seemingly negotiable, but the consequences of such action may be that other, and sometimes equally important, policies are rendered less negotiable.

Analysis concerning the primary and lesser options of the Federal Republic may be proliferated extensively; this treatment merely suggests the complexity and difficulty of the West German policy planner's task. On the basis of stated principles and courses of action taken by the West German government, it is clear that some policy option selections have been made and others are under way. To take full advantage of possible policy flexibility, however, it is necessary for the policymakers to project all potential options, assess their respective probabilities and merits, and establish both the optimal and the minimally acceptable priorities

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respecting their desirability and feasibility. Moreover, the results of such extrapolations need to be interrelated with one another in order to project their compatibility or incompatibility.

It seems clear that the Federal Republic has decided on its main options and some of its suboptions, but changing events will require reconsideration and adjustment of choices from time to time to keep its policy flexible and credible as new situations arise and as other powers modify their policies. Such changes, most likely, will pertain less to the main options than to the more precise suboptions. Because foreign relations do not become fixed or static, the process is a continuing one, and the review of options and contingency planning by the Federal government, therefore, also must be expected to be unending.

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THE CASE FOR U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO INDONESIA*

by Guy J. Pauker

THE strongest argument for economic aid to Indonesia is provided by the strategic interests of the United States. With a population of 115 million and a sense of "manifest destiny" in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, Indonesia could play a useful role in the future as a stabilizing factor in the area. A strong Indonesia could oppose politically and diplomatically Chinese attempts to establish hegemony in Southeast Asia and Soviet moves to assert supremacy in the Indian Ocean. She could also make military manpower available to the smaller countries of Southeast Asia in support of a purely regional system of collective security.

While Indonesia, like the rest of Asia, must continue to rely on American nuclear sea and air power to deter possible Chinese aggression of a nuclear or large-scale conventional variety, she could in time assist her neighbors to defend themselves against guerrilla warfare, subversion and insurgency. The Indonesian Army has had considerable experience and success in security operations during the past twenty years. But Indonesia's contribution to the stability of Southeast Asia will depend on whether her current economic crisis is overcome, and whether she remains under the control of the present dominant political forces dedicated to constructive economic partnership with the West.

I

Temporary political stability has been achieved with the elimination of the Sukarno regime and the appointment of General Suharto as President for a period of five years. Elections have been rescheduled for 1971, to allow enough time for political

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

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reconstruction. Of the major parties that emerged as leading forces in the September 1955 elections, two have disappeared: the Masjumi Party was banned in 1960 and the Communist Party (PKI) was destroyed in 1966. The other two, the Nahdatul Ulama and the Nationalist Party, have been greatly weakened by their extensive cooperation with Sukarno; they will have to find rational and modernizing younger leaders before they can again play a major role in the political life of Indonesia. Alternatively, the reconstruction of the party system may occur as a regrouping of existing political forces into new programmatic parties.

The most serious political problem in Indonesia today is harnessing the younger generation for constructive participation in the political system. The country's only major achievement since independence has been in education. The generation born since the end of World War II is literate and socially mobilized. Hundreds of thousands have some schooling above the elementary level; tens of thousands have been through the universities. Student groups, which are called the "generation of 1966," played an important part in the downfall of the Sukarno regime. At first they enthusiastically supported Suharto's "new order." But the lack of tangible improvement in the economic, social and moral life of the country is responsible for the growing alienation of this generation from their middle-aged elders, who are now in power.

At present the discontent of the youth is primarily expressed in democratic radicalism or in a return to religion, manifested increasingly as moralistic fanaticism. Unless the "new order" succeeds in giving the country a sense of progress, there is serious danger that within a few years the nation's youth will be polarized at the two extremes of the political spectrum. The radical democrats may become the leaders of the secularized rural and urban underprivileged elements from which the nucleus of a new communist movement could be recruited. This time the Indonesian extreme left may avoid the errors of the PKI: instead of building a gradualist mass party, they might create a revolutionary party of cadres with a paramilitary capability designed for guerrilla warfare in accordance with Maoist principles, and possibly with material support from China. The increasingly intransigent younger Moslem elements could in turn become the nucleus of a terroristic movement, similar to the Middle Eastern Moslem Brotherhood, nihilistic in its political objectives and capable of

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destroying the weak fabric of Indonesia's governmental structure.

A simultaneous attack on the regime from both extremes is quite conceivable—as happened in the Weimar Republic—due to hyperinflation, government ineptitude, and destruction of the value system which sanctioned the legitimacy of the moderate political forces. An Indonesia plagued by such political convulsions would not be a stabilizing force in Southeast Asia. Indeed, internal chaos could lead to external aggression. While nobody can guarantee that a prosperous and stable Indonesia would be peace-loving, the likelihood of external diversions is greater if the country finds it impossible to manage its internal crises successfully. Industrial weakness would not necessarily prevent an Indonesian government, faced with domestic turmoil, from embarking on foreign adventures, especially if the Western presence in Southeast Asia is reduced in the 1970's.

II

It is difficult to conceive how the consolidation of the present regime and the integration of the younger generation into the national community can be achieved without economic stabilization and development. The needs of all classes are too great, the Malthusian race between population and resources too tight, and the expectations of the younger, educated generation too high to allow us to assume that Indonesia can absorb, without major convulsions, an extended period of acute economic deprivation that holds no promise of growth. Much of what needs to be done to overcome the present economic stagnation requires no foreign assistance and may indeed not be amenable to external intervention, but it is also clear that the present effort of the Indonesian government cannot succeed without sustained external help. After twenty-five years of mismanagement the Indonesian economy is not capable of yielding the surplus necessary for economic growth. The technical resources within the country are not sufficient to provide the leadership and skills needed for modernization.

The policy of the United States after the upheaval of October 1965 was initially correct, responding sensitively to the needs of a government engaged in a gruesome security operation against a communist movement whose leaders had previously claimed up to twenty million sympathizers. The new Indonesian government was aided in its efforts to establish its domestic legitimacy by

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scrupulously avoiding giving the impression that it was manipulated from abroad. Therefore, as long as General Suharto was maneuvering to establish his position as President, the "low profile" posture adopted by the United States was entirely appropriate. But the time has come to review the adequacy of our policy in the light of our long-term interests in Asia, which dictate the creation of a balance of power based on strong and prosperous countries along the borders of China.

We cannot examine here the harm a communist takeover in Indonesia would have done to our interests and the resources we would have had to spend to counter the strategic implications of a Chinese-Indonesian or Soviet-Indonesian partnership. But we should consider the relationship of post-Sukarno Indonesia to U.S. efforts in Viet Nam, Laos and Thailand, and to our desire to reduce U.S. ground forces in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. economic aid commitment to Indonesia for the calendar year 1968 was $110 million as our part of the multilateral effort initiated in 1966, plus an additional commitment for $50 million in P.L.480 wheat and bulgur, of which only $35 million was expended due to an exceptionally good Indonesian rice crop last year. For the calendar year 1969 our maximum commitment for economic aid will be $120 million plus a fair share of a food aid program of $135 million. If one looks at Southeast Asia as a regional system whose security and stability are in the U.S. national interest, it is difficult to explain why the level of expenditure considered appropriate for Indonesia has been restricted to less than one per cent of the cost of our security expenditures on the mainland. Our ultimate objectives would not be achieved if we succeeded on the mainland but failed in the islands.

The level of aid for Indonesia's current stabilization program was determined by the collective judgment of International Monetary Fund, World Bank, American and Indonesian experts as the *minimum* amount of external support necessary to cover the deficits in the balance of payments and the national budget. But the process by which that level of aid was determined was dictated by political rather than technical considerations. First the experts decided how much aid could realistically be expected from the donor countries, and then an economic program was set up. In other words, the program was dictated by the budget, not the budget by the program.

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The results are beginning to show. The Indonesian government is increasingly handicapped by lack of resources, beyond the absolute minimum required to keep things going at current levels of effort. The expectations and enthusiasm that prevailed after the establishment of the Suharto regime have given way to a feeling of helplessness. The apathy that characterized Indonesia in the past is setting in again.

For reasons I cannot explain, Indonesia (like other less-developed countries after an initial outburst of optimism associated with independence) shows behavioral symptoms comparable to those of individuals suffering from mental depression: apathy, inability to do jobs requiring a lot of human energy but little capital inputs, lack of concern about the maintenance or improvement of the existing capital stock, a sense of helplessness and futility. Her essential problem today is to find ways to release national energy, enlist popular participation, and transform existing but passive public and private institutions into vigorous instruments of social action.

The main question to be answered concerning aid to Indonesia is: how can our current program, and supplemental aid to be obtained from Congress in the future, spark the release of national energy and thus help Indonesia to move from a stabilization program toward a relatively rapid, visible, development program?

It is wrong to assume that Indonesian society is so primitive that we must build institutions for them from scratch, or that their agricultural know-how is so rudimentary that they are unfamiliar with recent technological innovations. The anthropological research done in the early 1950's by the M.I.T.-sponsored Modjokuto Project in East Java showed that the peasants are capable of sophisticated agriculture and that Indonesian society is a complex fabric of institutions, based on popular participation. What seemed to be lacking fifteen years ago was precisely the drive, the release of energy, that would give life to existing institutions. What has never been attempted in Indonesia is systematic elimination of the bottlenecks that prevent farmers from using the most advanced state of the art to wipe out the country's perennial food deficit.

A large number of highly qualified experts working under the auspices of IMF, IBRD, ILO, AID, the Asian Development Bank, the Harvard Advisory Service and other external sources of expertise are helping the Indonesians with valuable studies at the

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macro-economic level. I am convinced that Indonesia's problems cannot be solved without an equally competent effort at the micro-economic, sociological and anthropological level. But with the exception of M.I.T.'s Modjokuto Project no systematic studies of Indonesian culture and society have been conducted. Without such micro-analyses we will not be able to help Indonesia to break out of her current state of collective depression.

III

In view of the fact that the Indonesian Army is now politically in control and responsible for the future of the country, it may be worth exploring whether an imaginative new effort on our part, enlisting the support of the most qualified social scientists available in the United States and in the other countries participating in the Inter-Governmental Group for assistance to Indonesia, could be linked to the army's civic action program. Although little has been done to translate words into reality, the doctrine of the Indonesian Army stresses the necessity of enlisting popular support in the defense of the country against external and internal threats. The army is seriously interested in improving its relations with the population as well as in contributing to national development through civic action.

This good intention has failed to produce operations on a meaningful scale due to three factors: the overall state of collective depression characterizing the national psyche; lack of adequate material resources; and lack of sophisticated understanding of ways to achieve an improved relationship between the military and the people. It may be possible to overcome the mental obstacles to development by an injection of hope, provided by the knowledge that truly adequate material resources and the technical know-how required to do the job will be made available.

The United States is already contributing, on a modest scale, material resources to the civic action program. With the cooperation of the Indonesian military, we should help Indonesian social scientists to conduct economic and sociological-anthropological, operationally oriented, research which would guide the local authorities and the foreign countries providing aid in their efforts to mobilize the population and release its latent energies. We can legitimately argue that only on the basis of findings from this research would it make sense to increase the level of assistance to

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the army's civic action program. With luck it might still be possible to generate a countrywide movement of Indonesian national regeneration in which the military, the bureaucracy and the young generation would all participate.

For twenty years the United States has invested substantial educational and financial resources to create area experts so that Washington would have intellectual resources to draw on in case of need. Indonesia offers a concrete case today to test the value of this national investment. The opportunity exists, in a country anxiously calling for our help, to attempt to provide scientific answers to policy questions. We are fortunate in that the Indonesian economists and social scientists with whom we are now cooperating in the host country have been educated and trained largely in America or by Americans.

Together with the Indonesians, employing adequate material and intellectual resources, the United States should attempt to discover whether and how the national energy of a less-developed country can be released and economic programs can be turned into a popular movement, without the need for charismatic demagogues and agitational politics, but relying on the self-interest and common sense of the people.

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OKINAWA REVERSION AS AN ISSUE IN JAPANESE POLITICS*

by Young C. Kim

A REVERSION of administrative rights over Okinawa[1] to the Japanese government has become one of the most controversial and central issues in Japan. Reversion is desired by the overwhelming majority of both the Japanese and Okinawans, and is basically motivated by nationalistic feelings.[2] Both peoples share a sense of impatience and indignation over the prolonged alien rule of the islands. In the case of Okinawans, their desire to be reunited with the Fatherland is reinforced by accumulated grievances toward what they consider are distasteful features and practices of American administration, plus a vague sense of anxiety over U.S. base operations, especially those connected with U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. The demand for reversion is buttressed by a widely-shared belief that the legal basis for U.S. administration of the islands has been eroded, if not totally undermined. To most Okinawans, none of the usual apologias for U.S. administration appear relevant or convincing, whether these are based on economic benefits accrued to the local populace, the sufferings sustained while under Japanese rule, or the vital importance of the Okinawan bases to Japanese and Far Eastern security.

What makes the reversion question a delicate and explosive issue in Japanese politics is the bearing it is deemed to have on the U.S.-Japanese security treaty which comes up for renewal in 1970.

*The opinions expressed in this article are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as reflecting those of the Research Analysis Corporation or any of its sponsors.

[1]The Ryukyu Islands are comprised of four groups of islands (*gunto*): Amami Gunto, Okinawa Gunto, Miyako Gunto and Yaeyama Gunto. Of the four, Amami was returned to Japan in 1953. Following Japanese practice, the term Okinawa is used by the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands to refer to all the Ryukyus—encompassing Okinawa Gunto, Miyako Gunto and Yaeyama Gunto. It will be so used in this study unless otherwise noted.

[2]*Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), October 17, 1967, p. 9; Ryukyu Shimpo Sha, *Okinawa no Seron* (*Okinawa's Public Opinion*), August 1967; Tsujimura Akira, "Okinawa no Seron" ("Okinawa's Public Opinion"), *Ushio,* November 1967, pp. 158-175; *Asahi Shimbun,* April 19, 1967 (evening), pp. 1-7; *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 23, 1967, pp. 1-4, and October 3, 1967, pp. 1-2; Shimabukuro Hiroshi, "Okinawa Seron no motomeru Mono" ("Things Desired by Okinawa's Public Opinion"), *Sekai,* November 1967, pp. 41-49.

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Whether or not the two concerns are logically related, all the political parties consider the reversion issue a matter critically affecting future Japanese security policy. For the left-wing opposition parties (the Communist and Socialist Parties) the reversion question constitutes a means by which to challenge the efficacy of the present security arrangement with the United States, thus creating conditions that could lead to the eventual downfall of the Liberal Democratic Party government. For the government, the issue presents an opportunity as well as a hazard, enabling it to defend its conception of security requirements for Japan and perhaps strengthen the existing level of armament.

With respect to the United States, reversion is an issue that could have a profound and far-reaching impact on U.S.-Japanese relations as well as on U.S. security requirements and capabilities in Asia. This is a matter transcending the intrinsic merits or demerits of Okinawan bases. The timing and kind of settlement the United States may accept for reversion can significantly affect future security trends in Japan.

This article deals with the views the Japanese political parties hold regarding the question of Okinawan reversion.[3] Its purpose is to present party positions on various aspects of the reversion question and the assumptions on which these are based. It attempts

[3]The following table shows the number of Diet seats held by parties as of July 31, 1968 and the percentage of popular votes each party received in the last House of Representatives election in January 1967.

DIET SEATS (JULY 1968)

	House of Councillors	*House of Representatives*	*Percentage of Popular Vote (January 1967)*
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	137	273	48.80
Socialist Party (SP)	65	137	27.89
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	24	31	7.40
Komei Party (KP)	10	25	5.38
Communist Party (CP)	7	5	4.76
Independent and Others	7	5	
Vacancy	0	10	
	250	486	

In Japan minority parties exercise power far out of proportion to their respective strength in the Diet. The factors that severely limit the LDP's strength include a cultural norm which calls for decision-making by consensus; a low degree of commitment to parliamentary processes on the part of all parties; intense interparty conflict deepened by ideological cleavages, and intense intraparty strife especially in the case of the governing party, LDP.

Factional strife within the LDP is invariably injected into the party's discussion of any major or controversial policy issue. The opposition parties often manage to present a united front vis-à-vis the LDP government. This, coupled with the factors specified above, inhibits (psychologically and politically, if not legally) full use of the LDP majority.

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primarily to explain why a specific party advocates a particular reversion formula; in other words, to identify the motivations, as well as the assumptions, underlying each party's formula.

The rationale for focusing on party views is that they reflect and articulate divergent opinions expressed on the reversion issue in Japan and indicate the relative distribution of these opinions and their political significance. Party views may be considered as outlining the possibilities for, as well as constraints upon, the Japanese government, and as constituting a component of "the internal setting" within which Japanese policymakers must make decisions.

The data used are of three kinds: primary documentary sources, such as the minutes of Diet proceedings and party publications; books and newspapers; and interviews the author had with Japanese and Okinawan officials and party leaders during June-September 1967.

The Socialist Party

The Socialist Party publicly advocates "immediate, total reversion with all bases removed," meaning not nuclear bases alone but *all* types of bases.[4] However, it should not be inferred from this official statement that the party is opposed to total reversion with the bases attaining the status of those in Japan proper. SP leaders have intimated in public and confirmed in private that they would not object to a total reversion formula which would make the bases similar to those in Japan.[5]

The SP is sensitive to a charge that its insistence on the elimination of all bases is likely to impede reversion—of whatever variety—and thus runs counter to general Okinawan sentiment. The Okinawans place far greater priority on reversion than on the

[4]Kawasaki Kanji, "Ichioku no Kokumin no Te de" ("By the Hands of 100 Million People"), *Sekai,* August 1967, pp. 55-61; *Asahi Shimbun,* September 6, 1967, p. 1. The phrase *total* reversion is used in contradistinction to partial reversion, understood in terms of either geographical or functional reversion of administrative rights.

All political parties in Japan assume that nuclear weapons are present in Okinawa. The U.S. government has maintained silence on this question, neither confirming nor denying the Japanese assumption. Since the Japanese consider the issue of nuclear weapons an integral aspect of the reversion question, these views are discussed here. Their inclusion should not be interpreted as acceptance by the author of Japanese assumptions regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.

[5]*Sangiin Okinawa Mondai To ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai Kaigiroku* (*Minutes of Proceedings of the Special Committee on Okinawa Problem, etc., House of Councillors* [hereafter referred to as *HC Special Committee*]), June 28, 1967, p. 10.

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disposition of bases. Aside from the desire not to alienate Okinawans, the SP's ambivalence is due in part to the fact that it cannot publicly come out in favor of the idea of Japan-like bases without contradicting its stand on abrogation of the Security Treaty and elimination of bases in Japan proper. There is a feeling on the part of some members that one cannot make a strong case for reversion if one concedes the need for bases.[6] Thus, the SP's public stand on reversion is presumably based on the rationale that any Japanese proposal for Japan-like bases at this time might invite the danger of a U.S. counterdemand for "reversion with nuclear bases" or "reversion with free use of bases."[7]

In appraising the SP's reversion formula properly, one must understand the party's more fundamental attitude toward the Okinawa issue. Perusal of SP literature over the past several years discloses that for the SP the Okinawa question constitutes a relatively insignificant issue; it is merely a part of, or a specific instance of, the larger SP struggle for abrogation of the Security Treaty and elimination of the bases. The demand for the reversion of administrative rights is presented nearly always in such terms and is usually accompanied by other demands, for example, an end to the American "aggression" in Viet Nam.[8]

This is not to imply that the SP fails to view the Okinawa question as one involving the principle of national self-determination or irredentism. Neither does it imply that the SP is indifferent to the well-being and sufferings of Okinawans.[9] The party's members are as susceptible to nationalistic sentiments as any other Japanese. But their open approach to the question has rarely been presented in terms of indignation about alien rule over their compatriots or desire for the recovery of a lost piece of territory.

The SP's premise is that the United States has no legal right to maintain its control over Okinawa. Members contend with varying degrees of conviction that Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace (1951)[10] violates the Charter of the United Nations and has

[6] *Ryukyu Shimpo* (Naha), August 28, 1967, p. 1.

[7] *Asahi Shimbun*, September 5, 1967, p. 1.

[8] *Gekkan Shakaito* (Central Theoretical Organ of Japan Socialist Party), March 1966, pp. 34, 50.

[9] *HC Special Committee*, May 19, 1967, pp. 2-6.

[10] Article 3 grants the United States "the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction" over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu and other islands, until these islands are placed under the UN trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority. Article 3 also stipulates that Japan will concur in any U.S. proposal to place the islands under the UN trusteeship system.

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become void because of Japan's entry into the UN.[11] In their view, the Japanese government should approach the reversion question from this basic premise instead of begging for the return of administrative rights, thereby leaving the matter to Washington's good will and consideration.

Until recently, however, the SP had not pressed the issue, in part because of its assessment that Washington would not even agree to discuss it. An examination of the minutes of Diet Committees on Foreign Affairs and Budget since 1960 fails to uncover any serious discussion of reversion by the SP—or by any of the other parties, for that matter. In the SP platform announced on the eve of the January 1967 general election, the issue of reversion was buried in a paragraph constituting a sub-sub-section with the heading "Peaceful Resolution of the Vietnam War."[12] The Diet debate on the question began to take place around June 1967. Then, in line with a generally heightened level of popular interest and agitation, SP members, along with members of other opposition parties, began to prod the government to tackle this problem frontally in order to secure the return of Okinawa.[13] Some SP Diet members took the position that the time was ripe for making vigorous representation to the United States. They share with others in and out of the Diet the view that "changes" in U.S. Far Eastern strategy and developments in weapons systems have reduced the utility of Okinawan bases. They argue that stationary nuclear bases would be vulnerable in view of Communist Chinese nuclear development; the United States has already deployed about seven Polaris submarines in the Pacific with their bases in Guam, and Thailand now provides bases for B-52's. These factors, they believe, provide an objective condition favorable to reversion.[14]

[11]Most frequently Article 78 is mentioned: "The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." Another related legal contention of the SP is that Article 3 of the Peace Treaty contravenes the Japanese Constitution. See *HC Special Committee,* July 14, 1967, p. 2; Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 56; *Gekkan Shakaito,* March 1966, p. 140; Kimura Kihachiro, *Sosenkyo ni nozomu Shakaito no Juten Seisaku* (*Major Policy Positions of Socialist Party for the Approaching General Election*) (Getsuyokai Repoto), January 10, 1967, p. 10.

[12]*Gekkan Shakaito,* December 1966, pp. 11-15.

[13]*Sangiin Gaimu Iinkai Kaigiroku* (*Minutes of Proceedings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Councillors*), May 16, 1967, pp. 6-7; *HC Special Committee,* June 9, 1967, pp. 6-7; *Okinawa Mondai To ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai Giroku* (*Shugiin*) (*Minutes of Proceedings of the Special Committee on Okinawa Problem, etc., House of Representatives* [hereafter referred to as *HR Special Committee*]), May 2, 1967, pp. 6-8, and July 21, 1967, p. 2.

[14]*HR Special Committee,* June 7, 1967, pp. 5-7.

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Awareness of growing American flexibility and a mellowing of the U.S. position have been most influential in shaping the Japanese attitude. SP members in general share this feeling of optimism and a belief that the United States can ill afford outright rejection of Japan's demand for reversion,[15] although some have observed in private that U.S. agreement would not be possible as long as the Viet Nam war lasts. Others, who judge the U.S.-Communist China confrontation to be at the root of the problem, have voiced doubts that reversion would occur until this confrontation comes to an end.

In campaigning for reversion, the SP views popular agitation, of increasing intensity and scope, as fundamentally important. In sharp reproof of the then Foreign Minister Miki, an SP member asserted—incorrectly—at a session of the House of Representatives' Special Committee on the Okinawa Problem that there is no precedent in the history of mankind where a colony was returned or a military base withdrawn voluntarily; such a development had always been preceded either by bloodshed or peaceful, yet intense, national movements. He added that he was by no means envisaging or referring to a bloody reversion struggle, but Okinawa would not return to the Japanese fold without a massive nationwide movement.[16]

As SP members see it, the major impediment to total reversion is the issue of free use of the Okinawan bases, particularly for nuclear weapons. As one of them remarked in exasperation, "Okinawa will not return [to Japan] unless Japan recognizes nuclear bases or the U.S. withdraws them. . . . There is no other way." He observed elsewhere that the crux of the matter is that, under the present arrangement, the United States is spared the need for prior consultations, including those governing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa.[17]

The SP is convinced that the government is using the reversion issue to strengthen support for its conception of security requirements. Former SP Chairman Katsumata, for example, repeatedly asserted that the government was manipulating public opinion to facilitate acceptance of the presence of nuclear bases.[18] The SP's suspicion was magnified by the contents of the Johnson-

[15] *HC Special Committee,* May 19, 1967, pp. 1-2.
[16] *HR Special Committee,* June 7, 1967, p. 12; *Asahi Shimbun,* November 30, 1967, p. 2.
[17] *HR Special Committee,* May 16, 1967, p. 4, and June 28, 1967, p. 10.
[18] *Mainichi Shimbun,* October 7, 1967, p. 1; *Asahi Shimbun,* September 24, 1967, p. 1, and November 23, 1967, p. 2.

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Sato communiqué and a series of remarks Prime Minister Sato made in and out of the Diet after his return from Washington in the fall of 1967. On December 17, 1967 Katsumata went a little further in observing that the government is apparently inclined to accept nuclear bases in Japan proper and is using the reversion issue to "nuclearize" the existing U.S.-Japan security arrangements.[19]

This leads one to the question why the SP opposes the presence of nuclear bases or otherwise free use of bases. Its opposition is consistent with its position on the Security Treaty and related issues in Japan. It is fully conscious of the pervasive popular aversion toward nuclear weapons. It is also aware of Communist China's sensitivity to Okinawan bases and accepts as valid a view that the nuclear bases, in particular, constitute a serious provocation to Peking. Any meaningful move toward the normalization of relations with Communist China and toward the conclusion of a nonaggression pact must proceed from the abolition of the Okinawan bases. This is a logical corollary of the SP premise that it is "the aggressive and imperialistic policies" of the United States which form the basis for tensions in Asia. Also, there is an SP estimate—not shared by all members of the party—that the U.S. bases could involve Japan in an unnecessary war. Such a development might occur in this way. The Okinawan bases, especially the nuclear ones, would be a target for retaliatory actions by adversaries. U.S. retention of nuclear bases in Okinawa *after* total reversion would be viewed by other nations as indicating Japan's decision to introduce nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. The vulnerability of Japan to retaliatory attacks is said to be acute whenever an armed conflict to which the United States is a party takes place. Even if retaliatory attacks were to be limited to Okinawa, SP reasoning goes, Japan would necessarily become involved in a war because Okinawa, when reverted, would come within the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Japan would be obligated under Article V to regard an armed attack on U.S. military installations on Okinawa as "dangerous to its own peace and safety" and to "act to meet the common danger."[20]

The alleged danger of Japan's involvement in a war is thought by the SP to be serious and probable in view of the U.S. military

[19] *Mainichi Shimbun*, December 17, 1967, p. 2.
[20] Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57; *HR Special Committee*, June 28, 1967, pp. 7-11; *Asahi Shimbun*, September 24, 1967, p. 1, November 23, 1967, p. 2, November 24, 1967, p. 2.

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treaties with South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. In its opinion, U.S. utilization of Okinawan bases in connection with the security problems of any one of these countries would give rise to such a danger. Okinawa, as it is now under U.S. administration, is covered by these treaties. Reversion would not significantly lessen the risk to Japan, because in the case of the ANZUS Pact and the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the scope of treaty application includes not only the island territories under the jurisdiction of the contracting parties (e.g., Okinawa), but also the armed forces, public vessels and aircraft in the Pacific (e.g., U.S. armed forces in Okinawa). Okinawa would in effect remain within the "territory" covered by these treaties, unless, of course, the U.S. military presence is terminated upon reversion. U.S. use of Okinawan bases after reversion would continue to present the danger of Japan's eventual involvement, although the enforcement of a stringent interpretation governing prior consultation in Okinawa might reduce the extent of that danger. In either case, the SP contends, a *de facto* NEATO, completed by the Japan-Korea Treaty (1965), would be operative.[21]

The SP's major objection to a formula that envisages reversion with the United States guaranteed free use of bases is that the Okinawan case would be a breakthrough leading to the nuclearization of Japan proper. That is, the Japanese government would allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan and free use of the homeland bases. Following reversion, the Self Defense Forces would be sent to Okinawa. In the SP view, these forces could be used to suppress anti-base movements and other struggles of renovationist parties, thus helping to perpetuate the U.S. military presence. Moreover, the need to defend Okinawa would give the government a pretext to increase the level of the Self Defense Forces and/or otherwise strengthen Japan's military capabilities. The SP is deeply troubled by the specter of NEATO and the implications for domestic and international politics of collaboration between "a militaristic, imperialistic Japan" and the United States in implementing a joint strategy of containment of Communist China.[22]

The SP attitude toward partial reversion—for example, one involving the return of control over education—must also be noted. This idea was from the beginning thought to be no more than a trick on the part of the Japanese government to deceive the

[21] *HR Special Committee*, June 28, 1967, pp. 7-11.
[22] *Ibid.* See also *Gekkan Shakaito*, March 1966, pp. 30-36, 139-141.

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public. The SP leadership suspects that such a formula was discarded by the Sato Government because of U.S. objection.[23] In private conversations with me in the autumn of 1967, some SP members indicated that they would welcome the return of any portion of administrative rights over Okinawa on a piecemeal basis, so long as the prospects for complete reversion were clearly set. They were concerned that gradual reversion may make the existing political and socio-economic conditions in Okinawa a bit more palatable and create an illusion of approaching reversion, while in fact the date of total reversion is being continually postponed.[24]

The Communist Party

The Communist Party's reversion formula[25] calls for "immediate, unconditional, total reversion with all bases removed." The word *unconditional* is meant to emphasize CP insistence on "total reversion with complete removal of bases," thereby highlighting its opposition to any other formulae. Although the word *immediate* is used, the CP sees little prospect for an early return of Okinawa to Japan. It expects a struggle of long duration because it does not contemplate any LDP government pressing for the kind of total reversion it advocates. Instead, it envisages that total reversion can be accomplished only by establishing a united front coalition government among opposition parties. Presumably, then, the CP's "struggle" on the reversion question is directed toward facilitating the establishment of such a coalition

[23] *HC Special Committee,* June 9, 1967, p. 7.

[24] Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 56; *HR Special Committee,* June 7, 1967, p. 11.

[25] In the preparation of this section, the following sources were used: Ueda Koichiro, "Mujoken Henkan no Yokyu ni Tatte" ("Standing on the Demand for Unconditional Reversion"), *Sekai,* August 1967, pp. 72-77; Nihon Kyosanto Chuo Iinkai Shuppanbu, editor and publisher, *Okinawa-Ogasawara Mondai to Nihon Kyosanto* (*Okinawa-Ogasawara Problem and Japan Communist Party*), 1966, especially pp. 16-24, 68-77, 110-195; Takayasu Shigemasa, "Okinawa Kaiho Toso to Toitsu Sensen" ("Okinawa Liberation Struggle and a United Front"), *Zen'ei* (Central Theoretical Organ of the Central Committee of Japan Communist Party), September 1963, pp. 26-35; *Zen'ei,* January 1965 (Rinji Zokan), pp. 38-45, 116-119; Matsumoto San'eki, "Okinawa-Ogasawara Henkan Toso no Hatten no Tame ni" ("For the Development of a Struggle for the Reversion of Okinawa-Ogasawara"), *Zen'ei,* October 1965, pp. 111-118; Kawabata Osamu, "Okinawa no 'Kakukichi tsuki Henkan' Ron to yu Beinichi Hando Seiryoku no Atarashi Boryaku" ("The Idea of 'Reversion With Nuclear Bases Attached', New Intrigue of US-Japan Reactionary Forces"), *Zen'ei,* October 1967. In addition, the following works were consulted: Makise Tsuneji, *Okinawa Henkan Undo* (*Okinawa Reversion Movement*), 1967; Okinawa-Ogasawara Henkan Domei, editor, *Okinawa Kokusho* (*Okinawa Black Paper*), 1967; Nihon Heiwa Iinkai, editor, *Nihon no Kokusho* (*Japan's Black Paper*), 1967—all three published by Rodo Jumposha, Tokyo.

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government in the long run, and, meanwhile, preventing "a reversion with free use of bases."

Communist Party writings on the Okinawa problem contain generous references to statements made by high-ranking American officials, all intended to emphasize how valuable Okinawa is to the United States. Having "documented" Okinawa's importance, the literature goes on to discuss the role of the bases. According to the CP view, Okinawa serves as the most important base of U.S. aggression in Asia. Specific countries listed as targets of alleged American aggression include Viet Nam, North Korea and Communist China. Reference to the latter is frequent, replete with charges that Okinawa is a base primarily intended for U.S. containment of, and eventual aggression against, China. Also, the role of Okinawa is variously described as being a politico-military keystone of "a Northeast Asia treaty organization" (NEATO), serving as a base for suppressing present and future national liberation movements and insuring American domination of Asians. Okinawa is claimed to constitute a prop for the "government of monopoly capital" subservient to the United States and a base for suppressing the "people's struggle for independence, democracy and peace in Japan proper."

The CP believes that American nuclear striking capability relies on Polaris submarines and B-52's (based elsewhere in Guam and Thailand) rather than on nuclear weapons based in Okinawa. Improvements in American military technology and advances in Chinese nuclear capabilities would further reduce the value of Okinawa as a nuclear base. Despite this, however, the CP believes that Okinawa's overall importance remains, and should U.S. strategy call for the absorption of a Chinese first-strike capability by Japan proper and Okinawa, its importance to the United States would continue.

For the CP, the question of reversion assumes significance because of its relevance to the "independence, security, and neutrality of Japan." The demand for reversion constitutes—with other demands such as a ban on port calls by nuclear-powered vessels and an end to U.S. "aggression" in Viet Nam—only a part of the CP's main struggle for nullification of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty and of the Security Treaty.

Although the CP insists upon its own formula, it declares that it is neither oblivious to nor inclined to reject automatically the "partial demands" of Okinawans (e.g., for the abolition of travel

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restrictions). Such demands would purport to improve political, economic and social conditions in Okinawa. It should be noted, however, that the CP does oppose a "partial reversion formula," which it labels as "phased" or "serial" reversion. It is "absolutely opposed to" such a formula ostensibly because CP acceptance would connote approval of American imperialism.

CP opposition to "phased reversion" in general, and especially to the separation formula, is based on the following set of assertions: it would give the people an illusion of early reversion, while in fact delaying it; it would help to suppress the people's struggle and weaken the movement for total reversion, causing a split among the ranks of "democratic forces"; it would strengthen the present colonial military domination of U.S. "occupational authorities" and increase the security of bases, and it would facilitate nuclearization of American bases in Japan proper and nuclear armament of the Self Defense Forces. As a result, the U.S.-Japan military alliance would be strengthened; Japan's participation in the execution of American imperialist policies would be assured, and the revival of Japanese militarism and imperialism would be given further impetus.

The CP's criticism of the formula of "total reversion with nuclear bases attached" is expressed in similar terms. As the party sees it, this plan has been advanced in defense of the Security Treaty and Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, and is designed to perpetuate the American "occupation." It would split the democratic camp and serve as a breakthrough to the nuclearization of Japan. The Self Defense Forces, when dispatched to Okinawa, would be used to suppress the people's struggle, thereby forming a *de facto* military component of NEATO, and could possibly be deployed overseas.

The CP views an unconditional reversion of Okinawa as impossible without abolishing the "U.S.-Japan military alliance." It therefore believes that expansion and intensification of a popular movement to overthrow the "San Francisco Regime"[26] is the single most powerful instrument to be used toward reversion. This, however, does not obviate the fact that it is the abolition of

[26]In the CP's view, the San Francisco system was created by collaboration between "American imperialism and Japan's monopoly capital" and has been institutionalized by a series of treaties, such as the Peace Treaty (signed in San Francisco in September 1951 by forty-eight nations, hence the label "San Francisco Regime") and the Security Treaty. It is described as "anti-Communist, anti-China, and anti-Soviet Union" and as insuring "U.S. oppression and exploitation of Japanese people" and Japan's subservience to the United States.

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the San Francisco Regime which is the CP's primary goal. In the CP's view, a government based on a coalition of "democratic" forces would emerge through the movement, and such a coalition government alone would be capable of demanding unconditional reversion from the United States.

The Democratic Socialist Party

The DSP formula calls for total reversion with the bases in Okinawa subject to the prior consultation clause, as applied in the case of Japan proper. The DSP is thus opposed to retention of nuclear bases on Okinawa and to other features of so-called free use, such as freedom to launch combat military operations from these bases.[27] It envisages an eventual removal of all U.S. troops. This is consistent with the party's proposed revision of the Security Treaty.[28]

For the DSP, the fact that fellow Japanese nationals are still under alien domination is a matter of fundamental and overriding importance;[29] the issue of reversion is not simply an instrument to be seized upon to promote the party's own conception of security policy versus that of the government. This is not to say that the DSP is unaware of the interrelationship between the Security Treaty and the reversion issue. It is aware that the existing security arrangement began concurrently with the Peace Treaty which determined the status of Okinawa, and that Japan's security policy affects the prospects of reversion. The point here is that its interest in the reversion question per se is far stronger than that shown by other parties.

DSP advocacy of reversion is often accompanied by the observation that the United States would not be able to maintain peace in Asia without Japan's cooperation, and that early reversion of Okinawa would be beneficial to both countries. Party leaders ascribe U.S. reluctance to relinquish administrative rights over Okinawa to Washington's desire to maintain free use of the bases.[30] But as they see it, the U.S. assessment of the value of

[27]The official statement is found in *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 24, 1967, p. 2. The principal source for this section is Nagasue Eiichi, "Okinawa to Ampo" ("Okinawa and Security"), *Sekai*, August 1967, pp. 62-66.

[28]It advocates withdrawal in principle of U.S. bases from Japan and an "emergency stationing" of U.S. armed forces. See "Anzen Hosho to Boei ni kansuru waga To no Kihon Hoshin" ("The Basic Guideline of Our Party concerning Defense"), *Seisaku to Toron*, Minshu Shakai To Seisaku Shingikai, editor, October 1966, pp. 14-20.

[29]See *HR Special Committee*, July 21, 1967, pp. 2-3.

[30]*Ibid.*, June 28, 1967, p. 12.

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Okinawan bases is open to question. They concede the usefulness of these bases to the United States in carrying out its Far Eastern strategy, but consider them not particularly important to Japan's security. In their opinion, the strategic value of Okinawa as a nuclear base has decreased considerably due to such factors as the development of the ICBM (the Minuteman in particular), deployment of Polaris submarines in Far Eastern waters, and Communist Chinese development of hydrogen bombs and the MRBM. DSP leaders believe that MACE B's are rapidly becoming obsolete anyway, and that the nuclear warheads of the Nike Hercules can be shorn off without jeopardizing their defensive function. In short, they discount Okinawa as a nuclear base, asserting that it can no longer function as a deterrent. As to its importance to the United States as a relay, training and supply base, this too will decrease sharply when the Viet Nam war is over, because of improvements in transportation, supply systems, and the availability of alternative U.S. bases in the Far East.

The DSP neither advocates nor expects immediate reversion. Although official party pronouncements mention 1970, this is meant to be no more than a target date and an expression of party position. Leaders are not optimistic about prospects for an early return of the islands.

The party position on Article 3 of the Peace Treaty is relatively moderate. In its opinion the validity of Article 3 is "quite dubious" in view of Articles 76, 77 and 78 of the UN Charter and has become "meaningless" since the United States "clarified its intention" not to place the islands under the UN trusteeship system. The DSP assertion is that the legal basis of American administration has been "considerably weakened" due to Japanese membership in the UN and "U.S. abandonment of its intention" about the trusteeship arrangement. Some party leaders feel that perhaps Japan should try to eliminate the legal basis for U.S. administration by removing Article 3 either through the International Court of Justice or negotiation with the United States and other signatories of the Peace Treaty.

The DSP is publicly opposed to a partial reversion, whether functional or geographic, on the ground that such a step might so stabilize the Okinawan situation as to retard the movement for total reversion. Another consideration is that a partial formula would split the national movement for total reversion, thus weakening Japan's thrust vis-à-vis the United States. The party

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would have no objection to a partial reversion occurring as part of an overall plan for total reversion which includes a definite timetable.

The DSP is strongly opposed to the formula of "total reversion with nuclear bases attached." This stand is consistent with its opposition to Japan's development of nuclear weapons and their introduction into Japan proper. It is also consistent with what the party considers to be the most desirable format for a nuclear umbrella for Japan. The DSP is dubious about the wisdom of relying exclusively on a nuclear shield provided by a *single* power, and instead envisages a multinational nuclear protection.[31] In a broad sense, its position on the reversion question is constrained or conditioned by its acceptance of the present U.S.-Japanese security arrangement as an effective deterrent to war,[32] as well as by its awareness of the Chinese Communist threat.[33]

The Socialist and Communist posture of confrontation toward the United States is viewed by DSP members as irresponsible and retarding the return of Okinawa.[34] The latter are largely free from enmity—whether doctrinally induced or otherwise—toward the United States and do not believe that a popular movement of anti-American coloration would expedite reversion. Their aversion to joint action with the CP is so pronounced that attempts in 1967 to wage a united front struggle on the reversion question among all the opposition parties collapsed because of the DSP's refusal.[35]

The Komei Party

The Komei Party favors an arrangement under which an immediate total reversion would occur concurrently with the

[31]Nagasue Eiichi, *Minshato no Boei Koso* (*Democratic Socialist Party's Program on Defense*) (Getsuyokai Repoto), May 30, 1966, p. 27.

[32]Minshu Shakai To Seisaku Shingikai, editor, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[33]*Ibid.*, p. 17; Nagasue Eiichi, *Minshato no Boei Koso, op. cit.*, pp. 22-23. Some members, however, have questioned the wisdom of U.S. Far Eastern strategy. For instance, a DSP Diet member remarked that it is difficult to conceive of a reversion of Okinawa as long as one accepts the Far Eastern strategy and the value of Okinawan bases to Japan's security.

[34]*Ryukyu Shimpo,* August 28, 1967, p. 1; *Asahi Shimbun*, October 28, 1967, p. 2.

[35]*Mainichi Shimbun* (evening), December 2, 1967, p. 1. Roughly speaking, the Domei, the DSP-oriented Japanese Confederation of Labor Unions, supports the DSP's reversion formula, and the Sohyo, the SP-oriented General Council of the Japanese Trade Unions, supports the SP's formula. The Sohyo tends to exert moderate influence on the SP regarding the reversion issue in deference to a flexible position taken by those Okinawan labor unions directly or indirectly affiliated with the Council. Major influential newspapers in Japan such as the *Asahi, Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* favor the DSP's reversion formula.

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removal of *most* bases.[36] The bases to be removed would include not only nuclear bases, but also most of the conventional bases for training, operations and supply. Only certain types—those used as "relaying stations, transportation and communication"—would be provisionally allowed to close up base operations, and these would be withdrawn completely within five years after reversion. During the transition period, they would be strictly subjected to the prior consultation clause. Superficially, at least, the KP formula is slightly more moderate than that of the CP or SP, and more stringent than that of the DSP. As in the case of the other parties, the word *immediate* is largely a slogan designed to make a show of militancy over the issue. The KP urges the realization of reversion by 1970, at the latest.

To the KP, it is intolerable that Okinawa is still under alien rule twenty-four years after the end of World War II, and the reversion question is primarily one involving recovery of a lost territory. It also views the issue as a matter affecting national pride. The party's official statement takes note of the Okinawans' ardent desire for reversion and emphasizes the need to respect their will. The demand for reversion is justified on the principle of national self-determination reflected in the UN Charter. There is also an assertion that the present status of Okinawa impedes the promotion of friendly relations between the United States and Japan. The party further contends that U.S. administration of Okinawa has lost its legal basis in view of Articles 76, 77 and 78 of the UN Charter and because of the absence of U.S. intention to place Okinawa under the UN trusteeship system.

It accepts the view that the United States exercises administrative control for the purpose of maintaining effective base operations, and, until recently at least, it conceded the usefulness to Japan of the existing security arrangement with Washington, presumably including the Okinawan bases. Its assessment of the value of Okinawan bases to the United States is substantially similar to those made by other parties, i.e., Okinawa is losing its significance as a deterrent to war. The KP does not accept the

[36]Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based largely on the following sources: "Okinawa no Hondo Fukki e no Michi" ("Road to Okinawa's Return to the Mainland"), *Komei*, October 1967, pp. 78-91; Kuroyanagi Akira, "Okinawa Shisatsu Nikki" ("Diary of Inspection of Okinawa"), *Komei*, August 1967, pp. 104-113; Watabe Ichiro, "Okinawa Chosadan Shisatsu Hokoku" ("Report of the Okinawa Inspection Group"), *Komei*, August 1967, pp. 95-103; Kuroyanagi Akira, "Seifu no Okinawa Henkan e no Shisei o tadasu" ("The Government's Posture Toward Okinawa Reversion Examined"), *Komei*, November 1967, pp. 75-81; *HR Special Committee*, June 28, 1967, pp. 12-17, and July 21, 1967, p. 3.

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familiar phrase, "tension and threat in the Far East," as a justification for U.S. retention of bases, especially nuclear ones. On the contrary, it holds that the removal of nuclear bases from Okinawa would contribute to relaxing the conditions of threat and tension. This is not surprising in view of the party's advocacy of "complete neutrality."

The KP is publicly opposed to a separation or partial reversion formula, holding that any such formula would amount to acceptance of a continued U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is against the continuation of the military base on whatever grounds, and declares its "absolute opposition" to a separate reversion that would allow the retention of nuclear bases.

There is no clear-cut statement in KP literature as to why the party opposes the nonnuclear bases. In most of the writings, the conventional military bases and nuclear bases are grouped together, although the argument is directed primarily against nuclear bases. Komei Party opposition is most often expressed in the following terms: "The military base, particularly with nuclear weapons, negates the right of the survival of mankind." The military base is also said to constitute a threat to Japan. In a broad sense, the stand regarding bases may reflect a commitment to what the party calls the principle of absolute peace or world nationality, and to its basic tenet that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful diplomacy without resort to military power. The KP's negative attitude toward a formula calling for a reversion with nuclear bases attached is based on considerations such as the following: it would have the effect of dampening a desire for total reversion, would be technically difficult to attain, and would tend to perpetuate or solidify the shaky legal status of the bases.

It is important to note that KP terms for reversion were hardened in the latter part of August 1967. Until then, the party had favored "an early total reversion with nuclear bases removed," which amounted to the acceptance of nonnuclear bases, yet this proposal was neither offered seriously nor accompanied by any expectation that such a formula would actually expedite a reversion. As of mid-August 1967, the KP's attention was almost exclusively focused on measures to improve the well-being of Okinawans.[37] Even today, the party retains its concern with, and emphasis on, practical policies to improve political, economic and social conditions in Okinawa. These intentions are expressed in the com-

[37]Kuroyanagi Akira, "mazu Jumin no Fukushi o" ("First of All, the Welfare of the Residents"), *Sekai*, August 1967, pp. 67-71.

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prehensive program it advocates for the transitional period prior to total reversion. It may have stiffened its position in 1967 because of a desire to retain its self-image as a progressive opposition party and to appeal to the voters. In view of the positions taken by other opposition parties, a posture representing somewhat greater militancy than the DSP's, yet less extremism than the CP's or SP's, may have appeared to the KP as most appropriate in terms of public appeal.

Regardless of the motivation, the KP's shift toward a more radical stand tended to necessitate a corresponding shift in its attitude regarding the security arrangement with the United States, which has added weight to the CP and SP positions.

The Liberal Democratic Party

The governing Liberal Democratic Party has not yet adopted any reversion formula. Although the party's basic attitude toward the question has been made public, there has been no official statement concerning the terms or conditions under which reversion would be favored. The desirability of reversion is not at issue. The problem is that a consensus has not yet emerged within the party regarding the proper disposition of bases. Diverse opinions held by individual members range from maintenance of the status quo to conversion of the bases into a Japan-like arrangement. Those members (e.g., Kaya Okinori) who oppose any measures that might reduce the effectiveness of the bases in Okinawa are presumably prepared to accept postponement of reversion rather than see such a reduction occur. The number of those who advocate a reversion with Japan-like bases is small. Most members incline to views between these two extremes.[38]

A reversion with nuclear bases attached would be personally *acceptable* to the bulk of the party membership, but the formula would not command their positive endorsement or support, mainly because such an endorsement would be politically explosive. Another formula—removal of nuclear bases but otherwise guaranteed free use of the bases—would be more attractive to, and would command support from, a larger proportion of the membership. Were a time limit to be attached to either of these

[38] *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 3, 1967, p. 1; September 4, 1967, p. 2; September 18, 1967 (evening), p. 1; October 14, 1967, p. 2; November 30, 1967, p. 2; *Asahi Shimbun*, November 3, 1967, p. 1; *Yomiuri*, February 12, 1968, in Daily Summary of Japanese Press.

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two formulas, a still greater percentage of the LDP would find them acceptable and worthy of support. A variation of the first formula, which would ban the constant stationing of nuclear weapons, but would allow—subject to prior consultation—the introduction of nuclear weapons in an emergency,[39] would be politically less risky and, hence, acceptable to most party members. The "salability" of this last formula to the public (if accompanied by restrictions on other aspects of the free use of bases) would make it an attractive choice, but whether or not it is preferred by the members is another matter.

The idea of a partial reversion involving the return of a geographic area or the return of functional rights, especially if coupled with a definite date for total reversion, has consistently enjoyed support from a wide circle of party members. A preliminary report issued in June 1966 by the party's Special Committee on the Okinawa Problem calls for a functional reversion of administrative rights. The committee favors such a reversion pending the realization of total reversion, which it believes would occur when tensions in the Far East subside.[40] As late as August 1967, a leading LDP figure spoke publicly in favor of a partial reversion involving either functional and/or geographic separation.[41] However, the LDP has never presented this as a formula preferred by the party as a whole. Aside from the question of its acceptability to the United States, it is considered politically unproductive and unwise in view of the hard line taken by the opposition parties.

During the January 1967 elections the party merely pledged its effort to seek an expeditious return of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, and, in the interim, to widen the scope of Okinawan autonomy and raise living standards to the level attained in the homeland.[42] The then chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, Nishimura, stated that the LDP would "make continued effort to obtain, if possible, the return even of partial ad-

[39] *Yomiuri,* February 3, 1968, in Daily Summary of Japanese Press.

[40] "Okinawa no Fukki Mondai ni tsuite no Chukan Hokoku" ("Preliminary Report on Okinawa Reversion Problem"), *Seisaku Geppo,* August 1966, pp. 56-58.

[41] Usui Soichi, "Dankai teki Henkan e no Michi" ("Road to a Phased Reversion"), *Sekai,* August 1967, pp. 49-54. See also, Tokonami Tokuji, "Okinawa Henkan e no Fuseki" ("Strategic Steps Toward Okinawa Reversion"), *Kuni to Seiji,* May 1967, pp. 7-17; Usui Soichi, "Saikin no Okinawa Mondai ni tsuite" ("On Recent Okinawa Problem"), *Minzoku to Seiji,* November 1966, pp. 13-15.

[42] Jiyu Minshuto, *waga To wa Koyaku suru* (*Our Party Pledges Publicly*), January 1967, p. 7.

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ministrative rights, to the extent possible."[43] The official statement of November 3, 1967 calls only for the establishment of a new Japan-U.S. consultative organ to discuss the issue and for an early clarification of the prospects for reversion.[44]

The LDP's reticence regarding specific terms for reversion is due mainly to the fact that the government—which ordinarily takes the initiative and makes decisions—has not yet put forward a preferred formula around which to rally party support. Sooner or later, the Sato cabinet will seek the party's tacit acceptance, if not a positive endorsement, of a reversion formula which it favors. The government's tardiness in this respect may mean simply that Premier Sato has not made a final decision on a formula, or it may signify a cautious approach. Difficulty in gauging U.S. reactions and the political ramifications of adopting a particular formula must in part account for the delay.

The *basic* attitude of the party membership toward the reversion question is easily identified. Party writings invariably treat reversion as involving a reconciliation between the intense desire for it which is shared by all Japanese and Okinawans, and the importance of the Okinawan bases in maintaining the security of Japan and the Far East. A fundamental proposition accepted by the party in general is that the maintenance of peace and security in free Asia requires close cooperation and mutual understanding between Japan and the United States. The LDP believes this basic posture of cooperation with the United States should be upheld in settling the Okinawa problem.[45]

The party's call for reversion is frequently buttressed by the following argument: a continuation of the status quo would only alienate the local populace; it would tend to strengthen the opposition parties and anti-American sentiment; and effective U.S. base operations depend on the cooperation and understanding of the Okinawan residents. More importantly, the LDP considers that the problem may introduce a serious strain on the relations

[43]Nishimura Naomi, *So Senkyo ni nozomu Jiminto no Juten Seisaku* (*Major Policy Positions of the Liberal Democratic Party for the Approaching General Election*) (Getsuyokai Repoto), January 7, 1967, p. 7.

[44]*Asahi Shimbun*, November 3, 1967, p. 1. As of May 1968, the LDP policy called for promotion of diplomatic negotiations with the hope of obtaining a timetable for reversion by 1970, and separate negotiations on the status of military bases in Okinawa, taking into account the trend of public opinion.

[45]For example, see "Okinawa no Fukki Mondai. . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 56-58; Jiyu Minshuto, *waga Kuni no Anzen Hosho ni kansuru Chukan Hokoku* (*Preliminary Report on Our Nation's Security*), June 22, 1966, pp. 8-9, 15-17, 21-23, 27-32, 40-46.

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between Japan and the United States, thus undermining the foundation of their friendship.[46]

The Problem for Sato

The Premier's decision will hold profound consequences for Japanese security and foreign policy, the fortunes of his party, and his own survival as head of the government. The activities of the opposition parties and resultant popular susceptibility are important enough, but they are not in themselves as critical as the possibility of intraparty dissension and disunity, which may occur during a period of political crisis. Any hasty attempt on the part of the Sato cabinet to carry through a controversial formula could be used to undermine Sato's position by rival aspirants for the premiership. Any formula involving acceptance of nuclear weapons in Okinawa is potentially capable of precipitating major factional strife.

Upon his return from the United States in November 1967, Sato expressed his firm conviction that the timing for reversion would be decided within two to three years, and that a precondition for reversion is the attainment of a national consensus on the problem of national security.[47] It is evident that he has undertaken to face the problem of national security squarely and to cultivate a sense of "defense-mindedness" among the Japanese. Presumably the national consensus sought is understanding and acceptance of the importance of the security arrangements with the United States, and especially of the contribution the Okinawan bases are making to the security of Japan and the Far East.

Since November 1967, the Premier has been diligently reiterating such phrases as "defense-mindedness" and "resolution to defend the country with one's own effort."[48] However, he has been extremely cautious in spelling out the implications of these phrases. He has so far ruled out any revision of the Constitution or of the current Third Defense Plan.[49] Despite persistent questioning by opposition party members, he has *never* come out publicly in favor of retaining nuclear weapons in Okinawa. He

[46]See "Okinawa no Fukki Mondai. . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 57; Tokonami, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11; Usui, "Saikin no Okinawa. . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

[47]*Mainichi Shimbun,* November 21, 1967.

[48]For example, see *Asahi Shimbun,* December 5, 1967, p. 1; December 12, 1967, p. 1; November 21, 1967, p. 1.

[49]*Ibid.*, December 8, 1967, p. 1.

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has been fielding these queries with a refrain about his position being one of maintaining a "clean slate," but he has intimated that he is favorably disposed to the idea of allowing nuclear weapons in Okinawa. The most revealing answer was his refusal to say definitely that he will not approve nuclear bases in Okinawa.[50]

Sato's justification for maintaining the position of a "clean slate" is that there are three relevant factors which will have a bearing on the advisability of allowing nuclear weapons in Okinawa: changes in the international situation, developments in science and technology, and trends of public opinion. Since the government evidently does not foresee major rearrangements with respect to the first two factors, the only change anticipated is in public opinion on the question of nuclear weapons.[51] Sato hopes to obtain—within a year or so—U.S. consent to a timetable for reversion.

Despite the wording of the November 1967 Johnson-Sato communiqué, in which he merely "emphasized" that agreement should be reached "within a few years," and that the President "fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion," Sato is irrevocably committed to obtaining U.S. agreement on a date for reversion within "two to three years." He is hopeful that by the time of his planned visit to Washington in 1969, Japan and the United States can agree on the timing and formula for reversion, with the date for reversion specifically set around 1972.[52]

[50] *Yomiuri,* February 6, 1968, in Daily Summary of Japanese Press.
[51] *Asahi Shimbun,* December 16, 1967, p. 1; *Yomiuri,* January 30, 1968, in Daily Summary of Japanese Press.
[52] *Yomiuri,* January 9, 1968; *Tokyo Shimbun,* January 11, 1968; *Nihon Keizai* (Tokyo), January 13, 1968; *Mainichi* (evening), January 18, 1968—all in Daily Summary of Japanese Press.

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TAIWAN AND U.S. POLICY

by Thomas J. Weiss

SINCE the eruption of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Communist China in 1965-1966, rethinking of the United States' China policy has been given a higher priority by government officials, scholars and journalists. A time such as the present, when Peking's internal preoccupations are combined with its ideologically-rooted ineptness in international affairs, may offer opportunities for Washington to take diplomatic and political initiatives that might not be available to it at a time when the Chinese communist regime was more successfully living up to its potential for international influence. Furthermore, if there is any foundation for the consensus among China watchers that the successors to the "Long March generation" will have different perspectives on the world in general, and politics and ideology in particular, from those of today's rulers in Peking, public discussion of U.S. policy toward China is timely.

Taiwan—thorn in the side of the People's Republic, and stone in the shoes of those American policymakers eager to tread the path toward eventual détente with Peking—continues to be the biggest single obstacle to any attempt to suggest changes in China policy which go beyond mere gestures of good will. Even if no important change in U.S. China policy occurs in the next few years, the political future of Taiwan will remain a policy problem. There is, perhaps, a tendency to feel that as long as Washington follows a certain strategic policy toward mainland China, its policy toward Taiwan will more or less ensue therefrom.[1] A significant range of options regarding Taiwan is available to the United States, however, regardless of the current state of relations between Peking and Washington. It would seem, therefore, that (1) the facts of political life on Taiwan, and (2) the U.S. policy options regarding the island and their implications and limitations, should be kept under continuous public review.

[1]One could point to the much-publicized China policy hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1966. All major witnesses agreed that Taiwan was a key issue and briefly stated their own policy preferences regarding it, but no statement dealt with Taiwan in detail, and no committee member pursued the subject at length during the questioning. See U.S. Congress, Senate, *U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China*, Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966.

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Social and Political Conditions on Taiwan

Of the approximately 13.6 million people inhabiting Taiwan today, somewhat more than two million are mainlanders or the children of mainlanders who came to Taiwan in the late 1940's. The Taiwanese, who constitute over 80 per cent of the population, are ethnically also Chinese, being mostly the descendants of those wayfarers from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces who migrated to the island from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Besides these main groups, there are 150,000 to 200,000 aborigines of Malay stock who live in the mountain areas and have their own language.

The Taiwanese are distinctive in their spoken dialect, social mores, religious practices, and to some extent even in their physical characteristics, being shorter and squatter than the northern Chinese. The mainlanders consider the Taiwanese socially inferior, backward and ill-mannered, to the extent that a housemaid who is a mainlander may easily feel herself superior to a Taiwanese physics professor.

Except at the levels of local and municipal government, political power remains almost completely in the hands of the mainlanders, as do high army posts and district police offices. Some attempt has been made to allow Taiwanese a share in civil service, however, and commonly a government department will have at least one bright young Taiwanese in a responsible position.

Economically it is a different story. The middle-class mainlander is, if anything, likely to be less well-off than his Taiwanese counterpart. Most mainlanders do not own land, shops or business enterprises, and although the younger ones are gradually moving into other occupations, they are still for the most part employed in government service, the military, teaching, and government-owned or -related undertakings. Taiwanese domination of the production of goods and services is so extensive that until recently most of the shops on the island operated on a three-price system—the lowest for Taiwanese customers, a second for mainlanders, and a third for foreigners. Mainlanders often complain that Taiwanese discrimination against them makes it difficult for them to find jobs outside of government and teaching.

The Kuomintang government is a one-party dictatorship, with a governmental structure and a constitution which are on paper

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democratic; the dictatorial practices of the regime are publicly justified as reluctant concessions to the continuing "state of wartime emergency." The Constitution of the Republic of China provides for indirect election of the President and Vice-President through a National Assembly convened every six years for that purpose, and for direct election of a Legislative Yuan (Council), which has supreme lawmaking authority. There have been no general elections for these two bodies since 1948, however, and even the 1948 elections could not by Western standards be said to have been free and unfettered. So far as important policy questions are concerned, the Legislative Yuan today is hardly more than an aging debating club. Effective power is still in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, eighty-one years old and now in his fourth six-year term as President of the Republic. His son, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, is the number two man in the power hierarchy and is generally regarded as the likely successor to his father's power, if not to the formal office.

There is a good chance that the problem of succession to power which will arise in the not too distant future will be solved smoothly. Chiang Ching-kuo, now fifty-nine, commands the loyalty of all important military commanders, having personally approved all such high appointments. His strongest potential rival and the only other official who had a substantial personal following in the party and army, former Vice-President Ch'en Cheng, died in March 1965, after which the younger Chiang moved to eliminate or neutralize the political influence of Ch'en's following. Vice-President and Premier C. K. Yen, although powerful in financial and party circles, appears not to have sufficient military backing (he has never held a military command) to make him a serious contender for top power.

Once the elder Chiang leaves the scene, the trend of liberalization evident in the past decade or so could easily be at least temporarily reversed. Chiang Ching-kuo is not regarded as a man of liberal democratic instincts and, lacking the political stature of his father, may feel it necessary to impose stricter controls in order to maintain his position. Educated in Moscow and long the regime's chief political policeman, he even now from time to time makes speeches emphasizing the dangers of "individualism" and the necessity for all to submerge themselves in the "great common endeavor." One potential source of trouble for the younger Chiang may be his stepmother, First Lady Madame Chiang, who is

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only nine years his senior. Relations between the two have been noticeably cool, especially in the past couple of years, and rumors of family disagreements involving the senior Chiang as well are persistent. Although she commands no independent base of power, Madame Chiang has considerable public and international standing; her support would be valuable to Chiang Ching-kuo, and, by the same token, she remains a logical center of support for any potential rival to him.

The legitimacy of the Kuomintang government on Taiwan rests squarely on its claim to be the rightful government of all of China, and on the attendant claim that Taiwan is irrevocably part of China, that the Taiwanese, as Chinese, share the goal of mainland recovery. The Taiwanese, however, are not particularly interested in the recovery of the mainland; nor, for that matter, in any other political goal. The political apathy of the Chinese populace, long the despair of Western-oriented intellectuals and political activists, persists on Taiwan, especially since the spurs of want and immiserization are largely absent. Unlike most of the rest of Asia, Taiwan has no acute food and housing shortage. It is a rice exporting area; the population has enough to eat, the price of rice is reasonably low, and housing is by Asian standards cheap and abundant.

The intelligent and educated Chinese, whether mainlander or Taiwanese, often retreats to a kind of easy-going cynicism about politics: his hopes are modest, he has no blind faith in the wisdom and virtue of his rulers, he does not believe everything they tell him. As long as he is left alone and conditions are gradually improving, he is content to keep his opinions to himself and avoid politics altogether. The mainlander may grumble about the economic power of the Taiwanese, and the Taiwanese may complain about the political power of the mainlanders, but the difference which seems to loom largest in the minds of both is that between the allegedly corrupt or incompetent "ins" and the unfortunate "outs." The Taiwanese, for instance, grumbling about corruption in the government, readily admit that the Taiwanese who control municipal and local governments are as corrupt as anyone else.

Perhaps the most valuable freedom the people on Taiwan have is one denied to their mainland brethren—the freedom to be apolitical and to be left alone. Most Chinese in Taiwan readily take advantage of it. Even the Kuomintang party structure is

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loose, and although a youth movement is associated with the party, there is no indoctrination comparable to that of the Chinese Communist Party, and most youths do not take politics seriously. If a youth happens to be asked a political question by a foreigner he will readily supply the "official answer," but if pressed further he is likely to respond with a shrug of the shoulders.

The Taiwanese who are old enough to remember clearly the events of the 1940's still feel bitter toward the mainlanders for the brutal subjection of the native populace at that time. In 1947 the regime eliminated potential centers of political opposition by murdering many prominent Taiwanese,[2] and the mainland soldiery indulged in gratuitous cruelty and outright banditry and murder. While mainlanders still feel strongly anti-Japanese, the older Taiwanese, many of whom speak Japanese better than they do Mandarin—the Chinese national language—tend to admire the achievements of the Japanese and contrast the orderly years of occupation with the turbulence, terrorism and corruption rampant after the mainlanders took over. The government now admits that "mistakes were made" in the early years of its rule on Taiwan. No admission is made, however, that there was a deliberate anti-Taiwanese policy on the part of the regime; any "unfortunate incidents" are blamed on the confused and difficult postwar conditions and on the errors of individual military commanders and government officials, most of whom are by now either dead or retired.

In recent years, the dictatorship has become much milder, and its police-state aspects have receded into the background. Gone are the days, even up to the late 1950's, when the police might make a rude midnight check of one's house to see whether any unaccounted-for people were being harbored there—although on one occasion in 1965 a sudden and intensive house-to-house search for subversive materials was conducted throughout the island when Dr. Thomas Wen-i Liao returned to Taiwan after renouncing the cause of Taiwanese independence. The police today are generally deferential and polite to the citizenry.

Likewise, there is much more freedom allowed to the press and publishers than in former years. Criticism of the Kuomintang regime as such, its basic policy goals, or President Chiang personally, will not be tolerated and will be censored out of im-

[2]See the account in George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 291-310.

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ported books and magazines, but a great deal of latitude is allowed for criticism of local governments, individual officials and particular policies or institutions. Thus, while one never reads a criticism of the goal of mainland recovery, the press can and does criticize national economic policies, police abuses and incompetence, government monopolies and individual corrupt officials.

There has long been an exile-led Taiwanese nationalist movement, based primarily in Tokyo and secondarily in Hong Kong, the United States and Europe, which advocates the establishment of an independent republic of Taiwan. For a number of reasons, however, that cause has not prospered and its prospects for the foreseeable future appear bleak. The movement has always been plagued by factionalism and weak leadership. It also suffers from a "generation gap," between the older Taiwanese who are motivated primarily by memories of personal suffering at the hands of the Chiang regime after World War II and the more ideologically-motivated younger element. In the 1950's the most prominent exile leader was the above mentioned Thomas Liao, who headed a Taiwanese "provisional government" in Tokyo, supported by his Formosan Democratic Independence Party (whenever linguistically possible, Taiwanese nationalists prefer to use the Western name "Formosa" rather than the Chinese "Taiwan") and by groups in Hong Kong and the United States. The Formosan Freedom Independence Party also operated from Japan and, after 1960, there was the Young Formosan Association (Taiwan Chinglian Hue), now called the United Young Formosans for Independence.[3]

When Liao returned to Taiwan in May 1965, his followers in Tokyo and Hong Kong dissolved their groups and a new exile "provisional government" was formed in Tokyo under Kuo Chin-cheng. One American scholar has estimated that among the 25,000 Taiwanese living in Japan during the early 1950's there were approximately 500 to 700 activists in the movement.[4] Since that time the overseas movement has made little progress, although the

[3]Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Perspective on Liao's Return to Taiwan," *Independent Formosa*, August 1965, pp. 16-21. On Liao's relationship to the overseas and intra-island independence movement, see Mendel, *loc. cit.*, and *Independent Formosa*, June 1965, pp. 1-3. Brief descriptions of the overseas groups are in Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 194-200, and David Wurfel, "Taiwanese Nationalism: Problem for United States Policy," in Robert Sakai, editor, *Studies on Asia, 1963* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 101-119.

[4]Mendel, *loc. cit.*

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number of Taiwanese students and professionals living abroad and committed to the cause of independence seems to be growing slowly.

The independence movement has suffered most seriously because of its failure to strike deep roots within Taiwan and win the active support of any large segment of the Taiwanese population. Between 1957 and 1961, advocates of independence concentrated their efforts on attempts to establish an opposition party by legal means. A number of leading Taiwanese political figures tried to found an organization for the study of local self-government, which was hopefully to prepare for the establishment in 1960 of the China Democratic Party. Some mainlander intellectuals, including Hu Shih, voiced their support for the idea of an opposition party at that time. The Kuomintang easily squelched the movement, however, through pressure on the individual Taiwanese leaders and finally by the arrest of Lei Chen, mainlander editor of *Free China,* a fortnightly magazine outspokenly critical of the government. Subsequently, Su Tung-chi, one of the Taiwanese politicians involved, was charged with plotting an armed rebellion, sentenced to death and executed.

The most recent Taiwanese nationalist *cause célèbre* was the case of the Taiwanese head of the political science department of Taiwan National University, P'eng Ming-min. P'eng and two associates, Hsieh Chung-min and Wei Ting-chao, were imprisoned in 1965 for putting out an anti-government pamphlet, *Declaration of Formosans*, which included the sentence: "The people of Formosa, regardless of their origin, must unite themselves, stand against dictatorship, and fight till the last drop of our blood to destroy it." Several months later P'eng was pardoned and the prison terms of the other two men were reduced.

It is obviously difficult to form an accurate idea of the strength and political importance of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment within the island. There is some underground activity and organization (the United Young Formosans for Independence distributes a clandestine paper, *Toklip Taiwan*), but for evaluating the real or potential strength of extralegal anti-government opposition only impressionistic evidence is available to an impartial observer. It seems likely, though by no means unquestionable, that the bulk of the Taiwanese population would, if given the choice, opt for independence from the mainland even if there were a noncommunist government in Peking. However,

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there are no overt signs of mass willingness to support the cause of independence against the active opposition of the present island regime; on the contrary, the Taiwanese are conscious that they have a lot to lose in taking such a stand.[5] Exile leaders find the lack of active intra-island support for their cause disturbing and embarrassing, and explain it by saying that the Taiwanese know that any opposition movement would be quickly crushed—a somewhat damaging admission in itself.

International Status and Foreign Policy of the Republic of China

For the government on Taiwan, the publicly stated goal of the recovery of the mainland remains the keystone of foreign policy and international relations. The government has been surprisingly successful in solidifying its international position over the past two decades. In January 1966, fifty-seven states maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China; a year later the number was sixty; by June 1968, it had increased to sixty-four, while only forty-five states were represented in Peking.[6] Taiwan has also been able to hold on to the China seat on the United Nations Security Council.[7]

The indispensable prerequisite for this success has, of course, been vigorous U.S. military support for the Nationalist government's status on Taiwan and U.S. diplomatic support for its claim to the mainland. That the government has been able to maintain such U.S. support, however, has been due as much to its own prudent policies and Peking's diplomatic ineptness as to its friends in Washington. In the first place, the regime, despite its unrepresentative character at the national level, has satisfied one of the most basic demands of American policy by its genuine progress toward ruling in the interests of the people. The political stability and economic progress on Taiwan in the 1950's and 1960's give the United States good grounds, both politically and morally, for commitment to the island's defense. At the same time, by skillful use of carrot and stick, the regime has eliminated all

[5]See the impressions of Mendel in "Greetings to the Taiwan Chinglian Hue," *Independent Formosa*, February 1965, pp. 5-7.

[6]*China Yearbook, 1966-67*, p. 831; cf. 1965-66 edition, p. 919; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research Memorandum REA-23, June 13, 1968.

[7]The resolution to expel the Republic of China and seat the People's Republic of China was defeated in 1967 by a vote of 58 to 45, with 17 abstentions; in 1968, 58 to 44, with 23 abstentions.

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possible rivals to itself as the ruling force on Taiwan. The Taiwanese independence movement has never had official support from any nation or from the United Nations. As noted above, the Nationalist government's vigorous internal security measures, combined with the amorphous discontent, if not outright apathy, of the Taiwanese people, have virtually eliminated any possibility of an independence movement that would provide a reasonable alternative to the Kuomintang regime on the island.

While the political situation on the mainland remains confused and uncertain, the international position of the government in Taiwan has shown signs of further improvement. Taipei has been especially careful in the past two years not to embarrass the United States by a militant posture or by talk of an imminent attack on the mainland, and has gone out of its way to play down the notion that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution might present a good opportunity for military action by the Nationalists. Chiang Kai-shek in his 1967 New Year's Day speech emphasized that the present "counteroffensive" against the mainland must be political rather than military.[8] He specified on National Day (October 10) that year that the counteroffensive should be considered 70 per cent political and 30 per cent military.[9]

That the Nationalist government still considers mainland recovery to be a serious policy goal after twenty years on Taiwan may be hard for Americans to believe. But while the regime does not minimize the difficulty of the task, it has by no means given up genuine commitment to this goal, and it should not be seen as merely a rationale for continued dictatorship. Most of the adult mainlanders now in Taiwan still have members of their immediate family, usually parents or siblings, in China. Even with the passing of the present generation, hope of return will not die easily. Irredentist movements and exile hopes in general tend to remain strong for generations, as is continuously demonstrated so vividly in the Middle East. Mainlanders in Taiwan are convinced that even if it takes another fifty years or more, communism will fail or fade away on the mainland and they or their descendants will then finally return home. If anything, this conviction is growing in light of the recent troubles of the Peking regime. The easy assumption that time alone will bring Peking and Taipei around to accepting the permanent separation of Taiwan from the

[8] *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Taipei), January 1, 1967, p. 1.
[9] *Ibid.*, October 10, 1967, p. 1; see also *New York Times*, February 12, 1968.

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mainland—Peking for the sake of UN admission and other diplomatic advantages, and Taipei because of military weakness and waning enthusiasm for the crusade—is probably mistaken, at least while mainlanders retain the dominant political voice on the island.

One possibility cannot be entirely disregarded. It is not inconceivable that new leadership in both capitals may in the future find it possible to come to some kind of working arrangement which would reunite Taiwan with the mainland.[10] No one can be sure how flexible will be the tactics of the leadership that ultimately emerges in Peking after the current turmoil, let alone of the successors to the present leadership in Taipei. Any American policy that moved toward formalizing the severance of Taiwan from the mainland would increase the incentive for the Kuomintang and communist governments to collaborate in opposition to it.

The United States and Taiwan

At the Cairo and Potsdam conferences during World War II, the United States, along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, publicly endorsed the principle that Taiwan is rightfully part of China. The Cairo Declaration stated that "all the territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic of China." On the military side, as part of Operation Causeway, there had been plans for the American occupation of Taiwan subsequent to its projected capture by U.S. forces, but these were shelved when it was decided to bypass Taiwan on the drive toward the Japanese home islands. Thus it was that with U.S. assistance the Republic of China accepted the Japanese surrender on Taiwan in 1945 and assumed administrative authority over the island. The Truman Administration later chose to write off Taiwan and allow its fate to be settled by the outcome of the Kuomintang-communist civil war, again adhering tacitly to the principle that the island was part of China.

With the communist attack on South Korea in June 1950, Washington reversed its policy. President Truman used the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Straits in order to deny Taiwan to the communists and to prevent the Nationalists from widening the war by a mainland counterattack. Then the United

[10]Lasswell and Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-185, give one view of the possibilities for such an agreement.

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States began casting about for some diplomatic means to minimize its informal commitment to restore Taiwan to the Republic of China, although in face of the Nationalist regime's *de facto* authority, there was no easy way to withdraw it altogether. The United States adopted the position that the status of Taiwan was undetermined, and Washington deliberately kept it that way. While Japan formally gave up its sovereignty over the island in the Treaty of Peace of San Francisco in 1951, sovereignty was never transferred to any other government.[11]

Since that time, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has remained equivocal. The United States has not attempted consistently to pave the way for Taiwan's reversion to China, but it has found no enduring diplomatic and political alternative to upholding the Kuomintang as the *de jure* ruler of mainland China (technically not of Taiwan), even though it has never seriously intended to support a Nationalist attempt to retake the mainland. Thus, of the territory under the actual control of the Republic of China, Washington has formally recognized that government's sovereignty only over the offshore islands.

The political price exacted for the turnabout in U.S. policy is a permanent state of hostility between Washington and Peking (Peking's image of the United States as determined to destroy the Chinese communist regime may have affected its decision to intervene in the Korean War), and continued association with a troublesome ally that has a vital stake in involving the United States in a war with Communist China. On the other hand, Taiwan, whatever its strategic value, has been denied to the communists, and its thirteen million people have been saved from a regime far worse than the one ruling them today.

Policy Options for the United States

Taiwan is the most intractable major issue dividing the United States and the People's Republic of China. Since 1950 neither side has budged an inch on the Taiwan question.

The present Far Eastern policy of the United States still revolves around the principle of containment and, less con-

[11]See background in Joseph W. Ballantine, *Formosa, A Problem for United States Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1952). The literature on the legal status of Taiwan is fairly extensive, including Frank P. Morello, *The International Legal Status of Formosa* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), and Lasswell and Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-95; both these works contain bibliographies, Morello, pp. 101-102, and Lasswell and Chen, p. 374.

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sistently, isolation of Communist China. Fundamentally it applies to East Asia the policy of containment of the USSR which was successful in Europe after World War II. It dictates the strategic reason for the U.S. presence in Viet Nam and elsewhere on the periphery of the Asian mainland. With respect to U.S. policy toward Taiwan, therefore, the basic choice is whether to use it to support the strategy of containment and isolation of Communist China in the Far East, or, alternatively, to try to reduce the range of conflict between Washington and Peking as far as is consistent with the vital interests of the United States and the inhabitants of Taiwan. This choice will depend primarily on an evaluation of the military potential of the Republic of China.

Although the imaginative use of our Taiwan policy to implement the larger policy of containment might conceivably produce the greater international political advantage, it is much the more difficult alternative to follow. The military power of the Republic of China constitutes a continuing threat to Peking and is a significant factor in the overall balance of tactical power in the Western Pacific and East Asia, and thus should not be given up without good reason. It is, however, a difficult power to use, short of a general war with Peking. In the limited war in Korea the United States was unwilling to support action by Nationalist forces against the mainland for fear of bringing on a full-scale war. Nor were Nationalist military forces pressed into service as combat allies in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, since their participation might have (1) weakened international support for the American position in these conflicts; (2) provoked Peking unnecessarily; (3) been of only marginal military value; and (4) been unacceptable, because no East Asian country likes to have Chinese soldiers on its soil.

Hence, if the military power of the Nationalist regime has any value to the United States at this point, it can only be as a deterrent or political tool by means of which we seek to affect Peking's policies and international behavior. Yet even in this sense it has its limitations; although more than adequate for the defense of Taiwan, it is woefully inadequate for an attack on the mainland, and in view of American strategic strength in the Pacific area it could hardly be decisive in deterring Peking from full-scale hostilities. In a limited war, ROC forces are only minor restraints on Peking's actions because they are most unlikely to be used, either against the mainland or in the limited fighting itself. As a

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political weapon, also, ROC military power is ineffective because the United States has only limited and indirect control over its use, and can neither coordinate its use with political moves nor give it up as part of any political bargain with Peking. Thus in the future it may be nothing more than a nuisance to Communist China and of little political and military advantage to the United States. This suggests that it would be preferable to take reduction of the range of conflict between Washington and Peking as the guiding principle of American policy toward Taiwan.

With regard to specifics, the available options for U.S. Taiwan policy are basically four:

(1) A one-China policy in favor of the Taipei government, recognizing the *de jure* unity of Taiwan and the mainland under Nationalist government authority;

(2) A two-Chinas policy recognizing the Peking government as ruler of the mainland and guaranteeing the independence of Taiwan under its present government, as long as that government chooses to remain independent;

(3) A one-China, one-Taiwan policy recognizing the Peking government as ruler of the mainland and the independence of Taiwan under some representative system of government;

(4) A one-China policy in favor of the Peking government, recognizing the unity of the mainland and Taiwan under Chinese communist authority.

Since the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. policy has been an amalgam of options (1) and (2): giving limited diplomatic recognition and support to the Nationalists' claim to the mainland and protecting their position on Taiwan, yet discouraging any attempt to assert that claim militarily, and dissociating the United States from any action in the area that could not be justified as necessary to the defense of Taiwan.

While each of the four options can be supported by reasonable arguments, the choice among them is restricted by the strong commitment the United States has incurred to preserve Taiwan from Peking's control as long as the Peking government maintains its present character. This obligation is primarily moral in nature. Although there are political and legal commitments involved, such commitments could in time, if so desired, be set aside by legal means. The essence of the matter, however, is that Taiwan's independent existence is due to the deliberate policy of the United States since 1950, when the Taiwan Straits were neutralized by

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American naval power, and to the continuing American pledge to defend the island. Only by equally deliberate U.S. action could Taiwan fall to Peking, and should we allow this to happen it would be a denial of the moral basis of our entire Asian policy—much more so than withdrawal from Viet Nam would be.

Given the basic constraints against either giving up Taiwan to Peking or supporting any action likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war with the Chinese communists, the ideal from the American standpoint would be an independent Taiwan, governed by a representative administration with no irredentist goals and buttressed by a continuing U.S. commitment to defend it against attack from the mainland. These are the implicit aims of the two-Chinas policy, most often urged as an alternative to the present U.S. policy, and the explicit aims of the one-China, one-Taiwan policy.

The two-Chinas policy as it is commonly expounded would involve, at a minimum, U.S. support for Peking's entry into the United Nations and membership in the Security Council, with Taiwan becoming a member of the General Assembly; Peking, in other words, would be given the opportunity to enter the United Nations and other diplomatic advantages at the price of its claim to Taiwan. On Taiwan we would support an independent, hopefully representative government. This policy and its variations, however, have the vital defect of overestimating the tractability of both the Peking and Taipei governments. Critics often stress this point, especially as it applies to Peking's behavior. There is little evidence that either government will renounce its territorial claims. Despite all the pressure the United States could reasonably bring to bear, the Kuomintang regime will resist giving up its claim to the mainland or implementing any kind of political reform it believes to be contrary to its vital interests. Washington has not even been able to persuade the Nationalist government to withdraw from the offshore islands, mainly because holding them keeps the civil war alive—and in this Peking as well as Taipei has a vested interest: the continuing stalemate prevents the formalization of Taiwan's independent status.[12]

Owing to the American moral commitment to Taiwan, the Nationalist regime can proclaim its one-China policy without having

[12]Thus the communists shell Quemoy on odd days of the month, and on even days the Nationalists bring foreign visitors there to see the "battlefront."

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to take the responsibility of self-defense that would logically go with it. Because they know that only under extreme provocation would the United States withdraw its commitment, the Nationalists are also given the opportunity to pursue with impunity policy goals which embarrass us or with which we are in fundamental disagreement. At the same time, should it fear U.S. implementation of a two-Chinas policy, the government is free, if it can ever come to terms with Peking, to make a deal reuniting Taiwan with the mainland regardless of American wishes. Our inability to affect the political situation on Taiwan or to change the policies of its government is an even more compelling reason than Peking's intractability for not adopting a two-Chinas policy now. We would still have to support the Nationalists, and this in itself would negate the possibility of reducing tensions with Peking.

The character of the two regimes involved is at the heart of the issue. If the Peking government were not communist, the United States, in justice, good conscience and good politics, could have allowed Taiwan to fall to the mainland regime in 1950. China's claim to Taiwan is not a Cold War tactic but has a good deal of legitimacy. After World War II, it was as strong as her claim to Manchuria, which no nation in principle disputed, or Japan's to Okinawa. It is far stronger than China's ancient and long-inactive claims to such surrounding areas as Korea, Indochina and Outer Mongolia, and than her claim to Tibet. None of these territories was ever part of China proper, as Taiwan was, and none is populated by Chinese people. The United States has never explicitly repudiated the informal recognition given to China's claim by the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and by our continuing diplomatic support of the Republic of China on Taiwan. It is solely because the Peking government is communist that Taiwan has been denied to it. On the other hand, if there were a representative government on Taiwan—one in which the mainlanders did not have the dominant voice—that government would not cherish a claim to the mainland and the United States could then support Taiwan's independence without having to uphold the one-China fiction.

The one-China, one-Taiwan policy would attempt to solve this problem by denying the right of the Republic of China to govern Taiwan and reserving that right only for a government chosen by Taiwan's people, whether their choice might be the present

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regime or some other.[13] The nub of such a policy would be a UN supervised and enforced plebiscite to determine the island's political future. Its proponents believe Nationalist opposition to it could be overcome by the combined pressure of the United States, the United Nations and the native Taiwanese population. They also believe a viable alternative to Kuomintang rule exists or would speedily emerge from among the native Taiwanese population. A further necessary assumption is that the UN could undertake a plebiscite without the support of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (which might fear Peking's retaliation in Hong Kong).

The difficulties inherent in such a policy are formidable. Nationalist control in Taiwan is firmly established, and the government is no longer utterly dependent on U.S. aid. Economic aid was formally terminated in 1965, and even in the military sphere Taiwan is now beginning, for instance, to manufacture its own small arms. A plebiscite might well be impossible without the use of armed force against the Taipei government. In their book, *Formosa, China, and the United Nations,* Lasswell and Chen do not rule out the use of force, but they discount the likelihood of serious Nationalist resistance. They believe the Nationalists would probably bar UN personnel from entering the country, but government resistance (and, indeed, the government itself) would soon collapse for lack of support even from the majority of mainlanders. The way would then be clear for the founding of an independent republic on Taiwan.[14]

These authors' estimation of the likely course of events, however, is not supported by persuasive evidence and argument. It is impossible to know in advance what the response of the native Taiwanese population to such a situation would be. Plainly there is no dedicated Taiwanese independence movement operative on the island today, and it is questionable whether a strong, reasonably united movement would emerge in the event of a UN attempt to implement a plebiscite. Exile assurances that mass support for the cause of independence would immediately spring forth if only the United States committed itself firmly to that cause are far too shaky a foundation on which to construct American policy. As things stand, the Nationalist regime is confident of its ability to ward off any attempt to remove it from

[13]This alternative has recently been advocated and elaborated by Lasswell and Chen, *op. cit., passim.*
[14]*Ibid.*, p. 153.

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power. Unless large-scale Taiwanese opposition to the government materialized quickly, the United Nations and the United States would be faced with an extremely embarrassing and dangerous situation, at considerable risk of the use of violence, and would probably have no choice but to admit defeat and back down.

No one can say for certain under what conditions the native islanders' sense of identity as Taiwanese rather than as Chinese could be translated into support for an independence movement, how strongly the bulk of the Taiwanese population would be attracted to such a movement, and, most important, how much they would be willing to sacrifice for it. In the long run, it might be argued, increased education and political awareness among the people will tend to bring about a more dangerous cleavage between rulers and ruled. Yet the regime has shown that, except on questions of mainland recovery and the Chiang family itself, it can accommodate to pressures. No matter what policy the United States may choose to follow, there remains the possibility of some sort of violent upheaval on Taiwan in the future, but the type of proposal Lasswell and Chen describe would seem to involve greater likelihood of violence, would make the United States directly responsible for such violence, and would stake U.S. support and prestige on one or another faction in the attempt to oust the incumbent government.

The irreducible fact which must condition any choice between a two-Chinas and a one-China, one-Taiwan policy is that the political situation on Taiwan can be decisively affected and altered only by the inhabitants of Taiwan themselves, and their actions are incalculable. Thus, U.S. policy should not be tied directly to any planned or hoped for action on their part. A policy which proceeded on the premise that the present government in Taipei is authoritative for Taiwan would probably offer the best chance of success. As far as the danger of a Nationalist-communist deal is concerned, it would be all the greater if the United States specifically repudiated the authority of the Republic of China. The risk of this possibility remains in any event, and were the inhabitants of Taiwan to acquiesce in such a deal, Washington would have little choice but to accept it.

In the short run the United States stands to gain nothing from the two-Chinas policy, since the Peking regime is not interested in accepting any recognition or form of admission to the UN that involves giving up its claim to Taiwan. The preference of many U.S. government officials and others for a two-Chinas policy rests

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rather on the longer-range expectation that Communist China may become more flexible and pragmatic at some time in the future and accept the independent status of Taiwan for the sake of political gains accruing from greater international respectability. The rationale for this expectation derives from the generally observed tendency for ideological fervor and commitment to diminish over any extended period in the life of an "ism." However, one of the bitter lessons of international politics learned since the time of Napoleon is that it is difficult in an age of mass nationalism for any nation to accept unfavorable changes in its boundaries or the forcible cession of what it believes to be its territory. On the issue of Taiwan, ideology and national interest reinforce each other, and it seems likely that any Chinese government, whether communist or not, would be extremely reluctant to renounce its claim to the island. If Peking finally does participate in the United Nations and other normal international intercourse, it will probably be on terms that do not require such a concession.

Nevertheless, the two-Chinas policy has this merit: it could help us to overcome the limitations of the general strategy of containment and isolation of Communist China and to hold on to the diplomatic initiative regarding our position on Taiwan's status. If the Kuomintang regime could be persuaded to mute its claim to the mainland, the United States would have something to gain by adopting a two-Chinas policy. It is an exploitable weak point in our position that our basic objective to maintain a Taiwan independent of the mainland runs counter to our public and diplomatic (albeit halfhearted) commitment to the principle that Taiwan is a part of China. The relative success of the one-China policy, especially in recent years, owes much to Peking's narrow attempt to apply the Chinese revolutionary experience to the rest of the underdeveloped world, as well as to its clumsiness and inexperience. It might be worthwhile at some time in the future to risk what Taipei might do in response to a two-Chinas policy for the sake of larger considerations, such as improved relations with other countries. To predict under what circumstances this might happen is difficult, since the major variable is Peking's behavior, which has taken some unexpected turns since 1949. But should such a situation arise, one hopeful point about the political problem on Taiwan is that abandonment of the mainland claim would not necessarily mean the death of the Kuomintang govern-

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ment. Its claim to be the rightful authority for all of China may be the pillar of legitimacy of the Nationalist regime, as is often observed, but this does not mean that the government would fall if it ceased to assert that claim or affirmed that for humanitarian reasons it no longer intended to try to enforce it by violent means.

The mainland claim is not vital to the life of the government, but is rather a vital part of the consciousness of the leadership, who still have hope of a return to the mainland, if not for themselves at least for their descendants. The problem is thus psychological as much as political, and as such it may ultimately be solved without violence. Given Taiwan's relative social and economic stability, the regime would probably survive the abandonment of the claim even if it did not immediately implement democratic reforms, as long as a Taiwanese-mainlander split on crucial domestic issues could be avoided.

From the viewpoint of American policy, democratically oriented reforms would not change the situation regarding Taiwan except as they indicated that the leadership had tacitly given up the assertion of a claim to the mainland. If this were the case, the United States could adopt a two-Chinas policy without waiting for representative government to appear on the island. This is admittedly less than optimal considering the desirability of representative government, but it holds promise in that it would separate the problem of gaining international recognition for the principle of an independent Taiwan from the less tractable problem of Taiwan's internal political system, which must be settled by the people on Taiwan themselves. The example of the German Federal Republic, however, suggests that international recognition of Taiwan's independence might be gained without the government formally abandoning its desire for ultimate reunification with the mainland.

Assuming Peking's continued hostility and ideological commitment, the United States must realize that Communist China will be much harder to deal with once it wakes up to gains to be had from more sophisticated political and diplomatic maneuvers and initiatives. A few of the more Western-oriented Chinese leaders, notably Chou En-lai, are well aware of this, but since the passing of the "spirit of Bandung" in 1957, the predominant strategy of the People's Republic has been the "primitive" one of promoting immediate world revolution. In this limited sense it is Trotskyism applied to the underdeveloped areas rather than the

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industrialized countries. Indeed, Trotsky's flip remark that as Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the revolutionary regime he need only "issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop,"[15] seems almost to describe Peking's international behavior during the worst period of "revolutionary diplomacy" in 1967.

To some extent the current attitude in Peking is similar to that of the period of "war communism" in the USSR. But it should be remembered that after the Soviet Union made an adjustment to the nation-state system, concentrated on building socialism in one country, de-emphasized world revolution, and engaged in sophisticated diplomatic maneuvers even at the expense of the world movement, the regime's international position was strengthened and in some ways the USSR became a greater threat to Europe than before. Communist China may experience a similar "opening to the right" as the next generation of leaders comes to power. The present Peking leadership fears that the growth of Soviet-style revisionism in the People's Republic is a distinct and ever-present threat.

If Peking becomes aware of possibilities similar to those Stalin saw and exploited, it might be a more powerful force to reckon with than it is today—especially in view of its budding nuclear capability—and a flexible policy on the part of the United States will be necessary. Such flexibility on major policy questions cannot be taken for granted. Western democracies in the 1930's failed miserably to use diplomacy with the Soviet Union as an effective political weapon against Hitler. There were a number of opportunities open to the Western states, but their leaders were still thinking of the "cordon sanitaire," the policy of containment and isolation of the Soviet Union, and did not exploit these openings. They failed again, at the end of World War II, to take the diplomatic initiative with the USSR in order to make maximum political use of the temporary Western military superiority and this led, as Winston Churchill predicted it would, to serious losses for the West. In both situations Western leaders, following the temper of the times, were the prisoners of outdated policies—first the policy of containment and isolation of the Soviet Union and then the policy of wartime alliance—so that at the crucial moment, when circumstances changed rapidly but predictably, they were not prepared to grasp the political and diplomatic initiative.

[15]Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1930), p. 341.

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With regard to Taiwan, the United States should do nothing that will make it more difficult in the future to adopt an unambiguous two-Chinas or one-China, one-Taiwan policy. If and when Peking becomes reconciled to the fact that the "peoples' wars of liberation" line is likely to fail as a global strategy, it may well try to exploit the political and diplomatic vulnerabilities of the U.S. position on Taiwan. Communist China has now needlessly alienated both world superpowers, which gives us an advantage in dealing with her. But a serious diplomatic offensive by Peking could, for instance, bring passage of the perennial UN resolution to seat the People's Republic and expel the Nationalist government. The diplomatic reverses suffered by Peking in recent years in Africa, South and Southeast Asia and elsewhere could have been largely avoided, and had they been avoided Peking would probably be much more troublesome to the United States today, both inside and outside the UN.

Chief among the political and diplomatic gains Communist China might expect from a less "radical" line is a restoration of the working alliance with the Soviet Union which prevailed until about 1957. This is not a pipe dream, although it seems impossible during Mao's lifetime. One of the greatest "crimes" of former Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, dismissed in 1959, was his desire to preserve the alliance with the Soviet Union, and there are today some among the less radical Maoist leaders who would like to see those ties at least partially restored. Furthermore, as the failure of the "peoples' wars of liberation" strategy becomes more obvious, the greater will be the pressures on Peking to build a more modern military establishment; without Moscow's help this task will be most difficult.

One of the sore points between Moscow and Peking in the 1950's was the meager support given by the Soviet Union to Communist China's claim to Taiwan. In recent years, Moscow seems to have been warning Peking that its support for China's claim is contingent, not guaranteed, and that it might be withdrawn altogether in the face of continued provocations by Peking. Chinese leaders were incensed when, in the debate over China's proposed admission to the UN in November 1967, the Soviet delegate "actually mentioned in the same breath the question of restoring China's legitimate rights and that of admitting the German Democratic Republic as a new member of the United Nations." This was "obviously meant to aid and abet the U.S. im-

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perialists in their plot to create 'two Chinas' in the U.N."[16] A few months later, a Soviet-published bulletin on the Olympic games[17] carried on its inside cover the flag of the Republic of China along with the flags of the other participating nations; a New China News Agency release of March 21, 1968 claimed that the Soviets had deliberately sent copies of the booklet to Peking. *Jen-min Jih-pao* of the same date printed an article recounting occasions during the previous year or so when the Soviet press had referred to Nationalist China as a "state" and when the Soviet Union had attended conferences at which Taiwan was represented. On July 6, 1967 Peking noted that Chiang Kai-shek was referred to in *Pravda* as "the President of the Kuomintang."

The support now denied by Moscow could be granted under changed circumstances. Since the United States supports, however ambiguously, the principle that Taiwan is part of China, a good diplomatic case can be made for Peking's claim. The Soviet Union might be willing to support it as part of the price for better relations with Peking, for this would bring to the Soviets the advantage of a stronger strategic position vis-à-vis the United States. It would also tend to isolate Washington diplomatically on the Taiwan issue, retard détente with the Soviet Union, and probably force the U.S. government to sacrifice other policy goals to maintain its position on Taiwan. This danger would be reduced if the United States had previously established a counterclaim committing itself and as many other nations as possible to the principle of an independent Taiwan rather than to the principle of a defensive alliance with the Republic of China government. The principle involved, so well understood and utilized by Manhattan cab drivers, is that of making a credible, public, irrevocable commitment, in this case to the defense of an independent Taiwan, so that other nations will oppose it only if their own most vital interests are at stake. The United States, at the least, must give the Soviet Union every reason to continue to regard the Western Pacific geopolitically as an American lake.

With all its drawbacks and liabilities, the present one-China policy, coupled with decreasing military aid to the Republic of China, is the best course of action for the short term. Adopting a two-Chinas or one-China, one-Taiwan policy would hold no immediate advantages for the United States: Peking would remain as

[16] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 30, 1967.
[17] New Books, No. 6 (Moscow: International Publishers, 1968).

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hostile as ever because Taiwan would still be separated from the mainland and the United States would still be defending the Kuomintang pretenders to Peking's power, while Taipei would become hostile toward Washington for trying to betray what that government feels is its vital interest. Finally, the incentive for Peking and Taipei to make a political deal, thus undercutting the basic American objective of denying Taiwan to the communist regime, would be greatly increased. The present diplomatic fictions and inconsistencies in U.S. Taiwan policy at least have the merit of faithfully reflecting the realities of power politics. But Washington must not allow its public commitment to such fictions and inconsistencies to obscure the best interests of the United States and the people of Taiwan.

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ATOMIC ENERGY AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1946-1954

by Francis Duncan

FEW events have had as much impact on international relations as the introduction of the atomic bomb in 1945. Ever since the grim holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, men have searched for ways of controlling the threat of nuclear weapons while enjoying the benefits of the atomic age.

The history of the efforts centering in the United States to control military use of atomic energy is a long and tangled skein of developments stretching from the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal in early 1946 through the Baruch plan, "Atoms-for-Peace" proposals, disarmament conferences, test moratoriums, an atmospheric test ban treaty, debates on the "nth country" danger, and warnings of accelerating nuclear proliferation. Even if all the pertinent information relating to these attempts to control atomic energy were freely available and had been carefully summarized by historians, the record would be complex and difficult to follow. But in the absence of full documentation, the torrent of books and publications on the subject has done as much to confuse as to clarify public understanding of efforts at regulation.

In the course of preparing the second volume of a history of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, covering the years 1947 through 1952, the commission's historical staff has had a unique opportunity to review a great variety of records, many of which are not yet available to the general public, and to make a detailed study of the international aspects of atomic energy during these years. Although a comprehensive treatment must remain for the forthcoming volume, the importance of placing the outlines of this history in proper perspective has led to the preparation of this article. It attempts to set forth in summary fashion the principal developments in international atomic affairs in the years 1946-1954.[1]

[1]The citation of documents bearing on these developments does not imply that the materials are unclassified or that they are necessarily available for examination by the public.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

I

President Truman was on his way back from the Potsdam Conference when the first atomic bomb was detonated over Japan. By prearrangement, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson released the Presidential statement concerning the event on August 6, 1945. Short and simple sentences declared that British and American scientists had won the race against the Germans to develop the atomic bomb. The new weapon would be used to destroy the ability of Japan to continue the war. Toward the end of the statement came a reference to the new understanding of nature that man had gained in harnessing the atom. Although it was not the policy of the United States to withhold scientific information from the world, not everything about atomic energy could be made public: technical processes of production or military application would be kept secret until safeguards had been devised to protect mankind from its unbridled use.

On October 3, 1945, in his special message on atomic energy to Congress, Truman called for action on the domestic and international fronts: Legislation was needed to establish an atomic energy commission which, among its several duties, should maintain scientific freedom and also safeguard information and regulate research and development on atomic energy. On the international plane, Truman proposed discussing with Britain and Canada means by which cooperation might succeed rivalry in the development of atomic programs. These talks, he emphasized, would deal with conditions under which international scientific collaboration and exchange of information could take place, but not with disclosure of manufacturing processes.[2]

A few days later in western Tennessee, Truman explained informally to reporters that there were no scientific secrets behind the atomic bomb. What was secret was the military application of the scientific information involved. The United States had not shared its knowledge of engineering processes with other countries and would not do so: not even, he declared firmly, with Great Britain and Canada. On November 15, 1945, in the presence of Cle-

[2]For the background on the Atomic Energy Act and on early attempts at international control, see Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *The New World, 1939-1946*, Vol. I of *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), pp. 408-619. The Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, and Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy, October 3, 1945, may be found in *Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, 1945* (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 197-200, 362-366.

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ment R. Attlee of Great Britain and William L. MacKenzie King of Canada, Truman promised that the three governments would work together for effective atomic safeguards under the United Nations, and would make available to all countries the fundamental scientific knowledge on atomic energy. Information on practical matters the three leaders saw as another affair. Since military and industrial uses of atomic energy rested largely on the same processes, the three states would share the technology of atomic energy "just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised."

The bill Senator Brien McMahon introduced on December 20, 1945 incorporated the distinction between the two types of knowledge. In Section 9, entitled "Dissemination of Information," McMahon established one category treating basic scientific data and another covering technical processes. He proposed that scientific data would spread unchecked while technical information would be subjected to some sort of control so that its dissemination would be consistent with the President's domestic and foreign policies. In the evolution of the bill, Section 9 became Section 10, more strongly labeled "Control of Information." Senator Warren Austin, taking his cue from the Truman-Attlee-King statement, had inserted in the section the proviso that industrial information would be withheld from other nations until adequate safeguards existed.[3]

At the time of Truman's signature on August 1, 1946, Section 10 read as follows:

SEC. 10. (a) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the following principles:

(1) That until Congress declares by Joint Resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes; and

(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to

[3]The President's News Conference at Tiptonville, Tennessee, October 8, 1945, and The President's News Conference Following the Signing of a Joint Declaration on Atomic Energy, November 15, 1945, *Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, 1945*, pp. 381-388, 472-475; Hewlett and Anderson, *op. cit.*, Appendix I, pp. 714-722; U. S. Senate, Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 1946, *Hearings on S. 1717, A Bill for the Development and Control of Atomic Energy*, Part 1, p. 9; Part 4, p. 483.

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provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress.

Somewhat later in the section, "restricted data" was defined as all data concerning the manufacture or use of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material for the production of power.[4]

Truman's signature marked the end of long hours of Congressional hearings and debates over the philosophy and administrative machinery for the national development and utilization of atomic energy. On the international level, progress was much harder to find. At the United Nations, an American delegation under the driving leadership of Bernard M. Baruch was trying to breathe life into a plan to transfer the technology of the atom from the United States, Britain and Canada to an international agency. Since the attention of U.S. officials was focused on the struggle over domestic legislation and the attempt to arrange for international control through the United Nations, the relations of the United States with Britain and Canada on atomic energy remained unformulated. The Atomic Energy Act—particularly Section 10—did not promise that working out satisfactory relations would be an easy task.

II

The Atomic Energy Act had been drawn up in almost total ignorance of the details of the wartime cooperation among the three powers. In these arrangements, Britain and the United States had the major roles. Canada had played a smaller part, confined largely to furnishing uranium ore, performing research on reactors which used heavy water to moderate neutron energies, and producing limited amounts of heavy water. The legislators might well have suspected the relative importance of the contribution each nation had made, but they did not know that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed at Quebec, in August 1943, that the United States and Britain would never use the atomic bomb against each other, and that neither without the consent of the other would use the bomb against a third nation. The two leaders had also set up the Combined Policy Committee to give broad direction to the effort to produce the bomb. The Combined Development Trust, an organization to coordinate uranium ore procurement, began

[4]Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Atomic Energy Legislation Through 88th Congress, 2nd Session* (Washington: GPO, 1964), Appendix B, "The Atomic Energy Act of 1946," p. 226.

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operating the following summer. Although the British and Americans shared equally the costs of ore obtained through the trust, all shipments went to the United States because it had the facilities to convert the ore to the fissionable material needed for the atomic bomb. The policy committee and the trust had stood the strains of war successfully and continued in existence.

The legislators were also unfamiliar with postwar plans and developments. They did not know that at Hyde Park, on September 18, 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill had initialed an *aide memoire* calling for full cooperation between the two governments in the development of military and peaceful uses of atomic energy. The *aide memoire* dropped from sight for a while at Roosevelt's death.

More important in the postwar situation than the misfiled document was a change in the destination of the ore shipments, most of which came from the Belgian Congo. Lord Halifax, about to return to London after an arduous tour of duty in Washington, had pressed Britain's claim for its share of ore. He had advanced the reasonable argument that the United Kingdom should receive the material for which it was paying. Unwillingly, General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, had conceded the point. Groves was in a difficult position. He was trying to hold together the vast empire he had created until Congress could decide the form of the nation's atomic energy program, and he had reason for his reluctance. The British did not yet have the facilities to use the ore they were demanding, while the Americans needed all the ore available to keep their installations operating efficiently.[5]

To David E. Lilienthal, appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on November 1, 1946, the sooner Congress knew of the wartime arrangements and the pressing need of the American program for uranium, the better. The problems posed by Britain and Canada were not identical. Indications were that the British intended to build a complete atomic energy complex, capable of carrying out all the steps from processing ore to fabricating atomic weapons. In contrast, the Canadians were concentrating their attention on reactor development. On December 30, 1946, Lilienthal asked Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to inform the Senate of the wartime complications. Byrnes, however,

[5]Hewlett and Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-280, 288; David E. Lilienthal, *Journals*, Vol. II, *The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 175.

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was only a few days away from ending his unhappy term of office and did not act. His successor, George C. Marshall, had to return from China to take up the burdens of office and to face the Greek and Turkish crises and the preparation for the Moscow conference of foreign ministers. With matters of such magnitude demanding immediate attention, it must have seemed to him that atomic energy relations with friendly foreign powers could wait.[6]

Another reason why atomic energy relations with the British may not have seemed critical was that the ingredients for an agreement were present. Roger Makins, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary attached to the British Embassy in Washington, talked with Lilienthal and his colleagues on January 29, 1947. Although Makins discovered that the AEC commissioners believed the Atomic Energy Act made it impossible to return to the close cooperation which had been achieved during the war, there was no denying that the Americans needed the ore Britain was accumulating. A few days later Makins called on Dean G. Acheson, Under Secretary of State. Both discovered grounds for an agreement. The Americans wanted to get rid of the agreement providing for mutual consent before employing the atomic bomb and the British wanted American technical information so they could build production plants. The need for the information was not imperative, since in time and with effort the British could undoubtedly solve the difficulties, but it would be a wasteful expenditure of money and talent to duplicate American work.[7]

During the war Roosevelt had handled atomic energy matters with Britain and Canada as executive agreements because of the need for secrecy. However, stable postwar arrangements would require the assent of Congress. That body had yet to learn of the agreements Roosevelt had made. The logical Congressional group to receive the information on the wartime entanglements and the urgent need for new arrangements was the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Under Section 15 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act, the commission was charged with keeping the committee "fully and currently informed." Moreover, members of the Joint Committee served on other committees: Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Thomas Connally, for example, were ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Consequently, approval

[6]Lilienthal to Byrnes, December 30, 1946, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as *AEC*).

[7]Lilienthal to Commissioners, January 29, 1947, and Acheson, British Request for Cooperation in the Field of Atomic Energy, February 1, 1947, *AEC*.

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by the Joint Committee meant more than support by the sum of its members. After a grueling political battle, the Senate confirmed the five commissioners appointed by the President. On May 5, 1947, at the first meeting with the Joint Committee after confirmation, the commission revealed part of the situation. Sumner T. Pike, a commissioner with a strong background in petroleum and mining, explained that the British were getting half of the ore from the Congo. His colleagues added that the British and Canadians had been active in several phases of the American effort; certainly the British knew how to make the bomb. One week later Acheson gave the committee further details. The members were shocked. The restrictions on the use of the atomic bomb had to be erased.[8]

Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper and Vandenberg turned to James V. Forrestal, recently appointed Secretary of Defense, and sought his support for getting rid of the British restrictions. Forrestal himself was impatient with any limitation on the most powerful weapon in the American arsenal. Nonetheless, negotiations did not begin at once, possibly because of efforts in the United Nations to achieve international control of atomic energy. In August 1947, George F. Kennan of the State Department's recently formed Policy Planning Staff concluded that the United States could no longer base the atomic energy aspect of its foreign policy on the Baruch plan. He recommended that, while efforts in the United Nations should continue, the United States should draw closer to Britain and Canada.[9]

In the fall of 1947 preparations for talks with the British and Canadians were begun. On September 22 Truman appointed Marshall, Forrestal and Lilienthal as the American members of the Combined Policy Committee. Meeting together on November 5, 24 and 26, the three formulated an American negotiating position. There was some discussion of the fact that fissionable material and atomic energy installations in Britain were more vulnerable to Soviet pressure and that American security from a military view would best be served if the British had no atomic

[8]Lilienthal, *Journals*, II, 175-176. No detailed accounts of the committee meeting with Acheson have been found. Acheson's proposed statement is in a binder entitled, "U.S.-U.K.-Canada Negotiations," Book 1, October 31, 1947, Federal Records Center (hereafter cited as *FRC*).

[9]Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 359-360; Forrestal Diary, September 11, 1947, Office of Research Administration, Princeton University; Kennan to Lovett, August 21, 1947, enclosure, "General United States Policy With Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy," *AEC*.

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energy program. However, there seemed to be no way to achieve this goal, and the group turned to more realistic possibilities. In return for a large share of the ore under British control and the abrogation of the Quebec agreement on the bomb, Marshall and Forrestal were willing to give Britain the information she needed.

Lilienthal had reservations. He believed at first that Section 10 made it illegal to exchange information with the British. Although State and Defense were willing to support amendments to the act to remove any impediment, Lilienthal opposed this course, fearing that it might reopen all the wounds of earlier Congressional battles. However, he and Herbert Marks, the commission's general counsel, saw a possible solution. They pointed to the phrase in Section 10 which empowered the commission "to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security." They concluded that only the military establishment could make the determination that exchanging information with the British and Canadians would benefit the United States. The American negotiators conferred with Vandenberg and Hickenlooper, the two most powerful members of the Joint Committee, and found them in agreement on the need for a new arrangement. Vandenberg was even willing to use economic aid to Britain as a weapon in the negotiations. Hickenlooper, although seeing the necessity for an accommodation, warned that any agreement had to be consistent with the Atomic Energy Act.[10]

The meetings with the British and Canadians, beginning on December 10, 1947, went with remarkable smoothness. Because the Canadian interest was largely limited to reactor operations, the main discussions were between the British and Americans. The three nations quickly agreed to exchange information in nine areas, none of which dealt specifically with weapons. Included among the areas were health and safety, research uses of radioisotopes and stable isotopes, fundamental and extranuclear properties of all the elements, fundamental properties of reactor materials, extraction chemistry, the design of natural uranium power reactors, and research experience with low-power reactors. Reaching an agreement on ore allocation proved more difficult.

[10]Truman to Lilienthal, September 22, 1947; Minutes, American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, November 5, 24, 26, 1947, and Forrestal, Meeting with Lovett, Vandenberg, and Hickenlooper, November 16, 1947, *AEC*. Lilienthal, *Journals*, II, 260-261.

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The Americans offered a formula in which the available ore would be allocated to meet the requirements of both the American and British programs. Since the American effort was the larger, in terms of absolute tonnage, it would receive the most ore. For 1948 and 1949, the Americans wanted all the ore production plus a considerable amount which the British had accumulated. On January 7, 1948, Robert A. Lovett for the United States, Lord Inverchapel for the United Kingdom, and Hume Wrong for Canada, agreed to three documents: the nine areas of information exchange, the ore allocation agreement, and a covering document called the *modus vivendi* which governed the relations in atomic energy among the three nations.[11]

III

The commission's procedures for administering the exchange of information were set up largely at the instance of Commissioner Lewis L. Strauss and were intended to make certain that every matter proposed for information exchange would appear before the commissioners for approval. Difficulties in exchanging information soon arose. A small American group, led by Walter H. Zinn, a leading reactor expert and the director of the AEC's Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago, visited England in late May and early June 1948. Zinn discovered that the British reactor effort was not directed toward the nuclear generation of electric power, as he had supposed, but to the production of fissionable material. Since the British in negotiations leading to the *modus vivendi* had indicated that they intended to build production reactors, they presumably were not aware of the impact Zinn's report would have at commission headquarters. Also the British had earlier informed the State Department that they intended their program to include atomic weapons.[12]

Strauss found Zinn's account disturbing. During the summer of 1948 he argued that Zinn's report revealed a very different situation in Britain than that upon which the *modus vivendi* had been concluded. In summary, he saw the British interest in producing plutonium as disclosing an intent to make nuclear weapons. American assistance to Britain was therefore helping another

[11]Minutes, Combined Policy Committee, December 10, 15, 1947, January 7, 1948, *AEC*; Lilienthal, *Journals*, II, 282.

[12]G. W. Weil, C. W. J. Wende, W. H. Zinn, "Report of Visit to Harwell and Risley, May 28-June 4, 1948," and Gullion, Memorandum of Conversation, March 19, 1948, *AEC*.

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power to breach the U.S. monopoly. He did not think this was the goal of American policy. If it were, the assistance to Britain should not be limited to nine areas. The existence of these areas was evidence that the American intent was not to help Britain acquire the technology to fabricate weapons. Strauss urged a Presidential review of the *modus vivendi.*

At this point Strauss stood alone. His colleagues on the commission felt that the British program was not subject to American control, that the British had never concealed their interest in producing atomic weapons, and that they had kept their agreement on the all-important ore allocation. His position received no support from the Department of State. His old friend Forrestal, confronted by the crisis of the Berlin blockade, was impressed by British willingness to accept the stationing in Britain of B-29 squadrons capable of delivering the atomic bomb. Although Forrestal listened with sympathy, he felt that the British program was an important factor in maintaining British confidence.[13]

At this juncture the information exchange program suffered a new crisis. Cyril S. Smith, a prominent metallurgist and an expert on plutonium, had worked during the war at Los Alamos. He was also a member of the powerful General Advisory Committee, established by the Atomic Energy Act to provide technical guidance to the commission. British by birth, but for several years an American citizen, Smith in May 1948 was planning a visit to England with his family. Prior to his departure, the British Scientific Mission in Washington followed the usual procedures and asked that Smith be allowed to discuss a number of topics at Harwell, the British atomic energy research center located near Oxford. Among those topics was the basic metallurgy of plutonium. This precise subject was not explicitly a part of the nine areas of the *modus vivendi,* although the metallurgy of plutonium could be considered as falling within the area known as the fundamental properties of reactor materials. In June 1948 the commissioners approved this area for information exchange, and on July 26, 1948 Smith was authorized to discuss the basic metallurgy of plutonium with the British. Plutonium was a reactor material in the sense that it was produced by reactors and had a long-range potential as a reactor fuel. However, the immediate im-

[13]Lilienthal, *Journals,* II, 380-381, 382, 385, 387; Forrestal Diary, July 8, 1948, Office of Research Administration, Princeton University. Strauss, Memorandum to the Commissioners, July 15, 1948; Bacher, Pike, Waymack, Lilienthal, Memorandum, July 23, 1948; Strauss, Memorandum for the Commission, July 29, 1948, *AEC.*

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portance of plutonium was that it was a fissionable material used in atomic weapons.[14]

Pike and Strauss were the only commissioners in Washington in August 1948 when Admiral John E. Gingrich, the commission's director of security and intelligence, learned of the recent authorization. The director turned to Strauss, a long-time friend, who urged Pike to cancel the authorization. Pike, acting chairman, scented trouble and sought the advice of Robert F. Bacher, the only commissioner with a scientific background. From the commission's laboratory at Brookhaven, New York, Bacher replied that the authorization should not have been given. Strauss contacted Hickenlooper, who had become chairman of the Joint Committee. Hickenlooper and Vandenberg went to the Pentagon to complain to Forrestal that the information exchange had become too broad and that the commission's administration of the program was too lax. Pike successfully reached Smith, and no discussion on the basic metallurgy of plutonium took place.[15]

The ramifications of the incident were great. The Joint Committee and the military now doubted that the commission was exercising sufficient care in managing information exchange. The British found the exchange program growing increasingly cumbersome and slow. Within the commission itself there was recognition that the *modus vivendi* had broken down as an instrument for information exchange and that a Presidential review was necessary.

William Webster, chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, the link between the commission and the military establishment, arranged for a meeting at Princeton to discuss a new policy to replace the *modus vivendi*. On January 24 and 25, 1949, representatives of the commission, State, and Defense discussed the complex question under the leadership of Robert Oppenheimer, chairman of the General Advisory Committee. The group felt that the real threat to American security came from the Soviet Union. Consequently, American policy should be to utilize uranium ore, atomic energy installations and scientific manpower in the most efficient manner possible so as to maximize the security of all three nations within the least amount of time. From this premise they concluded that British, American and Canadian efforts

[14]A. K. Longair to F. T. Hobbs, June 22, 1948, and J. B. Fisk to C. S. Smith, July 26, 1948, *AEC*.

[15]The sequence of events is not clear. The Strauss and Pike versions are in *Congressional Record,* 81st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 9755-9773.

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should be tightly woven together into what would be virtually one program. The degree of cooperation envisaged would have been greater than that which existed during the war.[16]

The National Security Council studied the proposals and forwarded them to the President on March 2, 1949. Truman approved the policy, but was sensitive to the need for Congressional support. On July 14 he and members of his administration met with Congressional leaders to hear Acheson, Lilienthal and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson present the proposals. Hickenlooper and Vandenberg left the meeting unconvinced. Briefly Truman pondered whether his powers as President were sufficient for him to make an agreement independent of Congress. Johnson and Acheson advised him not to press the question, since Congressional support was essential. The Joint Committee on July 20 and 27 heard the administration's proposals. The vehement questioning of the first session gave way to the relative calmness of the second only with Acheson's assurances that Truman did not intend to circumvent the committee. Furthermore, Acheson promised to keep the committee informed of the negotiations.[17]

IV

Before the exploratory conversations with the British and Canadians could begin, the situation changed drastically and irrevocably. The Soviets detonated a nuclear device in August 1949, and the premise upon which opposition to the *modus vivendi* was based—the preservation of the U.S. monopoly—was shattered. American and British scientists had already cooperated in analyzing the radioactive debris circulating through the atmosphere when conversations among the three nations began in the fall. The Americans proposed a closely integrated program with most of the production and weapon fabrication facilities in the United States. The British countered by asking whether the proposal would be acceptable to Congress. To this query, the Americans replied that Congressional approval would depend upon the terms

[16]Unsigned, Notes re Princeton Meeting, January 28, 1949, *AEC*.

[17]R. Gordon Arneson, Minutes of Meeting, The Special Committee of the NSC on Atomic Energy Policy With Respect to United Kingdom and Canada, March 2, 1949; and Arneson, Memorandum For The File, Subject: Blair House Meeting, July 14, 1949, *AEC*; Louis A. Johnson, Memorandum For The President, July 25, 1949; Arneson, Memorandum For The Files, July 20, 1949, and Press Release from the Office of Senator Brien McMahon, July 27, 1949, *FRC*; Lilienthal, *Journals*, II, 543-552, 555, 447-459; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 302-304.

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of the agreement, but presumably a united effort based on the most effective use of resources would stand the best chance of acceptance. The British were interested in close cooperation, but they also wanted a complete atomic energy program, including weapon facilities, and a somewhat greater degree of independence than the Americans desired them to have. Whether the differences could have been bridged will remain a matter for speculation: in February 1950 came news of the treachery of Klaus Fuchs, a leading figure at Harwell and a member of the wartime British group at Los Alamos, where he had been aware of the theoretical discussions of a thermonuclear weapon.[18]

Fuchs' espionage threw a harsh light on the American dilemma. Truman had announced on January 31, 1950 that the United States would accelerate its thermonuclear weapon effort. In succeeding months, official studies clearly indicated that a greater production effort would be necessary. Although the Belgian Congo was still an important source of uranium ore, other locations were coming into prominence as potential sources. In some of these areas British influence was strong. Moreover, much of the increased American production program was to be based on heavy-water-moderated reactors, a type more advanced than the graphite-moderated reactors built at Hanford during the war. In heavy-water-reactor technology the Canadians were leaders and could offer valuable assistance. Some American scientists, recalling British contributions at Los Alamos during the Second World War, hoped that some way could be worked out to revive the collaboration. Edward Teller, an ardent advocate of the thermonuclear effort and well aware of the formidable technical obstacles, appeared before the Joint Committee on March 3, 1950 and named several British scientists whose help he would welcome. Others hesitated. Secretary Johnson felt that the lesson

[18]Minutes, Combined Policy Committee, September 20, 30, 1949; Draft Minutes, Sub-Committee III, September 21, 1949; Meeting of Drafting Groups, Sub-Committee III, September 22, 1949; Draft Notes on Meeting of American Working Group, CPC . . ., November 22, 1949; J. Hall, Draft Notes on Meeting of Sub-Group I, CPC. . . , at 10:30 A.M., November 28, 1949; Hall, Draft Notes on Meeting of the American Side, CPC, Sub-Group I, at 3:00 P.M., R. Gordon Arneson's Office, November 28, 1949; Remarks by C. L. Wilson, The Steering Group Meeting on December 2, 1949 at 10:00 A.M.; Notes on Meeting of Sub-Group I (Steering Committee) of the CPC, 10:00 A.M., December 2, 1949; Notes on Informal Exploratory Technical Discussion Held in The Department of State on December 2, 1949 at 11:00 A.M., and Notes on An Informal Exploratory Meeting Held in Carroll L. Wilson's Office at 4:55 P.M., December 2, 1949, *AEC*; Lilienthal, *Journals*, II, 565, 574-577, 634-635.

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of Fuchs was that the United States should conduct its atomic energy program as independently as possible.[19]

The American policy was still undecided when the Korean War broke out. The bleak summer months of 1950 were followed by optimism in the fall as General MacArthur's forces swept across the 38th Parallel. Then hopes for an early end of the conflict and for a unified Korea were dashed by the onslaught of the Chinese communists. On November 30, 1950, Truman dropped a casual remark at his press conference which was interpreted to mean that he was considering use of the atomic bomb. Europe and Britain were alarmed, and to cheers in Parliament Attlee announced his intention to fly the Atlantic and talk to Truman. On December 8 the two leaders issued a joint statement. In cumbersome language, the President "stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."[20]

Attlee had won the right to be informed. In retrospect, it seems difficult to believe that his victory was significant. The United Kingdom was the major ally of the United States, British forces were in Korea, and the two governments were so involved financially and militarily that it seems inconceivable that American leaders would have used the atomic bomb without informing the British. Yet MacArthur and the British lacked confidence in each other, and observers in London must have been aware of the difficulty Truman was having in controlling the general. Attlee had good reason to consider relations between London and Washington regarding atomic energy to be unsatisfactory. He must have known that one of the major American goals in the negotiations leading to the *modus vivendi* was removing the British hold over the American use of the bomb.

Section 10 of the Atomic Energy Act, however, was still an obstacle to close cooperation. Gordon E. Dean had succeeded Lilienthal as chairman of the commission on July 11, 1950. A member of the commission before becoming chairman, Dean had watched Lilienthal wrestle with the problem of cooperating with

[19]Joint Committee, Hearing on H-Bomb Personnel, March 3, 1950, and Johnson, March 13, 1950, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, *AEC*.

[20]News Conference of November 30, 1950, and Joint Statement Following Discussions With the Prime Minister of Great Britain, *Public Papers of Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington: GPO, 1965), pp. 724-728, 738-740.

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the British. As a lawyer, he was worried about the ambiguities of Section 10. He thought the section made it impossible to exchange information with any nation on industrial applications of atomic energy, regardless of a determination that the action would benefit U.S. security. He was aware that British and Canadian assistance was of tremendous benefit to the United States. Therefore the law should be changed.[21]

In September 1951 Dean and the Joint Committee discussed Section 10. The committee was willing to accept the need to work with the British and Canadians, but was not willing to trust the commission's judgment in administering a cooperative effort. Hickenlooper bluntly stated that his distrust stemmed from his experience with Dean's predecessor. Into the amendment of Section 10 the committee wrote several restrictions. The commission could give information to another nation on the production of fissionable material, reactor development and research, but not weapon data. No agreement could be made with any nation which threatened the security of the United States, and security standards of the recipient nation had to be found adequate. Moreover, the commissioners had to agree unanimously that American security would be substantially improved by transmitting the information. The President, after receiving the written recommendation of the National Security Council, had to make a similar determination. Finally, the Joint Committee itself was to have thirty days, when both Houses of Congress were in session, to consider a proposed action. After very little debate, the bill passed Congress and was signed by Truman on October 30, 1951.[22]

V

In 1954 the Atomic Energy Act was drastically rewritten, and only traces of Section 10 remained. In the new act, careful wording allowed the British, who had demonstrated their competence by detonating their own atomic device in 1952, to receive restricted data on atomic weapons. The partnership of the United States and Britain had now become even fuller than it had been during the days of Roosevelt and Churchill.

In the long haul, Section 10 was perhaps not significant. Its effect upon Anglo-American cooperation was only temporary, but

[21]Dean to Lilienthal, *et al.*, July 21, 1949, and Dean, Memorandum to the Commission, October 20, 1949, *AEC*.

[22]Joint Committee, Hearing on Amendment to Section 10, September 12, 24, 26, 27, 1951, *AEC*.

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its existence caused bitter disputes. As Strauss observed in later years, Section 10 was a weak part in an otherwise well-drawn legislative act. The main defect, according to him, was the contradiction between the injunction to maintain security and the encouragement to disseminate scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy.[23] Law is, however, always an endeavor to balance irreconcilables. Probably the main flaw was the declaration that industrial information on atomic energy could not be exchanged with another nation until Congress resolved that effective and enforceable safeguards existed against the destructive forces of atomic energy. The only agency by which such safeguards could be administered was the United Nations. Section 10 gave no latitude to deal with a situation in which negotiations dragged on endlessly, and it was to the Soviet advantage for the discussions to spin on indefinitely.

Section 10 was based on the idealism that led to the birth of the United Nations, and not on the realism of international politics. Had the legislators known of the details of wartime cooperation, sounder legislation might have resulted. There need be no conspiratorial theory to account for the lapse. Truman knew little about the wartime arrangements. Some of those who knew were worried that continued close ties with Britain would jeopardize reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union under the auspices of the United Nations. Of the many lessons that Section 10 has to offer, one in particular seems to stand out: it is difficult to write good legislation if all the facts are not available.

[23]Lewis L. Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 255-256.

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CATHOLICISM, REVOLUTION AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA: LESSONS OF THE 1968 GUATEMALA MARYKNOLL EPISODE

by Francis X. Gannon

THROUGHOUT most of the postwar period, the Catholic Church in Latin America has found itself increasingly shaken by a series of movements seeking to modernize its religious and social direction in radical ways. In recent years contrasting answers to the calls for religious renewal and reform issued by the Second Vatican Council have accelerated this process, but in large measure it remains as before, a conflicting series of ecclesiastical responses to the desperate poverty and social injustice rampant throughout the continent.

As with other "revolutions," this one within the Church is marked by clashes between radical innovators and moderates. On the one side are those who, even if they style themselves "revolutionaries," support evolutionary but dramatic change to overcome social and economic backwardness. On the other is a more limited number in whose judgment an apocalyptic revolutionary overturning of Latin America's traditional social structures is the only way out of present conditions into a less unjust future. According to this latter view, the Church, if it is to be relevant to human needs, now has no other course but to place itself firmly in the revolutionary vanguard—even while recognizing that protracted "violence" inexorably attends political upheavals.

The situation has long been confusing to the uninitiated, chiefly because all sides have persisted in marching forward under the banner of "revolution." This term has been abused to the point where "to a Catholic in Mexico it may be repulsive; to a Catholic in Brazil, meaningless; and to a Catholic in Chile, necessary."[1] Latterly, the distinction has become more apparent: a growing segment within the Church maintains not only that episodic violence may accompany social revolution but that protracted

[1]Most Rev. Marcos G. McGrath, C.S.C., "Church and Social Revolution in Latin America," in John Considine, M.M., editor, *Social Revolution in the New Latin America* (Notre Dame: Fides, 1965), p. 149.

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political violence is a *sine qua non* for social revolution to occur at all and that the Church is obligated to support this position.

Conflicts over these issues affect both ecclesiastical and national life, and they have been widely publicized in countries like Brazil, Colombia and Chile. In late 1967, however, the scene of drama shifted for the first time to Central America. There, several U.S. Catholic missionaries of the Maryknoll Order, which had been working in Guatemala for twenty-five years, were expelled from the country for alleged complicity in guerrilla activities. In public declarations, the offenders admitted the correctness of the charges but contended that love of Christ rather than love of Marxism had led them to the steps they had taken. They would not cease their activities, they announced, even though expelled from both Guatemala and their order, but would seek to develop a "Christian Front" to aid in overturning, with political violence if needed, both the religious inertia of the Church vis-à-vis poverty and injustice and the Guatemalan government itself.

These events raised questions not only about the issues of Church self-reform and social revolution, but about the future of foreign missionary involvement in Latin America. Because of the great upsurge of foreign church assistance since 1959, 35,000 foreign Catholic priests, nuns and laymen, including 5,000 from the United States, are now working in Latin America, largely at the request of the Latin American Church.[2] The Guatemalan incident has thus had an enormous impact beyond that country's borders, and the central question is not so much whether the actions of these U.S. religious were condonable by the Church or justified, but whether they are a portent of things to come for Catholicism in Guatemala and elsewhere across Latin America.

II

To understand the implications of the 1968 developments for Catholicism in Guatemala and Central America specifically, and Latin America generally, they must be seen against the period of Isthmian independence (1818-1821) and the political environment in which the Church existed during the next 130 years. At the time of independence, the Church in Guatemala, given the cultural milieu in which it functioned, was reasonably sound in-

[2]For a brief history of the origins and dimensions of this massive foreign church response to "The Plea of the Latin American Church," see the 1964 address by the late Bishop Manuel Larrain, then President of the Latin American Bishops' Council (CELAM), on "Latin America and the Universal Church," in Considine, editor, *op. cit.*

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stitutionally. In Guatemala City—which had been in existence only for fifty years following the destruction by earthquake of the previous capital, Antigua, and its large shrines and convents—religious orders and lay religious associations were flourishing; and across Central America, churches and church life were a dominant part of the Isthmian scene. When independence came, Church leaders, like other groups in society, were split into camps opposing and favoring the move. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that of the twenty-nine signatures on Guatemala's Declaration of Independence, thirteen were those of clergymen.[3]

But almost immediately the Church found itself caught in incessant bitter struggles between anti-clerical "liberals" and opposing "conservatives," which continued throughout most of the nineteenth century. In 1822 a foretaste of what was to come occurred when the new Guatemalan government, finding the national treasury depleted, ordered several religious orders to turn over funds collected for the redemption of captives in the Holy Land. This tendency to confiscate ecclesiastical goods for public purposes, once set in motion, gradually increased over time.

During most of the ensuing decades, the record in each of the Central American countries was approximately the same insofar as the Church was concerned. Alternatively, as liberals and conservatives vied for control in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, the Church found its fortunes ebbing and flowing. At one time or another, as different governments came on the scene, religious orders were expelled, presidents were declared to have the right to appoint churchmen to ecclesiastical offices, and divorce was legalized against the wish of the Church; on other occasions the religious orders were recalled, the Church was subsidized from the national treasuries, and the clergy were given control of education.[4] Entrapped by such circumstances, the Catholic Church gradually grew weaker, to the point where its religious mission was impaired and it was unable to provide moral and social leadership to the surrounding society.

While many of Isthmian Catholicism's nineteenth and early

[3]Leandro Tormo and Pilar Gonzalbo Aizpuru, *La Historia de la Iglesia en America Latina,* Tomo III (Friburgo: FERES, 1961), p. 61. FERES is an international organization of socio-religious research centers, with headquarters in Brussels, which in the early 1960's published a pioneering 40-volume series of studies on Latin America.

[4]See Kenneth Scott Latourette, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: The Nineteenth Century Outside Europe* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1961), pp. 312-316.

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twentieth century failures were of its own making, due to its heavy-handed intervention in politics, a considerable share was imposed by political circumstances. Authoritarian liberalism, for example, after closing Church schools and expelling clergy as it invoked Comtean odes to "progress" and "light," time and again rubbed political salt into ecclesiastical sores by incongruously flailing the Church's blindness to progress. Guatemala under and after dictator Justo Rufino Barrios (1871-1886)—where, according to Mario Rodriguez,[5] violent repression and "deliberate anti-clericalism . . . reduced the once-powerful Guatemalan Church to a meek tool of the State"—merely exemplifies the situation into which the Church was frequently driven because of its own misdeeds and the actions of its opponents. That a century of liberal anti-clericalism still holds sway over Isthmian minds was evidenced during Nicaragua's presidential election campaign in 1962. In that year, a group of self-proclaimed social revolutionists within the Somoza continuation regime sought to run a strong candidate against their own party's nominee, the eventual President, Rene Shick. Issuing a weekly newspaper, these "revolutionary liberals" claimed they would present a comprehensive program for social reform. Instead, their key plank proposed closing down private religious schools, a trivial matter since only 12 per cent of the handful of Nicaragua's population attending school was enrolled therein, but rich in symbolic meaning for the traditional anti-clerical mentality.

No doubt the Church's religious and social impoverishment in the postcolonial period can be attributed to many nonpolitical causes, including the endless clashes between its theological teachings and the indigenous Indian myths. The aftermath to this struggle lingers on, vividly so in western Guatemala where tourists at Chichicastenango can view Mayan rites as they are performed each Sunday on the steps of the parish church. On occasion even in Nicaragua and Honduras liturgical fiestas break into public brawls between churchmen anxious for orthodoxy and reveling laymen. Clergy zealous to cleanse out superstition may find themselves unwanted, as several foreign priests did recently in rural Guatemala, where they were turned out of six towns in a four-year period.

But the Church's postcolonial ineptness rested on more than

[5]Mario Rodriguez, *Central America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 96.

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struggles with politicians or an unreceptive Indian mind. Theological and pastoral fuzziness, for one thing, can never be unanticipated in countries like Guatemala where major seminaries are only now under construction, four centuries after the educational and pastoral reforms demanded by the Council of Trent. Nor should theological obfuscation be unexpected in situations where sustained reflection is at best an incredibly difficult task.[6] Beyond these dilemmas, however, a central source for the Church's growing irrelevance in the postcolonial world was the lack of priests and religious. This has been chronic and is true of the region even today. In 1958 Honduras had fewer diocesan clergy than in 1912; in Nicaragua's capital, Managua, in 1955 there were only fifteen run-down, understaffed parishes, each caring for an impossible 28,000 parishioners; Guatemala, even if the vast Peten area is excluded, has one priest per 20,000 Catholics, has had but two or three nationals ordained in many years, and of 115 diocesan priests in 1960 could count only seventy-three who were indigenous. By adding to clergy shortages the near total absence of parish life, the phenomenon which sharply distinguishes Latin American Catholicism generally from that in the United States, an observer can visualize the traditional picture of weakness the Church in Central America presented both to itself and to the outside world. While much of this weakness can be attributed to non-Church influences, such as rigid class differences which precluded the formation of genuine parish communities, the inability of the postcolonial Church to develop a stronger national clergy and a more effective ecclesiastical organization stemmed chiefly from the incapacity of the Church itself, no matter how much this may have been due to historical conditioning.[7]

From 1815 on through 1945, in short, the Catholic Church in Central America increasingly tended to exist on the margin of national and regional life and reposed, to adopt Jordan Bishop's phrase about its condition in Latin America generally, "in large part on baptism, conceived not as a sacrament of faith, but rather as a sort of magic which will somehow produce the faith without the Gospel having been preached." This may have sufficed to in-

[6]On the difficulties facing Latin American theologians, see Juan Luis Segundo, S. J., "Theology: A Latin American Problem," Information Documentation on the Conciliar Church (IDOC), No. 68-14, April 7, 1968.

[7]For facts and figures on clergy problems and distribution in Central America, see Garrido Isidoro Alonso y Vines, *La Iglesia en America Central y el Caribe* (Friburgo: FERES, 1962).

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still the basis of faith in the majority, but it meant, as the distinguished Mexican poet, Octavio Paz, claimed similarly for Mexico, that for the middle and upper groups, and particularly for the intellectually enterprising and socially-conscious, religion and tradition were too frequently "offered . . . as dead and useless forms that mutilate or stifle our individuality."[8]

Although exerting a nominal moral influence over some key aspects of individual and public life, Isthmian Catholicism remained entangled in the ethos of religious individualism impressed on it during the colonial and liberal periods, the ethos which seemed to demand exclusive concentration on one's own salvation while ignoring the welfare of others. It lacked a modernized social vision and existed almost in alienation from the values and life of the surrounding society. True to its origins in a highly-spiritual Spanish Catholicism, it has until recently not been an "Incarnation Catholicism," that is, it was "never very concerned with man's life in this world."[9]

Ivan Vallier has pointed out that traditional Catholic elites in Latin America have since colonial times been frustratingly subject to "secular control" of one form or another and have "had to work through the non-Church elite in order to initiate Church activities or develop strategies of survival." To survive in this environment meant haggling with and depending on the secular powers, and this in turn weakened the capacity of the hierarchy and the clergy "to create and institutionalize a religious-moral foundation for the growth of an agreed-upon system of values."[10] Chiefly because of Isthmian isolation from the continental community, the history of the Central American Church has frequently been an exaggerated repetition of the situation encountered elsewhere in Latin America during the past century and a half. In consequence, the Church generally found itself unable to contribute to the development of an "agreed-upon system of values" to replace the traditional system which was no longer proving viable.

While the colonial forms of Catholicism found in Central America may have been culturally valid for and adequate to preindustrial or even semi-industrialized societies, they eventually

[8]Octavio Paz, *The Labyrinth of Solitude* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 106.

[9]Interview with Roger E. Vekemans, S.J. by Russell J. Huff, C.S.C., "Is the Church Losing Latin America?," *Ave Maria,* January 9, 1960.

[10]Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites: Differentiation and Development in Roman Catholicism," in S. Lipset and A. Solari, *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 191 ff.

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proved unsuitable to a modernizing, dynamic world. Octavio Paz has perhaps overly criticized the Spanish colonial world, but his criticism is applicable to Central American postcolonial Catholicism. It too "was a world open to participation, was even a living cultural order, but it was implacably closed to all personal expression and all adventure; it was a world closed to the future."[11] In many respects Leslie Dewart's description of the weakness of the Church in pre-Castro Cuba equally applies to the Church in Central America, especially to its situation from 1870 to 1945. It had become wrapped inside a siege mentality, its outlook characterized by quiet despair since it could make little impression on the community around it. Dewart has observed in his short study, *Christianity and Revolution*:

> Immemorially, then, the Church thought of itself, correctly, as impotent, as barely surviving under duress, as threatened by secularism, indifference, freemasonry, and in the last twenty years or so by Protestantism as well! To the high and low clergy this was especially humiliating in view of the privileged position of the Church in Spain. They knew that [Central America] would never realize the Spanish ideal, yet this ideal, being a matter of Christian principle, as they thought, was never to be given up in intention. The Church, thus, was caught in a vicious circle: it was discontent with the here and now, but it saw no other solution than trying to hold on to the past. This was the sort of posture that, by its own implications, could not but confirm the stagnation from which the Church suffered.[12]

III

With this background, the remarkable aspect of Central American Catholicism in recent years is that the Church is no longer theologically and morally inert, even if it remains institutionally weak. Before the Second Vatican Council modern papal social teachings were largely unknown in Central America; as late as 1964 papal encyclicals rarely appeared in bookstalls. At present, Christian moral concerns and social teachings, though by

[11] Paz, *op. cit.*

[12] (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963). That not all Central Americans would accept this portrayal of Isthmian Catholicism is evident from statements by the Salvadorian Catholic delegation to a Church self-evaluation meeting held in Chimbote, Peru, in 1953. In their report the Salvadorians said the Catholic Faith in their country "must be very deeply rooted and sincere. How else could it have outlasted all the excesses of the Era of Emancipation [Independence] and the efforts of nineteenth century liberalism and masonry to uproot it? In spite of the great scarcity of clergy . . . the delegates did not want their country to be considered a mission land." William Coleman, M.M., *Latin American Catholicism: A Self-Evaluation* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: World Horizon Reports, 1958), p. 30.

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and large still not acted upon, are nonetheless stated clearly. Notable Church documents attesting to this point include the 1962 Guatemalan episcopal letter, the 1963 and 1966 statements of support for the political integration and social reform of Central America made by the Regional Episcopal Conference (CEDA), and the 1967 pastoral letter of the Guatemalan bishops.

The 1967 bishops' letter, deeply sensitive to Guatemala's history of political turbulence, placed the Church's influence behind massive social reforms but against further political violence. Both a commentary on Guatemala's immediate religious, political and social problems and an incisive application of Pope Paul VI's acclaimed encyclical on "The Development of Peoples" to Guatemalan conditions, it provides an extraordinarily frank assessment of the needs of that troubled country. While the Guatemalan bishops, unlike some of their Latin American episcopal counterparts, made no pretense to have the answers to the questions confronting both the Church and their turbulent and desperately poor land, they did proclaim the absolute need for a "revolution in liberty" so as to preclude a revolution in violence. Perhaps their statement contained nothing that has not previously been forthcoming from other areas of the Church, but its mere appearance indicates how deeply Central American Catholicism has been affected by the worldwide "Catholic revolution" which is seeking to renew the Church and place it at the forefront of the clamor for social reform.

The rapidly changed role of the Church has been reflected during the past ten years in the seminaries opened in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua—despite the fact that, due to cultural factors, the attrition rate of entrants remains abnormally high. The Capuchin seminary in the backwaters of Bluefields, Nicaragua, provides an impressive example. Two new Jesuit universities, one in Nicaragua staffed entirely by Nicaraguan Jesuits, the other in Guatemala, are highly active, and competition from them is forcing educational improvements in the national autonomous universities.

In the rural zones, especially in volatile Guatemala and Nicaragua, the Church is keeping pace with the region's modernizing trends, largely through the presence of several hundred foreign priests who spend from five to twenty years there and are

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stimulating catechetical, educational, health and self-help activities. In Guatemala's northern Huehuetenango Province, for instance, where only two priests served 150,000 Catholics in 1944, by 1968 the Maryknoll Order alone had thirty priests serving seventeen parishes with five to twenty rural chapels, many reachable only by horse. Maryknoll also has a network of nineteen dispensaries staffed by nuns; fourteen Catholic schools with over 3,000 students; and a highly effective catechetical system, relying on 1,000 well-trained Indian catechists, to re-evangelize and provide social leadership for the area's 250,000 inhabitants. In Siuna, Nicaragua, a Capuchin-inspired rice and bean cooperative among several hundred illiterate peasant farmers has realized member gains of over one and a half million cordobas, an astronomical sum in this zone which lives on the margin of the national economy; and, notably in El Salvador and Honduras, the Church has developed powerful systems of radio schools that stimulate both religious and social change.[13]

The percentage increase of priests in Central America between 1945 and 1965, chiefly due to the foreign clergy influx, was approximately three times greater than the region's rapid population increase. Time alone will demonstrate whether, as some observers charge,[14] this foreign assistance is saddling Latin America and especially countries like those in Central America with church structures it should not have and cannot support; or whether, on the contrary, a new religious situation, replete with a modernized, incarnational and social reformist Catholicism, will become a genuine element in Central America's religious tradition.

The post-1955 renewal in the Church's religious and social mission has been remarkable both at theological and social action

[13]For a general resumé of this "Catholic Revolution," see John Goshko's six-part series in the *Washington Post*, March 10-16, 1968. For details on specific countries, see the international bulletin published in Brussels, *Pro Mundi Vita*, especially January 1964, July and August 1965, and November 1966. All regional and national episcopal letters are available through National Catholic (N.C.) Foreign News Service Dispatch, U.S. Catholic Conference (U.S.C.C.), Washington, D.C. N.C. News Dispatches on March 11 and 21, and April 4, 1968 provide factual data concerning the Church's social activities, as do the present writer's articles, "A Model Town for Latin America," in *The Catholic Digest*, January 1964, and "Self-Help at Siuna," in *Inter-American Cooperative Review*, January 1966. See also the U.S.C.C. monthly publication, *Latin America Calls*, for various on-site reports by foreign Church personnel at work in Central America.

[14]Some of the issues and viewpoints involved in "Reappraising Aid to Latin America" are summarized in *Herder Correspondence* (Dublin), June 1967, pp. 178-179. An uproar was created by Msgr. Ivan Illich's massive attack on the shape of U.S. foreign Church aid in Latin America, "The Seamy Side of Charity," which appeared in the U.S. Jesuit magazine *America* in January 1967.

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levels. To anyone aware of the condition of Catholicism in Central America ten or even five years ago, the changing Church outlook and its support for modernization of religious, social and economic structures, no matter how convoluted or inept, is clearly a phenomenon. Abbé Francois Houtart's comment in 1963 about Latin America is applicable generally to postwar Isthmian Catholicism:

> . . . despite the fact that Latin American Catholicism may seem to be a "pure facade or almost exclusively superstitions," nothing is more false. . . . except for certain urban populations it can be stated that the Latin American populations have the faith and that they express it by an attachment to Catholicism. Even in those regions abandoned for a long time, the response of the people to a little dynamic pastoral approach is a witness of this attachment.[15]

The Central American experience would also seem to lend credence to Vallier's argument that "this new Catholicism is the point of Archimedean leverage between Latin America's past and its future" precisely because continental realities demonstrate that "religious reform is a requisite of social reform."[16] With respect to Central America, Vallier's thesis may require delimitation, primarily because the Isthmian countries generally lag twenty to thirty years behind their larger neighbors in capacity to achieve desired changes, whether religious or social. The main lines of his argument, however, seem borne out for Guatemala as much as for Chile or Argentina.

IV

Yet, despite sweeping changes in its outlook, role and practices, the Catholic Church in Latin America has during the past several years been confronted by demands that it must move beyond self-reform and support for changes in social institutions to support for revolution, even if prolonged political violence is the inevitable outcome. According to this viewpoint, any other posture will make the Church even more irrelevant to the surrounding society than it is currently said to be. A small number of increasingly clamorous clergy and laymen have been urging that if the Church is genuinely to place its influence behind the changes required to break the strangleholds of poverty and injustice on the majority of the people, it must sanction revolutionary political violence "in

[15]Francois Houtart, *The Latin American Church and The Council* (Friburgo: FERES, 1963), p. 55.

[16]Vallier, *loc. cit.*, pp. 225-226.

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the name of the cross."[17] Operating from this premise, in 1964 several Brazilian priests were arrested for urging overthrow of the government. Priests in Panama and Uruguay have recently proposed the same course of action for the Church in those countries. And in 1966 a well-known priest who had requested laicization, Camilo Torres, was shot by Colombian military forces in an ambush on a guerrilla band he had joined. Subsequently, Torres' fame inspired a cult among university students throughout the continent, and in many quarters his teachings are propounded as the latest Gospel.

In late 1967 and early 1968 the demand that the Church must work for the violent overthrow of existing social structures and institutions, perhaps by backing anti-government guerrillas, took the form of an international incident in Guatemala. Unexpectedly, first news of this episode came from a press release on January 20, 1968, in which the U.S. Superior General of the Maryknoll Fathers announced the suspension of two members of the order stationed in Guatemala for "personal interference on the part of American citizens in the internal affairs in a country where they are guests." Both men, and subsequently a third and a Maryknoll nun, refused to comply with requests of their superiors to return to the United States and fully explain alleged complicity in guerrilla activities, and all left Guatemala under threat of expulsion. Maryknoll, which is the largest organization of U.S.

[17]For various estimates and analyses of the scope of these demands that the Church give its blessing to revolutionary violence as the only way to achieve reform, the following news reports and articles are helpful: Georgie Anne Geyer, "Catholic Revolution in Latin America," *The Progressive,* July 1968; "A Church Shift on Rebels," *National Catholic Reporter,* January 31, 1968; Thomas C. Brumeau, "The Church Moves Left," *Commonweal,* February 2, 1968; Jaime Fonseca, "CELAM Faces Latin America's 'Temptation' to Violence," *The National Catholic Register,* July 28, 1968; "Paiz, Justice et Violence," *Informations Catholiques Internationales,* December 15, 1967; Sally Thran, "Catholics Study Violence Ethic," *Washington Post,* February 2, 1968; Jose M. Bonino, "Christians and the Political Revolution," *Overseas Mission Rev.,* Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1968; Jordan Bishop, "Prudencia y Revolucion," *Vispera* (Montevideo), April 1968.

The theoretical perspectives of Dr. Richard Shaull, a Presbyterian theologian, e.g., "When the old order is no longer able to serve men adequately . . . it will have to be brought down or broken open by conflict or violence of one sort or another," have also provided considerable stimulus to Latin American Catholics. Dr. Shaull's 1967 CICOP (Catholic Inter-American Forum) keynote address, "A Theological Perspective on Human Liberation," is reprinted in Centro Intercultural de Documentation (CIDOC), Doc 68/58, Cuernavaca, Mexico. A July 15, 1968 working paper of the Latin American Bishops Conference struck this theme by warning that Latin America faces the alternatives of "violent change and pacific change," *New York Times,* July 17, 1968. On August 4, 1968, *The National Catholic Register* reported that a letter was being "circulated among 'progressive' priests in Latin America for signatures asking the Bishops to reaffirm the morality of violent revolution in the face of great social injustice."

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Roman Catholic religious men working in Central and South America, stated that its policy is "to forbid its members to interfere in the internal and political affairs of a host country." According to an unidentified Maryknoll spokesman and to later news stories, the parties had admitted to their superiors in Guatemala that on two occasions in late 1967 they had met with guerrilla leaders and at least discussed the possibility of linking efforts. Refusal to explain these dealings to U.S. superiors meant suspension from priestly functions.

In ensuing weeks one of the suspended priests and the former nun were married, an action which provided comic-relief overtones to the episode for Guatemalans, whose abundant humor preys on the shortcomings of clergy. The other, after leading a group of Guatemalan students into Mexico, was expelled from that country and claimed he had been beaten by the secret police. Another participant reported as requested to the U.S. superiors but eventually dropped out of the order. The entire group ultimately arrived in Washington, where through various articles and speeches they announced their intention to form a "Christian Front" to promote revolution. While a news blackout by the Guatemalan government initially precluded widespread publicity on the affair both in the United States and in Guatemala, one of the suspended priests found a public forum to air the group's views at the annual meeting of CICOP, the Catholic Inter-American Forum, which was discussing Latin America in St. Louis on January 29-31, 1968.

Once this story received circulation, differing reactions came from many Church quarters. A small group of attendees at the CICOP meeting signed and circulated a petition urging Maryknoll to rescind the suspensions and asking other Catholics to support the demands for revolutionary upheaval. The remainder of Maryknoll's missionary group in Guatemala, 102 in number, signed a statement repudiating the actions of their confreres, who, "against our norms, took active part in the internal affairs of the country." At the CICOP forum itself, the founder of Guatemala's Christian Democratic Party denounced the perpetrators chiefly because the Guatemalan guerrillas, in his judgment, represented "no military strength or political ideal for most of the people," while a Panamanian Christian Democratic leader suggested that the missionaries' actions were a well-meaning but paternalistic intervention by foreigners to atone for U.S. misdeeds in Latin

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America. In Guatemala, the right-wing and anti-clerical press attacked all foreign-missioners and urged their expulsion as "preachers not of the faith but of communism."

Other spokesmen and news media pointed to the tremendous labor performed by Maryknoll over a twenty-five-year period. Commenting that two of the suspended priests had been highly praised for their work (the third and most publicized had not been in the country long enough to make a serious contribution to Maryknoll's effort), various friendly observers suggested that the grinding poverty of rural Guatemala had created a situation of total frustration leading them to consider political violence as the only solution to social malstructuring.[18]

Two of the individuals involved quickly put forth detailed defenses of their actions which received wide publicity in the United States, notably through the *National Catholic Reporter*, a liberal weekly with a circulation of 80,000 subscribers. Throughout 1968 other public newspapers and Church-related journals carried occasional articles on or by the ex-Maryknollers.[19]

[18]Details about this episode have been put together from news releases and documentary statements issued by N.C. News Service, Foreign and Domestic, on January 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 28 and 31, 1968, which later appeared in many U.S. Catholic diocesan newspapers. According to one unverified story, a total of five priests and four nuns, under the leadership of Sister Marian Peter, M.M., had held a secret meeting in Escuintla, Guatemala, with guerrilla leaders and made plans to smuggle light arms into the country. When the Maryknoll superiors learned of these activities, they ordered the individuals involved to desist. (Matanzas Domestic Service in Spanish, 1700 GMT, January 23, 1968, as found in U.S. Information Agency, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Latin America,* February 8, 1968.)

The most interesting reactions to the arguments of the ex-Maryknollers were those of Rene de Leon, founder of Guatemala's Christian Democratic Party, and Ricardo Arias Calderon, a Panamanian professor. At the CICOP meeting, the former commented that "Violence is not an answer to violence. In Guatemala there exists a movement of popular promotion which hopes to improve those marginal areas [of society] in such a way that men can assume for themselves capability in the cultural, social, economic and political areas. . . . I think that even where violence exists the Christian answer is to make man complete—let him become a man—and not throw him into a war he does not understand." Arias Calderon noted that "Latin America may be undergoing a compensatory movement . . . we may be receiving now people with honest desire to give testimony against the exploitation of the past, but it's a testimony that is not totally relevant to the situation in which we Latin Americans are living." (*National Catholic Reporter,* February 7, 1968.) A sympathetic but generally unanalytic review of the Guatemalan episode is Ralph Clark Chandler's essay, "Guerrilla Priests," in *Commonweal,* August 9, 1968. Dr. Chandler is Secretary for International Affairs of the United Presbyterian Church. See also stories in the *Washington Post* on February 4, 17 and 18, 1968; and in the *New York Times* on January 19 and 20, 1968.

[19]The main defense is contained in "The Present State of the Church in Latin America," a 4,000-word essay issued in Mexico on January 20, 1968 and written by ex-Maryknoller Father Thomas R. Melville. Significant excerpts from this essay were printed under the headline "Revolution Is Guatemala's Only Solution" in the *National Catholic Reporter,* January 31, 1968. On February 14, 1968, the Sunday

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According to the participants, they had been led to take the steps they did "because of the teachings of Christ and not because of Marx or Lenin. . . . our response to the present situation is not because we have read either Marx or Lenin, but because we have read the New Testament." They charged that the Guatemalan hierarchy had done little "to alleviate . . . misery," and that "their insistence on preaching a legalistic Catholicism, based on Rites and Sacraments, without any attempt to translate their significance into daily living, is a fact that cannot be questioned." Attacking the Guatemalan government for failing to curb purportedly rightist-inspired violence which had led to at least 1,000 killings in two years, the expellees also assailed the United States for supplying arms to Latin American governments. They argued that revolutionary violence by the Guatemalan masses is just, precisely because it "is the oligarchy that is using violence —that is, violating the rights of the masses," and contended that they would continue their struggle since "we do not pretend to be a foreign force . . . we know that we are invited by the masses to participate in the transformation of society."

In Guatemala, much of the furor over the Maryknoll incident died down several months later when the government curbed rampant rightist terrorism after several hard-line right-wing elements had captured, and subsequently released unharmed, the Archbishop of Guatemala, Mario Casariego. That the thinking and actions of the parties to the episode paralleled those of other U.S. missionaries, however, is evidenced by the April 1968 statement of a Maryknoll nun still stationed in Guatemala:

> Our real contribution to Guatemala will be when that country has undertaken a social, nationalistic revolution, whether peaceful or violent. When Guatemala has put in a true land reform, has nationalized all public utilities, mines and industries, has an educational reform, an effective tax reform—all for the benefit of the majority of the population.[20]

The idea that nationalistic revolutions "whether peaceful or violent" are the key to transforming Latin American societies,

Outlook Section of the *Washington Post* printed a short essay, "A Priest on Guatemala," by Father Blaise Bonpane, M.M., one of the expellees, and Bonpane's comments on Father Camilo Torres appeared in "The Brotherhood of Priestly Revolutionaries," *Jubilee*, July 1968. Two news stories that reflected the participants' views were "Bonpane Screams at U.S. Arms Role," *National Catholic Reporter*, February 2, 1968, and the N.C. News Service story of April 4, 1968 on Father Arthur Melville.

[20]"A Proposal for Development in Guatemala-U.S. Foreign Policy" by Sister Marian J. Pahl, M.M., February 1966, reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, April 23, 1968, pp. 3210-3212.

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with their juxtaposed parafeudal, neomercantilist and even fully modernized socio-economic institutions, is not new. Despite the belief among current "Catholic revolutionists" that their cause is novel, apocalyptic ideas conceived to transform society at one stroke have flourished throughout Latin American history—even in the Guatemala of 1824, where, typically, the "liberals" proclaimed: "The time has come in which America should solve for the entire world the great question of the universal betterment of society." This stream of apocalyptic thinking is mainly manifest today in the view held by some components of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the "Catholic revolutionists" that a "command economy" is the only way to modernize Latin American economies. Yet down through history it has had its counterpart urging recognition of the futility of "revolutionary utopianism." As expressed in 1852 by the distinguished Argentine leader, Juan Batisti Alberdi, the challenge is to work toward an America which will be "more practical than theoretical, more given to reflection than enthusiasm, as a result of maturity and experience, must think of things rather than men and turn its attention not so much to final goals as to the means of reaching them today. We seek the practical reality of that which in other days we were content to proclaim in writing."

V

A small but influential element within Latin American Catholicism is firmly convinced that the indispensable prerequisite to contemporary socio-economic reform is to break down and break open the old order, hopefully in a peaceful manner but with resort to political violence where necessary. Is there validity in this approach? Is it acceptable in light of Catholic tradition about the relationships between morality and politics and Church and State? And what does it portend for the future of Catholicism in Latin America? While there are no uncomplicated answers to these questions, the following observations will illustrate the difficulties confronting the Catholic proponents of unremitting violent revolutionism.

First of all, critiques such as the religious, socio-economic and political analyses set forth by the ex-Maryknollers concerning conditions in Guatemala do not reflect the course of development and modernization throughout Latin America. Considered against the

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religious and social updating of the Catholic Church which has occurred in both Guatemala and Central America generally since 1945, the charge that institutional Catholicism is still operating within an outdated theological framework and is utilizing irrelevant socio-religious approaches is hard to sustain. Moreover, while such statements correctly attack the gross social inequities found in the continent, they give little indication that significant economic progress is taking place. Even at present growth rates, according to the President of the Inter-American Bank, Felipe Herrera, the region can expect by the year 2000 "a per capita income level at least on the order of $700 [the present per capita income of Puerto Rico] . . . and can look forward to becoming one of the world's most dynamic areas of the future."[21]

Inadequate assessment of the pace of economic growth and social change in Guatemala was noticeable in the statements of the disaffiliated Maryknollers. For one thing, they seemed unaware that the process of "ladinoization," whereby the Indians are being "absorbed into a broader social stratum," is accelerating to the point where in another two or three generations Guatemala "may cease to be a nation of two cultures."[22] For another, their protests focused on political and socio-economic conditions in 1967 and 1968, when Guatemala was experiencing political turmoil initiated by leftist elements which had been driven out of the countryside into the capital. They overlooked the transformation of Central America's traditional economies occurring under the leadership of the Central American Common Market and Integration Movement. From every indication this movement, begun in 1958, has given strong stimulus to regional development. Whereas in 1960 trade among the member nations amounted to $32,000,000, or about 8 per cent of their total trade, by 1967 it had increased over 700 per cent to $220,000,000, or approximately 20 per cent of their total trade.[23] This, for an area the size of California, with a population of fifteen million, was a remarkable advance.

Although it has not yet resulted in significant benefits to the Isthmian poor and deprived, the economic integration movement is helping to stimulate changes in fundamental financial, fiscal,

[21]Address, World Trade Conference, Chicago, February 29, 1968. Available from the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington.

[22]Richard N. Adams, "Social Change in Guatemala and U.S. Policy," in *Social Change in Latin America Today*, introduction by Lyman Bryson (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 255-256.

[23]*Baltimore Sun*, July 2, 1968, p. 1.

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agricultural, communications and general economic structures, institutions and conditions which alone can bring about genuine social reform and modernization.[24] Central American socio-economic development is in many respects only in the beginning stages, especially with regard to the reform and modernization of agricultural structures, but to overlook the vast changes occurring in Central America beclouds Isthmian realities.

Second, those favoring "revolution" run up against the fact that even the most determined ecclesiastical social reformer is wary of "violence." This is especially so, as no less than the radical Brazilian Archbishop, Helder Camara, points out, when violence threatens to overturn the religious and human values the Church has helped to impregnate into Latin American societies. Progressive and innovative Catholic elites recognize that the Church's religious and social failures from the postcolonial period to 1945 were often due to its episodic failures, in Vallier's words, "to create and institutionalize a religious-moral foundation for the growth of an agreed-upon system of values." They seem aware that since 1945 these failures have been largely overcome, thereby allowing the Church to contribute critically to the formation of an emerging modernized value system in the continent. Vallier believes the nature and influence of this contribution is such that, unless secular reformers can tie their political and economic objectives to Catholicism's "new face," Latin America "will continue to show regressive swings, egregious political setbacks, and familiar patterns of development and resistance."[25]

The "radical" solutions now proposed by "Catholic revolutionists" are thus considered too illusionary by the majority of Catholic modernizers, chiefly because the latter groups tend to recognize that the new value systems and reform activities they are helping to create are not yet widely enough accepted and applied. In many respects they seem to assent in Vallier's judgment that if, in the present circumstances. "Catholic revolutionists" are led to act

without the support of a Catholic-based social ideology that condones development and modernization, [a] tragic situation will arise for both

[24]For a cursory review of this movement, see *The Central American Common Market*, published by the Bank of London and Montreal, 1966. The 1967 ROCAP Report, "Profile of Progress of Social and Economic Development and Integration in Central America and Panama," available from ROCAP/USAID, U.S. Embassy, Guatemala, also gives a perspective absent in the ex-Maryknoll declarations, as do the many studies and reports issued by SIECA, the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration, Guatemala.

[25]Vallier, *loc. cit.*

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the Church and the society. For the Church and its traditional hierarchy, the legitimation of the more radical kind of pluralist strategy, at this time, is too destructive of their own authority. They cannot give way and maintain their own dignity. At the same time, key sections of the laity are not prepared to confront the problems that the new priests and a new laity are defining to the public. If, on the other hand, the traditional sections of the society, both the hierarchy and the secular groups, had been prepared by a phase of contact with the modern Catholic ideology, the pluralists [i.e., modernizers] would now be able to tie their efforts into a meaningful movement of social action.[26]

Third, while the "Catholic revolutionaries" may find within the Catholic community considerable sympathy and understanding for their "outrage" against social injustice, they also encounter the hard truth that in Latin America and elsewhere, full-scale calls for revolution with or without "violence" have through the years been peripheral to Christian theology generally and Catholic thought specifically. Typically, in 1967 the Guatemalan bishops pointed out that the nation, even though wracked by injustice and turbulence, had a "legitimately constituted Government" and that this fact in itself was hard-won progress for a bitter and strife-torn land. The bishops went on to cite the Church's theological tradition which recognizes a "sad, sorrowful and constant experience: Nations which have suffered a violent revolution, have experienced substantial changes in their economic and social structures—no one can deny this—but they have seldom reached the justice thirsted after, and in the majority of cases their situation has worsened in a most impressive way." They concluded that sooner or later the situation in Guatemala could change "either by a revolution in liberty or by a violent cataclysm," but offered no apocalyptic panaceas for the nation's poverty and injustice.[27]

Behind Church reluctance to approve revolutionary violence lies the weight of Church tradition. In his widely-cited encyclical on "The Development of Peoples," Pope Paul VI drew on this tradition to point out that "insurrection, except in case of evident and prolonged tyranny, which seriously attacks the fundamental rights of the person and dangerously harms the common good of a country—engenders new injustices, introduces new disequilibriums and provokes new destructions. One ought not combat a real evil at the price of a greater evil." And Archbishop Helder

[26]*Ibid.*, p. 225.

[27]Exhortacion Pastoral del Episcopado Guatemalteco, May 9, 1967 (mimeo.), available from the Latin American Bureau, U.S.C.C., Washington.

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Camara, who is generally considered so revolutionary-minded that, according to the *Washington Post's* John Goshko, Pope Paul "once greeted him smilingly as 'my communist bishop,'" operates within this tradition when he warns that although the Church must help overturn unjust social structures it "cannot allow that the authentic values of our civilization, which she has helped to create, might be overturned by structural changes which may be rapidly effectuated."[28] In other words, even "ecclesiastical revolutionaries" are not unaware of the need to choose between authentic and inauthentic revolutions, conditioned as they are by the traditional Christian insight on revolutionary upheaval.

Fourth, beyond these theological and ethical judgments about the usefulness of violence as a means of producing structural social and political change—a "revolution" grounded in liberty—the pro-violence position tilts against the reality of the Church's bitter experience that its overt intervention in politics often produces greater evil than good. For the most part, this self-appraisal of the Church's incompetence in political matters is shared by public and private leaders and institutions throughout Western civilization. In the words of Krister Stendahl, the head of Harvard's Divinity School, "the Christian West has learned far too slowly and reluc-

[28]Boletin Informativa (FERES, Bogota), Ano IV, 1966, p. 28. As Goshko points out in his *Washington Post* series cited earlier, since not even Archbishop Helder Camara can "discuss this renewal in specific terms," an observer must be careful when evaluating ecclesiastical references to social revolution. Nevertheless, as instanced by the reflection of Panamanian Bishop Marcos McGrath, Catholic social morality generally considers that "even from a tactical point of view, those who take to violence are often doomed to failure; for their 'testimony', although it may excite some admiration, often sets back the process of development itself." (*America,* April 27, 1968, p. 567.)

For a short review of traditionalist Catholic antipathy to the pro-revolutionist elements, see Paul Hallett's column, "Theology of Revolution," in *The National Catholic Register,* February 25, 1968. A 1968 pontifical letter to the French Social Week in Orleans stated the point clearly: "it must be affirmed today without equivocation: the revolution of the Gospel is not that of pagan force and of violence but that of love, according to the example of Christ and in imitation of Him." (N.C. News Service, Foreign, "Vatican Warns of Reform Through Violence," July 13, 1968.) Other 1968 declarations reiterated this theme, notably an article "On Theology of Violence and Revolution" by Msgr. Ferdinando Lambruschini in *L'Osservatore della Dominica,* Vatican City, on May 26; and the 4,000-word address of Pope Paul VI on June 23, which specifically condemned a so-called theology of violence and warned against the evils of political violence. (See *New York Times,* June 24, 1968.)

Two commentators, one Protestant, the other Catholic, have recently attacked the "pro-revolutionist" arguments as mere faddism and a species of verbal virility. (Martin E. Marty and Rev. Andrew M. Greeley in the *National Catholic Reporter,* May 15 and May 30, 1968, respectively.) Other commentators, however, suggest that theologians should develop "A Theology of Conflict" (John J. Lally, *Commonweal,* December 15, 1967) lest Christians be accused of seeking peace at any price. A similar thesis is reflected in an essay by a Brazilian priest, Almeri Bezerra de Melo, entitled "Revolution and Violence," IDOC, No. 68-28, July 14, 1968.

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tantly that a close interplay between religion and politics has dangers so insurmountable that our best choice must be acceptance of pluralism and the secularization of political decisions." In specific form this means accepting, according to Ernest W. Lefever, that "the social function of the Church is to clarify, enrich and renew the values of the political community. The task of the statesman is to pursue the goals of order, justice, and freedom in the face of entrenched interests that deny them or crusading forces that would destroy them."[29]

The Church's reluctance to ally itself with programs aimed at correcting political injustice by cataclysmic means is also rooted in a certain deference, again learned after arduous struggles, about its competence as a political judge. This humility, often forced on it from without, has helped it to recognize, in Karl Rahner's words, that "the Church does not offer patterns but the strength for enduring this life." The point is summed up in Alfred de Soras' observation that "the concrete judgments or rules suggested by the Catholic moralist are not necessarily the only valid ones" since "the Catholic moralist has, if one may express it so, no particular grace of infallibility in such technical analysis."[30] To those urging that the Church become the vanguard of "the revolution" these limitations which inhibit the Christian moralist, politician or ec-

[29]*The Reporter*, January 11, 1968, p. 42. A leading Catholic theologian, Rev. Pierre Bigo, S.J., former director of Action Populaire in Paris, reinforced this position at the Latin American Bishops' meeting on October 12, 1966 by observing: "God cannot become a fringe benefit of any political venture, legitimate as it might be. And neither can the Church .... the Church is not of this world, and she cannot become a political leader, not even of the poor, the victims of exploitation .... the Church recognizes for herself no right to change a leader or a decision of any union, political party or any other civil institution .... the Church intervenes in society only through the conscience of the layman, but she does not dictate his decision to him." ("The Nature of the Church's Presence in Latin America," *CIF* (Center of Intercultural Formation) *Reports*, December 16, 1966, Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico.)

[30]Alfred de Soras, S.J., *International Morality* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1963), p. 26. This is a volume of the French Catholic Encyclopedia. For a brief statement contending that the Church should abandon these traditional insights, see the article "Christian Democracy—R.I.P." by Peter Steinfels, *Commonweal*, December 1, 1967, pp. 294-296. Proponents of the latter position begin by decrying the "Church's failure to confront effectively the most obvious and simple of evils: Nazism, nuclear annihilation, racial oppression, worldwide poverty," and concur that "the Church should take precise and detailed political positions. This should not be an exceptional event but a normal practice of the community." In a deeper theological vein, the position has been elaborated in "The Church's Social Function in the Light of a Political Theology" by Johannes B. Metz, in J. B. Metz, editor, *Faith and the World of Politics* (New York: Paulist Press, 1968). Msgr. George Higgins, Director, Social Action Department, U.S. Catholic Conference, restated the traditional insights in a discussion of Vatican II held at Notre Dame University in 1966; see John H. Miller, C.S.C., editor, *Vatican II: An Inter Faith Appraisal* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1966), pp. 313, 507-508.

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clesiastical leader seem outdated. To Christians sensitive to their theological traditions and to those who have suffered whenever the Church intervened directly on the political process, however, the cautions of the Christian moralist inevitably appear to have a sound basis in both theology and human experience.

Doubtlessly, one response from within the Church to the "Catholic revolutionists" will be attempts to revise or further develop Christian theological teachings concerning socio-economic and political "violence." Experience, both contemporary and historical, suggests that progress presupposes a certain amount of conflict. There is also considerable recognition today that massive illiteracy, poverty and hunger may themselves be forms of "institutionalized violence." On the basis of these two postulates it seems that theological and moral discussion of this issue, if it is to be faithful to Christian tradition and yet open to the future, will accept that conflict seems inevitable at one stage or another in development and that therefore the central dilemma is to determine which forms of "violence" will respect human beings and their basic rights as free men with the least amount of evil.

It can be anticipated that calls for "Christian revolution," especially when these emanate from foreign missionaries in Latin America, will result in a constant re-evaluation of the role and work of the foreign Church missioner. Since 1950, the number of foreign missionary helpers in the continent has grown considerably. As time goes on their ranks may continue to swell, but this increase will no doubt be accompanied by a sharpened delineation of the theological teachings and national legal standards relating to foreign clergy noninvolvement in national politics, as well as by a reassessment of the nature and scope of missionary work, whether in religious or social fields.[31]

Of course, the final response to calls for revolutionary violence remains that of the ordinary Christian layman who engages in political life in Latin America. His reaction either to institutionalized violence or to the need for revolutionary upheaval

[31]This reassessment of missionary work does not seem to mean that the Church's missionary effort will be dampened. While some contend that the contemporary ecumenical movement fostered by the Second Vatican Council means a lessening of missionary endeavor, the more accepted view has been summed up by Peter Hebblewaite, S. J.: "The intention then, of the Council, should be clear: to restate the motives for missionary work as the manifestation and realization of the divine plan for mankind; and at the same time to indicate an approach to non-Christian religions less negative than has sometimes been the case in the past. The operation is, as I suggested, paradoxical but not contradictory." "Why Missions?," *The Catholic World*, September 1967, p. 339.

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will depend on his ability to make a prudent political decision as he relates his moral traditions and judgments to concrete political facts. As Bishop McGrath suggests, "each situation must be judged on its own merits . . . every person must make his own conscience judgment."[32] Since the Church and the Christian can exist under most social systems,[33] the Christian's problem goes beyond which socio-political system he should support to determining which system does the least violence to personal and human values and then moving toward this, ordinarily in a nonviolent way, with violence being the last resort.

[32]McGrath, *America*, April 27, 1968, p. 567.

[33]That an increasing number of Catholic bishops and elites concerned with the Third World are convinced that socialism is the main answer for the plight of underdeveloped countries, is evident from the October 5, 1967 declaration signed by 17 bishops, including 9 from Brazil ("Bishops Plead for Underdeveloped Countries," N.C. Documentary Service, U.S.C.C., 1967.) Also, see the essay "Christianity and the Socialist Revolution," by J. M. Gonzales-Ruiz in IDOC, No. 68-22, February 2, 1968. N.C. News Service (August 7, 1968) disclosed that a detailed draft statement of the Brazilian bishops on social reform was so strong that the government requested "that the statement not be published for fear that the detailed statement could provoke subversive action," and the bishops agreed to issue a more general statement. Some of the main philosophical barriers to outright Church support for Marxist-type revolutions and societies are outlined in "Marx and Religion: An Impossible Marriage," by Louis Dupre, *Commonweal*, April 26, 1968, p. 171.

While it may be that the Church can exist under most social systems and that it perhaps should lend its support more frequently to revolutions with a genuine human dimension, it is difficult to see how any Christian can welcome the coming to power of a "communist" as distinguished from a "socialist" regime of whatever variety.

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Reviews

Nation-Building and Civic Action*

by Bryce F. Denno

Recent U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks provide a current reminder that nations deeply begrudge the nonproductive expenditures required to support military establishments—even while recognizing the indispensability of security forces. This is one reason why countries have, from ancient times, used soldiers and sailors not only to fight but to explore and colonize, to build roads, aqueducts and public buildings. In short, military professionals have been required to help earn their pay by contributing to a public works program now often termed "nation-building."

There is an additional reason why nation-building by the military has received considerable emphasis in recent years: its role in countering incipient or active insurgency. While fighting the insurgent, the military attempts to woo the people away from the enemy by helping them. This effort, known as civic action, comprises a wide range of activities, including military road construction, education of the youth, provision of medical care, and assistance to peasants harvesting their crops. The aim is to cultivate popular support for the indigenous government which the military represents.

Professor Edward Glick's book, *Peaceful Conflict,* deals with both nation-building and civic action. He stresses that neither is new. Roman soldiers built roads in Great Britain still used today and colonized the area that is now Rumania. A British soldier, Colonel George Everest (after whom Mount Everest is named), surveyed the length and breadth of India, pioneering in triangulation methods of measurement. French engineering officers in the 1860's produced some of the best nineteenth-century maps of Mexico. More recently, Soviet military construction units have built houses as well as bridges, railroads and roads.

In our own country, the military have been especially active in contributing to national growth and development. West Point provided our young nation's first engineering school and the cadres and experience to found others. The U.S. Army's Corps of Engineers has had responsibility for internal navigation and flood control since 1816. Lewis and Clark, who established "the first clearly marked trail from the Mississippi to the Pacific," were U.S. Army officers. An Army surgeon wrote the first American textbook on psychiatry.

Building on its experience in administering conquered areas during World War II, the U.S. military has also developed considerable expertise in the conduct of civic action. This has proved in-

**Peaceful Conflict.* By Edward Bernard Glick. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1967. 223 pp. $6.50.

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valuable in recent years as we have been called upon for assistance and advice by friendly governments countering insurgency. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 reflected the emphasis the late President Kennedy placed on civic action "as an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the Armed Forces and the populace." (p. 71.) Under this act, the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development advise, assist and help finance foreign armed forces in their administration of civic action programs.

In Viet Nam civic action is an essential activity. It provides the core of the all-important revolutionary development program designed to win the Vietnamese people away from the Viet Cong. The South Vietnamese government, with massive U.S. assistance and advice, is conducting large-scale public programs to improve the health, education and economic welfare of the people. But much of this effort can go for nought if it does not accomplish an essential civic action objective—creating a favorable public image of the armed forces of Viet Nam. In most of rural Viet Nam, where the war will be won or lost, the Vietnamese soldier is the sole representative of the Saigon government. If he convinces the peasants that he is trying not only to protect them but to assist them toward attaining a better life, the government will be well on its way toward winning the war.

In an apparent effort to give comprehensive treatment to the subject of worldwide civic action (and perhaps also in recognition of the surfeit of published material on Viet Nam), Glick gives scant coverage to Viet Nam in his chapter on the Far East. Other chapters describe civic action in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. Of particular interest is Israel's program which Glick terms the "most highly developed . . . in the world." Israel is the "biggest 'exporter' of civic action help abroad and the biggest 'importer' of foreign civic action trainees." (p. 128.) The Israeli armed forces have been given the mission not only of defending their country, but of assisting in the huge task of national absorption and integration of immigrants of widely diversified cultures and possessing varied skills and levels of education. Thus, in Israel the army is not only a mammoth educational and training institution but a national social laboratory where the youth are being indoctrinated.

In his final chapter, Glick discusses the "problems and promise" of civic action. One problem is the competition military civic action offers to comparable civilian activity, thus hampering the growth of civilian services in a national economy. Often military units are not located in areas requiring civic action and it may not be feasible (or militarily desirable) to move them. Another major problem, in the opinion of this reviewer, is the deep-set reluctance of the military in many countries to participate in civic action. This attitude is not new; it is reflected in the com-

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ments of a nineteenth-century Inspector General of the U.S. Army who complained that the widespread use of soldier labor in farming "would sink the proud Soldier into the menial, & reduce him who may have gallantly led in the front of our enemies, into the base overseer of a troop of awkward ploughmen." (p. 51.) Military distaste for civic action often stems also from an understandable concern that this activity will degrade the combat capability of military units.

It is unfortunate that Glick waits until his final chapter before bringing up problem areas. Even then he fails to analyze them or even discuss them at length. Most of his book is a factual description of worldwide civic action programs, and his statistics are impressive. But he is short on the analysis which is needed if we are to identify and solve many of the problems that will be encountered in such programs in the future. Perhaps he will address himself to the analytical task as he continues his excellent writings on this subject.

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: A New Basis for Friendship*

by Richard L. Siegel

Students of political life usually approach political autobiographies with a high degree of skepticism. Such works are invariably self-serving, and only in the rarest of cases do they illuminate the motivations of the author or the history of the times. An autobiography written by a national leader while he is in power, particularly by a head of state and government who is involved in the furtherance of markedly new domestic and foreign policies for his nation, can be expected to be self-serving in the extreme.

Those who read President Mohammad Ayub Khan's *Friends Not Masters* from this perspective will be somewhat surprised. Clearly, this book is self-serving and rarely reveals the inner man; few negative personal qualities are admitted by the author. Yet, this autobiography cogently traces the development of the statesman-general and his program. More significantly, it presents an excellent explanation of the premises on which Pakistan's recent policies have been based. And it provides essential background information for an understanding of the recent turmoil in Pakistan and President Ayub's decision to retire at the end of 1969.

Much of the recent literature on military elites has prepared us to recognize the considerable variety of outlook in this breed of man. One is persuaded that, despite his role as the gravedigger of parliamentary government in Pakistan, Ayub Khan is not fundamentally hostile to democracy. Of course, this is one of the views Pakistan's President is most eager to convey to the foreign reader. Like various strongly authoritarian rulers, he calls for more traditional national political institutions and processes. Unlike most such figures, however,

**Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography.* By Mohammad Ayub Khan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 275 pp. $7.50.

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Ayub convincingly argues that he desires to see Pakistanis learn the ways of democracy so that this advanced form of governance might work in their country. He is positively oriented to the capabilities of the military and civil service administrators more than he is antagonistic to parties, politicians or parliaments.

Ayub also conveys the complexity of the Moslem soldier who strongly identifies with both Islam and his nation-state. The Sandhurst graduate repeatedly emphasizes both his religious upbringing and his desire for Moslem unity. Yet, it is his fervent Pakistani patriotism, expressed in his references to India and the United States, that appears to be his dominant impulse.

He is the consummate military staff officer, more urbane than most. In 1954 he privately set out his ideas about Pakistan's future in what he proudly refers to as "a military fashion." (p. 186.) According to him the 1958 coup was "handled as a military operation." (p. 71.) He followed the Eisenhower pattern in adapting military staff organization to the exercise of his civilian responsibilities.

Ayub's foreign policy outlook, despite his full awareness of the potentialities of relations with Moscow and Peking, is largely dominated by his assessments of India and the United States. The title, *Friends Not Masters,* derives from his view of U.S.-Pakistan relations, and his book amounts to a partial declaration of independence from the United States. His fundamental perspective on this matter is that neither institutional ties nor American economic assistance will compel Pakistan to forgo improving relations with Moscow and Peking or implement unwanted changes in domestic economic policy. Yet the reader is impressed with the limited nature of this declaration. Rather than an ultimatum, it is an appeal to Washington to agree to a new accommodation with Pakistan. Washington's permanent limitation of arms assistance for India and acceptance of a truly nonaligned Pakistan would provide the foundation for the changed Pakistani-American relationship Ayub proposes.

During the Johnson Administration, the United States by and large accepted this new accommodation even though the two presidents held diametrically opposed views concerning the role of India in Asia. Ayub's view of India is "pathological," a term he uses to describe New Delhi's outlook toward Pakistan, and there is no doubt that Pakistani-Indian hostility, distrust and suspicion are reciprocal. But this writer simply does not agree with Ayub that official India holds "a deep hatred for the Muslims." (p. 115.) All of India's efforts in foreign affairs are viewed by him as directed toward "one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration." (p. 117.) It is noteworthy that the otherwise sober and analytical Ayub makes no effort to downgrade the official mythology. Fortunately for Pakistan, Washington has retreated from its role of arms merchant to both parts of the sub-

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continent—a step that resulted from the obvious lessons of the September 1965 Kashmir conflict rather than American accord with Pakistan's view of India.

Ayub's discussion of China reflects the cautious flexibility that characterizes his foreign policy orientation. He explains in pragmatic terms the numerous friendly steps taken by Rawalpindi and Peking, emphasizing Pakistan's concern not to interfere with the legitimate interests of other states. In this vein, he notes that "the limits within which Pakistan's relations with China can develop are fully understood and respected on both sides." (p. 166.)

Pakistan's President wrote in 1960 that, "As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean."[1] Strongly influenced by the views of Z. A. Bhutto—his former Foreign Minister who today is his arch-political enemy—Ayub soon afterward deliberately set out to establish friendly relations with Communist China. He opposes the view that China has dangerous aspirations in South and Southeast Asia and calls on Washington to follow him in revising its approach to Peking.

In his discussion of Soviet-Pakistani ties, Ayub gives the impression of not fully appreciating the possibilities that began to unfold in the mid-1960's. This writer believes that the new Soviet awareness of Pakistan's value as a friendly power has been and will continue to be more important than the more publicized improvement in Sino-Pakistani relations. Moscow, like Washington, has not been persuaded by Ayub and his associates that New Delhi is fundamentally expansionist. Both superpowers have found other reasons to balance their commitments in South Asia. Soviet policymakers came to realize that their political, military and economic involvement in this area did not have to be one-sided in order to be rewarding. Beginning with its new attitude toward Kashmir, Moscow revised its policies in favor of Rawalpindi's major interests.

Primarily because of the continuing Soviet-American détente, it now requires less courage to pursue the policy of nonalignment than it did in earlier years of the Cold War. Regardless of who ruled Pakistan, events almost certainly would have forced important changes in her posture toward East and West during the present decade. Ayub Khan served his country well because he implemented a foreign policy reorientation with a minimum of international friction and without major harm to Pakistan's program for economic development. This could not have been accomplished by a firebrand such as Z. A. Bhutto. Both Pakistan and the United States should be grateful that because Ayub's moderation prevailed, the bridges connecting Washington and Rawalpindi have not been burned.

[1]Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1960, p. 556.

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Soviet Behavior in International Organizations*

by Richard N. Swift

In his study, *The Soviets in International Organizations,* Professor Rubinstein's aim is to analyze how, in the post-Stalinist decade, the Soviet Union behaved in the United Nations' specialized agencies and regional economic commissions. He begins by taking a retrospective look at the Stalin era, when the USSR was most concerned to keep the West from turning the UN into an anti-Soviet coalition. Then, starting with the Soviet Union's announcement in 1953 that it would thereafter participate in the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, he describes the Soviets' verbal (though not financial) support for the proposed Special UN Fund for Economic Development, their abortive call in the World Health Organization for an International Health Year, their niggardly financial contributions to economic development generally, and their opposition to using volunteer workers in technical assistance programs.

These preliminary investigations convince Rubinstein that Soviet statements and behavior in international organizations (but not foreign policy speeches by Soviet leaders or Soviet press commentaries) anticipate the direction, if not the timing, of innovations in Soviet policy. His research also demonstrates that Soviet decision-makers do not respond directly to external pressures; they alter Soviet policy only when convinced of the need to change. After they modify a policy, moreover, they almost never explain themselves, leaving others to infer the reasons for the change. He believes it impossible to ascertain the operational impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology on any particular decision. He also points out that some Soviet statements in various international forums have been undisguisedly preoccupied with considerations of national prestige.

With these observations out of the way, the author gives more sustained attention to changing Soviet policy in the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He shows us how, from 1953 to 1960, the Soviet Union tried to use its policy in the UN to achieve respectability among the neutralist countries, and how from 1960 to 1963 it tried positively to "bend international organizations to Soviet purposes." He draws on all his research to point up, in separate chapters, the relatively small role Soviet personnel play in international secretariats, the largely instrumental view Soviet leaders take of the UN, and the varying relations between Soviet ideology and Soviet behavior.

Finally, Rubinstein presents "prospects and proposals," in which he visualizes the possibility of stimulating Soviet interest in and modifying Soviet criticisms of international organizations. Three of his proposals toward these ends

**The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963.* By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 380 pp. $7.50.

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are modest: making a Soviet national the head of a specialized agency, locating one of the agencies in Moscow, and holding alternate General Assembly sessions in the Soviet capital. Two other suggestions are more far-reaching. One, which the Kennedy Administration put into effect, is that the United States should abandon the pursuit of meaningless issues in the UN designed to achieve propaganda "victories" over the USSR, as, for instance, the American fight against accrediting to the IAEA the communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.

The other suggestion is that the United States should challenge the Soviet Union to enter a joint program to help the developing states within the framework of international organization. If this idea has not yet appealed to American administrations, it certainly has appealed to the emerging nations which, since the end of the decade under study in this book, have persistently challenged the United States as well as the Soviet Union to cooperate in economic development programs. The challenges came at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and in the General Assembly's steps toward establishing the Capital Development Fund (CDF) in 1966. UNCTAD and the CDF, notable in themselves, are important also because of the way they brought the Soviet Union and the United States to stand together, conservative "haves" defending their relatively prosperous bastions from assaults by the more radical "have-nots." The Soviet Union's special interest in cultivating good will in the emerging states, which Rubinstein stresses, was obviously not stronger than its desire to limit the CDF; even cooperating with similarly minded American policy-makers was less objectionable than risking what seemed to be an unlimited and uncontrolled raid on the Kremlin's treasury.

Rubinstein's study ends just before this new phase of Soviet policy became manifest, and thus his book does not take it into account. Nor does he attempt, even in the materials he examines, to compare Soviet policies in the UN with those of other major states. But his book demonstrates that Soviet attitudes in the UN have not differed essentially from those of other members. Soviet views, like those of Western states, evolve with changing conceptions of national interest and tend to reflect overall national appreciations of the entire political environment. By failing to rise to the challenges of UNCTAD and CDF, for instance—just as by working toward a détente in the political and military realms—both the USSR and the United States clearly demonstrate that their common financial woes can overcome their mutual antagonisms. One wonders whether the enhanced interest in international organization, which Rubinstein would like to see emerge in the Soviet Union, can in fact occur without fundamental changes in Soviet perceptions of the nation-state system. Despite orthodox communist pretensions to "internationalism," Soviet decision-mak-

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ers seem even less likely than their Western counterparts to alter their outlook.

Notwithstanding his over-optimism about the chances of evoking more cooperation from the Soviet Union in international organizations, Rubinstein's volume is a significant contribution to the growing literature about selected aspects of Soviet behavior. He has read widely in Soviet materials, interviewed many governmental and international officials, and made good use of the available documents, overcoming as well as one can the inaccessibility of Kremlin papers. Professor Philip E. Jacob's Foreword makes extravagant claims about the book's methodological contributions, but he is justified in praising the substance of the study, especially its revelation of Soviet pragmatism, flexibility, and failures of coordination. By making the record of Soviet behavior in international organizations more accessible, Rubinstein has contributed in an important way to policy studies generally, to our understanding of the USSR, and to our appreciation of the marginal role the United Nations plays in the policies of all modern nation-states.

The Psychologist and the Decision-maker*

by John W. Bowling

Joseph H. de Rivera's *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* is a frontal attack by a representative of a major covey of would-be decision-makers from the Academy on the real decision-makers of the Establishment. The central message of the book is clear: U.S. government decision-makers are for the most part irrational.

This detached scientist tells us there are two ways of looking at national security policy. The first way is that of the Establishment: "If they are within the government, they believe they see the objective world situation, are doing everything they can to better it, and are choosing the best possible courses of action." The author openly rejects this view and defines his own perception pattern: "American foreign policy is relatively weak, officials are failing to perceive certain aspects of the world situation, and the way policy is formed needs drastic revision. Those of us with such feelings are motivated by a sense of urgency: by a fear that eventually a nuclear war will occur, by an anxiety that the nation may become less democratic, and by a desire to see other peoples develop their own unique potentials rather than be destroyed." He goes on to say that "this book expresses both my basic optimism in the ability of man to control his future and an idealistic view of truth. . . . I believe it is at least 'even-odds' that any distortion on my part is in the eye of the beholder rather than in the product [the book]." The professor complains that people like him have not been able to change policy.

De Rivera believes that his findings may lead to a reduction or

*_The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy_. By Joseph H. de Rivera. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1968. 441 pp. $9.25, trade; $6.95, text.

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elimination of these policy mistakes and to changes in the directions advocated above. In the book, errors of judgment and maladaptations to the real world will be exposed and analyzed, in the hope that changes in policy-making may result which will bring U.S. policy in line with the true requirements of the situation (i.e., de Rivera's objectives).

The author's attack is two-pronged: on the ineffectiveness of policymaking machinery based on his analysis (as opposed to recent professional studies) of what does and does not constitute good decision-making personnel, procedures and structures, and on its effectiveness as measured by the choices made among alternative policies by U.S. decision-makers. He points out that a decision-maker's perceptions of reality, rather than "actual" reality, will determine foreign policy; it is apparent that one can easily load the dice for or against the decision-makers by assuming one or another perception of reality to be "objective."

It is in the author's "factual survey" that we begin to find out what *his* hangups are. The survey emerges as a quaint High Camp Revisionism by Eric Fromm out of the Reverend Godwin, seasoned liberally with the New Left and a dash of Third World self-righteousness. This farrago of current neuroses of the intellectual establishment can be displayed better by example than by summary—its light, ethereal quality renders it difficult to tie down in a few sentences.

We are told at the beginning that decision-makers are prone to have distorted views of reality, that people tend to see in their environment what they want to see or what fits their current general theory of what reality is. This is hardly new; any plumber or carpenter knows of "cognitive dissonance," although he does not use the term. It is in his examples that the author proves his point. But he proves it in reverse; that is, he shows how his own perception of reality is consistently distorted by his personal ideology—the currently popular one described above. Thus: (a) The rapidity of arms distribution to the rebels in the Dominican rebellion was perceived in Washington as "an indication of organized communist activity—whereas it now appears that it was due to the sudden consolidation and emergence of student organizations." (b) John Foster Dulles, in any choice between "arms control" and "alliance strength," always chose the latter. This tendency "eventually defeated the arms control talks," although "the USSR was most interested in the separation of the antagonists in Europe and in conventional disarmament." (c) Dulles was incapable of changing his belief in Soviet aggressiveness. It is now evident that "no matter what the Soviet Union could have done [to convince the Secretary of its sincerity], the Secretary would have interpreted the very act that should have led him to *change* his belief in such a way as to *preserve* his belief." (d) Truman had a distorted view of the Korean War

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when it began; he actually categorized it with Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia. ". . . whereas Hitler's Nazi Party was based on aggression and needed to fight in order to survive as a political force, the communist party seems to have viewed the invasion as a tentative expansion in order to affect the U.S.'s gains in Japan and the increased power of the communist Chinese."

De Rivera is most concerned that "we are failing to see ways to increase the cooperation of different nations in ending poverty and war and advancing human dignity. We need to try to really understand the feelings of other people and to listen to what seem to be improbable ideas." Most men of action who have served in the national security apparatus have been and are concerned about exactly the opposite, namely, that we have lost sight of U.S. security while haring off on various schemes designed to end poverty and war and "advance human dignity."

The professor believes that American decision-makers have shown consistently the following biases against effective decisions: (1) There is always a correct choice. (2) Confronted by many uncertainties, they will seize as a logical base almost any constant that is offered. (3) A team in a power struggle will neglect major variables in order to concentrate on the variables it believes will win the power struggle. (4) Immediate certain costs will weigh more than distant uncertain costs. (5) When an official is given information with implications for planning, he will see those that help him to achieve his goals and fail to see those that create problems for him.

All the biases listed, except for number (3), appear to be tendencies well known to unlettered students of "human nature," and are not peculiar to decision-makers in the national security field. Number (3) is worthy of deeper study. Apparently any group primarily oriented to national goals and under the impression that national security or survival is essential is to be designated with the evil-smelling term "engaged in a power struggle." And, again by clear implication, the natural and historic inclination of such people to insure the survival of the nation-state and worry about the side consequences later is considered a "bias" which distorts decision-making. The author uses as an example of this "bias" the formulation of the Marshall Plan within the U.S. government. The allegedly power-oriented officials concerned were so preoccupied with the "preservation of American power" that they neglected the development of the United Nations, and never thought that a strengthened UN might administer the Marshall Plan! For those who have had close personal contact with the United Nations, and particularly with the General Assembly, which presumably would be the heart of any "strengthened" organization, a mental picture of Harpo Marx at the controls of a bulldozer fairly leaps before the eyes. A most serious and disquieting assumption behind bias number

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(3) underlies the entire book and many other recent books by behavioral scientists—an assumption that the national state system and the very concept of the national state (except for African, Asian and Latin American states, which seem to be granted a special moral license to exist) are inherently immoral and probably doomed.

In view of these official biases, the author recommends the establishment within the bureaucracy of institutionalized "loyal oppositions" to established policies. Apparently he is not aware that in the national security apparatus every policy based on priority for any geographical region, nation, internal pressure group, or functional operation of the government must constantly be defended against other policies based on other countries, regions, pressure groups or functions, and that the wolves are ready to leap in at the first misstep. Of course, de Rivera's recommended "loyal opposition" would constantly question "realistic" policies and urge underdog "idealistic" policies. Most professionals, as distinct from political amateurs, in the national security field would not object to the existence of an institutionalized opposition, but they would feel that its purpose would be to question certain idealistic assumptions behind current policies: that economic development in the Third World contributes directly, heavily and automatically to the national interests of the United States; that disarmament is inherently good, regardless of other factors; that the enhancement of the political power of international institutions at the expense of national sovereignty is necessarily good; that war is the greatest moral evil in the universe; that there is an immanent and massive common interest which can effectively unite mankind if only institutional barriers can be overridden.

The book wisely notes that the process of policy formulation within the U.S. government is characterized by "a battle to win power, gain allies, influence neutrals, and weaken opponents" and is comparable to "the diplomatic struggle between nations." The heavy emphasis on consensus formation within the government leads, in de Rivera's view, to (1) no policy or a contradictory policy; (2) delays; (3) a "gyroscopic" policy, outmoded and crisis-oriented; (4) unchangeable policies once the masses are aroused, since the masses are allegedly emotional rather than intellectual in their reactions to events; (5) diffused responsibility and dampened initiative, and (6) consensus rather than rationality as the ultimate test of policy. Except for (4) above, this is a good list of many of the things wrong with contemporary policymaking in the United States and other nonauthoritarian countries. With regard to the alleged emotionalism of the masses, one may examine the recent past, making slightly different but equally tenable assumptions about the "real situation," and deduce that the philosophers are the ones who have been emotional and easily aroused, while the masses, more than elite groups, have been coolly rational.

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De Rivera dodges some of the implications of his theory of Foggy Bottom's shortcomings. By refusing to recognize them as common to all liberal democratic systems, he implies that an improvement is an easy matter within the democratic ethos. It seems more likely that marked changes would come about only if the ethos itself were to be traduced or abandoned, to the point of letting Platonic philosophers handle national security without reference to folk wisdom or to the claims of plural and special interests. The fascist enemies of European democracy made the same attacks on democratic decision-making in the twenties and thirties, and they assumed the availability of an easy cure.

Some of de Rivera's specific prescriptions lead right into Plato's Republic. He points out the need for "intellectual training" to overcome decision-making deficiencies: "the thoughts and values of others are considered, but the decision is made by the person in authority." (This could be a quote from Mussolini.) But then the specter comes closer, and it turns out to be the increasingly comic counterpoint to the tragic process of national security decisions—the recent fad of Sensitivity Training. Thus, government decision-makers must study the "role of emotions," rather than mere words, to communicate values; use the catalytic outside and sympathetic observer (a professor of psychology, no doubt); and recognize the importance of informal discussion opportunities and the value of the "Rapaport Debate." (The latter is the author's term for the ancient practice without which no diplomat or military man could ever achieve much success, i.e., putting yourself in the shoes of your opponent and trying to find out why he thinks as he does by simulating his mental and emotional processes.)

De Rivera believes that wise policy formulation requires intellectual intimacy among the decision-makers, and that the training above, plus "norms that would enable open interpersonal relationships to exist in the midst of competitive politics," will be conducive to such intimacy. These norms, as he describes them, would appear to be more in evidence in the national security decision-making apparatus than in most college faculties, professional societies, churches, lodges, big businesses and foundations in this country.

We are told that in a regional bureau of the State Department, "It is expected that an officer will only communicate with other officers who are on his own level or who are his immediate superiors or inferiors." No such ridiculous behavior is expected of him; he may and does "communicate" with everyone or anyone from the Secretary to the office messenger. In the ordinary run of business, he tends to confine himself to the groups mentioned in the quotation, but *so does every official in any hierarchical organization*. No hierarchical organization could function otherwise. Perhaps de Rivera feels that hierarchy in itself is a characteristic of inefficient organization. This appears to be a basic tenet of the so-called global New

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Left today, as it was of the global anarchist movement seventy-five years ago. It may be true, but the argument should be made in the open, not by implication.

The author advises the individual American decision-maker to avoid hangups which will adversely affect his capacities by not (1) pretending he has something to fall back on, (2) emotionally preparing himself for the worst (it is never made clear exactly why such preparation is bad—perhaps it is part of the general Pollyanna view of human possibilities and the human condition which underlies the approach of the whole book), and (3) dodging upsetting elements by the process of abstraction. Somewhat more remarkable is the author's warning that the decision-maker needs emotional support and even love from others if he is to make good national security decisions.

One of the most eye-catching of the broad moral statements presented as scientific truth which abound in the book is the following: ". . . for any person to be happy and successful, he must arrange what he does so that his unique abilities can be used." What is happiness? Success? Does every person have "unique abilities?" If not, are the unfortunate possessors of ordinary abilities doomed to unhappy lives of failure? To the extent that the statement is true, is that truth specially applicable to educated Americans and West Europeans, or is it universally applicable spatially and temporally?

De Rivera, unlike the great mass of the American people, knows that the well-documented decision to intervene in Korea and the Formosa Straits was a bad decision. It was bad because, while there was "evident concern for the desires of the Korean Government, there was no consideration of what the Korean people might desire." This is listed as a fault of the particular decision and of the system. Not only is it implied that Kim Il Sung might have been a better representative of the "desires of the Korean people" than Syngman Rhee was at the time, but it is implied that wise U.S. decision-making, when the existence or interests of a friendly government is at stake, requires Washington by some mysterious process to go over the head of a sovereign government and decide what the "people" of the unlucky allied state really desire — then, presumably, U.S. leaders should act according to those desires. Such behavior would be completely destructive of the nation-state system and probably of U.S. security interests. It also represents a tendency among American scholars to assume that any government allied to the United States is guilty of tyranny until proved innocent.

Furthermore, it assumes a capacity on the part of U.S. decision-makers to determine by some magical formula the thoughts and desires of a "people" (whatever that is). Most decision-makers assume it could not be done even if it were in the national interest to do so, but would-be decision-makers, such as professors, students and journalists, unlike ordinary mortals, can easily determine what the

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"people" of a country like Korea really want and need. Apparently they do it by asking Korean students, journalists, and other would-be decision-makers. De Rivera also comments to the effect that while the Americans involved in the Korean War decision "were not at all callous or lawless persons, it was nobody's job to represent the concerns of the Korean people or of international law."

"Public Limits on Policy" might have been a useful chapter, but it contains the tired old moralizings about how the American public is emotional rather than rational and therefore incapable of contributing positively to the policymaking process. What de Rivera really means is that he does not agree with most of the American public's convictions on national security policy. He is wiser than they. Where this leaves him with respect to democracy is not so clear. "When a nation is challenged, its people tend to react, and thus may lose perspective. Note, for example, that the immediate response to news of China's hydrogen bomb was 'build anti-ballistic missiles' and not 'perhaps we should admit China to the UN.'" The professor actually believes that the first reaction is irrational and the second is rational, and that the American public is unworthy of participation in the decision-making process because it failed to agree with him.

That old chestnut about "the authoritarian personality" is brought up again. Here we encounter the scholarly distaste for any form of hierarchy except the scholastic hierarchy. Thus, a person who perceives personal interrelationships to any degree as domination and submission will only be capable of thinking of international relationships in the same terms; he cannot think (as can one who experiences "free interpersonal relationships governed by mutual love and respect") of the "freely accepted authority of law" as the basis of relationships between nations. It hardly seems necessary to comment on this hyper-simplistic idea. An unlettered citizen can tell you that a sense of hierarchy and the presence of mutual love and respect are not at all mutually exclusive—indeed, they are often complementary.

The concept of "freely accepted authority of law" is fascinating. An acceptance of revealed religious truth, or perhaps many taboos of primitive societies, might fall within that category. But a freely accepted system of law which would also be adaptive to a changing environment and which would exist independent of coercion (the only just coercion requires hierarchy) exists only in the dream world of anarchism and Christian pacifism.

We are told that today the USSR is not hostile but China is. What to do? Relying on some materials published in scholarly journals in the last few years, the author tells us that hostility should be met with "firmness," never with counter-hostility. Never threaten a nation or its ideology. After all, authoritarianism is only an indicator and a result of "high social goal structure." We must focus on the rewarding of positive behavior,

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since threatening, negative behavior may justify the opponent's hostility and "decrease his perspective." The best way to change an opponent's behavior is to change one's own behavior. Does all this sound familiar? It should, since it is a replay of the Spock baby books. Would that Mao Tse-tung shared my two-year-old's attitudes and potential!

When American academic circles comment on national security, it is usually the United States which is responsible for the ills of the world. "The U.S. is currently in danger of losing some of its identity as a democracy, while its citizens are becoming alienated and losing some of their identity as a people." This is the result of bad foreign policy, which "necessitates threatening other nations with nuclear retaliation." Have you, dear reader, recently felt undemocratic, alienated and unidentified because the United States has informed the world that it will answer a nuclear attack with the heaviest possible retaliatory strike against the party that starts a nuclear war? Perhaps Dr. Spock and Professor de Rivera feel that way. Your reviewer does not.

De Rivera has a remedy for this shameful situation: "It is necessary to change the opponent rather than defeat him, to involve the citizen in policy formulation, and to work toward limiting the conflict so that harmful policies are not invoked." We may be excused for becoming a little confused at this point; the professor has warned us against the American public, which reacts in irrational, emotional terms to the foreign environment, but now he wants to involve the citizen in policy formulation. Perhaps everything depends on which citizen is to be brought in.

The last chapter contains many prescriptions for dealing with China, the USSR, and other more or less hostile states. All the prescriptions involve the avoidance of unfriendly or threatening behavior and the making of concessions to reduce the hostility of the other side, which is, of course, based on insecurity—after all, Chinese totalitarianism symbolizes "high social goal structure." The empirical data on which the prescriptions are based are derived from alleged conflict situations. But the conflict situations selected as analogous to international conflict are ones where a massive common interest among the participants overbalances special interests, e.g., among slum children in a summer camp, among college sophomores playing two-dollar "cooperation or conflict" games. The prescriptions accordingly are paths to break through to a realization of the common interest. If the situations had been ones in which the participants had been playing for stakes such as a finger, the life of a family member, or life itself, the experimental results and the prescriptions would have been different indeed, and probably more useful in the real world.

If *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* were an isolated case, it could be regarded with quiet merriment. Unfortunately, it is fairly representative of the value orientation and the pretentious air

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of scientific detachment that permeates the majority of contemporary scholarly commentaries on foreign affairs. If undergraduates in the average university are not assigned this book as required reading, they will be assigned some other work which carries the same message. Is it any wonder that so many university students in the United States consider official decision-makers in the national security field to be incompetent dolts at best and mad monsters at worst?

We might leave these frustrated philosophers with two quotations reflecting a kind of wisdom they never knew or have perhaps forgotten. The first is from Oswald Spengler: "For world peace—which has often existed in fact—involves the private renunciation of war on the part of the immense majority, but along with this it involves an unavowed readiness to submit to being the booty of others who do *not* renounce it. It begins with the State-destroying wish for universal reconciliation, and it ends with nobody moving a finger so long as misfortune touches only his neighbor."

The second is from John Wesley: "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam, but it is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered in the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually."

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Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Democracy and Totalitarianism. By Raymond Aron. Translated from the French by Valence Ionescu. New York: Praeger, 1969. 262 pp. $7.50. The well-known Professor of Sociology at the Sorbonne, whose many books include *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* and *The Great Debate,* now deals with the theory of political regimes in modern industrial societies. He distinguishes between constitutional-pluralistic and monopolistic-party regimes, treating the French Fourth Republic and the Soviet Union as models of the two types of governmental systems. The book contributes to discussions on totalitarianism and "political pathology." Related to the latter is Aron's examination of corruption in constitutional-pluralistic regimes.

The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development. Edited by Richard N. Gardner and Max F. Millikan. New York: Praeger, 1968. 498 pp. $9.50. Nineteen leading authorities on international economic cooperation appraise the most important multilateral development programs of the past 20 years and seek to formulate new guidelines for future efforts. The authors include the editors, Walter M. Kotschnig, Isaiah Frank, Roy Blough, Jan Tinbergen and Robert E. Asher.

Guerillas: A History and Analysis. By Arthur Campbell, New York: John Day, 1968. 344 pp. $6.95. Lt. Col. Campbell of the British Army, who has had first-hand experience with guerrilla warfare in Burma, Malaya, Cyprus and elsewhere, traces its history from its inception in Spain in 1808 to the present. By treating the major guerrilla wars of the past 160 years one by one, he covers every aspect of this form of conflict, from the theories and practices of Karl Marx and Mao Tse-tung to the emotions and endeavors of men and women engaged in guerrilla actions. In the closing chapters, he draws conclusions from the past and summarizes the essential ingredients of success in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.

Introduction to Politics. Edited by Nelson P. Guild and Kenneth T. Palmer. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968. 341 pp. $7.95 ($4.95, paper). Professors Guild and Palmer present as an introductory text to the study of politics a selection of some 20 contributions by leading political scientists. The book is divided into five sections: What Is Politics?; Macropolitics; Micropolitics; The Political Order, and How Do We Study Politics?

Marxism and Christianity. By Alasdair MacIntyre. New York: Schocken Books, 1968. 143 pp. $4.50. An effort to reconstruct the history and logic of the confrontation of Marxism and Christianity and to find points of possible reconciliation between them by a Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex, England. In his preface he writes: "Then [in 1953, when the first edition of

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this book appeared] I aspired to be both a Christian and a Marxist, or at least as much of each as was compatible with allegiance to the other and with a doubting turn of mind; now I am skeptical of both, although also believing that one cannot entirely discard either without discarding truths not otherwise available."

Nuclear Proliferation. By Walter Wentz. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968. 216 pp. $6.00. Dr. Wentz, concerned with the destabilizing effects on the international system of the spread of nuclear weapons, identifies nine countries which are currently on the brink of developing nuclear arms and analyzes the specific problems of France, China, India, Germany, Japan and the Middle East. He finds the Nonproliferation Treaty inadequate to cope with the situation and contends that it may well serve to enhance the diffusion of nuclear weapons rather than limit it. In conclusion he examines present U.S. policy and suggests more viable alternatives.

The Origins of Socialism. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1969. 302 pp. $6.95. Lichtheim's previous works include *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study* and *Marxism in Modern France.* In this book he investigates the interrelationship between socialist theory and the historical circumstances in which it arose and flourished in France, Great Britain and Germany between the French Revolution of 1789 and the 1848 revolution. In examining the thought of socialist and pre-Marxian philosophers, he furnishes an analysis of the major theoretical formulations of socialism.

Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society. By Raymond Aron. New York: Praeger, 1968. 230 pp. $5.50. M. Aron's basic themes in this volume are the tension between reality and the ideal in history and in the daily life of man, and the nature of relationships between individuals and institutions in modern industrial societies. In the first part, "The Dialectic of Equality," he explores the questions of equality and hierarchy, and the extent to which each individual's right to dignity, happiness, and a reasonable standard of living is in conflict with the need for discipline and authority. In part two, "The Contradictions of Socialization," he analyzes the degree to which a technological civilization has altered the traditional relationships of the family and the working community. And in the final section, "The Dialectic of Universality," he raises the discussion to a global level, pointing out how advances in communication and transportation have brought a greater consciousness of the worldwide inequality of wealth. "Is humanity actually moving in the direction of a single society," he inquires, "or is technological unification merely a thin coating which conceals a fundamental diversity?"

Students and Politics in Developing Nations. Edited by Donald K. Emmerson. New York: Praeger, 1968. 444 pp. $9.50. Although student protest movements in Europe and North America have received considerable coverage in recent years, relatively little attention has been paid to student politics in developing countries. This volume helps to correct this situation by examining student movements in Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China, the Congo, Cuba, Ghana, Indonesia, South Africa, South Viet Nam and Venezuela.

Zwanzig Jahre Vereinte Nationen: Internationale Bibliographie 1945-1965. By Klaus Hüfner and Jens Naumann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968. 519 pp. DM 78,—. Compiled at the Otto-Suhr Institut of the Freie Universität Berlin, this bibliography includes 5500 books and articles on the United Nations and its specialized agencies published in English, French and German between 1945 and 1965. It is written in the three languages from which its materials were drawn and organized to follow the outline of the UN Charter. Particular prob-

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lems such as disarmament, and crisis situations such as Korea and the Congo, are given special coverage. The authors have been affiliated for years with the German United Nations Association in Bonn.

II. United States and Canada

Agenda for the Nation. Edited by Kermit Gordon. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968. 620 pp. $6.95. Eighteen experts from all segments of the public affairs spectrum examine major domestic and foreign issues and weigh alternative courses of action. Essays on domestic affairs treat such subjects as unemployment, welfare, poverty, the Negro and the urban crisis, housing, crime and law enforcement, education and inflation. In foreign policy, Francis M. Bator discusses the U.S., NATO and Western Europe; Marshall D. Shulman, U.S.-Soviet relations; Edwin O. Reischauer, transpacific relations; John C. Campbell, the Middle East; Richard N. Cooper, the dollar and the world economy; Max F. Millikan, U.S. policy toward the less developed world; Carl Kaysen, military strategy and arms control; and Henry A. Kissinger, central issues in U.S. policy.

The Early Republic, 1789-1828. Edited by Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968. 274 pp. $7.95. A collection of documents on the vital domestic and foreign policy issues that confronted the United States in the first four decades after the adoption of the Constitution. Selections include such public papers as Washington's Farewell Address, Hamilton's Report on Manufactures and the Supreme Court decisions of John Marshall, many private letters, newspaper articles, and other documents revealing the ability of Americans to examine critically the issues facing the young nation in this crucial period of consolidation and growth.

The President and Public Opinion: Leadership in Foreign Affairs. By Manfred Landecker. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968. 131 pp. $4.50. In examining the President's relationship to "public opinion"—to what extent does he lead, or follow, it?—Dr. Landecker focuses his attention on the practices and experiences of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman during and after World War II.

Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years. By Doris A. Graber. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 374 pp. $6.95 ($4.95, paper). Four case studies of the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking under Presidents John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and James Monroe. The author sets out to determine why and to what extent these founders of the nation took public opinion into account in making policy decisions, and the means by which public officials tried to ascertain what the public wanted.

Quebec Confronts Canada. By Edward M. Corbett. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 352 pp. $8.95. The Quebec separatist movement poses a serious threat to Canada's stability. In this first full-length study of the problem in English, a Canadian career civil servant examines the French-English conflict in its various components, principal among which are language, religion, and the outcry for equal rights. He finds that the French Canadians, much like the Negroes in the United States, are just now emerging from the status of second-class citizens to demand a full and equal share in Canada's national life, yet without sacrificing their national identity. He concludes that the future of the Confederation depends on how far the English majority is willing to go in meeting French demands.

Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. By Robert F. Kennedy. New York: W. W. Norton, 1969. 224 pp. $5.50. The late Senator's brief and

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clear daily record of events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962—the personalities, the nature of the working sessions, exchanges between Washington and Moscow, the actions and attitudes of the President, and the frightening responsibilities and moral burdens of the two superpowers.

III. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Franco: The Man and His Nation. By George Hills. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 464 pp. $7.95. Mr. Hills of the BBC strives to present an objective, factual biography of the Spanish ruler, his military career, relations with Mussolini and Hitler, role in the Civil War, policy guidelines at home and abroad since World War II, reliance on the Army, Church and Falange, and overall impact on Spain. He has had access to the Franco family papers and to the Spanish Army archives, and has talked to Franco, his associates, supporters and opponents.

A Free Trade Association. Edited by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. New York: New York University Press, 1968. 238 pp. $7.95. A collection of papers presented at a seminar at NYU in early 1968 to study the political, monetary, and economic and trade implications of a proposed Free Trade Association with the United States, Great Britain and Canada as its core. The writers contend that such an idea might permit the United States to maintain a viable two-ocean policy without overextending itself, serve as an alternative to British entry into the Common Market, and provide needed economic opportunity for Canada.

Modern European Governments. Edited by Roy C. Macridis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 244 pp. $3.75 (paper). This study examines the foreign policy decision-making process in the British, French, West German and Soviet governmental systems. Two major foreign policy problems of each country serve as cases: British military policy and the British decision to negotiate entry into the Common Market, the French *force de frappe* and de Gaulle's France in NATO, German reunification and the Berlin Wall, and Soviet foreign policy as it led to the Cold War and the genesis of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The Origins of Communism in Turkey. By George S. Harris. Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967. 215 pp. $7.00. A study of the vicissitudes of the communist movement in Turkey in the post-World War I period up to 1925, when it was banned by Kemal Ataturk. The author treats communist party activities during the Turks' struggle to overthrow the Ottoman Empire and throw back the Greek invasion, the influence that communism as an intellectual movement had on the Turkish elite, and the relations between Ankara and Moscow.

Politics and the Military in Modern Spain. By Stanley G. Payne. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 574 pp. $12.50. A comprehensive history of the relation of the military to Spanish politics, government and public issues in the 19th and 20th centuries, with special attention to the period 1917-1939. Dr. Payne, Associate Professor of History at UCLA and author of *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism,* asserts that the army has played a crucial role not because of its leaders' wisdom but because of its capacity to impose decisions on the recurring, intense and seemingly insoluble factional struggles that beset Spanish politics.

The Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France. By Peter Novick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 245 pp. $7.50. Determined to replace unworthy Vichy leaders with new leaders who would undertake the *renouvellement de la France,* the members of the French Resist-

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ance undertook a purge intended as a first step in this renewal. Dr. Novick discusses the underground origins of the purge, its role in the conflict between General de Gaulle and President Roosevelt, and the oft-repeated accusation that communist-inspired summary executions spread a reign of terror over France in preparation for a communist coup. Finally, the author describes the trials of many Vichyites and collaborators which led increasingly to frustration and disillusionment among members of the Resistance.

A Short History of Modern Greece. By C. M. Woodhouse. New York: Praeger, 1968. 318 pp. $6.50. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, British scholar, soldier, and Conservative member of Parliament for Oxford (1959-1966), introduces the reader to the history of Greece from the foundation of Constantine in 324 A.D. to the establishment of the military government in 1967.

The Web of Modern Greek Politics. By Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 240 pp. $6.95. In tracing the course of modern Greek politics from the 19th century to the military coup of April 21, 1967, the authors explore the factors in Greek culture which they believe have contributed to Greece's political instability.

Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider. By Peter Gay. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 205 pp. $5.95. This cultural essay on the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933, does not pretend to be a complete history, but an effort "to bring together themes that dominated the hectic life of the Republic, and to juxtapose them in a way that will . . . permit us to define the Weimar spirit more clearly and more comprehensively than it has been done before. . . ." The author describes the exiles Hitler made as "the greatest collection of transplanted intellect, talent, and scholarship the world has ever seen"—such individuals as Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Erwin Panofsky, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Gropius, Bruno Walter, Paul Tillich and Ernst Cassirer.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Der Chinesisch-Sowjetische Grenzkonflikt. By Horst Pommerening. Freiburg: Walter-Verlag, 1968. 266 pp. n.p. Written from materials gathered by the author during his year as an associate at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, this book examines the historical origins, present issues and future implications of the Chinese-Soviet border conflict. Over the centuries, the Czars had annexed large portions of China's northern territories, which the present Soviet leaders are determined to keep. Until recently, the Chinese lacked the power to press their claims for these areas successfully, but with their development of a crude atomic device, the situation has changed. How this will affect the course of the controversy and Russo-Chinese relations in general is the point to which the author gives prime attention.

Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967. By T. H. Rigby. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 573 pp. $15.00. Professor Rigby, a Professorial Fellow in Political Science at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, furnishes an extensive compilation of empirical data relating to the political and socio-economic situation of the CPSU membership. The data are interpreted mainly in accordance with the functions the party performs in the Soviet political system. In addition, the author analyzes the influence of extraneous factors on membership patterns and recruitment policies.

Die Krise der Intellekuellen. By Peter K. Raina. Olten: Walter, 1968. 128 pp. DM 13,—. A study of the rebellion of the intellectuals in Poland between 1964

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and 1966 by a scientist at the Free University of Berlin who studied at the University of Warsaw from 1962 until he was expelled in 1966. The author's analysis of the power distribution between the Polish Communist Party and the Ministry of the Interior (secret police) is especially interesting.

Prospects for Soviet Society. Edited by Allen Kassof. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968. 582 pp. $10.00. An ambitious and valuable effort by 18 sovietologists to examine recent trends in Soviet society and speculate on the kinds of changes that may occur in the next decade. Some of the topics treated are the party and society, interest groups, law and society, the military, non-Russian nationalities, population changes, education, agriculture, industry, science, the intellectuals, the USSR in the international environment. The authors include Cyril E. Black, Leon Lipson, Thomas W. Wolfe, Vernon V. Aspaturian, Herbert S. Levine, James H. Billington and John C. Campbell.

The Russians. By Leonid Vladimirov. New York: Praeger, 1968. 249 pp. $6.95. A defector from the Soviet Union writes a personal account of what it is like to be a Russian in the USSR today. This is not a bitter attack on the evils of the communist system, but a warm and witty portrait of the Russian people in many walks of life and of many aspects of Soviet society: religion, attitudes toward sex, education, the press, the arts and the generation gap. The author had been a foreman in an automobile factory, a tractor driver on a collective farm, a prisoner in one of Stalin's camps, editor of one of the USSR's leading science magazines, and contributor to *Pravda, Izvestiya* and other publications.

The Trouble with Marx. By David McCord Wright. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1967. 192 pp. $5.00. Professor Wright explains in clear language what the Marxist "scientific socialist" system is supposed to be and then "breaks the model" by exposing its fallacies, ambiguities and contradictions. He shows how Marx was in error in his analysis of capitalism and his understanding of social and economic change; examines the strengths and shortcomings of the Soviet economic system; and comments on the conditions necessary for progress in society and on the role of the individual and free choice.

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930. By Antony C. Sutton. Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968. 381 pp. $10.00. In 1917 the Bolsheviks inherited from Tsarist Russia an advanced, though relatively small, industrial infrastructure. Revolution and subsequent intervention did not affect the main manufacturing areas, but collapsing work discipline and the migration and emigration of skilled workers, engineers and managers brought the Soviet economy to a standstill by mid-1922. The author examines to what extent the economy was rebuilt with American, British, German, French, Italian and Swedish technological assistance, which penetrated the Soviet manufacturing industries completely by 1930.

V. Middle East and Africa

Economic Development and Planning in Egypt. By Magdi M. El-Kammash. New York: Praeger, 1968. 436 pp. $15.00. This recent addition to the Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development is an analysis of the Egyptian economy, beginning with the period prior to the 1952 revolution. Dr. El-Kammash covers the various aspects of development and the strategy used to implement programs in each of them. He discusses the shortage of inputs and the excessive population growth rate as key factors in Egypt's economic difficulties; assesses the attempts at political, social and economic reform undertaken since 1952 in light of contemporary economic theory; and advocates the

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supply approach as a useful framework for analyzing the process of development. Appendices include information regarding Islamic law on birth control and statistics of national income and investment expenditures.

A History of Central Africa. By P. E. N. Tindall. New York: Praeger, 1968. 348 pp. $7.50. After reviewing the archaeology of Central Africa, comprising the modern states of Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, the author traces early contacts with non-African peoples, describes Bantu migrations into the region, and discusses the structure of Central African society in the 19th century as it set the framework for the rapid changes in the present era. The account ends with the establishment in 1963 of the independent nations of Malawi and Zambia.

Israel and Elath: The Political Struggle for the Inclusion of Elath in the Jewish State. By Eliahu Elath. New York: Humanities Press, 1968. 24 pp. $2.50. *Israel and Elath,* first delivered as a lecture to the Jewish Historical Society in London, focuses on the political and diplomatic conflicts in the United Nations over the proposed incorporation of the then nonexistent port of Elath into the newly created state of Israel. The obstacles presented by those who opposed the partition plan or wished to see the new state otherwise limited were many. The author, who is one of Israel's most experienced diplomats, was a participant in the Elath negotiations.

A Short History of South Africa. (Third edition, revised.) By Leo Marquard. New York: Praeger, 1968. 272 pp. $6.50. The President of the South African Institute of Race Relations presents a comprehensive account of South Africa from precolonial days to the present decade. He describes the various peoples, Bushmen, Bantu, Boer and British, who have settled there and examines the role each played in the course of South African history. For this third edition of his work he has added a chapter appraising the first years of the Republic, in which he speculates about "whether Afrikaner nationalism can, before it is too late, break down the exclusiveness that it has built around itself in its rise to power."

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

Can We Win in Vietnam? By Frank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil, Herman Kahn, William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman. New York: Praeger, 1968. 427 pp. $7.95. Armbruster and Gastil argue that the United States can, and should try to, win the Vietnamese conflict and submit specific war plans by which they believe victory can be achieved. Pfaff and Stillman question the advisability of attempting to win and our ability to do so and suggest ways in which Washington may reach a settlement that would salvage some important U.S. interests. Kahn sets the context for this debate, analyzes U.S. attitudes, policies and objectives, and constructs scenarios in which the outcomes range from victory to defeat, across several levels of negotiated or imposed settlements. The volume, completed before the opening of the Paris talks, concludes with a free-wheeling discussion on the military, political and moral issues of the conflict.

Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. By Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish. New York: Praeger, 1968. 279 pp. $6.00. A brief examination of Chinese communism since 1949 with emphasis on political and cultural developments, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the role of the intelligentsia in politics, and the Cultural Revolution as a power struggle and stage in the growth of communist ideas. The appendix contains literary texts and official policy documents.

Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography. By Jean Lacouture. New York: Random House, 1968. 313 pp. $5.95. M. Lacouture, a correspondent for the influential

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French daily, *Le Monde,* and contributor to the *New York Times,* the *New York Review of Books* and the *New Republic,* has written a sympathetic biography of Ho Chi Minh, nationalist, revolutionary, and now communist President of North Viet Nam.

How Communist China Negotiates. By Arthur Lall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 291 pp. $7.95. Mr. Lall, former Indian Ambassador to the UN and currently adjunct professor at the School of International Studies, Columbia University, describes the course of the 1961-1962 Geneva conference on Laos, analyzing it in the context of the Chinese communist theory of international relations and negotiating behavior. He also includes general observations on the nature of Chinese diplomacy at other international conferences, and examines three bilateral negotiations which led to agreements between Peking and other Asian states. The author was the chief Indian negotiator at the Laos conference and participated in a crucial series of meetings with China's Foreign Minister on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. By Robert Jay Lifton. New York: Random House, 1968. 178 pp. $4.95. Professor Lifton gives us a combined psychological and historical perspective of the puzzling internal Chinese developments from mid-1966 to early 1968. He views the Cultural Revolution as a desperate effort by Mao to prevent the "death of the revolution" he has so long dominated and to render his works eternal. In one chapter Lifton explores the "excruciatingly complex encounter between man and technology" in China, and "the concept of 'psychism,' the exaggerated reliance upon will and psychic power to achieve technological goals." In other chapters he discusses "purity and power," "the immortalization of words," and "time and totalism."

Socialism and Private Enterprise in Equatorial Asia: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia. By Roger A. Freeman. Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968. 130 pp. $3.90. The author's comparative study of the economic policies and fortunes of Malaysia and Indonesia since World War II leads him to conclude: "The fact that capitalistic Malaysia has succeeded and socialistic Indonesia has failed cannot be attributed to coincidence, accident or luck. Policy played a major role." The contrasts he draws are dramatic, but he points out that factors other than economic policy were at work and encourages other specialists to undertake similar studies so that we might gain a better understanding of the interrelationships of economic development and economic policy in the less developed world. Mr. Freeman is a senior staff member of the Hoover Institution and a former staff member in the Executive Office of the President.

Thailand: Another Vietnam? By Daniel Wit. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968. 205 pp. $4.95. A brief survey of Thailand's political heritage; physical environment; human, cultural, economic and social forces; and contemporary political and administrative systems. The final chapter is a broad strategic evaluation of Thailand's development potential and policies, nation-building efforts, cultural and behavioral modernization, and national security problems. Dr. Wit, Chairman of the Political Science Department of Northern Illinois University, calls for adequate military actions to contain the communist revolutionary challenge along the Thai border, but stresses that "these regions, with their ethnically distinct peoples, must also be effectively politicized—fully incorporated into the Thai state and culture. . . ." He warns that "As an essentially administrative state governed by a conservative bureaucracy, [Thailand] may not be able to rise to the new challenges sufficiently because to do so requires a major and rapid self-transformation in the ruling oligarchy."

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VII. Latin America

Bernardo O'Higgins and the Independence of Chile. By Stephen Clissold. New York: Praeger, 1969. 254 pp. $6.50. This is the first full account in English of the careers of Ambrose Higgins, an obscure Irishman who journeyed to Cadiz in 1750 to seek his fortune and rose by 1787 to the rank of Governor-General of Chile and ten years later to Viceroy of Peru, and of his illegitimate son, Bernardo O'Higgins, who became the liberator of Chile, emancipating the Spanish colony over which his father had ruled.

The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History. By Lester D. Langley. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968. 203 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). This scholarly survey of U.S.-Cuban relations argues that Washington's policy toward Cuba has been different from that toward other Latin American countries. The author presents the reasons for and consequences of this special relationship and contends that Cuba was the most vulnerable area for Soviet penetration into the Western Hemisphere because of the long-standing hatreds engendered by the policies of John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, William McKinley and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution. By Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody and Thomas J. O'Leary. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. 161 pp. $5.95. This is an analysis of the phenomenon of self-imposed exile, based on research in the exile community in Miami. In light of the Cuban data, gathered from early exiles and those arriving as late as 1967, it is not the case that estrangement from the Cuban regime is essentially an ideological response: exile is seen to be mainly an individual reaction to personal experiences on which various revolutionary programs impinge. The appendix includes the questionnaire used in the survey.

Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba. By Mario Lazo. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968. 426 pp. $6.95. The personal story of a prominent Cuban lawyer's opposition to the Castro regime. Where the book concentrates on Lazo's experiences and conservative opinions, it adds to our meager store of knowledge about Cuba. Mainly, however, it amounts to a retelling of familiar tales, such as the Bay of Pigs and missile crisis episodes. It is recommended for the knowledgeable student of Latin affairs because of Lazo's participation in some of the events he describes, but it cannot serve as a basic introduction for the uninitiated.

Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation. By William Weber Johnson. New York: Doubleday, 1968. 463 pp. $6.95. A comprehensive history of the three decades of the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940, which describes this backward country striving for land reform, political and economic stability, and social justice; the central role of the legendary heroes, Madero, Carranza, Zapata, Obregon and Villa, all destined for martyrdom by assassination; and the heroism of the poor, troubled and bloodied Mexican masses. The author is Professor of Journalism at UCLA and a former correspondent for *Time* and *Life* assigned for some time in Mexico and South America. The book is in the Mainstream of the Modern World Series, edited by John Gunther.

The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict. By Peter Calvert. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968. 331 pp. $9.50. This study of the unfolding of the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1914 stresses the associated U.S.-British diplomatic conflict and its resolution on the eve of World War I. Dr. Calvert, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Southampton, treats the relationship between British and American oil companies in Mexico, presents new information and a new interpretation of key

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events in the rise and fall of the Madero and Huerta governments, and assesses the policies of the Taft and Wilson administrations toward the Mexican Revolution.

Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara. Edited by John Gerassi. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 442 pp. $7.95. Made up of 35 selections ranging from conventional poetry of the Hispanic sort, "Song to Fidel," to Guevara's own idiosyncratic type of prose-poem, the message to the Tri-Continental Congress calling for the creation of "many Vietnams," this is the rhetoric of revolution, didactic and stilted. No one will read this book for pleasure, but it is useful as a conscious explication of a revolutionist's motives and will facilitate an evaluation of Guevara's ephemeral but symbolic importance. The editor's introduction is highly hagographical.

The Western Hemisphere: Its Influence on United States Policies to the End of World War II. By Wilfrid Hardy Callcott. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968. 506 pp. $10.00. Professor Callcott has written an excellent history of U.S. as well as Canadian policies toward the nations of the Western Hemisphere. His book, extensively documented, makes considerable use of the reports of British diplomatic agents in South America and the private papers of the chief American figures. His inclusion of Canada into the sphere of relevant actors broadens the scope of his study.

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

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Problems of Village Leadership after Land Reform — Thomas P. Bernstein
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